

FOOTNOTES

1. There are at least four emerging analytical strands concerning the Arusha Declaration. They are: (1) the Protracted Transitionists (stay the course), (2) the Disillusioned Arushaists (implementational breakdowns), (3) the Right Rejectionists (Anti-socialism) and (4) the Left Rejectionists (for Scientific socialism).
2. A number of writers have pointed to this weakness. See, among others, L. Kleemeir, 'Tanzania's policy toward foreign assistance in rural development', in *Taamuli*, Vol. 12, Dec. 1982. She argues that the AD never defined a foreign assistance strategy at the level of conceptualisation, implementation and political will. She stresses the point that Tanzania's aid negotiators and planners appear more concerned to get as much assistance as possible with little concern about the rationality of the projects.
3. In the field of medicine pathologists claim that nearly 80% of patients die from a disease other than that diagnosed.
4. *The Arusha Declaration and Tanu's Policy on Socialism and Self-reliance*, Dar es Salaam, TANU, 1967, p. 9.
5. *Idem*, p. 10.
6. See Ministry of Commerce and Industries, *Investment Handbook*, 1964.
7. Arusha Declaration, op.cit., pp. 10-11. This point is further elaborated, though not developed, in J.K. Nyerere, 'Ujamaa, the rational Choice' in *Freedom and Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, OUP, 1968. He argues that the choice of socialism was not merely an ideal. It was dictated by the imperatives of economic autonomy and political self-determination. Capitalism in Tanzania, it was felt, would compromise these goals since it could not be in the hands of indigenous 'captains of industry' a la Schumpeter. See: J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 5th ed. London, University Books, 1977.
8. Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 12.
9. Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 14.
10. This debate features, among others, B. Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, London, Verso, 1980, and S. Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*, New York, Monthly Rev., 1970. Warren argues that imperialism is the pioneer of capitalism, whereas Amin denies this possibility and argues that peripheral countries must adopt strategies of de-linking from the capitalist world economy.
11. Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 9.
12. G. Kahama et al., *The Challenge for Tanzania's Economy*, Dar es Salaam, TPH, 1986.
13. The Carter administration in the US with its human rights orientation and growth with redistribution thinking a la Chenery at the World Bank also contributed to this conducive aid environment. Tanzania and the US, for example, re-instated the Peace Corps programme in 1979.
14. Nyirabu, 1978.
15. World Development Report, World Bank, 1986.
16. For a discussion of the marginalisation phenomenon, see: M.L. Baregu, *Long-term social costs and other limits to primary commodity production in Africa*. Forthcoming in the Proceedings of the 9th SAUSSC, Dar es Salaam, June 2-6, 1986.
17. These models are discussed in considerable detail in M.L. Baregu, 'Reversing the Partition of Africa, Imperatives of de-linking from the Capitalist World Economy', in *Mawazo*, Dec., 1984.

TANZANIA AND THE LIBERATION PROCESS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Introduction

When the Arusha Declaration was announced to the Tanzanian people in 1967 the third principal objective was 'to cooperate with all political parties engaged in the liberation of all Africa'. This statement was an expression of a commitment by the Tanzanian state and society to give meaning to the spirit of the Organisation of African Unity that stood for the complete elimination of colonial rule in Africa. In 1967, when this expression of solidarity was proclaimed, the full dimensions of the processes of armed struggles, war and destabilisation were not yet clear. A political leadership which gained its independence through constitutional means believed that the West could be persuaded by moral arguments to see that white rule in Africa should give way to more national forms of Africanisation of the region. This conception, which was clearly spelled out in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, showed that the Tanzanian state was seeking methods of legitimation in the period when Euro-American capital was demonstrating in the Congo and in Rhodesia that they wanted a new lease of life in Africa.

But if the State supported liberation for purposes of its own evolution and legitimation, the call for liberation support from among the workers and peasants issued from the depths of the African villages in Tanzania which wanted to create a new society. The workers and peasants were part of the social forces in Africa with a long tradition of opposition to European capitalism, which took the form of anti-slavery struggle, armed struggles, independent churches, welfare associations, cash crop hold-ups, worker protests and other forms of uprisings and mass resistance. But the lack of crystallisation of the popular forces led to an all class alliance to carry forward the historical task of claiming constitutional independence. Summing up the past twenty year period, it is now possible to discern two main trends in liberation support in Tanzania:

- (a) The one which emanated from the state in its search for legitimation and
- (b) the one emanating from the workers and peasants which sought a transcendence of capitalism and external domination of the African continent. As an expression of nationalism the Arusha Declaration combined these two conceptions into the all class politics of the period of decolonisation.

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All class nationalism proved to be a temporary affair all over the continent and in some states the commandism and militarism of the rulers became clear as the generals came to dominate the summit of the OAU. And yet, such was the force of the struggle for liberation that even the most reactionary of the African leadership had to pay lip service to support for liberation, while co-operating with imperialism and carrying out oppression in their own states which could hardly be distinguished from the oppression in South Africa. From the period of the heady days of independence in the 1960s to the present capitalist crisis of war, apartheid, destabilisation, hunger and IMF management, the limits of the nationalist ideology sharpened as the choice set before the African people became one between liberation or subjugation.

Tanzania, in Eastern Africa, is distinguished in its record of support for liberation and its ambitious attempt to place its concept of change in the roots of the village community. Under the philosophy of Ujamaa the conviction of the state was based on the view that the well-being of the society must relate primarily to the rural areas. The Arusha Declaration made sweeping claims towards the building of socialism and disengaging from western imperialism. As part of this effort, the Tanzanian state gave its support to the freedom fighters who organised their struggles from Dar es Salaam. Throughout the twenty year period, cadres of the liberation movements and their leaders who trampled the dusty paths of Dar es Salaam have moved from offices in Dar es Salaam to the corridors of power in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Other liberation movements from embattled South Africa continue to carry out their historic task within the framework of the political conditions of the Tanzanian state and society. As the Headquarters of the Liberation Committee of the OAU, Tanzania had the task to co-ordinate the support from the African continent to the recognised liberation movements. This task bestowed special responsibilities on the Tanzanian state and after twenty years it is possible to tender a tentative assessment of the politics of liberation within the context of Tanzania. This assessment includes raising a number of questions on the relationship between the liberation movements and the Tanzanian state. Among these questions are the following:

How was the radical thrust of Arusha translated in the area of support for liberation? What were the principal ideological guidelines which served as the basis for this support? Did the conception of socialism without class struggle blind the leadership to the realities of the Angolan struggle in 1975? What transformations were made in the state in order to meet the challenge of armed confrontation with imperialism? Were the popular masses mobilised and organised to meet the onslaught of the West? Did the state take seriously the requirements of socialist transformation? Did the state engender a political culture to clearly analyse and comprehend the development of war and destabilisation? Did the belief in the West constrain the prosecution of the guerilla war and/or give the forces of oppression time to work out neo-colonial settlements in Zimbabwe as they are now doing in Namibia?

That it is possible to pose these questions at all, twenty years after the Arusha Declaration in the context of the traditions of the University of Dar es Salaam is in itself important. The search for the answers to these questions requires more research and analysis but this is made easier by the actual experiences gained in the struggles to liberate Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Even though there are elements in Tanzania who would want to limit this form of intellectual inquiry, the questions posed above gain importance by the present war, destabilisation and popular uprisings against apartheid in South Africa. The apartheid war machine, like an army of locusts, carried waste, destruction and death in its wake. The pressures of the

allies of Tanzania, the President of Mozambique, Samora Machel. The unexplained crash of President Machel's plane, the intense war of destabilisation inside Mozambique and the struggle to maintain the sovereignty of Mozambique sharpened the political division inside Tanzania. There were two broad forces, the one that wanted to quantify support for liberation in monetary and financial costs and those who perceived concretely that the continued independence of Mozambique and the forms of transformation in South Africa and Namibia were inextricably bound up with social reconstruction in Tanzania.

Those who have aligned themselves with imperialism through deeper integration with the IMF and the World Bank warned against further involvement in the war as they measured the cost of the war in the simplistic terms of budgetary ceilings placed by the IMF. These forces suggested that Tanzanians were tired of liberation and were supporting societies that were materially better off than Tanzania. Unfortunately for this class, the imperatives of the war and resistance did not allow for this evolving state to pursue a clear strategy of negotiating with apartheid through the Commonwealth. Apartheid demanded concrete confrontation beyond the safety net of the call for sanctions by the international community. Moreover, as the crisis of capitalism deepened, corruption, bureaucratism and commandism by the Tanzanian ruling class sought to demobilise the popular masses. Economic hardships, shortages and an IMF austerity package led logically to the shooting of unarmed workers at the Kilombero sugar estates in Morogoro region of Tanzania. In the popular consciousness this episode was compared to the shooting of workers in South Africa. Through cultural expressions (Sukari Chungu), poems and songs the popular masses sought avenues of self expression and articulation of support for liberation beyond the initiatives of the State. Evidence of this trend can be found in the spontaneous outpouring of songs on liberation and socialism at the time of the death of President Samora Machel. This contrasts sharply with the way in which the State sought a quiet procession instead of an anti-apartheid demonstration, and the radio followed the lead of the western news agencies to limit the impact of the new stage of the struggle in Southern Africa. The present conjuncture of the struggle for liberation in Africa has demonstrated that the African revolution will be as much against the present leaders as against the forces of western imperialism and South African apartheid. For the Tanzanian state and people this was accentuated by the struggle to liberate Uganda from Idi Amin. Here, the war emphasised the contradiction in the Arusha Declaration of an African army and the idea of 'the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states'. The contradictory nature of this posture was exposed when Tanzanian troops fought in Uganda, and will be further tested as Malawi and Zaire are drawn closer into the war of destabilisation in Mozambique and Angola. Already the war of the Polisario in the Saharwi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has shown that in the future liberation struggles in Africa will be against African states. The episodes of war in Uganda, armed struggles against neo-colonialism, and the Moroccan occupation of the western Sahara gave rise to social forces and organisations in Tanzania which articulated the support for liberation beyond the requirements of state legitimation. State support for liberation meant more dialogue with the west; it demobilised the people and led away from confronting the question of socialist transformation within Tanzania. Twenty years after the Arusha Declaration the path to liberation in Africa was threatened by the plan of imperialism to reconstitute and recompose capitalism in Africa.

The Arusha Declaration: Liberation Support and Tanzanian Independence

The impact that the policies of Tanzania have made upon Africa and upon the rest of the world has already established the African state of Tanzania as one of the foremost political phenomena of the twentieth century... Tanzania is the highest peak reached so far by revolting blacks.

These statements were made by James in an attempt by this Pan African scholar to place the changes inside Tanzania within the global context of the struggle against racism and for independence in Africa. Tanzania (then: Tanganyika) gained its political independence in 1961. The level of social differentiation was not very high in the society and this enabled the independence movement to develop within the context of one party. However, the economic and political weaknesses of Tanzania and other fledgling African states became clear as imperialism openly flouted the demands for independence in the Congo and Rhodesia. *The Challenge of the Congo* in the heart of Africa showed the newly independent states of East Africa the extent to which western capital would go to preserve their interests in Africa.² In 1965, when Ian Smith proclaimed his Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Tanzania took the principled step of breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain. And less than four months later the African leader, Kwame Nkrumah, who had declared the need for an African liberation army, was overthrown in a *coup d'état*. In less than five years after the attainment of independence, Tanganyika went through (a) the Zanzibar Revolution and the subsequent Union to create Tanzania; (b) the challenge of mercenary troops in the Congo; (c) the launching of the armed struggle for independence in Mozambique in 1964; (d) the establishment of the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam; (e) the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia; (f) the experience of the bullying tactics of the Federal Republic of Germany over diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic; and (g) the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966.

These events, together with the problems of the terms of trade for primary products, demonstrated to the political leadership that an alternative path of social development was necessary beyond the limits imposed by capitalist underdevelopment. Drawing lessons from the overthrow of Nkrumah and the proliferation of reactionary military coups on the continent, the ruling party decided to chart a new socialist course for Tanzania. This was embodied in the Arusha Declaration, in February 1967. Numerous accounts since then and even at the conference on the 20th Anniversary of the AD have analysed the impact and the strengths or weaknesses of this declaration towards socialism. For the purposes of this paper, however, the important question is the link between the declaration of the socialist path in Arusha and the liberation struggle in Africa.

One fact which stands out is that despite the limitations of the conception of the Arusha Declaration (and there were many) the Tanzanian state and society sought a process of economic change which was based on the collective consciousness of the rural producers. The Arusha Declaration identified the western international bourgeoisie as the main enemy of the African poor and moved to expropriate foreign owners of the means of production.

The nationalisation of commercial banks, insurance agencies and foreign corporations underlined the radical base of Tanzanian politics, with an emphasis on collective willpower. Now, twenty years later, it is easy to see the difference between the

promise and reality and, ultimately, this will be judged by history. In the support for liberation, Tanzania continues to distinguish itself and this is even more urgent now that eleven years after the independence of Mozambique imperialism seeks to roll back the sovereignty of that country. As mentioned before, the challenge posed to the independence of Mozambique after the death of President Samora Machel sharpened the division in Tanzania between those social forces who wanted to transform the limits of Arusha and those who wanted to further reverse the elementary gains of the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration was an affirmation of the quest for economic independence in Tanzania. In this quest for its own independence Tanzania also provided the base for the liberation movements who were fighting for independence. While some member states of the OAU paid lip service only to the idea of liberation, Tanzania provided material and financial support. It offered training for guerillas, provided arms, set up guerilla camps in its territory, organised transit facilities for armed guerillas, provided rear bases and, at times, even sent its own troops to the front, as it did during the war for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Throughout the twenty year period, Tanzania not only provided a base but proved to be one of the principal forces behind the OAU support for liberation. The formation of the Frontline States showed the ability of Tanzania to bring together states of differing ideological postures in the cause of liberation. Thus, before the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, Tanzania acted as the unifying force to bring Mozambique and Angola together with Botswana and Zambia in the Frontline States.³

The first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, has been central both in the liberation posture of Tanzania and the articulation of the Arusha Declaration. Many studies have focused on his conception of liberation and the positive/negative role that he has played up to the present. One recent paper by the executive secretary of the Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, in full praise, said:

Indeed, Tanzania's commitment to the liberation struggle cannot be separated from the ideological ideals of its first President, Julius K. Nyerere, who from the early days of his political life believed that the independence of his country was meaningless if the universally accepted fundamental principles of freedom, equality and justice were not attained... As a dedicated son of Africa and true patriot of African nationalism Nyerere formulated a programme for African liberation.⁴

This kind of statement reflected the thinking of the leadership of the OAU and its organs and was symptomatic of the stress on individuals in African politics. Undoubtedly, Nyerere left his own stamp on Tanzania and on the ideological underpinnings of liberation support but, ultimately, as Marx remarked:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered and transmitted from the past.⁵

Tanzania and Nyerere had to support the struggles for independence under the political and ideological circumstances inherited from the past. One of the principal ideological heritages in Nyerere's thinking was the belief in constitutional negotiations. From the period of the Lusaka manifesto in 1969 which called for a peaceful solution to apartheid⁶ through to the extensive diplomatic manoeuvres over Zimbabwe, to the UN resolutions and shuttle diplomacy over Resolution 435 on Namibia⁸, to the recent attempts to develop a Commonwealth Negotiating Plan in South Africa⁹, Nyerere's firm belief in negotiating rather than destroying

and talking rather than killing'. Behind this conception of the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 and subsequent energetic investment in discussions with the West was the belief of the Tanzanian leadership that the western powers could be persuaded to change by logical arguments based on a moral reasoning and social justice. But despite this belief in the West by Nyerere the social forces in the Tanzanian society were prepared to go beyond negotiations. From the period when Frelimo organised its office in Dar es Salaam to the launching of the armed struggle in 1964, the Tanzanian state and peoples resolutely supported the requirements of armed struggle. The presence of Frelimo in Dar es Salaam is now recorded as one of the high points in the progressive period of Tanzania's recent history. Throughout this period liberation support was not simply the province of the State and the state institutions, for even in the most rural villages the poor peasants developed their own momentum of support. Stories abound of poor peasants donating grain, money and even donkeys to Frelimo. Evidence of this closeness can now be culled from the pages of the *Mozambican Revolution*, the mineographed mouthpiece of Frelimo in Dar es Salaam.

Frelimo had its principal training base in Nachingwea. From this base, this guerilla army struggled to develop an ideological and military capacity to defeat Portugal. This was no easy task and present research on the history of the liberated zones of Mozambique seeks to highlight some of the concrete problems of the differing ideological lines within Frelimo.¹⁰ Some of the problems within Frelimo had direct bearing on Tanzania, especially when the first leader of Frelimo, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, was killed in Dar es Salaam in 1969. Subsequent struggles over the place of Lazaro Kavandame and later Uriah Simango in Frelimo involved sections of the Tanzanian leadership and the radical intelligentsia. Unfortunately, those in Tanzania involved in the debate in 1968–1969 have not yet published their own version of the 'two line crisis' in Frelimo.¹¹ From the period of joint leadership immediately after the death of Mondlane up to the emergence of Samora Machel as the undisputed leader, Tanzania was directly caught up in the problems of Frelimo. This was a very difficult period, for Tanzania was attempting to guarantee the security of the leaders of the liberation movements in its territory without being drawn into the internal affairs of these movements.

Some historians have already acknowledged the important military contribution made to Frelimo by Tanzania during the Portuguese offensive called the 'Gordian knot' which was meant to crush Frelimo militarily. The Tanzanian army has played a decisive role in this operation to physically confront the Portuguese military and, up to today, the older officers of the Tanzanian army remember the invaluable role played by Col. Ali Mafhud. During the period of this war, the Tanzanian army was transformed from a simple neo-colonial army trained to defend western capital into a disciplined force capable of fighting South Africa. The experiences of the confrontation with Portugal forced the Tanzanian state to diversify its sources of military capital. By 1972, the size, composition and training of the Tanzanian People Defence Force (TPDF) was evolving away from the racially and tribally differentiated section of the British bequeathed Tanganyika Rifles into a dynamic and flexible army capable of fighting both guerilla and conventional wars. It was also during this period of the 'Gordian Knot' and the military coup in Uganda that the principles of Mwongozo 1971 were articulated as part of the socialist framework of the Arusha principles. The size of the army grew considerably in the period 1969–1975 and the programme of political education of the army instilled a sense of political awareness in the Tanzanian officer corps.¹² These officers learned that the army had to gain the trust and

cations and logistics necessary to support a very long supply line. The Tanzanian military had to unload and distribute an average of 10,000 tons of equipment per month between 1970 and 1973. They had the task of transporting and distributing the equipment to the different liberation groups and to liaise with the groups right up to the point of combat.

These experiences in the armed forces reached a plateau for, after 1972, in the period of the Gordian Knot, imperialism intensified its political and ideological offensive against Tanzania. Intrigues, imperialist machinations and other forms of petty bourgeoisie politics in both the mainland and Zanzibar led to the incarceration of both A.M. Babu and Ali Mafhud, weakening that section of the State and the army which was clear in its support for armed struggles. Even though the Tanzanian leadership remained committed to supporting the armed struggles for independence (and this was reaffirmed by the 'Dar es Salaam Declaration of a New Strategy for the Liberation of Africa, the Consolidation of the Reconstruction of the Liberated Territories',¹³), the internal contradiction between the State and the proletarianised masses was intensified by imperialist penetration of the economy. The ideas of Ujamaa and Self Reliance did not lead to the strengthening of the basic working class and poor peasant organisations; instead, the State undertook a mini-partition of the society under the umbrella of Regional Integrated Development Programmes (RIDEPs). As the State integrated itself with imperialism it sought to cut off popular discussion and participation on the question of liberation. Whereas in the early period the press and radio actively mobilised the working poor, in this period the sophisticated forms of anti-colonial mobilisation were harnessed for the purposes of demobilising the popular masses. In this period the ideological problems of the Arusha Declaration came into sharper focus.

The Arusha Declaration: Ideology and Armed Struggle

The presence of the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam had tremendous impact on the intellectual culture of the society. Within the institutions of higher learning the ideas of Franz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral and Che Guevara were eagerly studied and the limits of the Arusha Declaration were debated with force and vigour within the University. One of the problems identified by this intellectual culture was the absence of a coherent theoretical and ideological position to guide political action. Cabral, in his essay on the Weapon of Theory, had asserted:

The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements—which is basically due to ignorance of the historical reality which these movements claim to transform—constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism if not the greatest weakness of all.¹⁴

This ideological deficiency was present not only in the liberation movements but also in the Arusha Declaration. Because the principles of the declaration towards socialism were based on the alleged unity of antagonistic social forces there were bound to be problems in the relationship between the Tanzanian state and liberation movements. This was especially so when there was more than one liberation movement in one state. The low level of social differentiation in Tanzania led to the view that the same unity which derived from the specific history of Tanzania could be imposed on the liberation movements in Angola and Zimbabwe.

The struggle for the independence of Angola brought some of the ideological problems of the Arusha all class formulation in clear focus. By the time of the fall of the fascist dictatorship in Portugal, in 1974, there were signs that at least two of the liberation movements in Angola were in fact pseudo—liberation movements serving the interests of western imperialism.¹⁵ During the period of diplomatic and political struggles over the question of the recognition of the MPLA in Angola the Tanzanian state found itself temporarily in the same camp as the US and South Africa. John Stockwell, the former Chief of the CIA Angolan task force, stated unequivocally that 'FLNA and UNITA were supported at one time by the United States, China, Rumania, North Korea, France, Israel, West Germany, Senegal, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa'.¹⁶ Ultimately, the evidence of the UNITA alliance with the South Africans forced the Tanzanian state to fully support the MPLA. But the historical record is yet to ascertain the impact of the hesitation of Tanzania over the recognition of the MPLA when the South African forces were occupying parts of Angola. Cuba, a small socialist island in the Caribbean, intervened decisively and repelled the South Africans in 1976. Since that time, imperialism has sought to draw the question of the liberation of Africa into the East-West conflict.

The Tanzanian state, up to the present, has refused to be drawn into the debate on the Cuban troops in Angola and the linkage of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola to the independence of Namibia. If anything, the Tanzanian state has been forthright in denouncing the linkage, preclaiming its political and diplomatic support for the Angolan state. This is not to say there are no elements in Tanzania supporting the idea of linkage. The lack of a scientific and materialist intellectual culture meant that among some sections of the intelligentsia there were debates on 'Social Imperialism and the role of the Cubans as surrogate forces of the Soviet Union'. Though concealed in the strident debates at the University, in the late 1970s, on imperialism and the national question, the articles and writings on social imperialism diverted attention from the realities of the issues concerning Africa.¹⁷ This diversion served to demobilise young scholars at a time when the intellectual energies were needed to critically analyse the specificities of the liberation struggle in Africa.

The experiences of the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and Angola brought about the remarks by Cabral on the ideological deficiencies in the liberation movements. Moreover, to compound these deficiencies, liberation support in some societies was being based on the nature of the relationship of particular liberation movements to the different parties of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This erroneous position was to have its impact in Tanzania and became visible in the relationship of the University community to the struggles in Southern Africa.

Indeed, the ideological masks presented by the kind of Marxism which was linked to socialist states prevented concrete empirical research on the historically defined circumstances under which the liberation movements struggled. It has never been easy to define and clarify the links between the grasp of a scientific inquiry and the concrete historical specificities of Africa. Within all the liberation movements and, indeed, all African states there are concrete problems of language, regional interaction and how to build upon the positive traditions of resistance in Africa. Imperialism recognises the importance of these traditions and has unleashed bourgeois anthropologists in the rural areas to strengthen their efforts in the domination of Africa. In Zimbabwe, for a while, one section of the liberation movement consciously mobilised the traditions of resistance among the spirit mediums of the

tance as it turned its back on the rural poor.
During the process of the liberation of Zimbabwe, the issues of the specific historical conditions giving rise to liberation took second place to the energies invested in the Anglo-American initiatives over Rhodesia. The emergence of an independent solidarity committee, the Zimbabwe Solidarity Committee, in Dar es Salaam at this time was specifically linked to the need to have a politically independent group that could progressively build liberation support among the people. More and more, as the State placed its trust in President Carter and Andrew Young, the popular masses were cut off from the issues of the war, liberation and cross-border raids which led to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979. Up to the present, many questions requiring a clear analysis of the problems between ZANU and the subsequent struggles after independence need to be clarified. But the practice of cutting off debate among the people plus the political demobilisation of the poor has had negative consequences for the Tanzanian political culture.

Liberation and Demobilisation in Tanzania

The experiences of murder, internal squabbles, imperialist machinations and counter-revolution within Africa needed to be urgently analysed to enable the popular masses to grasp that the realities of the liberation process went beyond the simple problem of the seizure of power. Under the cloak of security there was a conspiracy of silence on some of the ideological problems of the movements and the State followed the lead of imperialism in analysing social and political problems in terms of tribal alliances.¹⁹ However, to develop beyond this kind of analysis a correct identification of the social forces at work inside the independent African states and the newly independent societies was required. This was not forthcoming. For this reason many in Africa are surprised by the political reversals in the independent states such as that of the Nkomati Accord of Mozambique and South Africa in 1984. The Nkomati Accord and the IMF programmes in Tanzania showed what had taken place in the Frontline States in the 1980s. The actual experience of Tanzania showed that, since Arusha, state control of the economy shielded foreign capital while the deteriorating condition of the poor was (and is) manifest in falling wage rates, increased poverty and hunger. Undemocratic and authoritarian practices by the petty bourgeoisie strengthened imperialism as the army became connected to the totality of the corrupted political system, through its integration into the party and other administrative organs.

The Tanzanian armed forces which had distinguished themselves in the 1970s became infected with the disease of primitive accumulation. Significantly, this came to the fore during the war in Uganda when the people were being mobilised to fight against a neo-colonialist dictator. The ephemeral nature of the political education of the army was exposed as the Tanzanian officers were dragged into the quagmire of commandism in Uganda. To compound the negative effects of commandism Tanzanian officers participated in the looting of Uganda immediately after the war. The Tanzanian society suffered irreparably as a result of the war in Uganda and even though the war was presented as part of the struggle against neo-colonialism²⁰ the popular masses saw the war as one more vehicle for the military section of the petty bourgeoisie to accumulate property.²¹

The end of the war in Uganda and the Lancaster Conference coincided with the deepening crisis of international capitalism. The Tanzanian ruling class was, at this time, seeking to integrate itself with international capital. Therefore, it was not pos-

sible to analyse the economic hardships in Tanzania on the basis of capitalist exploitation. Instead, the State gave a number of reasons for the economic crisis (Hali mbaya ya Uchumi):

- (1) the breaking up of the East African Community;
- (2) the low commodity prices;
- (3) the cost of the war against Amin;
- (4) the sharp increases in the price of petroleum products; and
- (5) poor weather conditions in the country.

The poor did understand the lopsided nature of the world economy and the need for a New International Economic Order. But the nature of the state-sponsored debate on the International Monetary Fund precluded an understanding of the links between the international crisis and the internal social relations. While the President of Tanzania made speeches overseas opposing the IMF, the State quietly implemented the IMF conditionalities of privatisation, liberalisation and devaluation. Tanzania limped to an agreement with the IMF in 1986 without telling the Tanzanian people explicitly that an agreement had been reached or what were the terms of this agreement.²² The World Bank/IMF/state alliance in Tanzania had reached a point where it was necessary to openly deceive the people and present extensive and prolonged devaluation of the return for labour in the mythical monetarist jargon of a relaxation of the exchange rate. Together with the economic regression, the forms of political obedience engendered by the crisis opened avenues for the complete demobilisation of the working poor.

It was in this context of the politics of demobilisation that war in South Africa called for a response from the Tanzanian society. Those in the State whose future was linked to the IMF and western capital sought negotiation and pressures from the international community on South Africa. They placed their hopes on international sanctions. Others who perceived the general destructive character of capitalism called for the complete mobilisation of the people. These two tendencies simmered in Tanzania until the tragic death of President Samora Machel of Mozambique. Elements of the Tanzanian ruling class were then jolted by the extensive war of destabilisation from Malawi and South Africa. Those who were counting the monetary cost of support for the liberation struggle kept quiet as the Mozambicans pleaded for more military support. It remains for history to judge whether the festering sore of the Ugandan involvement has stifled the army and sapped its potential.²³ While the South Africans studied the military, economic and political significance of Tanzania, between 1981 and 1986 the energy of the Tanzanian state towards liberation was largely spent on diplomatic initiatives within the United Nations Organisation and the Commonwealth.²⁴

Liberation in Southern Africa and Its Impact on Africa

During the 1980s the principal questions of liberation on the continent of Africa have concentrated on the transformation of the relations of production in South Africa. The Tanzanian state, locked in the conceptions of liberation which emanated from the 1960s, saw the problem of apartheid as that of majority rule. Through the step by step approach of the Frontline States it tried to use the forum of the United Nations to bring independence to Namibia. With implicit trust in the negotiating process of the Contact Group, led by Chester Crocker of the US, the State effectively cut off discussion on the compromises and changes made by the Frontline States in the

One could theorise on the weakness of the analysis of the Frontline States that the West could have been persuaded to bring Namibia to independence under an internationally accepted agreement.

The fact is that this faulty analysis could be linked to the breathing space given to the South Africans to build up an internal force of reaction inside Namibia and to use the cover of Constructive Engagement to destabilise the Frontline States.²⁶ By 1985, the estimated damage to the economies of the Frontline States was over US \$10 billion.²⁷ These costs were estimated in terms of direct war damage, extra military expenditure, reduced production and the destruction of economic infrastructure. The biggest cost, however, has been death, hunger and loss of confidence by the peoples of the region. The depoliticisation and demobilisation of the popular masses in the Frontline States and in Tanzania strengthened South African aggression. In those states, such as Zambia and Tanzania, where the South African army was not fully deployed, the IMF programme of 'economic stabilisation' completed the overall strategy of imperialism to undermine the independence of Africa. The war against the Frontline States reached a decisive state in 1986, when the South Africans changed their tactic of low intensity war within Mozambique to one where the South Africans were moving to directly occupy Mozambique.

These new threats to the sovereignty of the Frontline States were the response of the South African racists to the revolutionary situation inside South Africa. Throughout 1984 and 1985, the peoples of South Africa had given notice that the struggle against apartheid had reached a new stage. Popular power in the streets, in the factories and in the oppressed townships seized the initiative in the fight to create a new social system. Popular organs were developing, such as the powerful working class trade union, the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). In the process, the toiling masses of South Africa showed that the struggles in South Africa intended more than a reform of the system or the Africanisation of capitalism in that state. So cut off had Tanzanians become in the 1980s that they were unaware of the intense debates on social transformation inside that embattled state. The petty issues which divided the exile liberation movements over authenticity and recognition by the OAU preoccupied the State while in South Africa young comrades were establishing alternative bases of power and cementing the new structures which emerged from the self-organisation and self-mobilisation of the people. The cry in the townships of South Africa was Siyanova. The gulf between the State and liberation was unavoidable for inside Tanzania the State was effecting policies which further demobilised the working poor. Old colonial taxes, such as the Head Tax, were reinstated as Development Levy.

A Human Resources Deployment Act was rightly labelled Forced Labour—Nguvu Kazi—by the people and in the same month of the mourning for President Samora Machel the Tanzanian state introduced its own version of the pass laws in an Identification Bill. Fortunately for the popular masses, the State did not have the material resources to fully implement these coercive legislations. The divide between the State and the working poor of Tanzania had reached the point where the leadership did not disguise its immunity to the sufferings of the masses. In so far as the leadership was not responsible to the majority of the people, it meant that the African revolution was being armed as much against them as against the longstanding alien forces of capitalism and imperialism. The observations of James and Fanon on this question are worth representing here:

In the nationalist revolution of the twentieth century the people must be against not only the imperialists. Some of the people's leaders who come forward to lead the revolution have nowhere to lead the people and revolution must be as fiercely against them as against the imperialists. Some of the writers having learned all they could from Western civilisation, will join the revolution, but bring nothing positive and corrupt the revolutionary movement. The intellectuals must learn that they must dig deep among the mass of the population to find the elements of a truly national culture.²⁸

This demanded new forms of political struggles and the present crisis within Tanzania and in Southern Africa is the background for the resolution of this struggle.

Conclusion

The question of liberation in Africa has reached a new state in Southern Africa, and in Tanzania it has provided a test for the resolution of intense political struggles. As the Mozambicans call on Tanzania for more military support the question is whether this support can be organised while the popular masses are demobilised and exploited. Progressive forces in the State who survive recognise that, ultimately, it is the states of the region which must offer military support to the freedom fighters. But it is also acknowledged that support for the freedom fighters of Namibia and South Africa cannot only be based on support from the states, but that it has to be rooted in the workers, peasants, youths and progressive forces from other classes. This reinforces the fact that the extent of support for liberation by a state can be measured by the processes of liberation and emancipation in that state. Twenty years after the Arusha Declaration, it is clear that the Tanzanian state has retreated from the egalitarian principles of the quest to build socialism.²⁹ With this retreat the State seeks to erase from the memory of the people the facts of past confrontation with imperialism and is shirking from exposing the day to day destabilisation with imperialism in Tanzania. However, the death of President Machel in October, 1986, has brought a new awareness to those elements who see the dangers to Tanzania's own sovereignty. And even then the expectation is to confront the South Africans without involving the people.

In these circumstances the people are finding their own means to express their solidarity. Through songs of freedom and independence the people are energised to confront local reaction and foreign exploitation. This reality is now perceived but it has never been easy in history to modify prevailing ideologies. Ideas have a habit of lingering on long after they become useless to those who invented them. The workers and peasants who consumed the ideas of the Arusha Declaration took them seriously, assimilated them and still seek to understand and maintain them long after their usefulness for the ruling class has dissipated. Thus, in the long struggle for the liberation of Africa the workers and peasants of Tanzania will use its words as a weapon against their own neo-colonial masters:

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness which has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution—a revolution which brings an end to our weakness, so that we are never again exploited, oppressed or humiliated.³⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in Walter Rodney, "The African Revolution", in his *C.L.R. James, His Life and Work*, Paul Buhle, Allison and Busby, London, 1986, p. 44.
2. Kwame Nkrumah, *The Challenge of the Congo*, Pan African Books, London, 1967. For an analysis of the tremendous energies spent by the USA and the West to maintain control over the Congo, see M. Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, MacMillan Publishers, London, 1982.
3. The role of "Tanzania as a Frontline State" was critically analysed by Nathan Shamuyaria in *Conflict Change in Southern Africa*, published by the University Press of America for the Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, 1978.
4. Brigadier Hashim I. Mbita, "Tanzania and Liberation Movements", paper presented at the *Historical Association of Tanzania*, Sept. 15–20, 1986, p. 2.
5. Karl Marx "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" in *Selected works*, Progress Publishers, 1968.
6. For a critical analysis of the search for dialogue in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, see E.J. Kisanga, *The Organisation of African Unity and the National Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa*, M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1978.
7. For the efforts of Nyerere in the search for an Anglo-American compromise over Zimbabwe, see Julius K. Nyerere, *Crusade for Liberation*, Oxford University Press, 1978.
8. H. Campbell, "The Decolonisation Process in Namibia", in *Maji Maji*, 1986.
9. *Mission to South Africa*, The Commonwealth Report, 1986.
10. J. Depelchin, "Some Comments on the History of the Liberated Zones", Mwongozo Workshop, 1985, Kampala, Uganda. This work, as part of ongoing research, seeks to develop a critical approach to the history of Frelimo. This analysis can be distinguished from the uncritical studies which have been published on Mozambique after liberation.
11. J. Depelchin, in his own writings, suggested that Walter Rodney, the Caribbean revolutionary, sided with reactionary elements in Frelimo during the Simango crisis. See "African Anthropology and History in the Light of the History of Frelimo", in *Contemporary Marxism*, No. 7, 1983, p. 80. One has to be careful that the issue of the African revolution of this period is not compressed into a simplistic two line struggle over the race question. Rodney is not alive to speak for himself but he himself was critical of Kavandame and Simango. See his reference to this race question in Frelimo in "Southern Africa and Liberation Support in Afro-America and the West Indies", paper presented at Dar es Salaam, December, 1975.
12. F. Swai, "The Integration of the Military to the Political System of Tanzania", M.A. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982.
13. See *Daily News*, April 10, 1975. The Tanzania position paper became the working document of the OAU. This declaration was a far advance beyond the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969.
14. Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, Monthly Review Press, 1969, pp. 92–93.
15. The evidence on the role of the FLNA was quite clear even before the 1974 Coup in Portugal. For details of the links between the CIA of the USA and the FLNA, see John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, Futura Books, 1979. John Stockwell was the Chief of the CIA Angola task force operating from Zaire. For details of UNITA's link with Portugal and now South Africa, see Marga Holness, "Angola: The Struggle continues", in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.),

TWENTY YEARS OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION: ISSUES OF EQUALITY IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND OPPORTUNITY

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“The first aim of socialists, prized above all others, is equality of income”, W. Arthur Lewis (1949).

1. Introduction

The Arusha Declaration emphasises the development of man and his overall well-being. It places emphasis on creating a just society where exploitation of man is done away with. Issues of equality of income and opportunity do feature prominently in it.

Adam Smith's views of how best to run an economy are to be found in his plea for a free market. For Smith, the free market improved the allocation of resources and opened the door to economies of scale. He further believed that the policy of free competition would inevitably lead to a great increase in wealth, that is in output and real income.

Marxian income distribution theory accepts income differentials based on natural differences in physical and mental abilities in acquired skills and knowledge, and possibly also differences resulting from personal preferences (e.g. between work and leisure). It objects to income differentials based upon unequal distribution of wealth; the power structure of society; sex, race or ethnicity, and income differentials resulting from persistent disequilibrium between supply and demand in the labour market.

The Marxian principle of rewarding people according to their contribution to society is problematic in as far as measurement of contribution is concerned. For how can different contributions of different types of skilled labour be measured?

Neoclassical distribution theory places a lot of weight on the role of rational choice by the utility maximizing decision maker.

Marginal productivity theory holds that in equilibrium each productive agent will be rewarded in accordance with its marginal productivity as measured by the effect of the addition or withdrawal of a unit of that agent on the total product with the quantity of the other agents held fixed.¹

The aim of this paper is to examine the record on equality of income and opportunity during the twenty years of the Arusha Declaration. Besides examining the record on equality between households, the paper also looks at spatial equality of opportunity (equality between regions).

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16. John Stockwell, *op.cit.*, p. 198.
17. Both antagonists in the debates on imperialism supported the scientifically incorrect theory of social imperialism. For the most crude development of this theory in the context of East and Southern Africa, see Lucas Hamisi, *Imperialism Today*, Tanzania Publishing House, 1984.
18. David Lane, *Guns and Rain: Guerillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, ZPH, 1985.
19. This is especially the case in Zimbabwe where the political problems are analysed on the basis of the differences between the Shona and Ndebele or among the Karanga and Manika peoples. This is how the murder of Herbert Chitepo was presented, as were the problems between ZANU and ZAPU. For the official Zimbabwe viewpoint on the Chitepo assassination see David Martin and Phyllis Johnson (eds.), *The Chitepo Assassination*, ZPH 1985. For the Zambia version of the assassination, see “The Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo”. Tanzania has not yet presented its version of these events.
20. On the question of the struggle against neo-colonialism the position of Tanzania has created confusion in many quarters. Freedom fighters in other parts of independent Africa find out to their peril that they could be returned to their own states by the Tanzanian Government. This has occurred in two known cases: in the case of refugees from Kenya and Zaire. In the most recent case of the Kenyans: these were returned at the same time the President of Tanzania was receiving an international prize for the protection of refugees.
21. This conception of the war was presented by a popular theatre group in the play *Lina Ubani*, by Penina Muhando, Dar es Salaam University Press, 1984.
22. The first public acknowledgement that an agreement had been signed was made not to the Tanzanian people, but to a meeting of donors from Denmark. For an analysis of the impact of this on the politics of Tanzania, see Horace Campbell, “The IMF Debate and the Politics of Demobilisation in Tanzania”, OSSREA Conference Papers, 1986.
23. “The Strategic Significance of Tanzania, Military, Political and Economic”, Institute of Strategic Studies, Pretoria.
24. That there were elements in the Tanzanian state who were willing to promote the idea of negotiations, as opposed to the idea of armed struggles, came out on a conference on *Peace and Security in South Africa* in 1986 organised by the University of Dar es Salaam along with the International Peace Academy of New York. At this conference representatives of the South African state were invited.
25. So demobilised had their people become that, in 1981, when the State tried to mobilise a demonstration against Chester Crocker and their proposals of one-person two-vote the local party branch near the airport sent a traditional dance group to meet the western Five. The State had effectively cut off the idea of demonstrations against imperialism so in the consciousness of the local party functionaries the State could only be sending traditional dancers to welcome imperialism to Tanzania.
26. See Peter Manning and Reginald Green, “Namibia, Preparations for Destabilisation”, in *Johnson and Martin, op.cit.*, pp. 111–138.
27. Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, James Currey Books, London, 1986.
28. Quoted in Walter Rodney, p.44.
29. The justification for this retreat was given by the Party Chairman in his address to the University when he received an honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree. See Daily News Sept. 22, 1986, p. 4.
30. *The Arusha Declaration*, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967.