Democratic or Socialist Transformation of the Rural Areas, A Comparative Review of the Experience of Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe*

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Introduction: Theoretical Issues

A central element of the ongoing 'battle of ideas' on the future of the economies of the African countries and that of Sub–Saharan African in particular is the relationship between production performance of the agricultural sector and political 'systems' chosen by the various states. Some analysts argue or at least suggest that countries with socialist oriented policies have, over the last ten years, registered declining productivity levels particularly in the agricultural sector whereas those that have adopted capitalist policies have achieved comparatively high levels of economic growth and productivity.[1]

Unsurprisingly, most the development path debates, particularly on agriculture, have concentrated on Tanzania and to a less extent on Mozambique and Ethiopia as typical cases of the failure of 'socialist' agriculture in Sub–Saharan Africa. This is perhaps so because these three countries are among the very few that have declared their 'brands' practical boldly and for everyone to hear and have taken practical steps to put the various principles of their socialisms into practice.

Criticisms on Tanzania have been the most diverse and the most interesting. They range from criticisms by a number of left wing intellectuals who think that Tanzania would have already made tremendous headway, if the state had not been dominated by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie[2], to those of the new now–classical economists who are now advocating a fully fledged 'progressive' farmer policy as the only way out of the ongoing economic crisis.[3] Writers like Zaki[4] do not even think that socialist agricultural policies can be implemented in 'Africa' conditions.

Mozambique, whose performance, particularly in the agricultural sector, has been negatively affected by a combination of inappropriate policies, sustained alterations of drought and flood conditions and counter–revolutionary activities by increasingly effective groups of 'insurgent' armies under the organization of Renamo, has also attracted a number of academic criticisms. Unlike Tanzania, however, the few writers whose works are accessible in English have tended to attribute the poor performance of the Mozambican agricultural sector to the blind adoption of the 'Russian or 'Eastern European' model of agricultural transormation.[5]

The overall picture that one gets out of these analyses is the fact that the poor performance in the agricultural sectors of these two countries has, by and large, been caused by either tho much socialism and/or state intervention or because scientific socialist principles of transformation have not been grasped and implemented.

The experience of Zimbabwe in the organization of agricultural production since it got its independence in 1980 poses new questions whose understanding may clear the mist hanging on the development debate. Zimbabwe inherited a highly developed rural sector, but highly differentiated, basically along racial patterns. The settler economy formulated and implemented a land tenure system that condemned the majority of the peasants to marginal lands which were formerly known as the 'tribal lands' and that enabled the white settlers to buy the most fertile areas and practice freehold land ownership rights. The two land tenure systems were affected by the Apportionment Act of 1930. Although, as we shall point out in detail later, this rigid racial determination of land ownership was erased from the statute books by the Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977, "...each of the sixtysix former purchase lands has in fact retained its own territorial boundaries, name and social identity...".[6]. The Lancaster Agreement of 1980 which, in many ways, aimed at forestalling what were expected to be far reaching socialist transformations after the armed liberation struggle, included clauses that made it difficult for the independent state to change the existing land ownership relations. Partly because of this agreement and partly also because of a better understanding of the principles of socialist transformation, the post 1980 period has not seen significant changes in the inherited settler economy. Many however have interpreted the acceptance of the Lancaster Agreement package as a betrayal of the revolution[7] and despite much talk about socialism, this has remained a mere paper tiger.

areas. The problem of time period apart, there is the more fundamental problem of understanding what socialist transformation really is, particularly given the nature of the underdeveloped subjective and objective factors inherited from the settler economy. To expect that transformations of a socialist nature could have been brought about in seven years is to read Marxism up–side down.

Almost all in analyses on the socialist 'experiment' in most African countries little effort is made to come to grips with *concrete* transitional processes. And this is so in spite of the fact that Marxism is very clear on the nature of political and socio–economic transformations, particularly in countries in which the two principal capitalist classes (the bourgeois and workers) have not been fully developed. Lenin, in both the pre–and post–revolutionary period, took great pains to explain the necessity of having two stage revolution — the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.[8]

The democratic struggles are not only supposed to unite all progressive forces against imperialism (or the monarch in the case of Russia) in order to consummate a democratic revolution but, perhaps even more important, this revolution must be followed by a concrete programme of *democratic* political and economic reforms. In other words, the first stage of the revolution does not end with the seizure of political power by the *democratic* dictatorship of the workers and petty bourgeoisie (both rural, i.e. peasants, and urban, i.e. craftsmen)[9] but *must* be extended to the post–revolution period and involve all clearly anti–monopoly forces in the task of building the national economy.

Lenin's conceptualization of the democratic revolution is radically different from Mao's "New Democratic Revolution" which was basically used to seize political power for the workers and peasants. In China, therefore, there was no clear formulation of democratic transformation programmes both in agriculture and indus-

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While there may be some truth in all these assessments it is, nevertheless, far less plausible to argue that Zimbabwe has not embarked on the road to socialist construction because it has not brought about significant socialist transformations in the rural try. Small woonder, therefore, that the 1949 period was followed by 'fully fledged socialist' economic transformations whose negative consequences on productivity continued to be felt until the adoption of the so called modernization programme after 1978.[10]

All in all, the analyses of the problems of socialist rural transformation in a number of countries in Africa that nominally proclaimed socialist policies — be they African socialism (like Tanzania) or scientific socialism (like Mozambique and Zimbabwe) have paid very little attention to the problem of democratic transformations or what Lenin referred to as the minimum programme.[11]

Democratic transformations are, to be sure, not socialist transformations. They aim at consolidating petty commodity (small holder) production through appropriate land reform programmes, effective inputs and producers prices policies etc., and, where necessary, democratic transformations can use the 'democratic — nationalist' bourgeoisie to consolidate the national economy and create both the subjective and objective conditions for the transition to the 'maximum' programme — i.e. socialist transformations. Let us however hasten to point out that the 'use' of capitalism to create subjective and objective conditions for the transition to socialism is only possible under the state of the *democratic* dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Indeed, as Lenin pointed out:

> The democratic revolution is bourgeoisie in nature. The slogan of a general distribution or "land and freedom"—the most widespread slogan of the peasant masses, down trodden and ignorant, yet passionately yearning for light and happiness—is a bourgeoisie slogan. But we Marxists should know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry, than the path of bourgeoisie freedom and progress. We must not forget that there is not, nor can there be at the present time, any other means of bringing socialism nearer, than complete political liberty, than a democratic republic, *than the revolutionary–democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry* (my emphasis).[12]

A careful reading of all literature of agricultural transformation in Tanzania, Mozambique and even Zimbabwe shows an amazingly pronounced ignorance of the problem of democratic transformations. And this is not only true for academics of whatever political leanings but, perhaps even more so, for the policy makers in these countries. The selection of the three countries has been deliberate. Whereas in Mozambique and Tanzania there has been a consistent disregard of democratic principles of transformation, in Zimbabwe what appears to be a practical implementation of the principles at the level of the *economy* does not seem to have the corresponding democratic political super–structure that is necessary to effect a transition from democratic to socialist transformation.

In the second and third part, we shall review the rural socio–economic structures of these countries in *relationship* to the rural transformation policies adopted since they declared their various forms of socialisms, and in the last part we shall conclude with a brief note on the type of state that is politically capable to effect a change from the realm of democratic transformations into the realm of socialist transformations.

Socio–economic structure of the rural areas

The most important feature common to all three countries, is the centrality of the smallholder producers in the agricultural systems of these countries. Although Tanzania and Mozambique went through different colonial experiences, they are very similar in their socio–economic structures. Even though in Mozambique Portuguese commercial farmers constituting 10% of the farming population controlled about half of the cultivated land and the African subsistence peasants (about 1.6 million) cultivated the other half (see Appendix I), the so called traditional sector remained nevertheless a very important force. It was not only the only source of forced labour for the large estates and plantations in Mozambique but also an important labour reserve for South African mines.

The withdrawal of almost all the Portuguese white settlers after independence in 1975 certainly increased the importance of the smallholder producer and one would have expected that much more effort should have been spent by the new government in consolidating this form of agricultural production., As is shown below, however, this was unfortunately not the case.

In Tanzania, peasant production supplemented by the plantation economy was the backbone of the colonial economy. With the substantial fall of sisal world market prices in 1964[13], the smallholder peasant production of both cash crops and food crops became even more central to the reproduction process of the post–colonial economy. Thus, according to computations made by Msambichaka[14], smallholders (on the average owning not more than three hectares) produced about 99% of total maize production in 1981, 70% of wheat, 55% of paddy, 93% of sorghum and 95% of coffee, and 100% of cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco and pyrethrum.

The overriding importance of smallholder peasant producers is best explained by the land ownership structure in Tanzania. According to the 1972 national agricultural survey (the only such survey) approximately 90% of the holdings were less than three hectares and slightly less than 60% were below one hectare. Holdings exceeding 10 hectares were equal to 0.5% only of all holdings (Appendix II).

By quoting the above figures, we are in no way trying to suggest that in Tanzania the process of peasant differentiation has not taken place. Indeed, a number of studies suggest that this process has been going on in Tanzania[15]. However, the figures suggest that any minimum programme seeking to increase agricultural production and productivity *can not* overlook the centrality of this stratum of the peasantry.

In Zimbabwe, as pointed out earlier, the settler land tenure System was formulated in such a way that the white settlers relative to the size of their population owned the biggest and the most fertile lands while the so called traditional subsistence farmers were condemned to marginal land areas (Appendix II). The following table that shows the structure of landownership in post independence Zimbabwe clearly shows the numerical importance of the 'communal' farmers.

Table 1: Structure of the farm sector in Zimbabwe, (in percentage).

Farm	Land	Population	Output	Sales
Small–scale	4	4	7	4
Medium–scale	25	14	35	47
Large–scale	15	9	24	30
Communal	50	51	31	15
Other	6	22	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Commercial Farmers' Union, Zimbabwe Viability Conference 1984, in Supplement to *The Farmers,* October, 1984.

Table 1 shows clearly that in Zimbabwe the white settlers do not only own a significant percentage of total cultivated land but also are the dominant producers (of both cash and food crops). The commercial (settler) farmers occupy 44% of Zimbabwe's land area, constitute 27% of the population but produce two–thirds of the national agricultural output and 81% of total sales.

The communal subsistence farmers, while constituting 51% of the country's total population, own *only* 50% of cultivated land and produce 31 of total output and 15% of national sales. Without necessarily anticipating the subsequent discussion on the post–1980 impact of the agricultural policies on the communal farmers: what the General Manager of Cold Storage Commission, Mr. E.G. Cross, called a substantial contribution of the communal areas is largely attributed to the post independence policy changes in favour of the smallholder.[16]

However, even in a country like Zimbabwe where large scale settler farming is dominant democratic agricultural reforms can not ignore the smallholders. In fact the potentiality of the smallholders in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector is still substantial given the fact that there is still an abundance of unused land owned by the settlers which, if the government wins the current battle with the white settlers to buy more idle land, could substantially increase the size of land per household owned by the smallholders.

Post independence agricultural policies versus the inherited social–economic structures.

Common to both Tanzania and Mozambique is the systemmatic neglect of the smallholder producers (the most populous democratic force) since the two countries embarked on the road to socialist orientation. While the two countries adopted two different theoretical and ideological bases in the formulation of socialism, (Tanzania, in 1967, adopted the so called African socialism and, in the 1977 3rd Congress, Frelimo was transformed into a Marxist–Leninist party) there is one theoretical and practical problem that is common to both – the inability to make a *concrete analysis* of the inherited colonial rural socio–economic structures and, particularly, the predominance of a 'young' *petty commodity producing* peasantry.

What both the British (for Tanzania) and Portuguese (for Mozambique) colonial agricultural policies managed to do, was the conservation of traditional peasant relations in the interest of colonial capitalist economy. In Tanzania, traditional peasant relations were conserved in order to enable the colonial settler plantation and peasant cash crop economies to realise super profits whereas, in Mozambique, the preservation of these relations was extremely important for both internal and external requirements of migrant labourers.

Theoretical niceties about the total domination of the economies of these countries by monopoly capital apart,[17] this conservation both at the level of the superstructure and economic reproduction had for reaching *theoretical* and *practical* consequences for post–colonial agricultural policy formulation. In many ways, the peasants of the two countries at the time of adoption of socialist oriented policies, had perhaps not even finished establishing the first generation of petty commodity producers. They were, as petty commodity producers, constrained by the demands of the colonial economy and traditional patriarchal relations. In practical terms, what these peasants expect from any socialist oriented state is not their immediate transformation into producer co–operatives or another form of state *regimented* conditions of peasant production. For them, this would smack of the partriarchal and colonial constraints to their desire to become petty commodity producing peasants. Their most important *democratic* demand is to become efficient and relatively independent (of unnecessary state interventions and rich peasant control) petty commodity producing peasants.

Prof. Klaus Ernst, looking into the factors that led to failure of socialist orientation in Mali, had the following to say against the hasty introduction of producer co–operatives:

> ... the transition to cooperative production was placed on the agenda at a time when non–capitalist (i.e. socialist orientation) development demanded that the *freed peasant* be integrated into the state co–operative marketing system and the necessity existed to win him over to non–capitalist path in order to create the material, social and ideological prerequisites for high form of co–operative production. Instead, the task was set to gradually eliminate the individual fields, and to extend the collective fields and make them the kernel of large–scale co–operative production. As a result, no material support was given to individual producers, but only to co–operatives farms.[18]

While neither Tanzania nor Mozambique embarked on any serious producer co–operation exercise, their post 1967 and 1977 (respectively) policies showed a remarkable and systematic neglect of the smallholders, as already alluded to. Tanzania wasted three whole years (1967–1969) waiting for the peasants to voluntarily come together.[19] Faced with an immanent food crisis and foreign exchange crisis that had become obvious even as early as 1969, the state at last began to intervene directly in the conditions of peasants production.[20]

In Tanzania potentially democratic villagization programme that began in 1973 (potentially democratic in the sense that with correct policies so called planned vil-

lages could have favoured smallholder producers) only facilitated bureaucratic intervention in the organization of peasant production. The Decentralization Act of 1972 that officially dissolved the local district councils and the 1975 village and Ujamaa Villages Act that finally dissolved the already bureaucratically controlled cooperative union created a semblance of bureaucratic efficiency and attracted the biggest per capital aid both from the bilateral sources and, after 1974 increasingly from multilateral sources (particularly the World Bank) in post–colonial Africa.[21] The World Bank played a central role in creating conditions that enhanced state interventionist policies. Apart from the skewed intra–sectoral allocation of aid funds favouring state farms[22], the pressure to ensure the realization of profits from the aid and grant funds invested in agriculture particularly through the so called Integrated Rural Development Projects led to increased bureaucratic intervention in the conditions of peasant production. The regressive omnipotence of the Crop Authorities with their ever increasing overhead costs, the related decreasing producer prices[23] and decreasing annual budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector (see table 2) all contributed to the decline in both cash crops and food crops (see also Tables 3 and 4).

Table 2: Development Fund Allocation for the Agricultural Sector 1972/73 – 1980/81 (Million Shs. at Current Prices in Tanzania).

	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Ministry of Agriculture and Parastatals	102.3	146.4	319.6	543.6	500	420	580	530	590
Regions	8.4	32.5	56.2	105.0	56	55	34	65	57.7
Total allocation	110.7	178.9	375.8	39.6	556	475	614	595	647.7
% of the Total Development Fund Allocation	10.5	12	27.9	29.1	14.9	10.5	9.5	7.5	9.2

Source: L.A. Msambichaka at al., *Agricultural Development in Tanzania, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1982, p. 43.*

In Mozambique, the almost totalwithdrawal of the Portuguese settlers from both the plantation and estates commercial agriculture and the inability of the Frelimo Party to make a clear distinction between democratic and socialist programmes of agricultural transformation led not only to the wholesale transformation of the abandoned farms into state farms but also the amalgamation of the same into huge agricultural complexes. This process of amalgamation and the over–centralized determination of farming practices (involving the fixation of 48 *nation wide* farming norms),[24] led to immense productivity problems. The emphasis put on state farms both in the production of food crops and cash crops was also reflected in the skewed intra–sectoral allocation of investments. According to Raikes, investments in the state farms accounted for almost 90% of total investment in the agricultural sector and over half of the remaining 10% to the co–operative sector.[25] The implication of this skewed allocation of the investment funds against the smallholder, particularly of food production, is very obvious. Indeed, as Finn Tarp observed:

> No institutional structure has catered for family sector needs and it has been generally held that the sector would be quickly transformed. Individual farmers would become members of co–operatives or labourers on state farms within a matter of a few years. Therefore, it has been considered there was no real justification for giving priority to family farmers problems...[26]

While both in the case of Tanzania and, perhaps even much more, of Mozambique there have been external factors that have negatively affected agricultural production (drought, floods, externally organized counter–revolutionary forces) it is nevertheless true that the consistent neglect of the principles of democratic transformation of the agricultural sector has led to immense problems of productivity. Indeed, in the case of Mozambique, even the relative success of the 'bandits' can be partly tressed to the 'undemocratic' agricultural policies. The poor productivity performance in the agricultural sectors of Tanzania, Mozambique and also to some extent that of Zimbabwe can be gleaned from tables 3 and 4.

Table 3: FAO Indices for Agricultural per Caput Production 1979–81 = 100

	1974/75	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1985
Tanzania	89.86	102.70	97.74	100.21	92.30	93.03	91.20
Mozambique	38.62	114.64	105.10	100.00	95.07	87.77	83.63
Zimbabwe	113.11	111.41	102.30	110.07	86.87	84.35	102.27

Source: FAO Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, April, 1986, pg. 16.

Table 4 is even more telling as it touches on the most important question of cereal production, traditionally neglected both by the colonial and post–colonial states.

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Table 4: FAO Indices for per Caput Cereal Production 1979–1981 = 100

	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1985
Mozambique	167.40	137.59	113.19	102.61	90.41	79.74	78.48
Tanzania	57.85	94.37	96.101	103.41	91.37	94.74	98.68
Zimbabwe	113.32	95.91	84.89	124.05	80.27	51.08	107.97

Source: FAO Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, April, 1986, pg. 24.

As to Zimbabwe, it was already noted that this country, partly because of the learning process (from the problems of other countries) and partly because of the limitations of the Lancaster Agreement of 1980, did not 'disturb' very much the inherited socio–economic structure of the rural areas. However, this approach to agricultural transformation was not wholly determined by the learning process and neo–colonial limitations of the Lancaster Agreement; it was also based on a clearer understanding of the need to have a two phased socialist transformation of the rural areas. Indeed, as the then Prime Minister Mugabe pointed in the foreword to the Transitional Development Plan, 1982/83 – 1984/85:

> The plan, however, recognises the existing phenomenon of capitalism as a historical reality, which because it cannot be avoided, has to be purposefully harnessed, regulated and transformed as a partner in the overall national endeavour to achieve set national plan goals. Accordingly, whilst the main thrust of the Plan is socialist and calls for a greater role by the State enterprises, worker participation, and socialist co–operation, ample room has been reserved for performance by private enterprise.[27]

We are aware of the many problems that stand in the way of Zimbabwe's efforts to harness, control and use capitalism in the democratic phase of socialist transformation. To date, for example, there has been no effective democratic land reform campaign, without which the state will find it difficult not only to control the capitalist farmers but also to consolidate the smallholder producers. True, some progress has been made in the buying of the idle land from the so called commercial farmers (capitalist farmers). Since 1980 and at least up to 1984, three million hectares have been bought but this success, it should be stressed, has been achieved only through negotiations.[28] The fact that the white capitalist farmers are extremely hostile towards the Land Acquisition Bill that would give the state legal authority to buy more idle land only shows that an effective be democratic land reform law is long overdue.[29].

However, this and other problems to be discussed in the concluding part notwithstanding, the relatively better performance of the Zimbabwe agricultural sector can in part be explained by ZANU'S democratic realism. It is significan to point out that post 1980 policies have enable communal peasants to contribute significantly to the country's cereal production. While prior to 1980 they produced less than 10% of the maize produced, by 1984 they were contributing up to between 40–50% of total maize product.[30]

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The character of the state and the future of democratic transformation

In Lenin's article "Two tactics of social democracy in the democratic revolution" that has been the most important source of the theoretical basis of this paper, emphasis has been put on the character of the state needed to go beyond democratic transformations and bring about effective and productive socialist economic transformations. It is not the aim of this concluding part to go into the complex question of the role of the state in developing countries. It is nevertheless important to emphasize one key element: the need for a state and party in which the democratic forces dominant, i.e. the state of the dictatorship of the workers and the peasants or, to use perhaps the most appropriate concept, the state of the people.[31]

Of course, the socio–economic context in Lenin's time in which this state was supposed to operate was different. This article was based on the possibility of struggling *from below* during the early 1917 expected bourgeoisie revolution in Russia and on the possibility of influencing and transforming this bourgeoisie revolution into a socialist revolution. Lenin was, however, careful to emphasize that the necessity to struggle *from above* must *always* be open just in case the bourgeoisie over–powers the democratic forces. Perhaps, in view of the debates on the state that have been going on, it wouldn't be a far fetched idea to suggest that although states in the socialist oriented countries are not controlled by multi–party systems, nevertheless the mass one party system does constitute different class factions.

Within the tradition of the underdevelopment theory, the bureaucratic and dependent petty bourgeoisie are seen to be the dominant force.[32] Even in the situation where the dependent bureaucratic bourgeois are dominant still, there are struggles from below between this class and the democratic petty bourgeoisie. The debate on the character of the state in the developing countries has, however, gone beyond the underdevelopment theory. It is now generally accepted that the struggle for the *national economy,* as Lenin noted, has a tendency to create a national bourgeoisie.[33] As Lenin noted in "The right of nations for self–determination":

> From the standpoint of national relations, the best conditions for the development of capitalism are undoubtedly by the national state. This does not mean, of course, that such a state, which is based on bourgeois relations, can eliminate the exploitation and oppression of nations. It only means that Marxism cannot lose sight of the powerful *economic* factors that give rise to the *urge* to create national states. It means the "self–determination of nations" in the Marxists' Programme *cannot,* from a historical economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self–determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state (My emphasis).[34]

Both the traditional and the new debates on the state are extremely important for the possibility of effecting democratic transformations in the three countries under discussion. The success of the policy changes in the early 1980s both in Tanzania and Mozambique will depend on the outcome of the struggles between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie or the emerging national bourgeoisie and the people.

In Tanzania, the restoration and effectivity of the potential organs of mass participation, i.e. the co–operative unions and local governments, through the Co-operative Societies Act of 1982, and the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim provisions) (Amendment) act of 1982 respectively, for example, will depend on who will control these institutions – 'the people' or the bureaucratic

bourgeoisie in alliance with the rural rich peasants. This also applies to the current effects by the Party to establish socialist producer cooperatives.[35]

In Mozambique, the healthy move by the 1983 4th Frelimo Congress to put more emphasis on smallholder production and decentralize the management of the state farms will also depend for its success on who takes the upper hand in the ongoing struggles.

In Zimbabwe, the situation is even more complex, for the presence of a powerful settler population (capitalist farmers) supported by South Africa and with far reaching influence on the African bureaucratic bourgeoisie means that the process of forming a state in which the workers and peasant will dominate will not be not an easy one.

In conclusion, for the three countries in question the struggle for general democratic transformations is far from being consummated, and the future of socialism in the Southern African region will depend on whether or not the workers and peasants will win the 'battle for democracy'. How this dominant democratic force will win this battle (whether by struggling from below or from above), will depend on concrete socio–economic transformations in each of the three countries.

Appendix I, Farm Size in the Agricultural Sector in Mozambique, 1970

Farm size	Commercial Sector: No. of Units	%	Area(1,000 Hectares)	%	Traditional Sector: No. of units	%	Area (1000 hectares)	%
Under 0.5	—	—	—	—	306.1	18.6	92.1	3.7
0.5 – 5	141	3.0	0.4	—	1,296.9	78.6	2,068	82.9
5 – 10	108	2.3	0.7	—	37.9	2.3	244.2	9.8
10 – 20	183	3.9	2.4	0.1	6.8	0.4	889	3.6
20 – 50	1,733	37.4	61.3	2.4	—	—	—	—
50 – 100	290	6.2	19.0	0.8	—	—	—	—
100 – 500	1,397	30.2	297.6	12.0	—	—	—	—
500 – 1,000	285	6.1	189.5	7.6	—	—	—	—
1,000 – 2,500	270	5.8	402.8	16.1	—	—	—	—
over 2,500	219	4 7	1,513.8	60.9	—	—	—	—
Total	4,626	100.0	2,487.6 (49.9%)	100.0	1,647.7	100.0	2,493.5 (50.1%)	100.0

Source: Estatisticas Agricolas de Mozambique, 1970, quoted from Srirastava, R.K. & Livingstone I. "Growth and distribution; the case of Mozambique," in Ghai, D. & Radwan S., *Agrarian policies and rural poverty in Africa, ILO, Geneva, 1983.*

Appendix II: Size distribution of Land in Tanzania, 1972

Farm size (ha)	Number of holdings	% of total holdings
0.5	771954	31.5
0.5 – 1.0	651386	26.6
1.0 – 2.0	605291	24.7
2.0 – 3.0	218375	8.9
3.0 – 4.0	88696	3.6
4.0 – 5.0	49985	2.0
5.0 – 10.0	53252	2.2
over 10.0	11625	0.5

*A holding is composed of all pieces (parcels) of land owned by a household.
Source: 1972 Agricultural Survey, Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, quoted from Ghai, D. et al, *Agrarian Systems and Rural Development*, ILO, The MacMillan Press, 1979, p. 243.

Appendix III: Arableland 1980 in Zimbabwe (in thousands of hectares and in percentages)

	Large–scale commercial land		Communal areas		Small–scale commercial land		All sectors	
	Area	Per cent	Area	per cent	Area	Per cent	Area	Per cent
Potential arable	4800	100.9	3300	100.0	500	100.0	8600	100.0
Under crops	620	12.9	1845	55.9	70	14.0	2535	29.5
Lying fallow	400	8.3	555	16.8	20	4.0	975	11.3
Cultivated	1020	21.2	2400	72.7	90	18.0	3510	40.8
Irrigated	151.7	3.2						

Source: Republic of Zimbabwe, Transitional Development Plan, 1982/83 – 1984/85, Vol. I, Harare, 1982.

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FOOTNOTES

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Indigenous Responses to the Imposition of Colonial Law: The Case of the Kuria People of Tanzania*

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Introduction

This paper aims at contributing to the discussion and research on the imposition of an alien legal system upon an indigenous population in a third world country. Colonial state law as opposed to traditional law was by its nature an imposition aimed at regulating the social relations of a particular population over which that state exercized power. Although state law is often necessary in order to bring about rapid social change, its effectiveness depends upon many factors. For example, it depends upon the particular sphere of social relations which state law seeks to regulate, whether that sphere touches on a matter considered vital by the population and whether economic factors operate to hinder or facilitate the effective operation of specific legal rule. Thus, whenever state law seeks to prohibit or regulate behaviour which is deeply internalized and based on many generations of habitual compliance the impact of such imposed law is likely to be very small. As noted by Moore, although new legislation is often passed with the intention of altering the going social arrangements in specified ways, those social arrangements are often effectively stronger than the new laws.[1]

Yet colonial state law, broadly defined, has a good chance of success because it did not aim at small scale interventions; rather, it aimed at completely altering the socio–economic conditions under which various traditional laws operated. This function of the law, as Fitzpatrick has argued, aimed at integrating the overall colonial social formation into the wider economy of the metropolitan state.[2]

The discussion of the Kuria response to the imposition of colonial state law will start from this broad function of the law. Moreover, colonial state law will be broadly defined as constituting the positive laws made by the imperial legislature, administrative regulations, judicial pronouncements and other forms of regulatory mechanisms devised to facilitate effective colonial administration.[3]

The paper discusses the attempts by the colonial state to regulate Kuria marriage payments and how the Kuria responded to this measure. In order to place the reasons underlying this response in their proper context, the first part of this paper provides an outline of the Kuria traditional social and economic system. The second and third parts describe the colonial occupation of Tarime district, the measures devised to regulate marriage payments and the response of the Kuria people to these measures. The fourth part discusses the reasons underlying the specific Kuria

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