

8. Ibid., pp. 178 – 184. See also Articles 19 and 20 of the East African Community.
9. Ibid., p. 170.
10. See "Integration" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 7, p. 383.
11. Arthur Hazlewood, *African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 83.
12. *Economic and Statistical Review*, June 1963, Table D. 17.
13. Hazlewood, *African Integration and Disintegration*. p. 84.
14. J.S. Nye, Jr., *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration*. p. 168.
15. Hazlewood, *African Integration and Disintegration*. p. 84.
16. M.A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, "Law in the International Community", p. 22.

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Class Interest and Public Policy in Nigeria: An Analysis of Governments' Policies on Agriculture and Housing*

O.O. Ibeanu**

Introduction

Presently, Nigeria is supposed to be in search of the "right" political future. This probably suggests that her political past and present has not been conducive to the attainment of the aspirations of her people. Nigeria's political past has, among other things, been chiefly characterized by frequent switches from civilian to military governments. Each of these two genres was expected to use state power in pursuing policies and programmes which in the main benefit all Nigerians. That is to say that such policies and programmes must be in the 'public interest'. The issue has often been reduced to which of these governmental forms better acquits this duty? Most experience has even led us to question the whole idea of a congruence between public policy and public interest. And it does in fact seem that the nature of the public interest in reality, needs to be explained and fathomed.

The Nature of Public Interest

Liberal democratic theory admonishes that the right use of state power is that one guided by the "public interest".¹ Thus, the right form of government is that which ensures that public policy² is determined by the will and feelings of "the people" (public opinion).³ From Plato, Locks (theory of royal prerogative) and Rousseau (volunte generale) through the present, this idea of the public interest with which public policies and programmes ought to be in congruence persists.⁴ However, in reality, we are quite aware that 'the public' or 'the people' as a homogenous whole, characterized by a harmony and consensus of interest, is pretty much a phantom. It has virtually become a self evident fact that government policies and programmes, even when they profess to serve the interest of the general public, persistently protect and project the interests of specific identifiable groups of social agents, who dominate society at the epoch. Some basic questions do arise. What are these groups? What is the nature of their interests? And by what dynamics do they emerge as dominant and therefore to direct public policy?

The nature of these groups and interests have been variously addressed by analysts. There is for instance, modern pluralism or group approach⁵ as well as the elite approach.⁶ Yet there is need for an approach and method of analysis which clearly set out a scientific basis for understanding and explaining the nature and logic of these groups and interests, clearly showing how they relate to public policy. These are provided by class analysis based on the method of dialectical materialism.⁷ In class societies domination revolves around the ownership of the means of production and therefore control of the labour process. Classes are themselves delineated by

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** Lecturer, Department of Political Science University of Nsukka, Nigeria.

production roles (division of labour) and the amount of social product (wealth: material and psychological) which these roles acquire and dispose. What is typical of such societies is the tendency for a role (or more appropriately, an alliance of roles), to become preponderant over others and thus to appropriate a disproportionate share of the social product. Of course, this entails the exploitation of the labour of another role. Such an economically dominant role (class) also becomes dominant politically through the instrumentality of state, thereby entrenching its control of production and society. Thus the state mirrors production relations and is determined by the complex relationships among classes and their fractions, which are in turn the social expression of the social reproduction process.⁸ It is from this background that we can understand why state policies and programmes as put forward by governments, reflect first and foremost, the interest of the dominant class. And indeed, any scientific analysis of public policy must necessarily come to terms with the class interests involved in a given conjuncture, which must in turn be situated within the class dynamics of the wider society.⁹ Our thesis then is that government policies and programmes in Nigeria are consistently geared toward the protection of dominant class interests whether under the military or civilians. To show this, we intend to examine two programmes of past Nigerian governments as case studies, namely the programme of large-scale agriculture 1976–1980 and the low cost housing programme 1980–1983. These two programmes were ostensibly formulated and implemented in the interest of “all” Nigerians. That apart they were directed at the solution of very vital national problems – food and shelter for Nigerians. Moreover, the periods 1976–1980 and 1980–1983 make for a comparative analysis of military and civilian governments.

1. The Programme of Large-Scale Agriculture 1976–1980

In the mid-1970's, the military rulers embarked on a programme of large-scale plantation agriculture across the country. On 21st May 1976, the then Head of State Major-General Obasanjo launched the Operation “Feed the Nation” (OFN) and millions of naira were budgeted for its execution. According to Obasanjo, the operation was aimed at making the nation “self-sufficient in basic food needs”.¹⁰ A month later, decree number 25 which established ten River Basin Authorities in the country and harmonized their activities was published.¹¹ In addition, there were the World Bank agricultural projects expected to spread to all states of the Federation in the 1980's.¹²

Apart from these more or less state ventures, private individuals and companies were encouraged to participate in plantation farming. The Agricultural Development Bank committed millions of naira to the Agricultural Credit Guarantee (ACG) scheme to facilitate this programme. Between 1978 and 1979, the loan commitment involved in the ACG scheme increased by over 200%; from about N 9.82m to over N30.6m (Table 1).

Of the N 9.82m commitments in 1978, over 81% went to individuals and companies while co-operatives received only 18.84%. In 1979, the share of loans to co-operatives fell to 2.34% while the share to private individuals and companies rose to 97.65%. This immediately shows that private large scale farming, usually capitalist concerns, was preferred to such venture by co-operatives. Collectivisation was apparently discouraged. Yet, as a digression, we know that such collectivist

Table 1: ACG Scheme: Summary of Loan Commitments by Category of Borrowers, 1978 and 1979

	1978	1979
Cumulative Total	₦ 9,821,060	₦ 30,635,655
% to Co-operatives	18.84	2.34
% to Individuals	43.62	31.63
% to Companies	37.53	66.02

Source: O.O. Ibeanu, *Soldier, State and Development in Nigeria* Unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. 1986. p. 253.

approach to plantation farming led to the transformation of agriculture even in some capitalist countries. The Israeli *Kibbutzim* and *Moshavim* promptly come to mind. As if to confirm its commitment to private plantation agriculture, the top brass of the 1975 to 1979 military regime soon, on handing over to civilian, collected fat loans and went into this type of farming.¹³

This agricultural programme was seen by the military as very important to the entire nation in two main ways. First, it was self-sufficient in basic food needs, an important step toward socio-economic transformation and self-reliance expected to make the nation. Secondly, it was claimed to be particularly targeted to benefit the poor peasantry by transforming the low productivity of small scale peasant agriculture. The programme would raise the peasants' share of the national wealth and generally improve the quality of life in the rural areas. Thus the World Bank boasts that its projects would lead to an increase in the standards of living of those to be affected, by eliminating unemployment, increasing farm yield, and therefore resulting in higher incomes for the people.¹⁴ The question is, how far in reality were these attained and why?

In the first instance, the extent to which plantation agriculture has made the nation self-sufficient in food needs, basic or otherwise, is debatable. In fact Turner and Badru have argued that the “Agricultural Oligarchy” this programme produced has been at the roots of hunger in the country.¹⁵ However, in assessing the class character of the programme, it is more appropriate to concentrate on the second ‘benefit’ of the programme. Our aim is to see the extent to which in reality it was aimed at benefitting the toiling peasants in the country-side; in fact to discover whose interests in reality, were served by this programme of large scale agriculture. We have accordingly chosen to closely examine one programme project in the entire gamut, namely the Bakolori project in Sokoto State.

The Bakolori Project

The project is the first phase of the Sokoto Rima River Basin Development plan as identified by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. The project which began in 1975 involves a dam built on the River Sokoto at Bakolori with a stor-

age capacity of 450 million cubic meters.¹⁶ When the dam was flooded, the 8,000 hectre (ha) reservoir displaced some 15,000 people from a thriving district headquarters and commercial town called Maradun. Maradun was an agricultural Habe/Fulani Community. Traditionally, land was communally owned in this area, though under the custody of the district head who allocated to the people as the need arose. There were basically two types of land supporting agriculture – *Tudu* or *Dogin Hoki* (up land) and the down stream marshland called *fadama*. River Sokoto flooded its banks annually creating this fertile marshland which supported dry season farming as well as filling wells for the use of the community. The people of Maradun raised lots of crops – rice (*yar Maradun*), cotton, sorghum etc as well as livestock. Land once allocated to an individual was treated as private possession. Land could change hand in a number of ways; by (1) inheritance; (2) exchange, e.g. exchange of *fadama* for *dogin hoki*; (3) lease; (4) pledge; (5) renting (*aro*); and (6) sale. However, land was never sold to non-indigenous. At death or migration and in the absence of a heir (son or brother), the land reverted to the community.

Traditionally, labour power in Maradun was largely *uncommodified*. Family members were the main source of labour power for farming and raising livestock. This source was usually supplemented by *gaya*, a system of co-operative farming, and rarely by hired labour. In any case, virtually everybody had land to cultivate and so there could hardly have been full-time farm hands. Thus the cost of hired labour in Maradun before the Bakolori project did not exceed ₦1.50 per day.

It was this largely peasant community that was displaced by the dam to be resettled in three new towns – New Maradun, Gidan Dan Kano and Kuku Mai Rafu.¹⁷ The Sokoto Rima River Basin Development Authority (SRRBDA) had decided that those to be uprooted will not receive financial compensation for their land and houses. In addition, there would be no compensation for economic trees. But “by February 1980, one third of the Bakolori farmers still had not received their compensation in kind.”¹⁸ Wallace has recorded in details the pathetic condition of Maradun people following the Bakolori project.¹⁹ The people were ‘resettled’ in an open, deforested land without trees to shade them from the glaring sunlight. Good drinking water was not available since there was just one central watering place, a dirty pool fed by a pump on the river. Even at that, those living at the outskirts of the settlement had to walk three kilometres to reach this dirty pond.²⁰

Perhaps of more importance is what happened to the people’s source of livelihood. The land suffered serious deforestation as contractors recklessly and indiscriminately chopped down trees. The grazing fields were destroyed while most of the people waited in vain to acquire new farm land. The down streamers lost their *fadama* as the dam made it impossible for the river to flood. With *fadama* went dry season cropping. About 20,000 ha of *fadama* was affected by the project, yet it was estimated that the scheme will ultimately create 24,000 to 26,000 ha of irrigated farmland. As at 1980 (five years after), with over ₦250m spent on the project, 20,000 ha of *fadama* had been lost, with a gain of just 1,000 ha of irrigated land.²¹

In reaction to these problems, there was a farmers’ riot at Bakolori in 1980.²² In fact from 1979, the people began to resist further rape on their well-being by blocking work on the project. At first, government tried to bribe them by paying-out huge sums of money as compensation. But when this failed, the people were broken by force. According to Wallace;

the deadlock was broken by force at the end of April (1980) when the Federal Government ordered in the police. In the ensuing confrontation many farmers were killed (the official estimate is 19, unofficial estimates are far higher) and villages were burnt to the ground.²³

Here is a people shattered culturally and materially. But the SRRBDA boasts of the success of the Bakolori project hammering on the ‘increase’ in food production which has resulted.²⁴ But how has the project affected the ordinary people of Bakolori? Farmers who are lucky to have received irrigated land, for example at Yarkofoji, have even challenged the SRRBDA claims of increased food production. Some of them have spoken to insist that aggregate production has in fact fallen. For instance, they say that before the project, they were harvesting between 300 and 1,000 bags, of *yar maradun* (rice) per season, but that has drastically fallen after the institution of the project. Furthermore, the farmers regard as nothing novel to the dry season cropping which the SRRBDA often canvasses as a major advantage of the project. They point out that before the project, the *fadama* provided just that.

We can see that there is enough reason to believe that the benefits of the project did not get to those for whom they were supposedly intended, the common peasants. Apart from the permanently displaced and landless peasants, the cost of staying on the project became too high for those lucky to be accommodated. The result has been that persons with enough money to hire tractors, pay for irrigation water, buy fertilizers and high-yield seeds, hire labour the cost of which increased by over 100%, etc. benefited from the Bakolori project. In the circumstance, land speculators and absentee farmers from Sokoto, Gusau and other big towns, as well as project staff, are known to have gradually squeezed the peasants off the land. In effect increasing numbers of peasants become landless and have been forced to migrate, become full-time farm hands for the ‘big farmers’, or live on the by-products of capitalist agriculture activities as food hawkers, cloth-makers, shoe-shine boys etc. Ultimately capitalist agriculture for profit had replaced farming for food. And labour widely become a commodity to be sold and bought in the process.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Bakolori project is an on-going one. Our data relate mostly to the terminal period of military rule (circa 1980). This implies that these problems may have been ephemeral; the inevitable initial difficulties that usually go with such large scale projects. In other words, further studies might be necessary before we write-off Bakolori. That does not however detract from our observations and assessment of the project. The project may have been “good intentioned” but its implementation belied the good intentions, throwing up the true forces that propel society. This again shows the importance of class forces in the analysis of government policies and programmes. It will always be problematic (if not impossible) to make a capitalist designed and oriented project like Bakolori to benefit the toiling masses. Increase in food production is most likely to result from such a multi-million naira project. But as usual, equity in distributing its rewards both within the scheme and among the general populace will always be suspect. Whether the leadership at the time was conscious of it or not the Bakolori – Maradun experiment was a classic instance of the proletarianization of the Nigerian peasantry. Rather than benefit the common peasants as declared by the policy-makers, the agricultural programme led to the emergence of a feudal oligarchy

of farmers (mostly ex-military men) and a systematic destruction of the peasantry by capitalist accumulation—Tina Wallace perfectly sums it up:

these schemes are accelerating the incorporation of the peasantry into the demands of capitalist farming—agriculture for profit. They are being carried out in the name of the small farmer, claiming to bring great benefit to him ... they are in fact the death knell for many small farmers ... as these projects are capital intensive, demand high inputs of foreign money, expertise and technology and focus resources on those best able to use them, i.e. men with capital, land, access to labour. That the small farmer is being squeezed off the land is merely an inevitable result of this approach to rural change.²⁵

2. Mass-Housing Programme 1980-1983

In April 1980, following the National Council of Housing and Environment Conference in Port-Harcourt, the government of President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) embarked on a 'housing for all' programme for the country. According to Shagari,

the goal of my administration in the area of housing was to ensure as much as possible that every Nigerian has access to a decent and affordable accommodation in a clean environment.²⁶

The specific objective of the programme were given as follows.²⁷

- (a) an increased production of affordable owner/occupier houses in the urban areas;
- (b) adequate provision of financial resources to institutions charged with the responsibility of home financing and building construction industry; and
- (c) support local initiative and activities in home production.

In implementing the programme, the Federal Government announced its commitment to the provision of 200,000 housing units yearly through both private and public efforts. The Ministry of Housing and Environment (MHE) was on its part to be directly involved with the construction of 2,000 housing units yearly in each state including Abuja.²⁸ This made a total government target of 40,000 units yearly. The emphasis ostensibly was on "affordable owner/occupier" houses for the urban proletariat. Rhetorically, therefore, the programme was a lofty one, populist in conception. The hopes of Nigerians were even more heightened when Shagari turned the sod for the programme in Yola on June 9, 1980. But for how long could such hopes be sustained? To answer this, let us look at the reality, the implementation of the housing programme.

Construction of the houses according to the MHE, was to be by tenders and contracts.²⁹ The government took care of the other aspects: (1) making building materials available; (2) acquisition of land; and (3) provision of loans.

On building materials, the Ministry "concluded negotiations with local manufacturers and importers of these materials with a view to making them available at reasonable cost to the contractors awarded the contracts."³⁰ How much more benevolent could government be? Of course the state did not stop there. The generosity was extended further by keeping labour price cheap for the contractors — what with the teeming population of unemployed Nigerians. On the other hand, the Federal Mortgage Bank (FMB) was on hand to provide soft loans (repayment period between seven and 20 years) toward the building of the following category of

houses,³¹ namely; (i) owner/ occupier houses; (ii) private residential houses for letting; (iii) houses by estate developers for sale; and (iv) commercial buildings for departmental stores etc.

By the end of May 1980, branches of the FMB had been established in all the 19 states. As at March 1980, the amount of outstanding loan applications and commitments to the bank stood at ₦750 million. This represents a 72% increase over the preceding six months (September 1979) when such applications and commitments stood at ₦210m.³² The class of people that benefitted from these facilities is common knowledge and need not be over laboured. But the point is that not only the fraction of the dominant class engaged in construction (as contractors) should benefit from this state largesse, but others too. Thus, they must be aided to acquire palaces, build more houses for letting and construct more commercial buildings to facilitate their comprador activities. It is not surprising then that a class of landlords burgeoned in the urban areas. Of course, the worker in the urban area which the programme was supposed to benefit was subjected to sustained harassment by the landlord. More baffling is the fact that inspite of millions of houses erected by landlords with loans from state coffers, cost of housed continued to soar due to the pettiness of these landlords and the inability of government to control prices.

Even more disturbing is the amount of money the country lost in fraudulent circumstances as a result of this programme. In spite of the fact that the MHE ensured that contractors procured building materials at reasonable cost; housing minister, Dosunmu on September 16, 1980, in Benin informed the nation that the 20,000 housing units for Bendel State would cost ₦20 million. Extended to the entire programme, this means that the construction was estimated to cost the nation ₦400 million yearly. That comes to an average of ₦10,000 per unit. Anybody who has seen any of these houses would likely be surprised at that price. Yet at the end of the day, more shuddering data emerged. At the end of 1983 it was reported that out of a total of 120,000 units expected to have been constructed across the country in three years, the ministry set up only 32,227 structures. Yet a total amount of ₦1.26 billion was committed to their construction during the period (1980-1983).³³ That leaves us with an average of over ₦40,000 per unit. That is outlandish and outrageous! The extent of financial loss through fraud and mismanagement came out in bold relief following the post-Shagari probes. Interestingly, many of the culprits were members of the National Assembly, the country's law-makers. A few cases will suffice. The Chairman of Senate Public Services Committee and the majority leader of the House of Representatives were said to have collected a total sum of ₦37,494,295 for the MHE as payments to contractors for jobs that were never carried out.³⁴ It was also reported that some members of the National Assembly collected about ₦140m for the supply of building materials which they never supplied.³⁵ In like manner, about ₦180m was said to have been paid out to contractors for the supply of building materials to some states of the Federation. Again, this was never done. In fact it has been estimated that over 50% of the total amount spent on the programme was embezzled.³⁶ It is therefore no wonder that out of 120,000 housing units estimated to be built across the country between 1980 and 1983 only 32,227 were erected representing less than 27% of the estimate. Even at that, most of the buildings erected lacked "basic amenities like electricity, roads and water."³⁷ It is not surprising then that a majority

of the purportedly completed houses were never occupied. Table 2 shows the case of Anambra State in 1983 which typified the situation across the country.

Table 2: The State of Housing Units Constructed Under The Housing Programme in Anambra State (1980-1983)

Local Government (Building Site)	Total Constructed	Observation
Abakaliki	100	Allocated but unoccupied
Aguata	50	Not allocated; unoccupied
Anambra	50	Unoccupied. No amenities
Awgu	50	" " "
Awka	—	Land not made available
Enugu	100	Partly occupied by the Army and Police
Ezeagu	—	Land not made available
Ezza	50	Unoccupied. No amenities
Idemili	50	" " "
Igbo-Etiti	50	" " "
Igbo-Eze	50	" " "
Ihiala	50	" " "
Ikwo	50	" " "
Ishienu	50	" " "
Isi-Uzo	50	" " "
Njikoka	—	Land not made available
Nkanu	50	Unoccupied. No amenities
Nnewi	100	" " "
Nsukka	50	" " "
Oji-River	50	" " "
Onitsha	150	Partly occupied
Udi	100	Unoccupied. No amenities
Uzo-Uwani	50	Unoccupied. No amenities
Total	1,300	

Source: Adapted from Ijioma Imo, *The Collapse of the Second Republic in Nigeria: Leadership Perspective*. Unpublished B.Sc thesis U.N.N., 1985.

First of all, of the total estimate of 6,000 houses to be built in Anambra State in the three years, only 1,300 structures or less than 22% were constructed. Of this number, only 250 units (about 19%) in Onitsha and Enugu were reported to be partly occupied. This leaves some 81% unoccupied mainly due to absence of basic facilities even though the contractors are said to have been fully paid.

Apart from the non-availability of basic amenities in the structures erected, those of them erected in the rural and semi-urban districts (most local government

headquarters in Anambra State fall into this category), which is where most of these structures were set up, were constructed with little regard for the values of those expected to occupy them. It is surprising that these rural and semi-urban dwellers who are used to large, walled compounds, were expected to live in those crowded, open places with non count-yards, shades or facilities for tending domestic animals. This insensitivity becomes more glaring if we consider the design of the buildings. Most of them are single bedroom apartments. Thus the issue is not the likely size of the family but rather a dubious belief that the statuses of those who will occupy the buildings qualify them only for such huts. Yet it is common knowledge that the 'low-income' groups in Nigeria generally maintain large families for obvious reasons.

On a final note, it is unnecessary to belabour this issue. But suffice it to say that the 'working class' in the urban and semi-urban areas of the country whom the government professed would benefit from the programme for mass-housing, turned out to be the group oppressed by it. Who then benefitted? It was of course the contractors, most of them politicians, who won the inflated contracts; the senior public servants in the banks and ministries who received "kick-backs"; the importers and suppliers of raw materials who were paid for materials not supplied; the landlords in the urban areas who built houses with generous loans and put them at cut-throat prices; and the kulaks (land speculators) who received compensation for the common land etc. This class of people 'own' the Nigerian State and as we noted, government policies and programmes, however forceful their populist rhetorics, are aimed at serving their interests.

Concluding Remarks

We began this paper by pointing out that the idea of the public interest, conceived as a harmonious set of interests shared by the generality of the public, and to which government policies and programmes conform, is a myth. What obtains in reality is that specific group interests are usually projected as the public interest. We tried to show the true nature of these interests which we argued are dominant class interests. We also argued that public policies and programmes are determined by these interests, the form of government notwithstanding. In other words, that if we moved beyond rhetorics, we discover that government programmes are never geared towards the interest of 'the generality' of the public.

We then proceeded to show the nature of dominant interests in Nigeria and their relationship with public policy. To underscore this, we analyzed two programmes of past governments in the country, namely large scale agriculture and housing for all. These two are particularly interesting because they were not only publicized as being of benefit to all Nigerians, but were executed under two different regimes; one military, the other civilian. What we discovered was that both programmes, in spite of their populist expressions, basically served the interests of a minority of Nigerians whose interests dominate society and who control the Nigerian State. This was true in both cases despite the fact that the programmes were pursued under two different forms of rule — military and civilian.

These facts again give credence to claims that the current preoccupation of Nigerians with finding a form of government most suitable for the country may well be a misdirected one. *It does appear that the problems being addressed, such as political*

instability, ethnicity, corruption, indiscipline, electoral malpractices, denial of social and human rights etc, can neither be explained in themselves, nor their solution sought in forms of government. Rather, their solution must be sought in the Nigerian political economy – the mode through which the country produces and distributes wealth, including its attendant class relations. Nigeria will be no where around evolving a true democracy until this mode and its immense superstructure are completely overhauled.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of the concept of public interest, see Glendon Schubert's pioneering work *The Public Interest*, Glencoe Illinois. The Free Press, 1960. For a presentation of the Liberal Democratic theory and the changes it has undergone, see David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship and Democracy*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. 1984 Chapt. 4.
2. It is not our intention to go into the polemics surrounding the meaning of public policy. The term is used here to refer to a government's course of action; a plan of things to be done by a government over a period of time.
3. Cf. Charles F. Cnudde, "Public Opinion Structures in the States", in Robert. E. Crew (ed), *State Politics: Readings in Political Behaviour*, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1968. p. 165.
4. Cf. Schubert, op. cit. p. 8
5. See Martin N. Marger, *Elites and Masses: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, NY: D. Van Nostrand Co. 1981. Chapter 3 for a concise discussion.
6. Cf. Ibid. Chapter 4; S.P. Varma, *Modern Political Theory: A Critical Survey*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975 and T.R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978.
7. Cf. Pierre F. Gonidec, 'Introduction', in his *African Politics*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981; H.L. Swarup. 'The Marxist Methodology of the Study of political structure and political process' Paper presented at the International Political Science Association Conference, Sukhumi, USSR, October–November, 1983; Okwudiba Nnoli, *Introduction to Politics*, London: Longman, 1986 and Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa*, London: Longman, 1981. Chapter 1.
8. W. Ziemann and N. Lanzendorfer, "The State in peripheral Societies", in R. Miliband and J.Saville (eds) *Socialist Register 1977*, London: Merlin Press, 1977. p. 151.
9. For a discussion of Nigeria's class structure, see Okechukwu Ibeanu, *Soldier, State and Development in Nigeria: The military's role in political development*, Unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, Univ. of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1986, pp. 71–81.
10. James Ojiako, *13 Years of Military Rule 1966–79*, Lagos: Daily Times, (Nd) p. 160.
11. Federal Government of Nigeria, *River Basins Development Authorities Decree 1976*, Decree No. 25, Supplement to Official Gazette, No. 33, Vol. 63 (24th June, 1976) Part A.
12. Tina Wallece, "Agricultural Projects and land in Northern Nigeria", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 17 (Jan. – April, 1980).
13. Terisa Turner and Pade Badru, "Oil and Instability: Class contradictions and the 1983 coup in Nigeria", *Journal of African Marxists*, No. 7 (March 1984).
14. Ibid. p. 7.
15. Wallace, op. cit.
16. *Sokoto Rima Basin Bulletin*, Special Edition (Nd) p. 13. See also Gunilla Andrae and Bjorn Beckman, *The Wheat Trap: Bread and Underdevelopment in Nigeria*, London: Zed Books 1985. p. 97.
17. *Sokoto Rima Bulletin*, Lop. cit. p. 14.

18. Wallace op. cit. (Note 12). p. 61.
19. Ibid. pp. 61–62.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. p. 65.
22. Cf. Andrae and Beckman, op. cit. p. 97.
23. Cf. *Sokoto Rima Bulletin*, op. cit.
24. Op. cit. p. 70.
25. Cited in Ijioma Imo. *The Collapse of the Second Republic in Nigeria: Leadership Perspective*; Unpublished B.Sc. thesis, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1985, p. 68.
26. Ibid.
27. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Decent Housing for All Lagos: Federal Department of Information* (N.d) p. 1.
28. Ibid. p. 2.
29. Ibid. p. 4.
30. Ibid. pp. 9–11.
31. Ibid.
32. Ijioma op. cit. p. 69.
33. Ibid. p. 74.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ex-Works and Housing Minister, in Ibid. p. 73.