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The Gulf Crisis: Impact, Implications and Lessons for Africa

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Introduction

The Gulf war¹ is now almost nine months behind. However, its repercussions will linger and be felt not only in the countries of the Middle East region but beyond. This is particularly true for Africa. While the crisis lasted, several analyses² had shown the short and medium-effects of the conflict on various regions, Africa included. The various reports focussed almost exclusively on the economic impact of the crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to sketch an analysis of some long term repercussions of the conflict for Africa from a foreign policy perspective. To do so one has to deal with such questions as: what are the major policy changes that the Gulf war has brought to the fore of the international agenda; and what are their implications for Africa. By identifying and examining five such policy changes³, the paper argues that though a few of these policy changes might appear, at first glance, to have positive effects for African nations; on balance the consequences would be negative. It is important to understand why and to draw the appropriate lessons.

This paper is divided into five parts. Part one gives a brief analysis of the short term impact of the crisis on African countries. Part two examines the sources and nature of the policy changes brought by the war. The implications of five major policy changes for Africa are set out in part three. The last two parts deal respectively with the lessons of the crisis and the issues that the conflict points up for African countries.

II. Short Term Impact

The crisis had two rather different repercussions on African countries in the short term. First were the immediate adverse consequences. These included a sharp rise in oil price between August and December '90 which increase the import bill of oil deficit in African nations. At the prices prevailing in the second half of 1990, it has been estimated that Africa's oil import bills rose to \$9.5bn, about \$2.7bn more than the previous year⁴. A large number of African migrant workers mostly from Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Mauritania returned from some Gulf states exacerbating unemployment in those countries but also leading to loss of foreign exchange earnings from their remittances. The tourist industry in many African countries, notably, Comoros, the Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania as well as North Africa suffered substantial losses.

The combination of lost workers remittances, lost trading opportunities with Gulf countries and lost tourism revenues as well as resettlement costs for returning migrant workers and high oil import bills – all of these had a very severe impact, albeit with varying degrees, on the growth, balance of payments and exports of various African nations particularly the oil importing and the severely indebted⁵. The conflict's "overall impact on the world economy seems in the end to have been smaller than feared"⁶, however.

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On the other hand, there were some positive consequences. For instance, the brief surge in oil prices between August and December fetched African oil producers windfall financial gain estimated at nearly \$10bn. Egypt benefitted from a debt write-off by the United States government of an estimated \$7 billion military debt and the cancellation of over \$7 billion of Egypt's debt owed to its Arab creditors⁷. The need to reward Egypt because of its participation in the Coalition force and for lining support of other Arab nations paved the way for additional debt write-off of nearly \$10bn by official creditors and generous terms of rescheduling of its outstanding official debt⁸. Overall, debt forgiveness for Egypt in appreciation of its Gulf war efforts was thus in the vicinity of 45% of its total external debt.

Egypt and Morocco are the African countries expected to benefit from financial assistance to be made available by the 26 nation Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordinating Group⁹. Financial assistance from this source was essentially compensatory, designed principally to off-set economic losses that were incurred by nations that were most severely hit by the Gulf crisis. A broad application of this criteria, should have made several African nations eligible for assistance from this source, as indeed five African countries, namely; Djibouti, Mauritania, Seychelles, the Sudan and Tunisia were among 21 nations which formally informed the United Nations about the economic losses they had suffered as a result of the conflict and also from compliance with U.N. Security Council resolution 661 [1990] imposing trade embargo against Iraq¹⁰.

The short-term repercussions on Africa extended beyond the realm of economics, however. For instance, during the crisis, political tensions mounted in some African countries as both governments and the populace had conflicting perspectives about the true origins of the crisis [religious war by coalition forces versus territorial conquest by Iraq]; about the justness of the conflict; and about the conduct of the war.

Five African countries namely; Egypt, Morocco, Niger, Senegal and Sierra Leon were among the 28 - nation Coalition Force that participated in the "Operation Desert Shield" and "Operation Desert Storm". In some of these countries, the decision to participate proved very controversial and engendered anti-government demonstrations. These various repercussions have different time scopes; while the impact of some have worn away, others still persist. The long term implications of the Gulf conflict, however, arise mostly from the policy changes it has induced for the long term.

III. Ascertaining Long Term Policy Consequences of the Gulf War

The long term repercussions of the Gulf war on Africa cannot be projected with precision. Indeed, the task of sorting out the consequences is fraught with many difficulties. Principally, these include: the continuing evolution of the post-Gulf war order; continuing negotiations on some of the likely policy changes; and the impossibility of anticipating the full consequences of a war - in other words, the specific policy changes anticipated may not occur, and what occurs may not have been fully foreseen.

An additional complicating factor is the possible coincidental impact of the Gulf war and profound changes that have occurred in eastern Europe. This is not difficult to illustrate: both developments would most probably lead to reductions of arms

sales to developing nations and diminution of resources flows. Reductions in arms sales to Africa may occur as much a result of the decrease in competitive arms supply policies of big powers owing to the end of the "cold war" as the desire of the big powers to curb arms sales to developing nations because of the experience with Iraq. Similarly, resource flows to Africa may decline or stagnate as much a result of their potential diversion to eastern Europe as their drifting to the Gulf region for reconstruction purposes, to pay for regional security arrangements and for compensating countries adversely affected by the war. The issue of impact of the conflict on resource flows will be discussed later.

Another problem is that the effects of the policy changes that will be unleashed on account of the Gulf war could show up indirectly over a long period. This may arise because of impact of some of the policy changes induced by the war may be fragmented or even anecdotal. The final point is that the specific repercussions of the policy changes induced by the war may fall unevenly on individual African countries. For a large majority, however, the implications would be similar given their many shared characteristics. These limitations are not insuperable. Rather, they imply that the identification and analysis of the long term implications of the Gulf war on Africa - and indeed on any other region - have to be done with considerable care.

What, then, are some of the likely policy changes and what would be their implications for Africa? It is useful, here, to make a distinction between how the policy changes will affect African countries; and how African countries could adapt to the changes. The first set of issues are taken up in the next section and the second component in the last section of this paper. Before exploring what these changes might be, one needs to explain how to identify the changes. These can be gleaned from several sources. They can be drawn from the plans offered¹¹, the views expressed, and actions announced by the leaders of three key countries of the coalition, namely France, Britain and USA - in other words from the policy changes that the war has brought on the international policy of the key nations in the coalition. This has important bearing for Africa in so far as the foreign policy orientations in these three countries have large repercussions on African countries partly because of their international political, economic, diplomatic, and military weight and partly because of Africa dependence on them for trade, economic assistance [both bilateral and multilateral] and military purchases.

Additional sources are from the conduct of the war itself; the events linked with its aftermath e.g. the establishment of the safe haven for the Kurds; the provisions of key Security Council resolutions dealing with Gulf crisis, from these declaring the invasion of Kuwait null and void to those imposing economic sanctions on Iraq through those authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq to the cease fire arrangements, including the sale of Iraq oil under Security Council supervision.

The major policy changes arising from the Gulf war which would have repercussions for Africa over the long term can be organized around the following themes: Controlling arms build-up in Third World nations, renewed commitment to deterring aggression, benevolent intervention, transformation of the U.N. Security Council as politburo for international decision making in matters of war, and financial flows crunch. The policy implications of these changes are assessed below.

IV. Policy Implications for Africa

Controlling Arms Build-up: One of the major direct repercussions of the Gulf crisis is that it has impelled many of the major arms producing nations among the industrialized democracies to put emphasis on the need for tight curbs on conventional arms transfers to developing nations. To be sure, reduction of arms sales, in particular, of weapons of mass destruction has been the object of several international disarmament negotiations; however, the gulf crisis has led to an avalanche of initiatives or policy measures on this front. Prominent among these are the proposal by the G-7 nations to establish 'a universal register of arms transfer under the auspices of the United Nations'¹²; and the so-called "NATO GATT" — an initiative aimed at tightening arms transfers to third world nations while lowering barriers on arms sales among NATO member countries.¹³

African nations are heavily dependent on the industrialized nations for their arms procurement, the various initiatives for tightening arms sales may reduce massive arms transfers to the continent. Given that most of the initiatives have tougher clauses regarding transfers to trouble spots, African nations ridden by conflicts may be less assured of arms supplies.

Slowing the flow of conventional arms sales is only one aspect of the arms control measures being pursued by the major powers in the aftermath of the gulf war. Considerable effort is now being deployed to preempt the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles: Witness the expansion by the U.S. government of the list of potential chemical or biological arms ingredients subject to control from 11 to 50 and creation of a web of new licensing rules for the exportation of equipment, technical data and services that can be used for making such weapons¹⁴ and the initiative of G-7 to ban export of ballistic missiles¹⁵.

Indeed, the prevailing view in some circles seems to be that the danger of allowing some countries to have certain categories of weapons is too great to be concerned about "the legalities or political niceties of a great power with nuclear weapons dictating to smaller power without them that it remain without"¹⁶. Thus whatever hopes some African nations may have nursed with respect to building an arsenal with advanced weaponry may face greater obstacles than before the gulf war. Such a development can hardly be a source of regret considering that permissive arms supply policies by suppliers have exacerbated several African conflicts. Indeed, African nations might be impelled to seek peaceful solutions of their intra or inter state conflicts. Of course, weapons per se are not the sources of conflicts, rather it is the intention to use them that heightens the conflicts. A significant reduction in sale of arms from major suppliers to Africa, if not replaced by indigenous arms development might liberate substantial resources for socio-economic development. The order of magnitude of such resources can be inferred from the military expenditures of those countries that have been embroiled in civil wars for a considerable length of time. For instance, military expenditures as a percent of gross domestic product for such countries are: Angola 12%, Ethiopia 8.6%, Mozambique 7%, Chad 6%, Sudan 5.9% and Somalia 4.4% Liberia has a ratio of 2.2%; which is attributable to the recency of conflict, having only started in December, 1998¹⁷.

The expressed desires of governments of arms producing nations to control arms flows will not be enough to slow the flow; given that the forces that propel arms trade are varied and complex. Prominent among these are the arms merchants who would

circumvent many arms export procedures to make profit, the strong desire of belligerent nations to obtain arms at all cost, and paradoxically, the inconsistent policies of arms producing nations which leave major loopholes. Unless these critical factors change the renewed efforts on reducing arms sales can barely succeed.

Most probably, the reduction of the flow of arms may turn out to be selective rather than comprehensive. Indeed; barely less than three weeks after the end of the Gulf war the United States announced plans to sell arms worth U.S.\$18bn to its allies in the Middle East region. Possibly, African countries deemed to be of high strategic value and not dangerous [perceived to be a threat to regional stability] would retain access to many categories of conventional arms. A minimal flow of arms needed for national security purposes would remain. But if a policy of selective arms sales is perceived as potentially destabilizing by some countries, the neighbouring nations not benefitting from the selective treatment may resort to the black market for arms. In that case, the potential benefits of the tight arms curbs policy will be lost.

Renewed Commitment to Deterring Aggression: The use of force to acquire the territory of another nation, in part or in whole, is an act of aggression that attracts severe condemnation and deterrence. Indeed, so high is the premium placed on deterring acts of aggression that the United Nations Charter in its Article 1(1) states that one of its principles and purposes is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace..."

This lofty objective of collective action in deterring aggression has not always been realized. However, throughout the Gulf war and after, the point was made repeatedly that aggression should not be rewarded and that the international collaboration in the Gulf war showed that deterring acts of aggression was essential to preserving international peace¹⁸.

This renewed commitment to collective action in deterring aggression should be a most welcome development to African nations given that some of them have been at the receiving end of aggression: witness the invasion of the Republics of Guinea-Conakry and Benin in the 1970s. To be sure, none of these previous instances of aggression involved annexation; still the constituted pre-meditated acts of aggression against sovereign African states. Invasion for annexation is a serious but by no means the only form of aggression that should attract collective international deterrence. Thus, if this renewed commitment is universally and consistently applied, Africa might turn out to be a beneficiary of this important consequence of the gulf war. Most likely, however, this commitment will be pursued selectively, because the stakes that were evident to the major actors in Kuwait will be lacking in many African countries.

On the other hand many analysts have attributed various motivations for the high level of eagerness evinced by major powers in expelling Iraq from Kuwait. The range of motivations extend from offering protection to sheikhdoms of the gulf in exchange for their economic and financial support; with the Saudis giving a prop to America's central position in the world financial system and Kuwait playing a similar role for Britain¹⁹; to breaking the mood of self-doubt and defeatism that had existed among U.S. elites since the 1960s²⁰; to keeping the hands of a ruthless blackmailer from controlling a significant share of world oil supplies²¹. These web of considerations explain why the enforcement procedures undertaken through the U.N. Security

one or more major military powers are at risk²².

Nonetheless, some permanent members of the Security Council notably China and USSR, were thought to be so uncomfortable about the way the Council was used that "no U.N. resolution condoning the use of force is to be expected the next time an Iraq style invasion occurs. We may even find that the hopes of an [age of the United Nations] – one where international community acts in concert to deal forcefully with aggressors – has been permanently extinguished"²³. The precedent for international solidarity against an aggressor in the Gulf may, thus, be an imperfect guide to future action. Nor does the experience in the Gulf provide a guide about what happens when a big power is the aggressor. In future, therefore, an aggressed African nation would have to gauge the probability of international support with reference to whether some or all the motivations, explained earlier, that triggered the support of many big powers are present and whether the aggressor is a big power.

Yet, it would matter less whether an African nation that is aggressed meets the requirements of high strategic value to major powers to qualify for collective international support if defence of a principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter were to triumph over individual national interests in the new world order. Indeed, one intangible positive spin-off of the Gulf war for African countries is precisely that the international solidarity on the Gulf offers a bench mark against which to measure international support when and if acts of aggression are committed against an African nation. However, this would be of little comfort to an aggressed African nation whose plight might be selectively ignored, because it has little strategic value to major powers.

Benevolent Intervention: The principle that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of another country is a highly cherished one and enshrined in the OAU Charter as well as Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter. However, when at the end of March, after the Gulf war the insurgency by Kurdish guerrillas in North Iraq was defeated by the government of Iraq, international efforts were made to both provide emergency relief and find a framework for adequate protection for the Kurds in Iraq²⁴.

A major element of this effort was U.N. Security Council resolution 688 which among other things called on Iraq to "allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance". It stopped short of authorizing U.N. force to support this operation. Still three of the permanent members of the Council were impelled to supply their troops for an "operation provide comfort", creating a "safe haven" in Northern Iraq for resettling, protecting and feeding Kurdish minorities fleeing reprisals. The troops from these countries were subsequently replaced by a small U.N. observer group.

Viewed against the backdrop of the principle of non-intervention, the creation of a safe haven in one country by foreign powers to deliver humanitarian assistance appears extraordinary. But there have been accumulating signs pointing to the fact that some qualification or modification would imminently be attached to the doctrine of non-intervention²⁵. Hence, the safe havens for the Kurds in North Iraq has served to reinforce a policy that has been advocated or fostered. Thus it has been said that it should not be "inconceivable that the Security Council may contemplate military action to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered safely to a targeted civilian

population in jeopardy there is still some hesitation to establishment of a United Nations operation that, from the outset, will be given the authority to use force to carry out its mission. Perhaps views might change if a humanitarian support operation were constituted on an *ad hoc* basic, and if it were dispatched only after all other efforts had been exhausted to deliver humanitarian assistance in a threatening situation"²⁶.

Gradually, albeit selectively, the doctrine of benevolent intervention may be applied in the belief that power could occasionally "reach across borders to rectify great injustices, provided it is done with self-restraint, according to a coherent set of rules, with an eye cautiously cocked on the obvious dangers"²⁷.

If the experiences in several African countries in the recent past, particularly those that have been crisis-ridden or have been replete with humanitarian emergencies, such as violation of human rights are repeated; it is not difficult to envision that the doctrine of benevolent intervention could be applied to justify "cautious help" to such "deserving" African countries in the future.

Indeed, it has been pointed out that "the international community must now think hard to decide whether outside interference is not necessary to stop the senseless killing in other civil wars raging on the continent of Africa. The wars in Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique and Angola have claimed the lives of those directly involved in the fighting, but also of millions of innocent civilians who became victims of famines and epidemics in the war-torn areas why should the world be called upon year after year to bring emergency aid to millions of starving Africans if the root cause of their misery is war and not natural disaster? Would it not make more sense to stop the wars even by outside intervention?"²⁸

However, if and when benevolent intervention does occur in Africa the permissive atmosphere made possible by the experience of the Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf war would be partly responsible. Possibly, the democratic-oriented changes occurring in the continent coupled with the winding down of the various conflicts would, if they endure, avert the probability of incidence of benevolent intervention. Arguably, there will be selective applications of the doctrine of benevolent intervention reflecting the preoccupations of interested powers.

Transformation of the Security Council as Politburo for International Decision-making on Matters of War and Peace: Entrusted by the United Nations Charter, principally with the function of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, the Security Council has twice in its history authorized "military enforcement" as against "peace-keeping" measures to give effect to the principle of collective security. The first instance was in Korea in 1950 and most recently in the Gulf war²⁹. The speed and efficiency with which the Council acted in the Gulf war has reassured many that, thanks to the end of the cold war, the Council may now be able to live up to its pristine purpose.

Yet certain developments during the Gulf crisis dramatized how less much important the non-permanent members have become. The first was that the key resolutions that were enacted during the crisis were discussed and agreed by the five veto-wielding permanent members and then submitted to the others more or less for endorsement. The non-permanent members were thus consigned to a reactive role.

Yemen and Cuba voted or abstained on many of the resolutions on the Gulf crisis adopted by the Council; but that hardly altered the ultimate direction pushed by the senior partners of the coalition who are permanent members of the Security Council.

Another episode related to the considerable difficulties encountered by the non-aligned members of the Council when they wanted an open discussion on the status of the implementation of Council resolution 678 just before the launch of the ground war. The discussions were subsequently held in private; and in any case too late to halt the continuation of the air war or avert the outbreak of a ground war.

The Security Council has always been a powerful organ of the United Nations, and the permanent members of the Council its aristocracy. The Gulf war, the first in an international climate devoid of the cold war, served to strengthen the role of the Security Council, as an important organ of the U.N. for enforcing and maintaining peace and enhanced the influence of the five permanent members as international "standing politburo" of war and peace.

No African country has a permanent seat on the Council, as such Africa might hardly be a key player on decision of war. This needs to be remedied the thrust of such an effort should be to ensure that "a continent that accounts for roughly one-third of the membership of the United Nations, ought to be represented in the most powerful chambers on a permanent basis"³⁰. Progress along this line is not particularly promising, desirable as it may be. Consequently, Africa would hardly share in the enhanced prestige the Council has acquired as a result of the Gulf war.

Financial Flows Crunch: Income losses from reduced or lost trade and evaporation of remittances were the dominant features of the short term financial impact of the Gulf crisis. In the long term, however, Africa potentially faces a major crunch in financial flows as a result of the Gulf war because of the huge cost of financing the war and compensations as well as reconstruction costs. Each of these needs to be explained.

The Gulf war operations had two funding arrangements relating respectively to military costs and economic costs for easing disruptions to the most immediately impacted nations amounting to \$40bn and \$13.5bn. Financial subscriptions to these funding mechanisms were from mainly the Industrialized nations and the Gulf states. Such significant financial outlays to the conflict potentially diminishes resource flows to Africa and other Third World regions; in so far as the financial contributions to the war efforts by the major surplus nations represent an extra demand on the same countries which Africa looked to for financial support for development³¹

Thus, African countries which as a group have been major recipients of official development assistance from the Gulf and Arabian peninsular states that would now bear reconstruction costs, face the prospects of reduced financial flows from the countries of that region. African countries use to receive approximately 45% of the total ODA assistance from the regional and national development institutions of the Gulf and Arabian peninsular states,³² which account for about 5% of total ODA resources to Africa. Moreover, if the proposal of starting Middle East Bank for reconstruction and development, by the U.S. Secretary of State materialized; it would be an extra conduit for resources from the Industrialized nations' adding to the high financial resource outlay to eastern Europe and Soviet Union³³. In these circumstances, unless the overall foreign economic assistance budgets of the OECD

nations increase significantly, Africa's share of official development assistance would face a long term decline precisely at a time when all projections point to the need for increased financial assistance.

There is another way in which the huge reconstruction costs imposed by the Gulf war would affect Africa: as several of the highly credit worthy Gulf states enter the international money markets, to raise funds to rebuild their economies, as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have done, interest rates would rise and African nations could be "crowded out"³⁴. Though lending to many African countries from the international financial markets have declined sharply since the onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, the impact of borrowing by the Gulf states for their reconstruction needs in the Gulf states would be to exert further squeeze on overall resource flows to Africa.

IV. Lessons

Various lessons can be drawn from the Gulf crisis for Africa. The military lessons of the conflict, which are worthy of a separate study have been omitted. The intention is to focus on only five, even though it is recognized that the list can be expanded endlessly.

Beware of Selective Application of Commitments: Contrary to the high promise that the new world order is supposed to hold, the Gulf crisis showed that there will continue to be selectivity in several aspects of international policy of the major powers. Thus, many African countries that were severely impacted in the Gulf conflict received no financial assistance. For example, the order of magnitude of GNP losses suffered by five African nations on account of the Gulf crisis by end of February [Chad 2.5%, Sudan 3.8%, Tanzania 2.85, Botswana 2.8%, and Mauritius 2.6%] were more than Pakistan 2.4% that was eligible for economic assistance from the Gulf Co-ordination Financial Crisis Group. Indeed, of the nineteen African nations which suffered economic losses in the range of 1% and above³⁵; only three were deemed eligible for assistance. Curbs on arms supply as the analysis has demonstrated will also be selective as would the commitment to deterring aggression. Selectivity was also very evident in the benevolent intervention pursued in Iraq: the Kurds of Northern Iraq were protected, while the Shiite muslim refugees in the South were left unaided.

While the policy of courting African and other third world nations by various blocs during cold war blunted the impact of selective policy commitments, the events related to the Gulf war have shown that Africa can expect to receive less support in the new strategic environment of the post cold war. Indeed, African countries have either not featured or have barely been mentioned among the priority regions being proposed for selective commitment³⁶. The reasons for this are not difficult to fathom. Traditionally, nations have been courted or coveted by others when they are a source of important raw materials, markets for exports or for sheer political value. Today, Africa's raw materials are for the most part replaced by synthetics, its low levels of income make it a not too profitable export market; and the end of the cold war has reduced the value of political relationship based solely on same vague notion of ideological affinity.

Impotence of Third World Organizations: The two main parties of the Gulf conflict were - and remain - bounded together in a dazzling array of Third World Organizations. They are joined in organizations relating to oil [OPEC]; religious faith [Or-

ganization of Islamic countries]; regional solidarity [League of Arab States]; Third world political solidarity [Non-Aligned Movement] and Third world economic solidarity [Group of 77]. Arguably, the particular orientation of some of these organizations preclude them from playing mediatory role, especially in matters as complicated as invasion and annexation. Still, it must be said that the two organizations that were eminently suited to play the role "the Arab league and the Non Aligned Movement were hopelessly divided"³⁷, exerting efforts too little or too late. The assertion that "if more than 40 muslim states had opposed the invasion of Kuwait, probably the tragic consequences could have been averted"³⁸, is hard to corroborate.

An important lesson of the Gulf crisis – a lesson that many regional conflicts have all too often demonstrated – is the failure of Third World organizations to exercise any influence over major disputes or conflicts affecting them. This is likely to be the case until the key Third World Organizations are more rigorously guided by some principles. In the case of the NAM, there should be rigorous adherence to the principles of inadmissibility of use of force to settle disputes and inviolability of national borders.

Construct Framework for Regional Security: The corollary to the demonstrated failure of Third World Organizations in the Gulf crisis is the absence of credible regional security framework that is founded on the notion of mutual security. The result as we saw in the Gulf conflict was that an aggressed neighbouring nation relied on the military might of mostly forces external to the region for protection. At present, the nearest thing to a regional security framework that Africa has is the Organization of African Unity. Even so it has not always been able to restrain inter-state conflicts much less mediate them. The Gulf conflict has underlined the need for Africa to construct a framework that links security and stability of each member state to the imperative need for enhanced co-operation. In the absence of such a framework that promotes confidence-building measures, there will be little scope for consolidating the democratic reforms in Africa, much less increase Africa's economic cooperation.

Do not Aggress Strategic Neighbours: It is often tempting for regional powers nations to cast covetous eyes on their small or weak neighbours. When such a relationship is characterized by long standing disputes over territorial nature, then the temptation is doubly reinforced. The Gulf war has shown that the defence of small or weak country, could be deemed on strategic importance by some powers or coalition of powers; and it becomes foolish adventurism to aggress, invade or annex such a neighbour. This inevitably raises the question of how to foretell whether an attack or an invasion of neighbouring country will attract deterrence. There is no rule of the thumb as the analysis in the previous section has shown. Vital national resources need not be used up for second-guessing whether an act of aggression will be repelled. Few African countries will fall into the so-called strategic category; and, perhaps, fewer still will be tempted to annex a country. Yet the Gulf crisis has taught a contemporary lesson of the perils of aggression, particularly when that act of aggression is defeated.

Perilous Lack of Viable Energy Strategy: The Gulf crisis exercise negative economic impact on many African countries via five main channels, namely: through increased oil import bills; resettlement costs; as well as through loss of export earnings; workers remittances; tourism receipts; and economic assistance from affected Gulf states. A survey of the economic impact of the crisis on nineteen African countries showed

that only in two [Egypt and Sudan] did the non-oil costs exceed the estimated economic cost imposed by high oil prices brought by the war³⁹. The Gulf crisis has demonstrated a new vulnerability of oil-deficit African countries to sharp and sudden up-swings in oil prices --- vulnerability made worse by lack of national energy strategy in many African nations. One of the greatest lessons to be "learnt from the Gulf crisis by Africa is the need for a comprehensive energy policy which will reach beyond the traditional issues of diversification of energy sources to the questions of designing an overall regional energy strategy"⁴⁰

V. Conclusions

The lessons from the Gulf crisis have pointed up a number of issues which African countries ought to revisit. One of these is the notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states of the OAU. The thrust of that effort need not be the scrapping of the concept as such, rather there should a re-examination of the circumstances when it should not bar member states from exercising well concerted benevolent action in support of certain humanitarian emergencies. This also implies that a mechanism for this action should be designed and put in place.

Second, many African countries failed to take a definitive stand on the aggression against Kuwait. This has raised the question whether such an attitude was dictated by the feelings of "it is none of my business" or "utter powerlessness about the course of events". Either attitude raises the troubling question about how much committed some African nations are to principles of inadmissibility of use of force to settle or acquire territory. Conversely, how would the African countries which stood by feel if they suffered aggression and were left to their own devices.

Third, there is the question of the adequacy of existing mechanisms within the continent for managing inter-state conflicts. Fortunately, most intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Africa are fast disappearing, often thanks to the mediation efforts of foreign powers. Where such external mediation has not materialized, and African initiatives have been left on their own, conflicts have dragged on and degenerated into bloody stalemates and quagmires. Consequently, there are no assurances or insurance against their reoccurrence. A viable insurance policy must consist of a mixture of strengthening or re-designing continental institutions that are vested with sufficient powers to resolve damaging disputes.

Africa's hopes of economic development and transformation as well as enhanced economic integration and prospects for recouping some of her lost significance in the affairs can only be realized in an environment devoid of politically damaging conflicts. Achieving these objectives require initiatives for mutual confidence-building in the political and security fields. It is vital to avoid gulf-conflict types of situations.

1. The Gulf war refers to "Operation Desert Storm" launched on January 17, 1991 in the context of U.N. Security Council resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 to liberate Kuwait which was invaded by Iraq on 2nd August and annexed on 8th August, rather than to the Iran—Iraq war fought between 1980 — 1988 which also goes by the same title.
2. See, for example *World Bank: World Bank Tables 1990/1991, Volume 1* [p. 23 — 24]; UNCTAD: Economic consequences of the present crisis: a preliminary assessment' Note by UNCTAD secretariat TD/B/1272 25th September, 1990; U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: A Preliminary assessment of performance of the Africa Economy in 1990 and prospects for 1991, 14 January, 1991. Adebayo Adedeji: *The Gulf Crisis and the World Economy*. Text of the 2nd Anniversary Lecture to the Nigerian—French Insurance Company under the auspices of the Nigerian—French Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 14th February, 1991 and also *Overseas Development Institute*, London: *The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on developing Countries*. Briefing Paper, March, 1991 [This study was finalized on the day the war ended].
3. The term policy changes is used interchangeably with policy consequences. Two types of issues have been confederated under these rubrics, namely; those that have received renewed emphasis in the light of the conflict; and those that flow from the dealing with consequences of the war. Each of the five major policy changes falls into one of these categories.
4. Except where noted, the discussions of the short term economic consequences draw on *U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Economic Report on Africa 1991*, p. 3 - 4.
5. See *Overseas Development Institute*, *op cit*, p. 1 - 2 and *World Bank op cit* p. 23 & 24.
6. See *United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs: World Economic Survey 1991*, United Nations, New York, 1991 p. 1.
7. See *World Bank*, *op cit*, p. 8.
8. See news report titled "Half of Egypt's \$20.2bn Debt being Forgiven by U.S. and Allies" in *The New York Times* May 27, 1991 p. 1.
9. The members of this Group are U.S.A., European Economic Community [12], Gulf Cooperation Council [6], Japan and some other OECD nations. These countries have agreed to disburse approximately \$14 billion in development [emergency] assistance to the affected countries. The full breakdown of disbursement and specific criteria for allocation have not been made public; a point also made by *Overseas Development Institute op cit*, p. 3 & 4.
10. See letter dated 21 March, 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of 21 nations to the President of the Security Council (U.N. Security Council Document S/22382).
11. Plans for a post Gulf war were variously articulated by President Francois Mitterand; Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary; and James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State. The key common elements of these plans which can be drawn from James Baker's were: new regional security arrangements for the Gulf; arms control measures, in particular, abolition of weapons of mass destruction; reconstruction of the region including the establishment of a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development; renewed commitment to finding a lasting peace to the middle east crisis. See *International Herald Tribune*, 7th February, 1991 p. 1 and 8th February, 1991 p. 4.
12. See excerpts from the Political Declaration of the G - 7 Summit in London, 1991 in *The Times* (London) 7 July, 1991 p. 8.
13. For details of the plan, See *Financial Times* (London) February 20, 1991 p. 3.
14. See *International Herald Tribune*, March 9 - 10, 1991 p. 3.

15. The G - 7 initiative on banning sales of ballistic missiles which has been codified in a Missile Control Technology Regime pre dates the gulf war. See *World Economic Survey op cit*, p. 186.; but they have reaffirmed their determination at the London Summit to strengthen and expand the non-proliferation regimes.
16. See Charles Krauthammer "Why Arms Control Is Obsolete" in *Time Magazine* August 5, 1991 p. 48.
17. The ratio of military expenditure to GDP of these countries, with the exception of Liberia, is far in excess of the African average of 4 - 4.2%. African average was calculated from the combined averages of sub-sahara and North African countries. See. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1990*, Oxford University Press, New York p. 162 and 174.
18. Indeed, President Bush has been reported as making "solidarity against aggression" as one of the four guiding principles of his New World Order. The others are "peaceful settlement of disputers"; "reduced and controlled arsenals"; and "just treatment of all peoples" See, Richard Brookhiser, "Two Centuries of New World Orders" in *Time Magazine*, May 6, 1991 p. 76.
19. See Walter Russell Mead, "A Successful U.S. Foreign Policy will be Realistic" *International Herald Tribune*, February 7, 1991 p. 6.
20. This motivation, which has been cited in several analyses and editorial comments in the U.S.A. explaining the involvement of the United states government in the gulf conflict, was referred to but not shared by Paul Kennedy "A Declining Empire Goes to War" *The Wall Street Journal* (New York) January 24, 1991 p. A10.
21. See *The Economist* (London) January 12, 1991 p. 12.
22. See Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin "The U.N. in a New World Order" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991 p. 77.
23. See Terumasa Nakanishi "The Gulf Graveyard of the New Order" in *Economic Eye : A Quarterly Digest of Views from Japan* Vol. 12 No. 2 Summer 1991 p. 10 [Published by Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs].
24. See "Keesing's Record of World Events". *News Digest for April* Vol. 37 No. 4 1991 p. 38126 — 38128.
25. For some accounts See Paul Redfern, "Global Initiative to Dump non-intervention Doctrine" in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi, Kenya) July 3, 1991 p. 6.
26. See James O.C. Jonah : "Developing A United Nations Capacity for Humanitarian Support Operations", Paper prepared for presentation at a Workshop on "Humanitarian Emergencies and Armed Conflict : The Possible Contribution of Outside Military Forces" in Niinisalo, Finland from 24 — 26 October 1989.
27. See Brian Beedham "Neither Quagmire Nor Empire, But Cautious Help", *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, 1991 p. 6.
28. See editorial comment titled "Towards a new Definition of Interferences?" in *Development and Co-operation* No. 3/1991 p. 2 [Publication of German Foundation for International Development].
29. See Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin "The U.N. in a New World Order" *op cit*, p. 69.
30. See Ibrahim Gambari, "Africa and the United Nations" in *Africa Forum*, Vol. 1 No. 2 1991 p. 66.
31. See Roy Lashley : "Increased Aid Needs Could Become Victims of Gulf War : Donors struggle to boost Africa Financing" in *Africa Recovery, United Nations Development of Public Information*, October — December, 1990, Vol. 4 No. 3-4, p. 7.
32. See figures in *World Economic Survey*, 1990 p. 241.
33. Total commitments of the OECD group of 24 to Soviet union and east european countries as of April, 1991 are put at U.S. \$86 billion, See *World Economic Survey 1991* p. 118.

34. This point has also been made in ECA : *The Persian Gulf crisis and the African Economies*, Report to the 26th session of the Commission/ 17th Conference of Ministers E/ECA/CM. 17/3, 17 April 1991 *op cit.* p. 6.
35. See, *Overseas Development Institute*, London : Briefing Paper *op cit.* p. 1.
36. For some typical examples of recent analyses; See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment" *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991 and Peter McGrath, "The Lonely Superpower" in *Newsweek*, October 7, 1991 p. 18 - 19.
37. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein "After the Gulf War" *Foreign Affairs* Fall 1991, p. 58.
38. See statement by Mr. Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysian Minister of Finance in *International Herald Tribune*, May-6, 1991 p. 4.
39. See *Overseas Development Institute*, London Briefing Paper *op cit.* p. 1 [The nineteen countries are : Benin, Botswana, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania].
40. See ECA : *The Persian Gulf Crisis and the African Economies*, *op. cit.* p. 6.

Refining the Issues for Realistic Population—Development Policies in Africa

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Introduction

The debate on the effect of population growth on development seems to have reached a mind unsettling, indeed an unfortunate settlement to reduce, without qualification, rapid population growth, effectively by reduction of fertility. This state of affairs can be seen from a change of attitude on this at Arusha and Mexico, respectively, and at Regional and World Population Conferences since Bucharest, 1974. At Bucharest, with China playing a significant role in the debate, developing countries insisted on development as the best "contraceptive" for solution of population problems (See an evaluation by Jonhson, 1987).

What is curious, indeed worrisome, is the recent virtual resignation, since the early 1980's by African countries, not just to the dictates of IMF—World Bank conditions, the source of the anti-natalist policy, but the abrupt change of orientation, even if forces, "without a fight", particularly after "drawing the battle lines" at Bucharest. Ironically, the Reagan Government through the United States mission to the Mexico conference took the earlier developing country Bucharest position of development as a solution, through the fundamental difference was the United States urging of free enterprise and markets.

Even before meeting at Mexico for the subsequent 1984 World Population Conference, African countries, in coming to adopt the Kilimanjaro Declaration in Arusha, January, 1984, showed they had swung like a pendulum to the other extreme, of virtually a frontal approach to population problems by limitation of fertility. (China itself, with the one child policy, is already falling into a bottomless pit, as will become clear later).

However, although it is not an excuse for change for basic positions — and in this paper they are urged to go back to their Bucharest stance — the practical reasons that have made African countries do so are understandable. In reviewing the evolution of population policy in the case of Tanzania which had the Bucharest position even much earlier, Kamuzora (1989a) shows it has been economic difficulties, solution of which the government has sought external financial assistance; conditions attached to this source of finance has forced it to work towards a population policy which prominently is anti-natalist. It is because donors insist on adoption of IMF and World Bank conditions which normally include reduction of fertility as a condition for the assistance, (The latest lambasting of African countries to adopt "birth control" as

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