THE OCTOBER 1994 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

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The Role of Campaigns in Local Government Elections:

Election campaigns are among the most critical components of the electoral process in any democracy. Campaigns can influence voters to make decisions on whether or not to elect a candidate to office. Indeed, "most elections take place after political campaigns, which theoretically illuminate and clarify issues".[1] Rational voters are assumed to make decisions about candidates and their political parties after being satisfied with issues and policies presented to them by these candidates or their agents.

Thus, "election campaigns are supposed to provide all relevant information about office seekers and party programmes which can allow the citizens to make enlightened decisions on party policies, programmes and the ability and worthiness of a particular party candidate".[2] Political campaigns are therefore the very essence of politics. Robert Dahl, has argued in polyarchy that conditions of stable democracy entails that "the psycho-technics of party management and party advertising, slogans and marching tunes, are not accessories; they are the essence of politics".[3] These campaign tactics help to institutionalize plural democracy. For, as Seymour Lipset has contended in his reflections on capitalism, socialism and democracy, "the basic problem of democracy is the need to institutionalize a peaceful struggle among competing elites that offer the masses the opportunity to choose between alternative programmes even as they expose one another's weaknesses and failings."[4] Election campaigns therefore facilitate the peaceful struggle for political office. Since the essence of democracy is to empower the voters to pick among the various competitors for political office, election campaigns enhance the institutionalization of political empowerment through informed voter decisions.

Campaigns are expected to supply all critical and relevant information about political office seekers. Furthermore, election campaigns also supply information about party programs and policies. It is "this informed judgement which enlightens political party competition and guarantees that voters will make their choices properly and rationally basing such decisions on the information availed to them during the campaigns".[5] This means that the party and its candidate has to be presented to the electorate in a manner that will enable voters to make their choice. In a way, campaigns package candidates and their parties in the most attractive manner. In essence, the candidate is packaged in similar fashion to the way "a commodity would neatly be wrapped up in an attractive box for the consumers (the electorate) to be enticed to prefer buying it, instead of another commodity."[6]

The basic rationale for political campaigns during elections is therefore to ensure effective citizen participation in a country's political process. Ideally, political campaigns improve the civic competence of the society through access to information about the whole political process, including party platforms, candidates' position on issues etc. Indeed, Robert Dahl has also strongly argued that the competence and

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political understanding of citizens is "augmented by the widespread availability of low cost information". That,

> "The supply of information is further increased by political competition among office seekers organized into political parties. As they compete for voters, office seekers are compelled to supply information on the basis of which citizens can make informed judgements about the policies, programs, and proposals of parties and elected officials, as well as the trustworthiness, honesty ability and other relevant characteristics of political leaders. Armed with information of this kind, citizens may hold elected officials or parties accountable in a succeeding election.[7]

Election campaigns are therefore not only a mechanism for informing citizens and improving their political competence, but it is also a mechanism for holding politicians accountable. Campaign promises create a sort of political cognitive dissonance. If politicians do not deliver on their campaign promises, they will be penalized by the electorate. This compels elected officials to follow through their election campaigns. Moreover, during campaigns citizens are able to seek clarification on salient policy concerns. In working democracies office seekers are bound to provide such clarification if they want to be elected.

Election campaigns also epitomize intra and interparty competition. This enhances democracy, particularly where political parties can campaign freely without intimidation from any quarters. In this essence, election campaigns can enhance multiparty democracy through competitive policy, especially because "free competition among parties is the hallmark of a pluralist democracy"[8] Here, political parties have to ensure free and fair competition for any vacant office within the party as well as within the government. Able party members have to be allowed to openly campaign for party nominations. Once nominated, candidates from different political parties have to seek the mandate of the electorate by informing them about their abilities and party programs. This democratic exercise is expressly performed in political campaigns.

Political campaigns during elections can also reinforce political participation by strengthening political parties. How does this happen? When campaigns get underway "they reawaken the partisan loyalties of voters" because "both candidates get publicity"[9] Voters become more aware of the existence of political parties during campaigns and may decide to become active participants both as campaign volunteers (activists) for their political parties and as voters, by making sure that they vote for their favorite political party.

Given the importance of campaigns in elections as underscored above, candidates and their political parties cannot ignore them. Neither can the election supervisors ignore them. Effective campaigns, therefore, involve both the election Managers as well as the candidates and their political parties.

Basic Steps to an Effective Election Campaign

An effective election campaign is envisioned as a campaign which delivers the intended message to the targeted voters at the appropriate time. Effective campaigns are therefore expensive and professionally conducted by a dedicated and highly motivated

staff. Campaigns must therefore be planned and executed within the bounds of prevailing election laws and regulations. Campaigns have also to take into consideration the political, economic and social conditions prevailing in a country. Shrewd election campaigns require to fulfill the following.

First and foremost, effective election campaigns require the establishment of a working organization, both at the party level and at individual candidates level. The purpose of the campaign organization is two fold. Fist, the organization has to raise campaign funds to meet campaign expenses, such as advertisements in mass media, i.e. buy radio time, printed media space, prepare posters, make T-shirts, etc. Second, the campaign organization has to prepare the campaign strategy to be adopted by the party and the candidate. In this regard, a campaign organization has to be headed by a competent campaign manager. Also included in the team are several qualified lawyers and accountants who will assist in mobilizing and accounting for the campaign funds. The campaign team will not be complete without public relations people, advertising specialists and political advisers. It is important that the campaign team also recruits volunteers who will inform the candidate and the party of the actual political situation in the contested constituency. Moreover, volunteers who will also assist in door to door campaigns, telephone and mail campaigns in urban constituencies have to be recruited.

A shrewd campaign team will also help the party and the candidate to recruit political, social and economic specialists who will advise on various issues relevant to the constituency. For national leadership contestation it may be imperative to assemble competent advisers who will write "position papers" on all pertinent issues that bother the society, ranging from unemployment, indigenization, inflation, degradation of the environment, privatization of state industries etc. All these teams of campaign specialists and advisers cost money.

The second key step in organizing effective campaigns is raising campaign funds. Without funding there can't be effective campaigns. However, it is imperative for the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to provide proper guidelines on how to raise campaign money. If care is not taken into consideration, elections can be unfair when some candidates and their political parties have access to unlimited financial resources while others are financially constrained.

Money can boost a candidate and his/her party by improving public visibility. Charles Dunn has correctly observed that "high visibility during a campaign is an asset for a candidate for political office."[10] Yet high visibility is only possible with a fat campaign wallet that enables the candidate to move from one corner of the constituency to the other, to organize campaign parties, to buy more campaign adds in the radio, TV and newspapers, to buy campaign volunteers, to distribute T-shirts, posters and other gifts. However, one has to hasten that the availability of money can tempt vote buying and other election irregularities. Indeed, observers acknowledge that "if one candidate has a good deal more money than his or her opponent, the campaign may be decided simply on the basis of contributions"[11]

In view of possible abuses of election laws, and the need to ensure fairness, the National Electoral Commission had to decide how campaign funds can be raised. Also, the Commission had to set maximum amounts individual contributors can give

candidates, and had to put limitations on how much individual candidates and their political parties can spend in a specified election i.e. local government election, parliamentary elections and presidential elections. It is not enough to give subsidies to political parties during elections. Guidelines on the management of campaign funds are imperative, so as to enhance rather than inhibit democracy. The Commission has to put limits on the amount of campaign funds given, received and spent by individual candidates and their political parties.

The third step in efficient election campaign management is the determination of campaign strategy. The campaign strategy has to be dictated by both the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in the constituency as well as by the campaign resources (money, manpower and equipment) available to the candidate and the party. A campaign strategy "consists of the answer to questions about the tone, theme, timing and targets."[12] The tone could be positive i.e. emphasizing on the burning issues of the constituency (developmental programs etc.) or it could be negative i.e. personal attacks of the opponent. Incumbent candidates are vulnerable to attacks on their office records and have to design a strategy to defend themselves.

Apart from the tone of the campaign, candidates have to determine campaign themes (simple appealing statements) which will capture the imagination of voters. Again campaign themes have to be dictated by social, economic and political expediency in a particular constituency for a specific election.

Both the campaign tone and campaign theme have to target specific voters. In this instance the candidate and his/her political party have to gather information about these voters who are likely to change their minds about how to vote. The candidate has to have an idea of the number of party members registered to vote in the constituency whether locally, district wise, regionally and nationally for national offices. Political parties and their candidates have also to focus their energies on those voters most affected by social, economic and political policies being implemented by the incumbent government. Low income groups, gender politics, unemployed workers, peasants affected by low cash crop prices etc. All these factors influence the campaign tone and campaign theme adopted by the candidate and the party.

The October 1994 local government election campaign will be evaluated using the above framework. That is, the campaigns will be evaluated taking into consideration, whether or not they were properly organized, whether or not political parties and their candidates focused issues relevant to local conditions, and whether or not campaigns, candidates and their parties adopted any campaign strategy with focused campaign tones and themes. Furthermore, the issue of campaign fund raising will also be looked into.

The Campaign Machinery

The October 1994 Local Government election campaigns were conducted under close guidance of the National Electoral Commission as per Part X of the Local Authorities (Elections) Act No. 4 of 1979. Part X Section 53(i)(a) provides that "The electoral authority shall declare the period not being more than fourteen days before the election day during which election campaigns shall commence and terminate in a ward."[13] In

accordance with the requirements of this act, the National Electoral Commission scheduled the campaigns to commence on 16th-29th October, 1994.

It is imperative to point out that field reports from various wards indicate that unofficial campaigns commenced several days before the NEC scheduled date of 16th October, 1994. In reality, therefore, actual campaign days exceeded those provided for by law. Campaign days legally recognized failed to take into account the fact that even the nomination of the candidates required campaigns. The law should be amended to let campaign days be determined by the candidate and the party to include party nomination campaigns. For a number of CCM candidates, campaigns started when they were seeking their nomination. For example, in Kainam ward, Mbulu District, campaigns started unofficially when Mr. Silvester Ombay was nominated by CCM. Mr. Ombay was disliked by CCM members in Kainam ward.

Thus, although CCM boasts of about 900 registered members in Kainam ward, CHADEMA won the election despite having only 30 officially registered members. Mr. Silvester Ombay, the CCM candidate was nominated because he won 270 preferential votes from his village (Kainam village) but did not secure substantial votes from the other 2 villages, Nahhseyi and Hareabi. His next rival Mr. Daniel Sulle got 103 preferential votes from Hareabi village while Mr. Quamara Baha got 77 preferential votes from his fellow villagers of Nahhaseyi. Also it is said that villagers from Nahhaseyi and Hareabi villages were displeased with Mr. Ombays performance as the Ward's Medical Rural Aid (RMS) at Kainam dispensary. They complained that Mr. Ombay neglected their villages, and worried that if elected councillor he would continue to ignore them.

When Mr. Qamara Baha crossed over to CHADEMA from CCM (after loosing in the preferential votes) villagers from the two villages immediately ganged against Mr. Ombay. Immediately after his nomination, villagers from Nahhaseyi and Hareabi decided not to vote for Mr. Ombay. Underground campaigns that commenced immediately following his nomination led to his ultimate defeat. Since the two villages had more voters and CCM members rebelled against their candidate, CHADEMA won handily (1039 votes against CCM's 949) despite the sloppy official CHADEMA campaign in the ward. Both CCM, CHADEMA and other political parties started their unofficial campaigns before the officially scheduled date during the registration period.

Section 53 (2) of Act No. 4 of 1979, allows candidates and their political parties to conduct election campaigns without seeking any permit from the government functionaries. This section affirms that "A declaration of the period of the campaign shall, without further assurance, constitute a permit for the candidates and the political parties sponsoring such candidates to convene and address public meetings" for the purposes of ward election campaigns. In the October 1994 local government elections candidates were therefore able to convene campaign meetings without having to seek permits from the government.

However, Section 53(3) directed that "for the purpose of ensuring peaceful and orderly meetings during the campaign period".

Each political party and its candidate shall:

a) submit to the Returning Officer the programme of public meetings to be held

b) the Returning Officer shall scrutinize the campaign programmes of all the candidates and if necessary advise the candidates to make changes to their programme in order to avoid conflicting meetings and;

c) the Returning Officer shall submit the co-ordinated programmes to the District Commissioners for information and for the purpose of providing security at such meetings if necessary.

The law also stipulates in section 55(1) that "every candidate shall be responsible for the expenses during the election". However, the government through the National Electoral Commission (NEC) promised to give each candidate TShs. 30,000/= to subsidize campaign expenses. It is not clear whether or not the government deliberately and maliciously delayed subsidy payments. All over Tanzania, candidates and their political parties complained that campaign subsidy money was paid after the elections were over.

Apart from guidance for the conduct of election campaigns provided by the law, the National Electoral Commission also issued several guidelines. Three guidelines in the form of booklets were issued by the Commission.

The first guideline was titled: "Maelekezo kwa Wasimamizi wa Uchaguzi wa Madiwani 1994" (Guidelines for Election Supervisors for 1994 Civic Polls). Section 6.14 reiterates that under multipartism, political parties and their candidates are responsible for election campaigns. This section of the guideline also reminds the election supervisors that the Commission determines the dates for the commencement of election campaigns after publishing them in the government gazette, and that the law permits only 14 days of campaigns. The latter part of this stipulation was ignored by the incumbent as well as the opposition parties.

The guidelines also direct that all campaign literature should be approved by the Commission and that as part of the Campaign literature, the Commission will issue "dummy" ballot papers showing the names of candidates and their affiliated political parties. These dummy ballot papers have to be distributed equally to all participating political parties to help in teaching voters how to vote on the election day.

Demanding that all campaign literature be approved by the Commission is too restrictive. It is an affront to the freedom of candidates and their political parties to think and organize as their conscience demands. Why should some other umpire oversee and determine what is good or bad for a political party. Such controls are rude reminders of the hey days of monopoly politics when the state dominated every aspect of political life in the country and freedom of expression was curtailed. Given that opportunities for petitioning wrong doing in a court of law exist, the demand that all campaign literature be approved by the Commission should be nullified. It only gives opposition parties room to complain of unnecessary control, harassment and domination by a state organ. Moreover, patronization of political parties which this demand seems to embrace does not border well with expanded democracy under

multipartism. Election campaigns are supposed to enhance and strengthen democracy, not to inhibit it.

At any rate, section 6(d) of this directive which states that all written campaign literature has to be approved by the Commission contradicts section 6(a) (ii) which states that, under multipartism, political parties are solely responsible for their election campaigns. In addition to this fact, the law governing election campaigns only mandates the returning officer to scrutinize the campaign programmes of all the candidates and not their campaign literature.

The second guideline issued by the Commission relating to the October 1994 Local Government elections was titled "Maelekezo kwa Vyama vya Siasa na Wagombea wa Uchaguzi wa Madiwani 1994 (Guidelines to Political Parties and Candidates for the 1994 Civil Polls). Pages 11 and 12 of this guideline reminds political parties and their candidates that they are free to conduct campaigns without seeking any permission. The directive states also that, it is the "sole responsibility of political parties and their candidates to conduct election campaigns". However, any other agent can campaign on behalf of the party and the candidate only with their tacit approval. Despite the freedom to organize, the Commission directs that "all written campaign literature can only be published and distributed after the approval of the commission,"[15] If election campaigns are to help the institutionalization of a democratic culture under multipartism, this unnecessary impingement on the freedom of expression of political parties and their candidates should be discarded; it kills innovation and undermines political competition. Furthermore, it is absolutely important for political parties and their candidates to feel that they are being allowed to manage their own political affairs without undue interference from state institutions, thus enhancing democracy by promoting a wider sense of freedom and vitality.

The third guideline that influenced election campaigns in the October 1994 civil polls was titled: "Maelekezo kwa Mpiga Kura" (Guidelines to Voters). This guideline should be commended for enhancing voter understanding of their rights and responsibilities during campaigns. The section on "election campaigns",[16] informs voters that political parties will conduct election campaigns in the form of public rallies, visiting voters, and through various advertisements. The Commission advised voters to attend campaign rallies, to listen attentively and read the campaign ads. That during campaign meetings or during consultations with election campaigners, voters can ask questions and seek clarification from candidates in order to understand well the candidates and be in a better position to exercise their civic rights in a better informed manner. More of this literature should have been distributed to voters before the commencement of election campaigns. However, it appears that only few copies were printed and distributed since it was not available to voters in the rural areas we visited during the campaigns.

Unlike in the by-elections held under multipartism, the guidelines did not remind political parties and their candidates to refrain from the use of abusive language and to exploit the campaign occasions to promote their policies and programmes to the electorate. Nor were political parties and their candidates warned not to campaign on tribal and religious affinities. This was perhaps an oversight on the part of the Commission. Yet it is important to have general guidelines that promote national cohesion and to avoid negative campaigns which promote conditions for conflict which if not checked can easily undermine democracy as espoused by multiparty elections.

The Organization of Campaigns

Officially, campaigns started all over the country on 16th October 1994 and continued up to 29th October, 1994. However, it is an open secret that unofficial campaigns started earlier in various arenas such as bars, shopping centres, sports centres and even on house to house basis by the candidates themselves or their agents.

Each contesting party was required to prepare and submit to the Returning Officer a schedule of its candidates' campaign meetings. There were instances where collaborative joint meetings between candidates, their political parties and election authorities were held to chart out agreeable campaign schedules. For example, in the Municipality of Arusha, before the campaigns officially took off, a joint meeting comprising the Chairman and Secretaries of political parties such as CCM, CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi, CUF and UDP, together with all the Municipal and Ward Secretaries was convened. The main issues deliberated in this meeting was to draw up the campaign timetable and procedures, including security arrangements during campaign rallies.

Campaign schedules had to indicate the date of the meeting, the location and time. To avoid clashes, the Returning Officers circulated the campaign schedules to all contesting parties. At the village level, the Village Executive Officers (VEOs) were responsible for organizing security arrangements during campaign rallies. All contesting political parties were entitled to fair treatment with respect to protection and space to hold their campaign rallies.

The need for a proper election campaign machinery cannot be overstated. No serious and successful election campaign can be conducted without creating a capable organization. The seriousness of a political party in this endeavour can be indicated by the type of campaign team created. In this regard the incumbent party, CCM, appears to have outmatched other contesting political parties.

Nationally, CCM prepared a party manifesto which was printed into booklets. These manifesto booklets were given to each candidate and were distributed all over Tanzania. The responsibility to organize and supervise CCM election campaigns was left to the CCM District Party Office. CCM was very organized and serious in its campaign. In each district, CCM district offices convened meetings to chart out their strategy as directed by the CCM National and Regional leadership that local conditions have to prevail. Most important, at the district level, the CCM constituted an Election Committee, chaired by the District Party Secretary. Also in each ward the CCM leadership met and charted out campaign strategies. In Arusha Kati Ward for example, the party had an Executive Committee meeting on 15th October 1994 to put up strategies for the campaigns. The strategies agreed were house to house campaigns and attendance of all CCM leaders in the ward led by the party Chairman in all CCM campaign meetings. Moreover, in all wards, CCM adopted a team-style of campaigning. Thus, CCM district party officials escorted their candidates in campaign rallies to help them win the voters hearts and minds. Other national leaders, such as Ministers and Members of Parliament accompanied the District leadership and candidates to boost their election campaigns.

The use of prominent CCM district and national leaders to campaign for the candidates in the civic polls influenced campaign rally attendance. For example, Hon. Augustine Lyatonga Mrema (then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs), campaigned all over Moshi Vijijini in the pretext that he was the Member of Parliament for this constituency. Mrema's crowd pulling effect was undeniable. For example, in Old Moshi East Ward, in Moshi Vijijini (Moshi Rural) the CCM candidate held three (3) campaign meetings at Mowo, Mdawi and Sango villages with audiences of about 50, 50 and 150 people respectively. However, when the Member of Parliament for Moshi Rural, Hon. Mrema appeared to campaign for him at Shia and Mahoma villages, the audience increased to 800 and 1,500 people respectively. The MP for Rombo Mr. Basil Mramba, the Member of Parliament for Arumeru, MP for Kondoa Mr. Mustapha Nyang'anyi are but few examples of members of parliament who campaigned for CCM candidates in their respective constituencies. District CCM Party Chairmen and District CCM Party Secretaries all over the country also campaigned for CCM candidates.

CHADEMA also used her national, regional and district leadership to campaign in favour of their candidates. Mr. Edwin Mtei, the CHADEMA National Chairman, campaigned in Rombo and Moshi Rural Districts as well as in the Arusha Municipality. Dr. Walid Aman Kaborou, a member of CHADEMA National Executive Committee, and prominent figure in Kigoma politics also campaigned for CHADEMA candidates in Kigoma, whereby his campaign rallies were well attended.

In apparent efforts to counter Mrema's influence in Moshi Rural, CHADEMA also invited Rev. Christopher Mtikila to boost their campaigns. In Mbokomu Ward, Rev. Mtikila, the Chairman of the unregistered Democratic Party (DP), accompanied by Mr. Ndesamburo, the CHADEMA Kilimanjaro Region Chairman, addressed campaign meetings on behalf of CHADEMA candidates. Many people attended the meeting.

Various reports on the civic polls indicate that "CCM campaigns seemed more organized from the district level down to the village level"[17] and were "well co-ordinated"[18] compared to opposition parties campaign meetings which were not "much organized ... mainly because of lack of adequate and proper representation from the district to the village level".[19] Apparently, most of the participating opposition parties did not have a well organized campaign machinery. Most opposition candidates conducted ad hoc individual campaigns without proper organizations to back their efforts. As one expert put it "opposition parties relied on individual candidates' skills and ability".[20]

Campaign Funding Constraints

The importance of raising funds to conduct sustained campaigns has a bearing on effective campaigning. CCM had advantages over the opposition in this score because it could use its many years of experience and existing organization structures. As stated earlier, the government through the National Electoral Commission had promised an election subsidy of TShs. 30,000/= to each candidate. This money was not only grossly inadequate, but all over the country, the subsidy never reached the candidates before the end of the campaign period.

CCM campaign meetings were lively and attractive because CCM had funds to hire musical bands, choirs and traditional musical groups and other crowd pulling entertainers. For example, in Arusha, it was not easy for CHADEMA and other opposition parties to "cope with CCM's campaign machinery which was able to hire opposition parties to "cope with CCM's campaign machinery which was able to hire musical instruments for Shs. 20,000/= per day, pay taarab singers 10,000/= per day and hire a generator for 5,000/= a day. Total spending was averaging TShs. 35,000/= per day for using musical entertainment alone compared to campaign subsidy of TShs. 30,000/= per candidate for the whole campaign period."[21] If election results are not to be distorted by campaign money given to, received and spent by individual candidates, sources of funds have to be open. All contributions for campaigns have to be reported to the Commission. Otherwise, fairness in elections can be undermined by unequal access to campaign resources.

Campaign Issues

The importance of election campaigns is not to entertain voters, but to enable them to make informed decisions. In this respect, a good strategy for winning the hearts and minds of voters is to ensure that the tone and theme of campaign rallies focus on issues that affect the electorate. It is also important for the theme and tone to target a specific category of voters. Why a specific category of voters? It is politically expedient for a shrewd politician to research and know his/her voters. Where political parties are well established, each party has a critical mass as supporters which will not easily switch allegiance during elections. Most of the time, this critical support is galvanized through ideological underpinnings. During campaigns, it is therefore prudent to target those voters who are undecided or those who are disillusioned by the existing social, economic and political situation.

In the October 1994 local government elections it was not easy to discern any particular theme during campaigns. Unfortunately no serious local issues were raised. The campaigns never targeted any special group. CCM campaigns focussed on a generalistic but well written election manifesto, leaving individual candidates little room for manoeuvre. The CCM manifesto summarized the CCM agenda up to year 2000 regarding the provision of social services, such as education, health, water, etc. However, the issues were not specific to the concerns of the electorate at the Ward level. Moreover, since the CCM District and Ward leadership often campaigned on behalf of their candidates, individual candidates could neither differ nor digress much from the party's official lines.

There were only very few instances where the CCM national manifesto was translated to a local election campaign issue. For example, the Moivo Ward CCM Chairman suggested in one campaign meeting that voters in Moivo ward should elect the CCM candidate because CCM had an office in the ward and in the villages so it will be easier to meet a CCM leader in case of any problems. He added that if the CCM candidate was elected he could help speed up the construction of a secondary school which was in the ward's development programme. Furthermore, he said that 75% of students will come from the ward and only 25% of students will come from other wards. The CCM campaigns at Moivo ward also promised more primary and nursery schools in the ward.

The CCM campaigns in general gloated over its successes in the last three decades of independence. It often alluded to having brought peace, harmony, stability and

development. This campaign strategy often made CCM's campaign tone to be negative. Thus, apart from promises of better education and better health care as per CCM manifesto, CCM leaders also used veiled campaign threats. For example, in Moivo ward Arumeru District, CCM leaders told would be voters in a campaign meeting that "to elect candidates from other parties is to dig your own grave." Also, the Mbulu CCM District Party Chairman warned potential voters in a campaign rally at Sanu Ward not to commit political suicide by electing the opposition candidates to office. "If you people in Sanu ward make a mistake by voting for a candidate from another party then your ward will continue to suffer because your councillor will have no say" in the District Council. Already, CCM was unopposed in 20 wards, out of 29 wards in Mbulu District. Also Pamba ward in the Municipality of Mwanza, "CCM scared the people by saying that voting for the opposition was an invitation for Rwanda-type massacres in the future", while "CCM members went around misinforming people on scheduled times for opposition parties' meeting" and "CCM organized youth gangs to pull down specimen ballot papers in order to deprive opposition candidates of publicity."[22]

In Kilimanjaro Region, CHADEMA's campaign was sometimes interrupted by CCM's unruly youths and drunk fanatics. For example on 16th October, 1994 at Kikarara Village, a CHADEMA campaign meeting was interrupted by a drunk man suspected to be a CCM sympathizer. CHADEMA enthusiasts shouted him down as there were no police or militia at the meeting. Also on 23rd October, 1994 a group of CCM youths decided to harass and intimidate people attending a CHADEMA campaign rally at Mhoma village in Old Moshi East Ward. Using three pick-up trucks full of CCM youngsters, the group sang CCM slogans and shouted down CHADEMA speakers addressing a campaign rally. The CHADEMA meeting was interrupted for about seven minutes. The CCM candidate in Mpitimbi ward, Songea Rural is also "reported to have consistently attacked and portrayed CUF as a party of hooligans and people bent to cause strife in the society."[23]

However, it has to be pointed out that the opposition was never better off in respect to negative campaign notes. As a matter of fact all opposition parties adopted negative campaigns as a strategy. All opposition parties accused CCM as a party of power hungry thieves who were not ready to relinquish powers to other parties as they were used to benefiting from other people's sweat etc. The opposition parties focused on blaming CCM for its failures. Sometimes they also attacked each other. For example in Maore Ward, Same District, the CHADEMA candidate attacked NCCR-Mageuzi and UMD - calling them weak parties rife with internal divisions. Such campaigns, not only undermined UDETA (an agreement between CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi and other opposition parties to cooperate in their resolve to defeat CCM in the polls) but also played into the hands of CCM. Overall, the opposition campaigns also lacked any serious relevant message to ward level civic polls voters.

Apart from the official campaigns, most candidates and their parties were also invited in unofficial campaigns. For example, in Kainam Ward in Mbulu District, the CCM leadership urged its members and in particular the ten cell leaders not to cooperate or assist other political parties. Other unofficial campaigns were conducted in bars and other entertainment spots, as well as in churches and mosques. Reports from Mbulu Mjini Ward indicate that there were instances when Muslims in their Mosque were urging their faithful to vote for the CCM candidate because he was a Muslim. There were also instances where Christians in their churches urged each other to vote for CHADEMA candidate because he was a fellow Christian.

Unofficial campaigns also included "pilau parties" for supporters in Mkuyuni Ward, Mwanza Urban, distribution of khangas to women in Mwanza, Kigoma, Arusha, Moshi Urban and Rural, Mbeya, Ruvuma etc. Other candidates distributed money to influence voters. Candidates attended funerals and generously contributed condolence monies, visited families of new-born babies with money, gifts and splashed money to entertain potential voters. Both CCM and the opposition parties indulged in such dirty campaign tricks.

It may also be pointed out that unofficial campaigns common all over the country never emphasized on social, economic or political issues. Rather unofficial campaigns focused on the negative characteristics of the other candidates.

Conclusion

Over all, most official campaign meetings were conducted without any serious incidents. Order was occasionally maintained by uniformed and non-uniformed policemen, militia as well as party vigilantes. However, there were also instances where no policemen or militia were seen in the vicinity of a campaign meeting.

The most depressing fact of the October 1994 election campaigns was their lack of seriousness. The campaign speeches failed to provide necessary information and education to enable voters to make informed judgement on the polling day. Moreover, the campaigns failed completely to educate citizens as to what multipartism was all about, the importance and role of local governments in furthering grassroots democracy and development. Nor did the campaigns provide any policy alternatives from the opposition political parties. Although CCM gloated over her success in creating stability in the country, as a party it failed to provide and elucidate a lasting CCM ideology. At the moment, CCM lacks a clear ideological direction. On the other hand, opposition parties focused on character assassination of individual CCM candidates, attacked CCM's dismal performance and lack of governing ideology. Yet, these opposition parties fell into the same political abyss by failing to present any clear ideological, philosophical or even policy stance as an alternative to the now discarded CCM's Ujamaa and Self-Reliance.

The lack of serious policy debate in the local government election campaign is unfortunate for two reasons. First, it can exacerbate voter apathy as inhibited in low attendance of campaign meetings and low voter turn out. This undermines multiparty democracy. Second, the void created by the lack of serious policy issues in the campaigns was often filled by using personal attacks on the character of other candidates. Such campaign tactics are dangerous for they can plant seeds of post electoral disharmony and distrust. At any rate rather than institutionalizing conditions of stable democracy, such campaign tactics can only succeed to dwarf efforts to enhance democracy and development in Tanzania.

NOTES

1. Charles W. Dunn, (1982), American Democracy Debated: An Introduction To American Government, Second Edition. Scott, Foresman and Company, p.303.

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4. Seymour Martin Lipset (1993), Reflections on Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Journal of Democracy. Vol4 No.2. p.47.

5. Max Mmuya & Amon Chaligha, op.cit. p.106.

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