

MWINYI'S SUCCESSION OF NYERERE IN 1985: HOW DEMOCRATIC?

By,

Dr. Mohabe Nyirabu

INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to examine the succession of Julius Nyerere which made possible the choice of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the second President of the United Republic of Tanzania in November 1985. Was the decision to elevate Mwinyi taken by Nyerere himself? Or was it a combination of forces that took Nyerere by surprise?¹

The subject of transfer of power in Africa has attracted scholarly attention even before the advent of multipartyism in African politics. In an earlier view that undoubtedly dominated scholarly thinking, Jackson and Rosberg advanced the view that a possibility of peaceful transfer of political power existed provided the constitutional rules or wishes of the departing ruler were accepted. However, in general they posited a pessimistic outlook for Africa's orderly political succession.² It is not difficult to see why such kind of thinking dominates the transfer of power in Africa. Since political independence, military coups have constituted the principal means of changing rulers in Africa. The regularity of the military intervening had created a received view that there was practically no chance of having peaceful statutory political succession. However, despite this general trend, one can point to examples of orderly transfer of power in previously one-party regimes. I propose to examine the transition in Tanzania in 1985.

To begin with, a caveat should immediately be stated at the outset. This discussion pertains to the transfer of power in 1985, when Tanzania was constitutionally a one-party state. However, since July 1, 1992 the Tanzanian Parliament has enacted *The Political Parties Act, 1992* which ushered in a new era of multi-party political system.

CHARACTERISING THE TANZANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN 1985

In meteorology, the concept of "climate" refers to relatively generalized weather patterns characterizing a said region over an extended period of time. However, at the aggregate human level, as Lasswell has noted, the term refers to a middle configuration between sharply defined images on the one hand and clear-cut terminations of decision outcomes on the other.³ It is in this latter context that one may say that a climate of opinion is a phase in the policy process. Of more interest to us is seeing the type of climate which existed in Tanzania in 1985 and whether that influenced the outcome of the nomination of the presidential candidate.

Elections in Tanzania have followed the general trend in Africa. The concern has been instruments of authoritarian rule legitimation rather than instruments of popular representation. In the case of Tanzania voting for the President of the United Republic of Tanzania did not involve choosing among contending candidates. Rather, the citizen was limited to accepting or rejecting a sole candidate who already had been selected and endorsed by the Party. In theory, the process was limited to the 18 citizens who were members of the Central Committee of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). These were supposed to pick the one they thought, felt or guessed would be the best candidate. Thereafter, they recommended the name to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Party which voted either to accept or reject the candidate recommended by the Central Committee. Once consensus in the NEC was reached, the name was submitted to the National conference for approval. If the candidate was accepted, the focus of the election shifted to the population at large who were vehemently urged to vote YES for the Party candidate.

At least four factors can be said to have provided parameters in the presidential nomination process. First of all, during this particular period the logic of developmentalism dominated political thinking in the country. Since 1967 the state had declared the policy of socialism and self-reliance as promulgated in the Arusha Declaration, to be the guiding principle for extricating the country from the yokes of poverty and ignorance and their attendant ills. It was therefore considered the duty of the Central Committee to nominate a candidate who was an acknowledged supporter of the policy and fully identified with it.

The second factor centred on the "Zanzibar factor". Here the central Committee was faced with the issue of whether or not the next President of the United Republic should hail from Zanzibar. The centrality of this factor was that since the first President of United Republic had been a non-Zanzibari, the strength of the Union would be enhanced by having a Zanzibari as the second president of the United

Republic. The Zanzibar factor was given added weight because of the existence of the "polluted political climate" that peaked in 1984 and led to the forced resignation of Aboud Jumbe as President of Zanzibar in early 1984.⁴

The third factor involved structure, that is, hierarchy and seniority within the party. There were several possible candidates whose names were mentioned in the international press. These included Salim Ahmed Salim, who had been Prime Minister for just over a year following the April 1984 death of Edward Moringe Sokoine. Another was Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa then the Secretary General of CCM and a veteran in the politics of both pre-and post-independent Tanzania. In reality, since the Second Congress of CCM in 1982, the consolidation of Party supremacy had been the pre-occupation of the Party machinery where the top leadership had consolidated its position. The party leadership structure comprised three top positions: Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary General. The latter two had been elected to their offices in 1984 and 1982, respectively. Thus, the argument for respect of seniority rested on continuation of leadership for the sake of promoting CCM stability and unity.⁵

The fourth factor is what we may call the business of politics. In a sense, politics is about who gets what, when and how. It is, in short, about the struggle for power. Some of the debates in this struggle concerned the presidency of Zanzibar and that of Tanzania. As far as the presidency of Tanzania was concerned, the issue centred on who should occupy the office. Secondly, it was becoming evident that the presidency of Tanzania had something to do with the presidency of Zanzibar. The salient features of this debate included a claim by some politicians that they had played a role in Jumbe's 1984 resignation and, therefore, the election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the third President of Zanzibar. In this process, they viewed themselves as responsible for the democratic reforms emerging in Zanzibar. Against the backdrop of this climate of opinion, we make a detailed analysis of the factors.

THE ZANZIBAR POSITION IN TANZANIA POLITICS

It is interesting that the publication of Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty Four*⁶ dealing with power and information coincided with the issue of power and information in 1984 in Tanzania. The year was the twentieth anniversary of both the Zanzibar Revolution and the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The emphasis that marked both occasions was on the factors undermining the union.

It is important to point out that the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar is the only such union existing in Africa. Perhaps it is because of that fact that it has attracted scholarly and political attention. To be sure, the Articles of Union

uniting the two countries provided for Zanzibar to retain its autonomy and construct its own policies in all matters other than those stipulated as union matters. Moreover, legislation of union matters was the prerogative of the Union Parliament where Zanzibar was effectively represented. A fact of interest here is that the Union Constitution stipulates that in case the President of the United Republic of Tanzania originates from Tanganyika, the First-Vice-President must, as a matter of course, come from Zanzibar, and vice versa.⁷

In a private motion tabled in the Zanzibar House of Representatives on December 22 1983, Juma Abdallah Machano wanted the House to react to the view by the late Prime Minister Sokoine that CCM should advise the Union Government and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council to establish new governments which would fully implement the building of socialism.⁸ Winding up the debate, Zanzibar's then Chief Minister, Brigadier Ramadhani Haji Faki, gave three conditions for the union to develop and grow stronger. The first was that it had to confer equal benefits to each constituent part of the Union. Secondly, it had to be of benefit to the Union itself, and thirdly, the Union had to be of benefit to African unity. However, the most important political argument related to CCM's role. Brigadier Faki warned that CCM had to refrain from involving itself in unilateral decisions aimed at establishing a new government, or else it would be abrogating the 1964 Articles of Union which provided for specific matters to be undertaken by the governments with neither violating the responsibilities of the other.⁹

In an interview published by the Government-owned *Sunday News* of January 15, 1984, Jumbe, then Tanzania's Vice-President, Zanzibar's President, Chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and Vice Chairman of CCM, stated that the Union formalised by Nyerere and Karume on April 26, 1964 had never posed any problem. As he himself put it: "To the best of my knowledge and recollection, no citizen of Tanzania has ever raised a voice, much less a finger, against the fact of the Union". Jumbe went on to say that whereas there seemed to be general agreement on the need for a stronger Union, there was no unanimity over the nature of the changes. It was therefore necessary to realize that differences are expected in any society: the issue was how to settle the differences according to procedures using the "force of logic and not the logic of force".¹⁰

On January 24, 1984 the NEC held an extra-ordinary session in the central town of Dodoma to clear what it termed the "polluted political climate" regarding the state of the Union and the status of the Party in national guidance. The next day the NEC Department of Political Propoganda and Mass Mobilisation issued a statement saying the session would discuss the confusion and negative views on the proposed amendments to the constitutions of both the Union and Zanzibar governments.¹¹ In the case of Zanzibar, three views seemed to dominate the

proposed amendments. First, there were feelings among Zanzibaris that the NEC proposals were a smokescreen by way of which the Mainland would swallow Zanzibar. Secondly, such feelings led to suspicions on both the Isles and the Mainland that Zanzibar was in effect preparing to pull out of the Union. Thirdly, there were some individuals in Zanzibar who had been airing views likely to endanger or sabotage the Union without the relevant authorities denying the statements or warning the authors of the views of the consequences. In short, the task of the session was to clear the confusion on the political scene and ensure tranquility during the deliberation of the people's views on the amendment proposals.

The position of Zanzibar in the Union heightened during the so-called "polluted political climate" in 1983/84. A by-product of this period was the forced resignation of Aboud Jumbe from all posts he held in April 1984.¹² This resignation paved the way for Ali Hassan Mwinyi to assume all posts formerly held by Jumbe. It was in the light of this that during the campaign for Zanzibar's presidency in 1984, Mwinyi had to strongly deny the allegation of Zanzibar's annexation, echoing the obvious view enshrined in the constitution that Zanzibar's autonomy was there to stay.

To some extent, Zanzibar as a part of the Union has been at the centre of political struggles. This particular struggle for political democratisation was part of a comprehensive quest for a more democratic society. And, in an important respect, the supremacy of the party in national political life was being rejected.

PARTY AND POLITICAL PROCESS

According to Fanon, three developments for a political party can occur after independence: disintegration or progressive transformation of the party into an information service helping the government to hold the people down or turn itself into a tool of the people through which they decide on the policy that the government carries out.¹³ What has been the role of the political party in independent Tanzania?

When Tanganyika achieved independence on December 9, 1961 it inherited a western European type of constitution which provided for elected government, parliamentary representation, competitive multi-party politics and liberal democratic political and juridical traditions. The supremacy of parliament was accepted by both the ruling party and the executive branch of government despite the fact that the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) won a landslide *victory* in the 1960 general election by *winning* all seats and therefore leaving the other political parties unrepresented in Parliament.

On November 23, 1962, the National Assembly constituted itself into a Constituent Assembly and passed the Act to Declare the Constitution of Tanganyika. The result of these constitutional changes was that the political equation changed dramatically at the expense of the people's rights. All the changes that were effected are beyond the scope of this paper. However, I shall note two which are relevant for our purpose here. First, there was enormous concentration of powers in the presidency, in the process, curtailing the power of the National Assembly. Secondly, a movement towards party supremacy was born. Again this was curtailing the powers of a representative institution of the people.

It did not take long before what was privately being contemplated by Nyerere became public. In January 1963 the National Executive Committee (NEC) of TANU passed a resolution authorising Nyerere to set up a commission to see it to that a one-party system of government was established in Tanzania. Nyerere's agenda for the Presidential Commission was crystal clear:

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I think I should emphasize that it is not the task of the Commission to consider whether Tanganyika should be a one-party state. That decision has already been taken. Their (commission) task is to say what kind of one-party state we should have in the context of our national ethic and in accordance with the principles which I have instructed the commission to have¹⁴

The Commission's expected report was on June 1 and 2, 1965 submitted to an extraordinary TANU Annual Conference which was also attended by Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) delegates, presumably because of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar on April 26, 1964. The conference approved the recommendations and a bill for constitutional changes was presented to the National Assembly and passed to become law on July 10, 1965. Tanganyika had become a *de-jure* one-party state.¹⁵

Prior to the decision to make Tanganyika a one-party state, there existed several political parties in Tanganyika although TANU was the real power. The same would be true of Zanzibar: there were several political parties which existed until the triumph of ASP as the only party after the 1964 revolution. In 1977 TANU merged with ASP to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi or CCM.

The decision to make Tanganyika a one-party state began the process of *statizing* politics and, in effect, disallowing *any* right of *dissent*. But, most importantly, the representative organ of the people—parliament—became a rubber stamp for the ruling party. This was a bitter lesson that some members of parliament had to learn as early as 1968. During a debate in the House, some Members of Parliament raised the issue whether they owed their position to the electorate or to

the party. Their view that they owed their position to the electorate was vehemently denied by Vice-President Kawawa who "reminded" them that the party was supreme. There is no need to dwell at length on the outcome of this debate, which the party obviously won. However, it is worth noting that in a National Executive Committee of TANU meeting in October 1968, TANU defrocked seven MPs from the Party "for having grossly violated the Party creed in both attitudes and actions, and for showing clear opposition to the Party and its policies and politics".¹⁶ This expulsion meant that the seven parliamentarians ceased being elected representatives. It was an indication of even more dramatic things to come and a development by which party supremacy identification would become simply and squarely equated with patriotism.

We submit that what is not potentially problematic about what has been the role of the party since 1965 is that the party derived its authority from the law. In other words, coercion and threats or sanctions were used to attract membership. This was to effectively accept that Tanzania should continue to be a closed society in party politics and any autonomous view should not be entertained or should be intimidated into silence or compliance. It was, by extension, a demand for ideological unanimity and a provision for rulers to continue staying in power. This historical recapitulation of the development of the Tanzanian one party state demonstrates the fact that any discussion of transfer of power up to July 1, 1992, when CCM ceased to have monopoly of politics, cannot be understood without understanding the domination and supremacy of the party. Once this is understood, it becomes easier to tie the pieces together and say whether, for example, an individual could have succeeded without party blessings or why one individual could dominate the political system.

THE EMERGENCE OF MWINYI

Providing a full account of President Mwinyi's biography is a task beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note that the personality of Ali Hassan Mwinyi himself may have been the most important factor in his movement from the marginal position to attain the highest office in the Republic within a span of one year.

In brief, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Tanzania's second president, was born on May 8, 1923 at Kivure village in Kisarawe district, Coast Region in Tanganyika. After his primary and secondary school education in Zanzibar, he trained as a teacher from 1943 to 1944. Between 1954 and 1956, Mwinyi was enrolled for a teachers' diploma course at Durham University in the United Kingdom. The first, and perhaps most striking, quality in Mwinyi's political calculation was in the eventful 1964 when he joined Zanzibar's ASP and not 1957 when the ASP was born. From 1964 to 1965, Mwinyi was Principal Secretary in the Zanzibar

Ministry of Education before becoming Deputy Director of the Zanzibar State Trading Corporation from 1965 to 1970.¹⁷

It is our view that Mwinyi's rise and ascendancy on the political ladder began in 1970 when he was appointed Minister of State in President Nyerere's Office. From 1972 to 1975 Mwinyi was Tanzania's Minister for Health and from 1975 to 1977 he was minister for Home Affairs. It was during his tenure as Minister for Home Affairs that he had to resign following the deaths of several Mwanza and Shinyanga residents because of tortures and beatings by security and police officers under his ministry allegedly because of witchcraft beliefs. In 1977 he was appointed Tanzania's Ambassador to Egypt, returning to Tanzania in 1982 to become Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism in the Union Government. In February 1983, he was appointed Minister of State in the Vice President's Office. Interestingly, all the ministerial posts were Union government appointments and none was in the Zanzibar government.

The second stage of Mwinyi's climb occurred on January 30, 1984 when Aboud Jumbe resigned from all official posts: Union Vice - President, President of Zanzibar, Chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and Vice Chairman of CCM.¹⁸ But, was Mwinyi destined to go beyond the Vice-Presidency of the United Republic of Tanzania? His two predecessors from Zanzibar had been unable to go beyond that public office. Indeed, the vice-presidency the world over is a public office generally considered the political equivalent of the elephant's graveyard: where big names die silently after long periods of public career to be recorded in history by obscure street names, playgrounds or stadiums. Contrary to this belief, Mwinyi was on his way up and on November 5, 1985 he was sworn in as the second President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Coming immediately after the renowned Nyerere, as he did, it was a glorious and challenging achievement.

NYERERE AND THE PRESIDENCY

A major source of discontent with the performance of the institution of the presidency in Tanzania is found in the political tradition established since independence. Because of the supremacy of the party, Nyerere performed two roles that in most other political systems are separated. This dualism of party and state organizations each with more or less the same departments for the same functions was not accidental. The purpose was to strengthen Nyerere's position and give more room for playing one machinery against the other. Was the role played by Nyerere during this nomination process typically of a political man, who, as Lasswell long ago pointed out, is really two stories: an outer one in which a

rational man calculates and an inner one in which emotional force rules and then private motives are displaced into the public arena and rationalized?¹⁹

What were Nyerere's views about Mwinyi's candidacy? To be sure, Nyerere's strength during the deliberations rested on two important factors. First, it was his official position in both the party and state. Secondly, it was his personal influence which was partly due to his longevity, prestige, and "father of nation" status. But it was also partly due to his being a prudent politician. And finally, it was the monolithic nature of the ruling party. The seduction of a deliberative atmosphere in various organs of the party has been a powerful one. However, it is our view that deliberativeness needs to be discriminated for a proper assessment of Nyerere's dominant role. Our central claim is that Nyerere was too domineering without equivalent in organs like the Central Committee. Even today, after retirement, this argument is justified by the advisory lectures he is invited to give in both Central Committee and National Executive Committee meetings.²⁰ By and large, the democratic tendency of the Central committee, for example, was mere propaganda for mass consumption.

The full story of the deliberations in the Central Committee is yet to be told. According to a source who has provided this account on condition that he may not be named, Nyerere presented three names to the Central committee meeting on August 12, 1985. In his opening remarks, he deliberately tried to be as neutral as humanly possible to avoid the accusation that he had picked a successor. However, he did suggest that the going would be tough and it was essential that a younger leader with freshness of ideas be chosen. During this meeting, Nyerere as a chairman presented three names: Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa and Salim, Ahmed Salim. All three of them were asked to leave the conference room to allow deliberations about their candidacy. However, at this moment, Kawawa offered not to stand and instead wanted to participate in nominating the future president of Tanzania.

THE CANDIDATES

Space does not allow an extended presentation of the background history of these two other candidates. Therefore, only a brief sketch is in order. Kawawa's political life history dates from pre-independent Tanganyika as a trade unionist. And, since independence in 1961, he has been a professional politician, holding different positions in both party and state structures. Through this span, he has been a Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Vice-President of TANU, Prime Minister and Second Vice President of Tanzania, Minister for Defence and National Service Minister without Portfolio and, in 1982, Secretary - General of CCM till 1990 when he became Vice Chairman of CCM till his retirement from active politics in 1992.

Apart from the efficiency which he has built in the party organization in an authoritarian state, he is a man of undistinguished personality. He has demonstrated a lack of initiative to strike out a position for himself particularly if it meant that it would conflict with Nyerere.²¹ Moreover, Kawawa has been an ardent believer in the logic of state developmentalism as stipulated in the Arusha Declaration and Nyerere's ideological leadership with singleminded faith. To Kawawa, Nyerere's *Weltanschauung* was the literal, revealed truth. In the changing political climate, Kawawa was material too poor to attain the presidency of Tanzania. With utmost difficulty, Kawawa knew that he lacked Nyerere's support and his withdrawal at the Central Committee's deliberation was his admission of that.²²

Salim Ahmed Salim hailed from Zanzibar. At the age of 22 in 1964, he was appointed ambassador to Egypt. From that time to 1980 he spent his working life in the diplomatic world which took him to New Delhi, Beijing and New York. In 1980 he was appointed Tanzania's Foreign Minister, partly to help his campaign for the post of Secretary General of the United Nations. He lost the race but continued to be Foreign Minister until April 1984 when he was appointed Prime Minister of Tanzania and Secretary of the Defence and Security Committee of the Party's Central Committee to fill the position of Edward Moringe Sokoine who had just just died in a car accident.

In contrast to Kawawa, Salim had the disadvantage of having been a career diplomat and not well conversant with the demands of domestic politics. In the preceding years when he was in Tanzania, he spent more time on the UN Secretary Generalship race and afterwards reflecting upon the loss. It should also be pointed out that all the posts that Salim had held since 1964 were union posts and, secondly, were not elective. While Kawawa was the known quantity in Tanzanian local politics, Salim was the unknown quantity.

At this stage we cannot omit mentioning a background briefing paper for President Nyerere on the eve of the Central Committee meeting.²³ This paper gave background information on the candidates and the different political scenario likely to emerge with each candidate's nomination. It is not entirely clear how many Central Committee or NEC members had access to this material before the deliberations. It would not be immodest to suggest that, overall, it was a campaign brief paper offering options for Nyerere.

Beyond the question of stressing a careful selection of the future president, this paper was first and foremost cautionary advice for Nyerere to desist from settling a precedent of nominating a successor. Convincingly, it spoke of instilling a process of orderly transition. The thrust of the argument suggested that this paper was written with the knowledge that Nyerere was supporting Salim's candidacy. Or

else, how are we to understand its overt stress that hierarchial standing in the party should be followed in case the nominee is among Mwinyi, Kawawa and Salim? Overall, it was extremely supportive of Kawawa's candidacy although admitting that he had weaknesses just like other human beings. Kawawa was presented as a tested and patriotic leader who had never been heard to plot against the state or oppose Nyerere. The paper urged continuity of the political agenda under the leadership of a person who had never run away from the problems that Tanzania had been facing.

The same could not be said about the paper's assessment of Salim Ahmed Salim. In general, the paper was fairly negative, portraying him as someone who lacked experience, was an unknown quantity and had spent too much of his career life in diplomatic corridors which were not relevant to the Tanzanian terrain. Salim was painted as someone who was comfortable in the First World. For example, it was pointed out that he missed his first and only independence anniversary celebration of Tanganyika of December 9, 1984 as Prime Minister because he had to attend a speaking engagement in Chicago, US. To be sure, it can be said that while the briefing was not totally against Salim, it presented a discouraging option for the future leadership of the country under him.

The third candidate was Ali Hassan Mwinyi. While the paper supported Kawawa and cast doubt on Salim's ability to lead, it offered a futuristic potential of Mwinyi's leadership. There was a strong view that Mwinyi was a promising leader as evidenced by his leadership achievement in the short period that he led Zanzibar. Candidly, it also supported Mwinyi as a person and, secondly, in emphasizing hierarchy it really meant Mwinyi as Vice Chairman of CCM and First-Vice President of Tanzania.

In the end, the Central Committee seemed to have agreed with the thrust of the paper and Mwinyi was the nominee. The stage was set for the National Executive Committee to accept or reject the recommendation.

THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

In reconstructing what happened in the National Executive Committee meeting held on August 14, 1985 it is essential to emphasize two points. There is a view that Ali Hassan Mwinyi had initially accepted to continue with his position as President of Zanzibar and that the decision to contest the presidency of Tanzania was made on the last day on the eve of the Central Committee meeting after pressure from individuals who were opposed to Salim's candidacy. In so far as this is true, then, Salim and his camp were caught unawares when Mwinyi accepted to leave the Central Committee conference room to avail of himself of consideration for the nomination.

A second point is political: since Salim knew that he had lost in the Central Committee, couldn't the Central Committee decision be revised by NEC? After all, theoretically NEC had that power. The answer here is that there was, in fact, an attempt to salvage his candidacy in the NEC. Ironically, when the Central Committee concluded its agenda on August 12, 1985 it misled the public into thinking that it was continuing to deliberate while actually it had completed its task and was waiting for the NEC to convene. This interval provided Salim and his supporters two days to work before the NEC began its session on August 14, 1985.

On August 14, 1985 the NEC began its session and Ali Hassan Mwinyi was presented as the candidate recommended by the Central Committee for the presidency of Tanzania. No sooner had Mwinyi's name been presented by Nyerere than Seif Shariff Hamad, then Zanzibar's Chief Minister, stood up to argue the case for Mwinyi to continue leading Zanzibar.²⁴ The real message was that Salim should be the candidate for the presidency of Tanzania.²⁵ On the other hand, Mwinyi's supporters who included Abdalla Natepe and Raphael Nenetwa from Mwanza, argued their support for Mwinyi's candidacy thus: if he had brought stability and good leadership in Zanzibar, what was wrong if that was to be gained by a larger Tanzania?

The apparent appearance of a blade of polemic took the members by surprise and, sensing the situation, Chairman Nyerere adjourned the session for a short break. Here it is necessary to point out that the consultation that Nyerere undertook, notably with the late Sheikh Thabit Kombo Jecha, may have concluded the debate. Far more pertinent and substantial is the fact that when the session began after the break Sheikh Thabit Kombo Jecha - an old veteran and respected Zanzibari Zanzibari politician—spoke in support of Mwinyi's candidacy and NEC agreed with this suggestion and thereby guaranteed Mwinyi's nomination.²⁶

The real meaning of this decision was that Salim had again lost the battle for the presidency of Tanzania — For he knew that the next stage of the National Conference was more symbolic: voting to accept NEC's recommendation with no deliberations whatsoever.

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE MEETING

On August 15, 1985 an extraordinary National Conference of CCM was held at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in Dar es Salaam with the sole task of approving the National Executive Committee's recommendation of a presidential candidate for the 1985 election.

Nyerere's opening speech highlighted the politics of nominations and why he was stepping aside. Opting for an educating role, he reminded the conference that the existing political structure was not changing, the party was still supreme and the new president would have to work under the leadership of the party. Secondly, he told the delegates that the deliberations leading to the naming of a candidate took considerable discussion time in the Central Committee with respect to what qualifications were required for the candidate and the qualifications of various candidates contesting. Accordingly, Nyerere told the conference that they had listed thirty-six qualifications!²⁷

In proposing Ali Hassan Mwinyi's name, Nyerere noted that Mwinyi was new to the top leadership of the country and had not been involved in the major political decisions of independent Tanzania. And, perhaps comparing him to Salim Ahmed Salim, Nyerere noted that Mwinyi was not well-known internationally "but those leaders of Government and fraternal Parties who have met him have been impressed by his ability to understand matters under discussion."²⁸ All in all, the first part of Nyerere's speech was so crafted that it could support either candidate without a realization that perhaps the speech had someone in mind. It is only the second part which focused on Mwinyi.

However, it is our view that the tension of naming Mwinyi was more pronounced by the other two candidates who withdrew or lost the race but were given opportunities to address the conference because of their positions in the party and government.

Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa, as the Secretary General of CCM, was second after Chairman Nyerere to second the nomination. As expected, he supported all that was said by Nyerere in his address. Nevertheless, he stressed the fact in the nomination of Mwinyi the Central Committee of CCM had grappled with the question of who would replace Mwinyi in the presidency of Zanzibar. This view supports the reasoning that Mwinyi should have been left to continue with the presidency of Zanzibar as advocated by Salim and his supporters.

Salim, as the Premier, was also given the opportunity to second the nomination. It is here that the tension of the contest was quite evident. He told the conference that the truth of the matter was that it was going to be difficult to get someone to fill the gap created by Nyerere's departure. He concluded his speech by saying that NEC's nomination of Mwinyi was not an attempt to search for another "teacher" - but someone who would attempt to appear and approximate what Nyerere stood for. In short, there was no equivalence between the two.²⁹

And finally, the late Sheikh Thabit Kombo Jecha concluded the list of endorsement by praising Nyerere for his superb leadership. And, as for the new candidate, he said that Mwalimu Nyerere's support and blessing was very important. To the degree that Mwalimu had supported and blessed Mwinyi, the latter's candidacy was without any problems.

MWINYI'S ACCEPTANCE SPEECH

At least three types of messages can be identified in Mwinyi's acceptance speech and all these messages centred on Nyerere. The first was his own comparison with Nyerere. This comparison included teaching, education, ability, trust and intelligence. Mwinyi admitted that his intelligence was as low as an anthill while Nyerere's was as high as Mount Kilimanjaro (highest mountain in Africa). In this respect, he echoed the view aired by Salim in his endorsement speech.

The second message was that he would not deviate from the policies that had been begun and pursued by Nyerere. He pledged to follow in his footsteps. And finally, in addition to showering Nyerere with praises, he pleaded with him not to abandon him but to continue to offer him guidance. The parameters which Nyerere had set in his nomination speech were publicly being accepted by Mwinyi.³⁰

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

On November 5, 1985 Ali Hassan Mwinyi was sworn in as the second president of the United Republic of Tanzania. The word continuity was used by Mwinyi when he named his cabinet. Despite expectation of change, the old guard from Nyerere's administration retained their former positions. The noted promotion was that of Joseph Sinde Warioba as the new Prime Minister and First Vice-President - A slot that had to be filled by a Tanganyikan as per constitutional requirements. In this respect, the succession of Nyerere was achieved with a degree of continuity.

However, this continuity was called into question by a loser in the race for the presidency. This was none other than Salim Ahmed Salim. Salim behaved as a dudgeon of a wronged victim. It was clear that because of constitutional requirements as a Zanzibari he could not continue as Premier and it is here that he kept the cabinet's swearing-in ceremony at bay for some time while negotiating for a senior position in Mwinyi's administration. In the end, Mwinyi and Warioba had to agree to create a new position of Deputy Prime Minister specifically for him in addition to giving him the Defence portfolio. Mwinyi's presidency had faced its first challenge, and lost.

To conclude, facts available about the deliberations in the Central and National Executive Committee are still rudimentary and highly incomplete. However, it is almost true to say that Nyerere must have played a big role. "Almost" has to be used here for two reasons. In politics, Nyerere has not been a saint. We have to agree with Machiavelli that the Prince should not keep the faith when it would be against his interest. Nyerere must have been concerned with who was to succeed him. Secondly, he wanted to continue being a political leader and a critical element here was whom he was going to share the political platform with.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. Rajab, "Tanzania: Political Machinations behind a Tale of Two Presidents", *Africa Events* Vol. 1 No. November 11, 1985.
2. Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
3. Harold Lasswell, "The Climate of International Action", in *International Behaviour*, H.C. Kelman (ed), New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.
4. This factor has been disputed by a member (did not want his name revealed) who was involved in the whole process of nominating a presidential candidate as having any importance in the course of deliberations. While accepting that it was mentioned, he strongly believes that was a strategy used by Salim and his supporters, notably Seif Shariff Hamad, as a campaign strategy. As far as he is concerned, the most important factor was Nyerere.
5. This view was again a factor in national party elections two years later. After the 3rd National Conference of CCM held in October 1987, where all the three top positions were retained by the incumbents, the CCM Secretary General said this was a defeat for the enemies: "Our enemies had wanted the country's top party leadership to change.... Not only that, they also wanted to confuse the thinking of Party members but we have defeated them." See *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam) November 6, 1987.
6. George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty Four: A Novel*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1949.
7. Article 47 section 5 and 6 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, as amended in 1984.
8. Addressing a Party seminar for District Party leaders and District Commissioners in July 1983 in Bagamoyo, Sokoine advised that the time had come for the Party to tell the two governments what should be done to

- fully implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance. See *Uhuru* (Dar es Salaam) July 23, 1983.
9. See Ramadhani Haji Faki, "Reaction to Prime Minister Ndugu Sokoine's Advice to the Party to Restructure the Government given to Party and Government District Leaders", Mimeo, 1983. The views expressed here can also be found in Wolfgang Dourado, "Consolidation of the Union", a paper presented to a seminar organized by the Tanganyika Law Society on NEC Proposals for Amendments to the Union and Zanzibar Constitutions, 28, July 1983.
10. *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), January 15, 1984.
11. *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam) January 26, 1984.
12. In a recent interview, Jumbe has denied that he was forced to resign. However, he admits that his position supporting three governments in the Union were unpopular and he saw no other alternative than to resign. See *Mwananchi*, (Dar es Salaam) March 8—14, 1993..
13. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Hamongsworth, Penguin, 1967.
14. Julius K. Nyerere, "Guide to the One-Party State Commission," in *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966 p. 262.
15. For an extended coverage of this decision see H.G. Mwakyembe, "The Parliament and the Electoral Process", in *The State and the Working People in Tanzania*.
16. Pius Msekwa, *Towards Party Supremacy*, Dar es Salaam: Eastern Africana Publications, 1979.
17. *Civil Service Magazine* (Tanzania) December 1986.
18. One of the major accusations against Aboud Jumbe was that he had failed to act decisively against those whom were airing views against the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Even President Samora Machel of Mozambique, visiting Tanzania to inform Tanzania's political leadership of the coming of the Nkomati Accord, echoed the same view: "History will judge with more rigour than our reasons as to why he ended up by failing to act against those who see in the destruction of Tanzania a platform on which to gain their objectives". See *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam) March 12, 1984.
19. Harold Lasswell, *Psycopathology and Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.
20. According to the weekly *Mwananchi* of November 16-23, 1992, Nyerere was a contributing factor to the NEC's attempt to change the presidential limitation term of ten years. During the NEC session's deliberations on constitutional

amendments there was a strong view that the changes should accommodate President Mwinyi's wish to stand as a candidate for another term. And most recently, Nyerere was requested by the country's top leadership to address the National Assembly as a committee of CCM on the crisis facing the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, violation of the Union Constitution by Zanzibar joining the Organization of Islamic Countries and the movement of creating a Tanganyika government See *Mfanyakazi*. (Dar es Salaam) August 18, 1993. and *Uhuru* (Dar es Salaam) October 15, 1993.

21. To be fair to Kawawa, a better characterisation of his behaviour in the light of working under President Mwinyi is that he seems to avoid conflictual encounters with any person in a higher position than himself.
22. In the course of discussing this issue with some close associates of Kawawa, it occurred to me that some members of the Central Committee had known before the session began that Kawawa was out of the race. The anticipated battle was between Mwinyi and Salim.
23. I had the opportunity to come across this paper although I cannot reveal the source.
24. Is politics a weird or funny game? Almost all the leading NEC Members who advocated Salim's presidential nomination, particularly from Zanzibar, were to face a not-so-good decision from NEC in May 1988. When NEC met this time, one of the decisions it took was to defrock seven Zanzibaris party membership. This meant the members automatically losing whatever positions they were holding. Those expelled included former Zanzibar Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad; Hamad Rashid Mohamed, Union Deputy Minister for Finance; Sound Yusuf Mgeni, Zanzibar Minister for Agriculture and Livestock Development; Suleman Seif Hamad, Deputy Speaker, Zanzibar House of Representatives; Khatib Hassan Khatib, Member of Parliament; Shaban Hamisi Mlool and Ali Haji Pandu, both members of the House of Representatives. See *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam) May 17, 1988. With the introduction of multi-party politics in Tanzania, Seif Hamad, Shaban Mlool and Ali Haji Pandu are active in a registered opposition political party, the Civic United Front.
25. If Nyerere supported Salim's nomination, then why can't one conclude that Seif Shariff Hamad's support for Salim's nomination was later reciprocated by Nyerere's support for Seif's reappointment as Zanzibar Chief Minister after the election of Idris Wakil? Asked why he supported Seif, Nyerere had this to say: I did this (support) not because I feared Seif, but for national unity. If this was a miscalculation on my part, I accept responsibility" See *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam) March 6, 1989.
26. A by-product of this decision was that NEC had to nominate a candidate for the presidency of Zanzibar. The two contestants were Seif Shariff Hamad, chief Minister of Zanzibar and Idris Abdul Wakil, former Speaker of Zanzibar House of Representatives. In the voting, Wakil got 85 votes to Hamad's 78 votes.

Wakil was the nominated candidate, eventually winning the presidency of Zanzibar.

27. See Majadiliano ya Mkutano Mkuu Maalum wa Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Agosti 15, 1985, Idara ya Uenezi wa Siasa ya Sekretarieti ya Halmashauri Kuu ya Taifa, Dodoma 1987 p. 92.
 28. See Speech by the Chairman, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, at the National Conference of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Dar es Salaam, August 15, 1985, Part II p.4.
 29. The exact Swahili version has a better message: "Yeyote atakayekamata nafasi yako Nyerere atakuwa na jukumu kubwa sana. Lakini kwa msingi huo kwa sababu hatuna nia ya kumtafuta mwalimu mwingine kwa maana ya mwalimu, lakini tuna nia ya kutafuta kiongozi ambaye kwa vitendo na kwa tabia atafuata fuatana na atafananafanana na yale ambayo mwalimu (Nyerere) ameyasimamia".
- See Majadiliano ya Mkutano Mkuu Maalum wa Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Diamond Jubilee Dar es Salaam, Agosti 15, 1985, p. 97.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 100-106.