

THE OVER-CENTRALIZED STATE AND ITS LIMITATIONS TO PARTICIPATION IN TANZANIA

By

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INTRODUCTION

The essence of plural politics in any society is to ensure, among other things, that no single group or coalition of groups dominates and oppresses the rest of the population of that society. The importance of strong and relatively autonomous local governments as institutions for participation and enhancing civil rights of each and every individual cannot be overemphasized. Local level organizations are important for a number of reasons including, but not limited to improving the social, economic and political welfare of the masses; establishing community projects and co-operatives; addressing problems people face on a daily basis in their respective areas; and promoting democracy, enhancing people's power and improving the quality of life (i.e. development) of all the people.

Any attempt, direct or indirect, by the state to control or manipulate local governments must therefore be challenged. In the past 30 years or so, Tanzanians could not challenge the state's efforts to monopolize power and direct all social activities from the center. The social-political and economic arrangement was such that all institutions and mass organizations at both national and local (grassroots) levels were strictly controlled by the ruling state-party.

The introduction of plural politics in Tanzania brings hope that such strict control of grassroots organizations will disappear. Multi-partism would pave the way for local governments to reassert themselves for the specific purpose of giving the people the right to organize and govern themselves. It is important to note, however, that those who control state power always seek to monopolize authority and dictate to others what they feel is good for the society. It is also important to

identify the mechanisms they employ in seeing to it that they control the direction of societal activities.

This paper attempts such an endeavor by looking at local government in Tanzania beginning in 1982 to the present. It argues that local governments in Tanzania have not been able to fulfil their obligations and are not institutions of self rule. It points out that local governments were not created to serve as institutions for the masses of the people to participate in the consideration, planning and implementation of their own development programs. The failure and/or inability of local governments to do well in service provision and spearhead development in their respective areas in Tanzania lies in the central government's own policies and actions.

REINTRODUCTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TANZANIA

In 1982 the government of Tanzania announced its intention to reintroduce local governments. The decision can be traced to a Party directive in the Election Manifesto of 1980. Clause six of the Manifesto read in part, "for Tanzania mainland to revive the local government system whose concept and structure should relate to the changes which have taken place since they were abolished with the aim of enhancing democracy and the development of self-reliance" (Max, 1991:103). To implement the Party's directive the government enacted five laws to pave the way for the reintroduction of local governments.¹

Apparently it would seem that both the party and the government were reaffirming Tanzania's commitment to the masses of the people to participate in consideration, the planning, and implementation of their own development programs as stated in *Mwongozo* of 1971.² The party and government, however, were responding to a deeper economic crisis that threatened not only the existence of the party-state but also total collapse of social services the provision of which formed part of the leadership's basis for legitimacy.

The crisis was economic in character but its root causes were centrally and fundamentally political calling for a political solution. To understand the nature and character of the crisis it is necessary to go back in time and look at some of the policy decisions made since 1967. First and foremost the Tanzanian leadership adopted the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 committing the country to the policies of socialism and self-reliance.

The "Declaration" could be viewed as a watershed in the ideological, political and economic history of Tanzania. It defined the direction which the country took and all the political and economic events that have unfolded since then. All the subsequent policies were derived from the "Declaration".

The stated objective of the Declaration was to create a society of equality and realization of human potential through collective action. Consequently, the government nationalized the major means of production, major businesses, commercial banks, major businesses in agriculture, transport, export and import trade, and wholesale trade. The idea was to bring about redistribution of income and assets, and more importantly the nationalizations were seen as a strategy to enable the state to take control over the utilization of surplus from the nationalized firms. Following the Arusha Declaration, and especially the nationalizations, the government pursued other policies and took measures that led to the decline of the economy. Those policy measures included abolition of producer cooperatives and formation of state run agencies (parastatals); forced villagization of rural peasants, expansion of agricultural production based on a few major export crops, import-substitution industrialization (with high import content) and encouragement of foreign investment capital, seen by the leadership as engine of growth, ideological rhetoric notwithstanding.

The adoption of the Arusha Declaration and the subsequent policy decisions enabled the centralization of both political and economic decisions. The policy of socialism and self-reliance ushered in centralized planning and control of the economy. It is said that by the end of the 1970s, 8 per cent of the large and medium scale activity was in the public sector accounting for 44 per cent of the monetary gross domestic product (GDP), and the public sector was responsible for 80 per cent of the monetary capital formation (Bukuku, 1993:6). The public sector also became the dominant employer of formal sector employment. Available statistics show that in 1967 the public sector accounted for 58 percent of total formal sector employment, rising to 65 per cent in 1970, 70 per cent in 1980 and 77 per cent in 1984 (Bukuku, 1993:6). This trend reversed from 1984³ and by 1987 the public sector accounted for 62 per cent of the total wage employment.

The economy of Tanzania is characterized by two distinct economic structures, consisting of a large traditional rural sector and a small capital intensive modern, urbanized sector. The former is concerned essentially with the production of food and cash crops, whereas the latter is concerned with manufacturing and service activities. However, there is a weak link between the two economic structures.

Tanzania's agriculture is rain fed and problems faced in this sector include the vagaries of weather, transport bottlenecks and production technology. With an increasing population, and the demands of the urban elite, the economic base could not sustain the pressure brought to bear on it. There is a limit to which rain fed agriculture wholly dependent on small peasants using a hand hoe could sustain the egalitarian policies of the Arusha Declaration and the industrial policies pursued by the leadership.

The policy pronouncements after Arusha Declaration brought about a decline in incentives. They also brought a big growth in the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and administrative/bureaucratic decision making in the economy. The economic growth of the 1960s and the early 1970s was predicated on the rise in the volume of export crops, on the one hand, and the "project"-oriented, import-substitution industrialization sustained on foreign funds, on the other. Socially, the expanding state bureaucracy and the inefficient and corrupt parastatal sector derived its resources from the increased exploitation of the peasantry. But these developments began to reach their limits in the 1970s. As noted above there is a technical limit on the expansion of acreage based on the hoe, just as there is a social limit to the extent of the exploitation of the peasant.

As argued by Hyden (1980) the state in Tanzania is weak and has never been in control of the civil society. When the pressure on the peasants mounted they put up resistance and withdrew their participation from the formal economy, falling back onto the "economy of affection". In practical terms their withdraw took the form of shifting from cash crop to food production for consumption or channeling their products to parallel markets. Once this started to happen in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the volume of exports began to fall. The fall in production of export crops accompanied by adverse terms of trade manifested itself in the shortages of foreign exchange.

This situation in turn affected the capacity to import raw materials and spare parts that were central to the running of the heavily import dependent industries. The net result of the whole process was the phenomenon known as underutilization of industrial capacity, shortages of industrial consumer goods, retrenchment, racketeering, and social unrest exemplified, for example, by university student demonstrations of 1978.

The symptomatic reflection of the crisis was in the balance of payments and therefore the solution adopted by the state emphasized redressing the balance. To rectify the balance of payments problem the typical measure was to make the exports cheaper and imports more expensive to balance the external trade; control inflation by controlling wages; cut down on the government budget by cutting down on social services and subsidies; and embark on a general liberalization of the economy. These prescriptions began to be applied in Tanzania in the early 1980s and they paved the way for an IMF agreement signed in 1986 (Shivji, 1992).

Sensing that some of these measures could be unpopular and potentially disruptive, the party sought to pre-empt their impact by proposing a political solution that would make the people believe that they were in charge of their own affairs. While the economic measures to solve the crisis were being implemented (and these included NESP, SAP and ERP⁴), a political solution was also invoked. It was the

reintroduction of local governments and producer cooperatives and the dismantling of marketing parastatals.

The Party directive of 1980 was thus implemented by the government beginning in 1982 with the passing of five acts which provided the legal basis for the newly constituted local authorities. A constitutional amendment to include a clause that provides for the creation of local governments was also made. As of January 1, 1984 local governments started to function again in Tanzania. To date, however, their performance is poor and they are neither delivering social services effectively, nor offering an opportunity for the masses of the people to participate in decisions which affect their lives (Liviga, 1993). The crucial factors for the failure of local governments to live to their expectations are again traceable to the nature and character of the Tanzanian state.

In the following section I will outline the factors which have inhibited local mass participation in local governments. Participation in this context refers to the extent and degree to which local officials together with elected local representatives make key decisions regarding strategic management and critical operating tasks of local governments. It refers specifically to the process by which final decisions are arrived at in such areas as finance, manpower, planning and implementation as well as monitoring of development activities.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION

The nature and character of the Tanzanian state is responsible for the subordination of local government authorities to the center and their subsequent failure to act as institutions for mass participation, let alone play a leading role in local development. There are four basic factors which are responsible for the state's position vis a vis local government authorities. The first factor is that the nationalists, that is, the people who fought for independence and captured state power sought to consolidate their hold on the state and political power. Centralization of both political and economic decision-making was thus used as the strategy to attain that goal.

Centralization of political power and economic decision-making translated themselves into such measures as the abolition of chiefdoms in 1962; the dismantling of the armed forces and formation of a new army whose recruits came from the youth wing of the only political and ruling party in 1964; the abolition of independent trade unions and formation of a state-run workers' organization in 1964; the constitutional amendment and subsequent enactment of a law making the country a one-party state in 1965; the nationalization of all major means of production and exchange in 1967; and abolition of rural councils in 1969 (Liviga, 1993).

Because the post-colonial state in Tanzania is weak, one which is superimposed on society without conditions of existence therein, and one that played no major role in the process of production from independence in 1961 to 1966, the authorities wanted to reverse that trend. The Arusha Declaration was thus an attempt in that direction, and it was a deliberate policy proclamation which aimed not only at wresting control of the economy from foreign interests but also subordination of the local producers. As a weak state struggling to control both political power and the process of production and exchange, its officials could neither entertain nor implement the idea of plural centers of authority. They could not envision sharing crucial decision making powers with institutions not located at the center including local governments. Powers and functions allocated to local government authorities are therefore restricted to peripheral issues.

The second major factor is the Arusha Declaration of 1967 which proclaimed socialism and self-reliance as the principal ideology and objective for the Tanzanian state. The country's policies of socialism and self-reliance strengthened the central government rather than local authorities. The nationalization of major means of production meant more responsibility for planning and control by the central government, and that left little room for local governments and other institutions to make independent decisions. Although the major tenets of the Arusha Declaration have been repudiated by the Party,⁵ centralization of political power still remains and the state continues to play a central role in the economy.

The third factor is the reforms of 1972 entitled decentralization. The reforms of 1972 substituted regional and district development committees for the councils. This administrative reorganization placed responsibility for the provision of social services and the task of initiating, implementing, and monitoring local development programs under the District Development Director (DDD), the Regional Development Director (RDD) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) at the district, region and national levels respectively. These offices still exist today and continue to fulfil their obligations, thereby making local governments redundant in some aspects.

The fourth factor is that beginning in 1961 and especially after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the central government created other agencies (for example, the National Housing Corporation, Urban Water authority, District Development Corporations, and so on) to share the duties and responsibilities given to local governments, thus diffusing the functions and effectiveness of local governments. These bodies were adequately funded by the central government and were not necessarily made to raise their operating and capital funds as local governments were expected to do. Also local government plans and budgets are subject to control by the central government, sometimes in detail, whereas no such requirement is implemented in the case of the other agencies.

The factors mentioned above combine to negate the possibility of local governments to function as independent units of self-rule. They inhibit the implementation of division of functions and responsibilities based on devolution of both political and economic power, i.e., territorial decentralization. As a result the only logical form of center-local relationship is one in which the center is in command of every facet of local government activity. Because of its monopoly of both political and economic decision-making the central state bureaucracy has effectively closed the avenues for local participation.

By territorial decentralization I am referring to the legal conferring of powers to discharge specific functions upon formally constituted local authorities. It means transfer of powers to geographic units of local government that lie outside the formal command structure of the central governments to discharge their obligations as part of a relatively autonomous national political system and not as a dependent element of a central hierarchy. Territorial decentralization would also allow the delegation of what Kiggundu (1989) calls "strategic management tasks" (SMATs) and not only "critical operating tasks" (COTs) from the central government to local authorities.

The centralization of state functions did not start at independence in 1961. The process of centralization has its origin from the colonial period and it can be traced to the philosophy underlying the concept and practice of colonialism. From its inception in 1884 to 1961, the colonial state was organized on the basis of a unitary state and its departments were sectorially or functionally organized. Local governments served not as production entities but played a circulation and reproductive role. They provided infrastructural and social services as aids to the accumulation and investment requirements of the colonial administration. The creation of local governments (decentralization) was conceived in terms of functional system of organization in line with hierarchical needs of the colonial state.

The central authorities in Tanzania have always sought to monopolize political power and direct all development activities from the center. They have been unwilling or unable to devolve both political and economic (financial) powers to local government authorities. The colonial administration did that because first, it was both politically necessary and ideologically correct, for colonialism entailed the subordination of the interests of the (colonized) local population to those of the colonizing power. In that context autonomous local governments as formal decision-making organs exercised by local representative councils or officials would have been contrary to the prevailing doctrine and would have undermined colonial rule. The colonial authorities could not give the councils any kind of freedom

(autonomy) without at the same time conceding that the colonial subjects were capable of governing themselves.

Secondly, the colonial authorities could not allow the various ethnic groups they had brought together into a nation-state (country) to break away. They had used considerable time and resources to subdue local resistance to colonization. The colonial state was thus centralized and division of governmental authority and responsibilities was based on function and not territory. Functional decentralization (deconcentration) refers to administrative decentralization or distribution of responsibilities within the central government ministries or departments to field offices and/or agents without transferring political power. A division of responsibilities occurs in which some decision making is transferred to field staff, and local units or local levels of government become agents of the central government.

In line with the above, the colonial authorities regarded decentralization more as an exercise in deconcentration and the role of local authorities was to provide a social and infrastructural environment conducive to such deconcentration. Local governments were therefore created and used as arenas where colonial policies and decisions were legitimized before being pushed down to the people through their chiefs for implementation.

The same pattern of relationship between the center and local governments continued after independence, and as we saw above four factors were responsible for that state of affairs. In addition there are three other reasons why the Tanzanian state (and its leaders) resist territorial decentralization. The first reason would be the need for unity. The country as it exists now is a colonial creation and it comprises of more than 120 ethnic (tribal) groups. The post-colonial state leadership inherited this composition of the country and would want to keep it intact. To allow territorial decentralization, i.e., devolution of political and economic authority and decision-making powers to autonomous local government authorities would jeopardize the fragile unity that exists now.

The second reason is that the leadership feels that the process of nation-building, i.e., creating and putting in place the necessary institutional structures, national economy, common cultural traits, ideology etc. requires centralized control and direction of political and economic matters of state. A young nation striving to build its foundation could not afford divisive politics, i.e., dispersion of decision making authority to several centers including local governments.

The third reason is economic by nature and relates to personal survival of the individuals in the state machinery. As is the case in most developing countries including Tanzania, control of political power gives the leadership control of the

economy as well. Politics and economics are two sides of the same coin there. Devolving political power therefore implies relinquishing control over the economy. For the political leadership surviving in office means at the same time continued economic prosperity. As Nafziger (1993:122) has observed, "in the 1980s, state funds could be used not only privately, as in the 1970s, but also for private accumulation; economic liberalism rationalized acquiring resources at the expense of the majority of the population". To date, no political leader in Africa, with the exception of Senghor (Senegal) and Nyerere (Tanzania), for example, has been willing to let go political power.

In the next section I will present an analysis of the origin of the Arusha declaration and show how it weakened local governments in Tanzania. Socialism and Self-reliance did not lead to devolution of power. Effective power remained concentrated in the hands of elites (central government bureaucrats). I will also show that effective decentralization (devolution) is not possible without the reform of existing power structures. The socialist policies enunciated in the Arusha Declaration did not overhaul the power structure of the Tanzanian state. The power structure that exists today in Tanzania is a major block to strong and autonomous local governments.

TANZANIAN SOCIALISM AND THE WEAKNESSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Socialism implies, among other things, a devolution of power and widespread political participation which would additionally suggest strong local governments. But this was not the case with Tanzania. To understand the weakness of local governments in Tanzania one needs to revisit the reasons behind the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration which spelt out Tanzania's socialism and self-reliance. It is also important to see how the leadership perceived socialism and the strategies they adopted to implement it.

In brief the Arusha Declaration was a political, economic and ideological response to the problems Tanzania had experienced from independence in 1961 to 1966. Economically, there were three major problems. The first problem was foreign control of the economy. Foreign interests controlled all banking activities, insurance, major industrial firms and plantations of sisal, tea, and coffee, the leading agricultural exports. Surplus profit was repatriated and less money capital was available for local development. Surplus was also drained out of the country through the process of over invoicing imports and under invoicing exports.

The second problem was that within the country the economy, with respect to wholesale and retail trade, purchasing of crops from peasants, and small scale industries were in the hands of Asians, some were nationals and others holding dual

citizenship mostly British and Canadian. These people also sent their surplus profits abroad for investment or safe keeping. They too denied the country some needed money capital for development projects.

The third problem with regard to the economy was the country's dependence on foreign aid for its development plans. The first development plan (1961-1964) was to be financed in part by US\$ 58.5 million from funds received as aid. By the end of the second year of the plan only 45 per cent of the planned contribution from aid was realized. Aid could not be forthcoming for essentially political reasons (Liviga, 1982).

Politically, Tanzania had conflicts with the west, from where most of her support in economic and other developmental activities used to come. Beginning in 1964 the Tanzanian leadership supported liberation movements in Southern Africa. They supported the Mozambican, Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian liberation movements by providing training bases, arms, blood for the fighters and other logistical matters. The western countries which were involved in the struggles responded by denying Tanzania assistance because, in essence it was fighting their interests in the said countries.

Secondly, in 1964 Tanzania clashed with West Germany one of the leading aid donors (US\$ 2.1 million in 1963/64). The clash with West Germany occurred when Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Before the union Tanganyika had diplomatic relations with West Germany and Zanzibar with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). After the union West Germany found itself having an embassy in the same country as the GDR. This was unacceptable to West Germany on the basis of the "Hallstein Doctrine" which in principle said that the two German states could not be represented in one and the same country abroad because West Germany did not recognize the existence of the GDR. West Germany demanded therefore that Tanzania (in effect Zanzibar) should terminate its relationship with the GDR or forfeit aid from West Germany. Tanzania refused to comply and as a result West Germany terminated all aid commitments to the country involving about US\$ 17.5 million.

Thirdly, Tanzania had problems with Britain and this involved the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in Rhodesia on November 11, 1965. Tanzania along with other members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolved that if by December 15 that year Britain would have not brought down the illegal regime they would break diplomatic relations with Britain. By December 15, 1965 Britain had not taken any steps to bring down the Smith regime. Subsequently, Tanzania and a few other OAU members including Zambia and Uganda broke diplomatic relations with Britain. The consequences of this

action were, among others, the loss to Tanzania of about US\$ 19.5 million which was promised to her in aid from Britain (Liviga, 1982).

Internally, there were political struggles too. For example, in 1964 there was an army mutiny during which soldiers demanded better pay and Africanization of the officer corps. They also demanded accelerated promotion for some officers who had been in the service since the colonial period. In addition they demanded expulsion of their top commanders who were all British citizens. The mutiny was put down by a contingent of British and Nigerian army units which came in response to a request by the government.

After the army mutiny there were workers' strikes in industries and plantations and the most demanding strikes took place in the transport sector. The railway workers' union called a strike which paralyzed transport and haulage of export crops from upcountry to the ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga. All these developments meant problems for the ruling party and the government.

Meanwhile, within the ruling circles there were voices which demanded that the government take action to allow it to control the bureaucracy (civil service) and adopt strong measures that would deny all those forces trying to assert themselves in the political system the avenues to do so. With regard to control of the civil service parliamentarian demanded Africanization of the civil service. The majority of senior civil servants in all ministries and other agencies were expatriates mostly from Britain. As for the economy the nationalists demanded that the Government should take action to curtail the dominance of the Asian community by specifically directing that purchasing crops from the peasants should be done by cooperative unions.

Another internal political problem arose in 1966 after the government announced that all students selected to join the university would undergo military training before they enroll at their respective campuses. Upon completion of their studies they would surrender 40 per cent of their salaries to the state for eighteen months as part of national service. University students opposed this move and demonstrated against the government calling Nyerere and his administration traitors and that his policies were worse than those of the colonial authorities. The government in turn reacted by expelling the students.

The internal political and economic problems were seen by the leadership as the beginning of division of the society into classes. A division which in their analysis would threaten peace and harmony because a society torn by antagonistic classes cannot forge forward as a united entity. Frustrated by lack of control of the economy, lack of external support in the form of development aid, loss of the leading aid donors as a result of the clashes with the west (West Germany and Britain), threatened by the internal upheavals (the army mutiny, workers strikes,

university students demonstrations, and the demands for Africanization of the civil service and banning of the Asian community in crop buying), the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) convened a meeting of its National Executive committee (NEC) to discuss the problems.

The meeting was held in Arusha in January 26-29, 1967. At that meeting Nyerere, the President of TANU and the United Republic of Tanzania presented a draft proposal of what came to be known as the Arusha Declaration. The NEC endorsed the proposal and it became the Party's blue print for Socialism and Self-reliance. Socialism because the party resolved to work to create a classless society, one of equals in which everybody had an opportunity to enjoy the available benefits accruing to it through the labor of all the people. Self-reliance because foreign assistance was hard to come by, and even if it was made available, usually it came in late and not in quantities sufficient to cater for all development requirements of the country.

Tanzanian socialism was therefore a policy statement whose basic aim was to solve the said political and economic problems that the country faced during the first six years of its independence. Socialism in Tanzania did not and could not mean wide spread participation or creation of strong local governments. In the first place, Arusha Declaration was essentially a compradorial petty bourgeois solution to the political and economic woes. The basic aim was to give the state bureaucrats monopoly of both political and economic decision making power. The declaration was not a product of a popular mass struggle in which workers and peasants united to capture the reigns of power and create institutions which, under the leadership of their representatives made decisions on their behalf.

Secondly, the workers movement was crushed in 1964 when the government banned all trade unions following strikes and formed one workers' union under its own control. The General Secretary of the union was appointed by the President and had to be a member of the NEC of the Party. The army was disbanded in 1964 and a new one created from recruits all members of the Youth Wing of the ruling party. In 1965 all political parties were effectively outlawed when the Government amended the constitution and passed a law making the country a one-party state.

Thirdly, after the announcement of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967, the Government nationalized all major means of production and exchange. New corporations and companies were formed to run the affairs of the nationalized firms. Politicians and some members of the civil service were given managerial positions in the new state companies. Relations between the new management and workers remained the same as they were before the declaration. The state took the place of the former capitalist owners, and workers continued to be exploited for the benefit of the new masters.

Fourthly, in agriculture both cooperatives, which were organized by indigenous Africans to counter the dominance of Asians, and Asian companies which bought crops from peasants were abolished. In their place the state created new companies which were charged with the task of buying the crops locally and market them abroad. The new companies included Tanzania Cotton Authority, Coffee Authority of Tanzania, Tanzania Cashewnut Authority, Tobacco Authority of Tanzania, Sisal Marketing Corporation, Tanzania Livestock Marketing Company and many others. Peasants were marginalized because their organizations, i.e, the cooperative unions were abolished and they were left with nothing by way of organizational mechanism to channel their demands. In 1969 rural councils were abolished thereby denying the people local democratic institutions through which they exercised their democratic rights.

The Arusha Declaration and especially its strategy of nationalization and creation of parastatal companies led to centralization of planning and monitoring of implementation of all policy decisions in the country. The way and manner in which Tanzanian socialism was conceived and implemented could not therefore, facilitate the broad participation of the workers and peasants (the masses of the people) in the development process.

In theory socialism entails communal ownership and control of means of production and participation by the masses of the people in decision making. This was not the case in Tanzania, and the state realized the contradiction between theory and its practice some four years later. The realization came as a result of an army coup in Uganda in 1971. The coup provided to the Tanzanian leadership an eye opener as regards the dangers to the stability of African regimes. According to *Mwongozo* (TANU Guidelines, 1971), a document issued after the coup in Uganda, the dangers to African regimes were a result of continued privileges and inequalities associated with a process of internal class formation and the countries' dependence on international capitalist system.

To solve the two basic problems *Mwongozo* stated that Tanzania needed good leadership in both the party and government. Good leadership according to *Mwongozo* means, among other things, the people participating in the consideration, the planning, and the implementation of their own development programs. *Mwongozo* was, therefore, a tacit admission by the party and Government that there were no provisions or opportunities for the Tanzanian masses to participate in the development process of their country. An admission also indicating that Arusha Declaration with its policy of socialism and self-reliance did not mean, (and never gave) power to the people. *Mwongozo* was therefore a call for a democratic pattern of policy making.

After the publication of *Mwongozo* workers in some factories in Dar es Salaam and Arusha responded by locking out management and took over the running of those factories. In other industrial firms workers issued memoranda calling for dismissal of managers whom they claimed to have been practicing capitalist methods of management (Shivji, 1986; Mapolu, 1979). When these calls went unanswered by the state, the workers called for strikes which the state suppressed with impunity. The working class movement was again destroyed and the state, despite the call for democratic policy making continued to dominate in policy making.

Liberalization of the economy (1986) and the introduction of multi-party politics (1992) are testimony to the fact that the state and its centralization policies is no longer capable of fulfilling its obligations to society. Likewise, local government authorities, dependent on the central government for finance and manpower find themselves incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities effectively.

CONCLUSION

It is the position of this paper, therefore, that the main obstacle for local government authorities to do well in provision of social services and development in their respective areas in Tanzania lies in the central government's own actions. I am referring to the centralization of governmental powers both political and economic. Because of this centralization of authority local governments face serious problems including insufficient qualified manpower, inadequacy of funds, scarcity of technical equipment, and organizational and institutional constraints. This position is shared by Olowu (1990), Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), and Conyers (1982).

I am arguing also that in developing countries, Tanzania included, problems such as ethnic conflicts, political efficacy, administrative weaknesses, and economic stagnation can be explained in part as a result of attempts to impose a high degree of centralization. Olowu (1990) has argued in similar terms when he discusses what he calls the failure of the centralized state in Africa. During the colonial period centralization was necessary because it fitted in with the ideology of colonialism. Whereas, after independence, centralization has been a result of a combination of several factors. The most important factors include nationalists strengthening their hold on the state and political power; the move towards one-party system; adoption of socialism as the guiding ideology; weakness of the state itself; the need for unity; the process of building a national economy and its attendant structures; as well as personal survival needs of the rulers given the nature and character of political economy.

This paper suggests also that an analysis of center-local relations, the form they take and how they constrain local government effectiveness can be understood as part and parcel of the process of division of functions and responsibilities, i.e., the process of decentralization. This argument is also advanced by leading scholars such as Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), Mawhood (1983), and Greenwood and Stewart (1986). Rondinelli and Cheema in particular discuss various organizational forms decentralization takes and the circumstances under which each one form is preferred to the others.

Finally, I would suggest that an ideal political decentralization is one in which there is devolution of both political and financial authority from the center to sub-national units, e.g. local governments. I would suggest further that the essence of decentralization is system separateness where the subnational units discharge their obligations as part of a national political system and not dependent elements of a central hierarchy. In other words, for local governments to be politically and economically strong and effective, the Tanzanian central government should adopt territorial and not functional decentralization.

Territorial decentralization (devolution) as opposed to functional decentralization (administrative decentralization) leads to relatively strong and autonomous local authorities. Local governments which have control over functions that impact within their territories are more likely to be effective than those assigned to deliver services locally but controlled at the center. This argument (i.e., the need for devolution) is the central theme in the works of Maddick (1963), Sherwood (1969), Rondinelli (1989) and Greenwood and Stewart (1986).

The organization of local government in Tanzania referring specifically to internal structures and institutional links with the central government essentially reflect the state's (central government) political and economic interests. The desire by the nationalists to maintain a hold on the state and political control, the need to control the process of production and exchange, as well as the decision to pursue policy measures that seem to encourage participation by the masses of the people but in essence strengthen the center's monopoly of decision-making powers can also be explained in terms of the nature and character of the state (Skocpol, 1982).

Skocpol's theory of the state (statism) which notes that local policies and center-local relations can best be understood in the context of ongoing economic and social changes which are national and international in scale is useful in this regard. It is useful because it states that state restructuring which includes local government is a function of both local and international political and economic factors. In that regard state managers, political rulers and administrators are seen as key actors all maneuvering to extract resources and build administrative and coercive organizations at the point of intersection between international conditions

and pressure, on the one hand, and class structured economies and politically organized interests, on the other.

Skocpol's approach is also useful because it supports the assertion that the state has distinct interests other than those of society. By viewing the state as an organization through which official collectivities pursue distinct goals; as configurations of organization and action that influence meaning and methods of politics for all people; an independent institution and some of its policy decisions emanate from its own interests and not necessarily from those of society; it is possible to explain why political leaders act on their own and sometimes in contradiction with societal interests or expectations. It is also logical to regard what happened in Tanzania following the Arusha Declaration as an example of state officials acting to serve their own interests at the expense of the society.

Thirdly, statism considers state structure, defined first of all as administrative capacity as an important independent variable. Therefore, success or failure of either the central (state) government or local authorities to achieve goals hinge upon two factors: sovereign integrity and stable administrative control of a given territory, and loyal and skilled officials and plentiful financial resources. The Tanzanian state policies towards monopoly control of political power and the process of production pursued vigorously after 1967 can therefore be seen as an attempt to create the conditions necessary to control the civil society.

In attempting to control both political and economic decision-making, the Tanzanian case was not unique as far as neo-colonial economies (developing countries) are concerned. Kenya tried to do that in 1965 by adopting African Socialism as defined in Sessional Paper No. 10, Zambia announced Humanism as its national ideology in 1968, and Uganda adopted the Common Man's Charter in 1969. All these policy documents aimed at, among other things, giving the nationalists monopoly of control of political and economic power and decision making. What might have been unique in the Tanzanian case was the degree and intensity with which the Tanzanian leadership embarked on the path to socialism, and rather than rely on help from socialist or communist countries, its development plans depended heavily on funds from the west (Crouch, 1987).

When foreign sources of finance and technical assistance began to assert their control over project identification, implementation and monitoring; when local production and funds could not sustain the state's egalitarian policies and foreign donors demanded streamlining government operations; the economy declined and state control of both politics and economic began to fall apart. It was in response to this trend that both the Party and Government decided to invoke a political solution by reintroducing not only local governments but also producer cooperatives and privatizing the ailing state owned enterprises.

The fundamental contradiction between territorial goals of local governments and the functional basis of organization and operation is yet to be resolved. Local governments are yet to be institutions of self-rule; they are unable to act as people's institutions which allow mass participation in the consideration, planning and implementation of development programs. They are neither partners in the process of development nor autonomous units responsible and/or accountable to the people in their areas of jurisdiction. Local governments are in essence administrative agents of the central government, and central government bureaucrats make key decisions in crucial sectors including, but not limited to finance, manpower and planning.

NOTES

1. The five acts passed by the Government to facilitate the reintroduction of local governments are: The Local Government (District Authorities) Act # 7 of 1982; The Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act # 8 of 1982; The Local Government Finance Act, # 9 of 1982; The Government Service Act # 10 of 1982; and The Local Government Negotiating Machinery Act # II of 1982.
2. Mwongozo was a Party document issued in 1971 which stipulated, among other things, the Tanzanian workers and peasants are the masters and state officials are servants of the people. The people, therefore, had to have an input in the consideration, planning and implementation of their own development plans.
3. Beginning in 1984 the Government implemented economic measures which allowed private interests to import goods and provide services which hitherto were the monopoly of the state. The move was labelled liberalization.
4. National Economic Survival Program (1981), Structural Adjustment Program (1982) and Economic Recovery Program (1986) were economic measures adopted and implemented by the Government to alleviate the economic crisis which had engulfed Tanzania beginning in the late 1970s.
5. The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party decided in 1991 to do away with the restrictions imposed on the country's leadership. The restrictions concerned mostly barring party and Government leaders from engaging themselves in capitalist ventures, doing such things as owning and renting houses, holding shares in capitalist firms, holding directorships in foreign firms, and earning more than one salary.

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