

# The Politics of Education for Self-Reliance in Tanzania: Lessons from Experience

By  
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## Introduction

The year 1967 will for quite some time be remembered in Tanzania as the time when the country embarked upon the now failed policy of '*Ujamaa n kujitegemea*' (socialism and self-reliance). For most people outside Tanzania this was the time around which Tanzania was arguably the most well known and talked about African country. For the latter group it is probably Tanzania's '*ujamaa*' which is most remembered (with good reason) because, of the two goals, 'socialism' received the greater emphasis and publicity than 'self-reliance'.

The Arusha Declaration which launched the twin-track policy, was the culmination of a process in which Tanzania was trying to respond to the contradictions and challenges of political independence since the early 1960s. The declaration was the embodiment of Nyerere's idealism, rising popular discontent, frustrated economic ambitions and creeping class differentiation evolving and political conflict. To be fair sure, it was constantly stressed that the Arusha Declaration was a declaration of intent whose achievement would crucially depend on the will and commitment of the leadership to carry it out. In brief, the Arusha Declaration (at least rhetorically) sought to bring and to accomplish this while relying primarily on the utilization of domestic resources, on the other. For anybody acquainted with the politics of Tanzania, it is almost a truism to say that the Arusha Declaration is the single most important factor that has structured and conditioned politics in the country over the last almost three decades.

What precipitated the Arusha Declaration? The back-drop against which the declaration was conceived, discussed and passed by the sole ruling party, TANU, is of extreme importance, if only because the majority of

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analysts, proponents and critics alike have largely taken the Arusha Declaration at its face value, there are at least two theories concerning this question. One theory is that the Arusha Declaration was a well intentioned, earnest and consensual attempt to chart out an alternative path to development which would avoid the dangers of western neo-colonialism and the ideological hegemony of Soviet led communism. In explaining the failure of the Arusha Declaration this theory tends to stress such factors as naivete of an overly idealistic Nyerere, general ignorance concerning the nature of the capitalist world economy, faulty implementation, lack of political will and capacity, a hostile external environment, bad weather, etc.<sup>1</sup>

The other theory is less begin. It begins by assuming that in Tanzania, as elsewhere, politics was at work and the struggle for power is what lies at the root of the proclamation and subsequent failure of the Arusha Declaration. At one level, it is postulated that the Arusha Declaration was an attempt by the ruling elite to consolidate its class base by imposing an egalitarian and populist ideological hegemony over the whole society. At another level, it is contended that the Arusha Declaration arose from intra-elite struggles for domination in the context of the class differentiation that was evolving.<sup>2</sup>

While the 'good intentions' theory emphasizes contingent factors in explaining the failure of the Arusha Declaration the political power theory portrays failure as success in terms of the containment of rising expectations and channelling dissent. In other words, this school contends that the Arusha Declaration failed in its stated lofty social goals mainly because they were never seriously intended; but it succeeded in its unstated political goals of maintaining order "to contain the participatory and distributive demands generated by the imperatives of equality".<sup>3</sup>

We posit in this paper that it is the material circumstances that led to the conception of the declaration in terms of the identification of the problems to be addressed, the definition of the goals to be accomplished and the elaboration of the means to be employed. It is primarily these factors which account for the outcomes. Problems arising from interpretation and implementation are certainly important but only secondarily. As we shall try to show, it is not by accident or ignorance that the Arusha Declaration was unclear in its conception of the problems to be addressed, vague in its definition of goals and unspecific in the elaboration of means to be employed. The Arusha Declaration was triggered by immediate instrumental political



imperatives of social control for political stability. The policy of Education for Self-Reliance (ESR) can only be understood in this light. To speak of success or failure, let alone to draw lessons from the experience, will very much depend on one's vantage point.

This paper argues that the failure of ESR in Tanzania arises primarily from the fact that, like the Arusha Declaration itself, the policy was adopted for reasons of political expediency rather than from earnest commitment. This is why self-reliance is defined in narrow and largely backward 'peasant' terms and no effort is made to prioritize transformative education and to commit appropriate resources to it. In essence, however, the policy achieved its unstated instrumental goal which was to dampen, control and ultimately channel the rising expectations of the youth, in particular, in an economy that remained untransformed (colonial in structure and composition) and was neither expanding to generate additional employment nor diversifying to create new occupational opportunities within and outside agriculture.

### Rising expectations and Creeping Frustration

When Tanganyika (later Tanzania, after the union in 1964) became independent in 1961, it had a visionary and charismatic nationalist leader in the person of Julius Nyerere. Capitalising on the dominant position of his political party (TANU) and the popular support carried over from the nationalist movement, Nyerere, almost single handedly, defined the future goals, identified the challenges to society and spelled out the new tasks of the political leadership. In his vision of the future Nyerere argued that colonialism was no longer the principal enemy of the society. Instead he identified the new enemies as poverty, ignorance and disease and declared war on the unholy trinity. On the poverty front the war demanded economic development. The war on ignorance implied the expansion and deepening of education. The attack of disease entailed the provision of improved medical and public health services.

In the heat and euphoria of independence, it may be argued that there was considerable popular consensus on these goals which also constituted the major popular social expectations in the post-independence period. There was however no corresponding consensus on how they were to be pursued and attained. Differences abounded on questions of definition, strategy and tactics and struggles ensued immediately after independence.

That is why the new state imposed political restrictions and enacted or re-enacted colonial repressive laws to force at least a semblance of consensus and unity of purpose. The claim was that unity was a necessary condition for political stability which, in turn, was a precondition for nation building and development. The restriction of political freedoms and suppression of dissent was the price to be exacted where spontaneous consent was absent.<sup>4</sup> Nyerere offered an apt rationalization in 1962:

... immediately after its formation, the new government is faced with a major task—that of economic development... through the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease. In order for this objective to be successfully accomplished there is as much need for unity as was required during the struggle for independence. Similarly there is no room for difference.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of such rationalizations Tanzania underwent a number of major political and legal changes which were, in their essence, repressive;

- ⇒ A republican constitution was adopted with a strong presidency to ensure centralized authority and effective government.
- ⇒ Traditional political leadership and ethnic based political organizations were banned in the interest of 'national unity'.
- ⇒ Competing political parties were proscribed and a single party constitution adopted.
- ⇒ A preventive detention, and a deportation act, were enacted to contain dissent in the interest of 'political stability'.
- ⇒ Trade unions were forcibly brought under the control of a government sponsored and controlled Tanganyika Federation of Labour - strikes were outlawed.
- ⇒ Farmers' co-operatives were brought under the tutelage of TANU through the government sponsored Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, to circumscribe the power of rural leaders.

The foregoing moves, which were carried out in the first three years of independence were actively opposed by the leadership of the concerned



groups and a section of the politically conscious public. Trade unionists, leaders of cooperatives, traditional chiefs, etc. not only resented the loss of their autonomy but actively protested against the restrictions imposed on their basic freedoms of organization, assembly and speech. Some trade unionists were detained and chiefs deported from their areas as a result.<sup>6</sup>

A section of society supported the government either out of nationalism, patriotism, perceived class interests or pure opportunism. To this group any opposition of the repressive measures was portrayed as betrayal of the cause of development and nation building. The larger, though silent majority however, either merely acquiesced to the measures or offered conditional support in the hope that the ends (if realized) would justify the means. Thus a set of social expectations were formed and it is the frustration of these expectations and the discontent it precipitated that, at least in part, gave rise to the Arusha Declaration.<sup>7</sup>

Poverty, ignorance and disease proved to be formidable enemies in the first few years of independence and have continued to defy all efforts to defeat them. Apart from the curtailment of political freedoms in the interest of unity and stability, Tanzania expected massive inflows of financial resources from external sources to finance the war against the three enemies. At this stage the external environment was perceived to be at least benign if not benevolent. Unfortunately these expectations on the part of Tanzania, proved to be illusory.<sup>8</sup>

On the investment front, Tanzania enacted a liberal investment promotion and protection act in 1963 but by 1966 little capital had been attracted into the country. Thus the expected growth in employment and expansion of employment opportunities did not materialize. Conditions pertaining to risk to capital, availability of skills, the size of the market and profitability simply did not encourage investment. Indeed during this period capital outflows exceeded capital inflows.<sup>9</sup> This meant that the Africanization program which had begun in 1962 soon hit its limits without fulfilling the expectations it had created. A small class of 'naizesheni' - beneficiaries of 'uhuru', particularly in the senior positions in government began to emerge and added to the evolving social differentiation between the haves and have-nots in general.

On the aid front Tanzania was experiencing equally intractable problems. Both Three Year plan (1961-1964) and the First Five Year Plan

(1964-1969) had anticipated major aid receipts. In the event, however, Tanzania fell out with its major benefactors. Federal Germany invoked its Hallstein doctrine and questioned Tanzania's right to retain an East German mission in Zanzibar after the union in 1964. Germany withdrew its training assistance for Tanzania's embryonic air-force. Tanzania responded by asserting its sovereignty and ordering the withdrawal of all German aid. Britain too clashed with Tanzania over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia in 1965. Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and lost several million pounds worth of British aid. In the same period, Tanzania quarrelled with the USA over a 'CIA spy incident' in which a US diplomat was expelled. The US responded by suspending aid to Tanzania.<sup>10</sup> All in all, these developments served to curtail the resources that Tanzania could have received from abroad. This, in turn, undermined the government's capacity to meet the expectations raised by its own promises of liquidating poverty, disease and ignorance. Since it was against these promises that the government had obtained compliance to repressive measures where there was no spontaneous consent, the contingent and implied social contract was running its course. Patience began to run out and people were becoming progressively restive and questioning the legitimacy of the post-colonial state. Specifically, renewed opposition emerged, particularly from the TANU dominated and controlled trade union and co-operative movements and threatened to engulf the whole society.<sup>11</sup> It would seem therefore, that in response to this looming political crisis the government and TANU borrowed a page from Machiavelli's *Prince* rather than Marx's *Capital*. Extant work on political development emphasizing political stability and effective government rather than political freedoms and legitimacy, as represented by Huntington and Zolberg, were the immediate source of inspiration.

### Ujamaa: Mobilizing to Defuse the Crisis

Contrary to popular belief Ujamaa was not intended to mobilize the people for self-determination and socialist development. Given the backdrop just described and with the benefit of hindsight, it is now surprising why the Arusha Declaration was taken by many at its face value as a declaration aimed at mobilization for empowerment. In reality the Arusha Declaration should be seen as TANU's attempt to impose an ideological hegemony of socialism and self-reliance essentially to enhance its legitimacy and to defuse and demobilize popular discontent which was growing from frustration to aggression.<sup>12</sup>



To a very large extent the hegemonic intentions of the Arusha Declaration were quite successful. Not only did the populace become highly mobilized but even the most vociferous critics did not question its 'good intentions'. Socialism and self-reliance were very enticing goals in the Tanzania of the late 1960s. To the ordinary person they rekindled hope which was flagging as a result of the creeping disillusionment with independence. To the small but growing group of local intellectuals it provided an anchor for the then popular 'problem solving, another development' intellectual discourse. These goals were also favoured by the social democratic international environment that prevailed at the time. The Nordic countries, in particular, were not only fascinated by Tanzania's desire to lift itself by its own bootstraps, but also by its commitment to a brand of socialism which was avowedly non-communist. This converged with the ideals of the social democratic regimes of most European countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s and led to the Nordic-Tanzania honeymoon during which aid disbursements to Tanzania grew paradoxically, in support of the policy of self-reliance.<sup>13</sup>

Whatever the beliefs and incantations about the Arusha Declaration, however, it has since become progressively clear that 'ujamaa' resulted in economic disruption and the dislocation of production, greater inequality, a higher dependence on external resources and a greater outflow of internal resources. At first the party-state maintained that these outcomes did not emanate from the policy *per se* but that they were independent of it. In other words these negative consequences were not only unintended but also anomalous. But this was by no means the only position. In the mid-1970s such response divided themselves into roughly four groups.

The *doctrinaire or ideological Arushaists* maintained that the policy in itself was correct but it had been afflicted by problems of conflicting or incorrect interpretation and implementation by those lacking in ideological clarity or commitment or by a hostile external environment. The prescription was to make the necessary corrections and stay the course. This was the position taken by Nyerere. The *pragmatic or reforming Arushaists*, on the other hand, conceded that the policy was faulty in such respects as over-centralization and excessive state intervention and argued for greater flexibility. This position was taken by some elements in the party and the government bureaucracy. A third group, which may be identified as the *left skeptics*, argued that the Arusha Declaration was essentially a populist, utopian ploy launched by a self-serving elite to pre-empt a genuine workers'

and peasants' revolution. This group appealed for scientific socialism and class struggle. A sizeable group with this position was at the University of Dar es Salaam. The fourth group, which has now become the dominant group is that of the *right skeptics*, or indeed, *cynics*. This group expressed general opposition to socialism and argued in favour of capitalism. Supported by multi-lateral agencies, this group included local business interests and the neo-classical economists at the University of Dar es Salaam.

### Education for Domination and Conformity

It has become clear over the last few years that Tanzania has, for all intents and purposes, abandoned socialism and self-reliance under the duress of the IMF/World Bank's Structural Adjustment Program and the ideological hegemony of its policies. The 1990 elections perhaps marked the formal turning point. The CCM election manifesto carefully, but conspicuously, avoided mentioning the 1987 party program which had sought to re-commit the party and political system to the goals of socialism and self-reliance<sup>14</sup> The Zanzibar Declaration of 1991, which, in effect, abrogated the Arusha Declaration leadership code, was the last nail in the coffin of the Arusha Declaration. It legitimated a process which had begun in the early 1980s with the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs. As a result of this process, which Nyerere identified as a series of unplanned retreats from socialism, most of the gains made in the so-called social services have become steadily reversed. Education is one such area where the record of achievements is, at any rate, a mixed one.

*Education for Self Reliance, Socialism and Rural Development* and *Politics in Agriculture*, were the three principal policy documents that followed in the wake of the Arusha Declaration. It is perhaps not surprising that *Education for Self-reliance* was the first document. This is for at least two reasons. One is that since the Arusha Declaration was aimed at imposing ideological hegemony, education was the obvious tool of transmission. It is thus the ideological essence of education for self-reliance rather than its programmatic content that is of primary significance. Secondly, and perhaps more important, was the channelling of expectations and controlling the frustrations of youth before it could take on the form of open political aggression. Nyerere repeatedly made the point that the majority of primary school leavers (87%) '... who left with a sense of failure, of a legitimate aspiration having been denied them', would have to stay in the villages and education must prepare them '... for the work they will be called



upon to do in the society which exists in Tanzania - a rural society where improvement will largely depend upon the efforts of the people in agriculture and in village development<sup>15</sup> Thus, says Nyerere; '...our primary schools must be a complete education in itself.'<sup>16</sup>

It is instructive to note that as far back as 1928, the colonial administration had advocated similar goals emphasizing agriculture and community service;

...in any vision of future development, agriculture must occupy the foremost place... Everything, therefore, points to agriculture as the basis of our educational system in the elementary stages.<sup>17</sup>

Closer to independence in the early 1950s the colonial administration was even more focused. In the newly designed middle school syllabus it was envisaged that only 25 per cent of the pupils would prepare for secondary and teacher education as well as various kinds of vocational training. For the majority, '... the middle school would provide a preparation for future life as citizens in a rural community'<sup>18</sup> Thus the middle school course was designed to be complete in itself and was '... to be related to the needs and reflect the life of the area in which the school is situated. In an agricultural area, for example, the bias will be agriculture, in a pastoral area the bias will be more towards animal husbandry ...These biases will be of a practical nature...'<sup>19</sup> Dodd is quite right in contending that; "There is at least an echo of much of the *Provisional Syllabus of Instruction for Middle Schools* of 1952 in *Education for Self-reliance* of 1967."<sup>20</sup>

It should be borne in mind that the middle school syllabus was born out of a concern for growing rural to urban migration in the post-war period. That is why it was designed exclusively for African children to keep them on the land. Some even contended that it was designed to keep us as 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'. Ironic as this may sound, to the extent that education for self-reliance was conceived in similar terms, it had the same objectives. And in that regard it was as retrogressive as it was oppressive.

The principal sources of the social crisis were the failure of the government to expand higher education, to provide employment in the 'modern' sector and the lack of transformation in agriculture. The strategy of education for self reliance therefore was three pronged. One was to re-orient the education system from 'theoretical' or class-room learning towards

'practical' or field learning and to inculcate respect for and acquiescence to physical labour. Secondly, self-reliance was also intended to reduce the schools dependence on public funding by undertaking income generating activities to supplement their budgets and reduce the government's fiscal burden. Thirdly, self-reliance simply meant the transmission of values which placed emphasis on rural life and dampened the desire of youth to look up to life in the urban areas as their ultimate aim. In brief, education for self-reliance at the primary level was intended to make the youth into agricultural producers, working with their hands on the land and staying in the villages.

Without going into the virtues or ills of rural to urban migration, it should be emphasized that under ujamaa, in general, rural development became a major slogan. That is why the policy paper on rural development was the second document to follow in the wake of the Arusha Declaration. Unfortunately, by and large, the slogan remained largely empty. The crucial weakness of the policy which is quite telling is that it did not embody and indeed it rejected rural transformation, particularly through the development of the forces of production. Instead, rural development essentially meant the concentration of sparse populations and the rudimentary collectivization of traditional villages. This, in effect, tended to entrench and to some extent glorify the hand hoe economy, thus making a virtue of necessity. That is the sense in which ujamaa has been variously described as 'narodnik' or as 'primitive communalism'.<sup>21</sup> Parents, teachers and pupils resented this policy mainly because they had higher expectations than being locked into an untransformed agrarian economy. A parent expressed this resentment succinctly:

Our children don't study how to read and write nowadays. They only go to work on school farms. After seven years of primary schools, children can't even write their names.<sup>22</sup>

The triple goals of education for self-reliance at the primary level, in particular, could not be realized without transforming agriculture in terms of making a significant departure from colonial crops and developing the forces of production beyond the back-breaking hand hoe.<sup>23</sup>

At the adult education level ESR took on a predominantly ideological and directly extractive form. Up to the mid-1960s Tanzania did not have a systematic and comprehensive adult education program mainly because all



attention had been directed at the formal school system. Yet the adult illiteracy rate stood at nearly 80 percent and by the mid - 1960s it was acknowledged that this stood in the way of modernization. Thus within the context of the Arusha Declaration the goal of fighting ignorance was revitalized and extended to adults with the immediate objective of improving their productivity. The Unesco World Conference of Ministers of Education held in Tehran in 1965, had earlier decided to launch a World Experimental Work-Oriented Literacy Programme to counteract the impact of the Cuban success in adult literacy. Rather than literacy with revolution, Unesco advocated literacy with work.

Work-oriented or functional literacy had the objective of revitalizing agricultural production which was declining even as it was the back-bone of the economy. Thus literacy programs were designed to promote increased production of export crops in particular. Cotton, coffee, pyrethrum, cashew nuts, tobacco and sisal were the major programs and with this objective in mind the transmission of literacy skills became incidental to the major purpose. That is why the level of literacy has declined in recent times and a good percentage has relapsed into illiteracy. Literacy for self-reliance was not intended to enhance the peasants' capacity for independent action. Rather it was a means of deepening exploitation and the persistently declining incomes from export production eventually induced a steady retreat into subsistence production. It is this retreat in protest against exploitation which, in exasperation, prompted G. Hyden to refer to ujamaa development with an 'uncaptured peasantry'.<sup>24</sup>

ESR reveals its most serious weakness or its true meaning at the level of secondary and tertiary education. First, it should be stressed that it is this level of education which was at the root of the conception of ESR. Even as the overt argument emphasizes self-reliance and the dignity of work the essence of the message is anti-elitism and against academic excellence. Manual labour is elevated to a virtue mainly because the deeper meaning of education was ill understood, then as now!

In the early years of independence there were significant advances in secondary school expansion. Between 1961 and 1967, enrolment rose from 11,832 to 25,000. Form six graduates alone rose from 176 to 830. Although these seem to be impressive rates of increase, the real numbers are very low in relation to the available pool and the requirements for high-level

manpower. Yet, rather than vitality, the government was beginning to exhibit fatigue with education.

It is revealing, for example, to note that in spite of the relatively small number of pupils going to secondary schools, Nyerere argued at the time of launching ESR that Tanzania could not increase its expenditure on education '... it ought to be decreased', he inveighed. He further insisted that "... examinations should be down-graded in government and public esteem." Further, ESR required that "... all schools, but especially secondary schools and other forms of higher education must contribute to their own up-keep; they must be economic as well as social and educational communities" - presumably in that order! (emphasis added).

The school farm or workshop was not to be highly mechanized, or else, "...it would not teach the pupils anything about the life they will be leading." In other words, the life to which their parents and grand parents had been condemned by colonialism and had to endure because they had no choice in the matter. Thus, like colonial education, ESR directs higher education, not to intellectual growth, but to manual work. When confronted by the argument that intellectual achievement would be hurt by the glorification of manual work, Nyerere rejected the association and insisted, in a rather stubborn tone:

But even if this suggestion were based on a provable fact, it could not be allowed to over-ride the need for change in the direction of educational integration with our national life."

However, by 1971 this integration was yet to be implemented. Nyerere was quite frustrated but still typically quite single minded about the correctness of the policy. It was the society which was slow to catch on to his good idea because, as he explains it; "We are still trying to grasp 'working' onto 'learning' as if the former is 'extra'. Much as one must appreciate the dialectical unity of theory and practice, one must also beware of a mechanical application of this principle. It would seem that in this case it was being invoked opportunistically to rationalize the failure to expand educational opportunities and to refuse to acknowledge that the policy of ESR was being actively resisted. Presumably the intended 'beneficiaries' of the policy were seeing right through the ploy. That is what explains the exponential growth in public secondary schools in the 1970s and 80s.



## Results and Lessons

In and of itself and in so far as it speaks to relevance and self-determination, ESR is a laudable goal particularly for third world or South countries with their proverbially exploited economies and foreign dominated cultures. However, it must be an education that is progressive, transformative and meeting the needs and expectations of the participants. Above all, it must be acceptable to all concerned, if only because, it must be in education where the saying; 'You can force a horse to the river, but you can't force it to drink the water', must find the greatest application. For that reason, if ESR is conceived purely in instrumental terms such as system maintenance or controlling rising expectations, as was the case in Tanzania, the results will inevitably be justifiably disappointing. In Tanzania; parents, teachers and pupils have actively resisted and continued to reject education for conformity and underdevelopment disguised as self-reliance. In resisting ESR, Tanzanians have merely behaved as any other rational beings with a strong desire for advancement. Education for an untransformed rural life, declining education standard, the denigration of excellence and the general celebration of mediocrity are certainly not alluring goals.

In his celebrated '*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*', Paulo Freire advocated learner generated and driven learning as the pedagogy for liberation. Central to this approach is the need for the learners themselves to identify their learning needs and to participate actively in the elaboration of learning programs as a process of active social action. In this scheme of things self reliance means something quite different from the Tanzania conception which is essentially instrumental in purpose - that purpose being domination and oppression.

When Freire visited the Tanzania literacy program in 1972 he protested strongly against the pedagogical system which we had adopted, in which program design, elaboration and the preparation of materials were undertaken by experts and the learners were only expected to absorb the material. He quite correctly pointed out that we were imposing on the learner - which was consistent with the underlying domination objective.

Education in Africa today is under a state of siege. Like other so-called social services, the education budgets of most African countries have been declining steadily. At the time of launching ESR Tanzania was spending nearly 20 per cent of its national budget on education. It now

spends less than 5 per cent. Although it is an undisputable fact that Africa's overall economic performance has been dismal, the curtailment of the education budgets in particular is bound to exacerbate the problem. Yet the budget constraints at the very least suggest that we have to be imaginative and innovative in trying to get the most out of all resources invested in education.

Investment in human resources development is the single most important factor accounting for the success of the NICs or the tigers of S.E. Asia. It is also the single most important factor missing in the African development strategies. In the case of the tigers, not only have considerable resources been invested but also relevance and self-reliance have been defined in positive terms of transformation rather than our negative terms of containing youths in the villages and making them work with their hands. While the tigers have stressed braving the frontiers of science and technology, Tanzania has glorified the village frontier and, in effect, rejected science and technology. That is what needs to change in order to stand ESR on its feet from its head.

## Notes

1. Julius Nyerere's various writings basically take this position. This theory was espoused by L. Cliffe and J. Saul in *Socialism in Tanzania*, vol. 1 & 2. Nairobi East Africa Publishing House, 1972. Perhaps its most articulate proponent was C. Pratt in the *Critical Phase in Tanzania- 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of Socialist Strategy*, Cambridge University Press, 1966.
2. Notable in this group is Issa Shvji in *Class Struggle in Tanzania* Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House 1976, takes this position. See also African Review 14, Nos. 1-2 (1987), A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* Cambridge University Press, 1982.
3. J.S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome", in *Crisis and Sequences in Political Development*, (ed.) L. Binder, et al. Princeton University Press, 1971, p.74. See also S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.
4. Among these laws are; The Preventive Detention Act, 1962; The Deportation Ordinance 1962; The Regional Commissioners Act, 1962; The Area



Commissioners Act, 1962; The Witchcraft Ordinance, 1928; The Collective Punishment Ordinance, 1921; The Corporal Punishment Ordinance, 1930.

5. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*. Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1967. p.158-8
6. Under the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1962 and the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act, strikes and lockouts were banned and compulsory settlement of disputes was imposed. See M. Baregu, "The Rise and Fall of the One Party State in Tanzania", in J. Widner, (ed.), *Economical Change and Political Libralization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994.
7. See N. O'Neill and K. Mustapha *Capitalism, Socialism and the Development Crisis in Tanzania*. Aldershot: Avebury 1990.
8. Ibid. Also see J. Reweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania* (Nairobi: OUP).
9. A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press, 1982. P. 174.
10. See O. Nnoli, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania* (New York: NOK Publishers, 1977) for a detailed account of the conflicts between Tanzania and western countries in this period.
11. This unrest was climaxed by a failed mutiny of the Tanganyika Rifles. In the aftermath of the mutiny the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) was dismantled and a state controlled National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) was created in its place. See Tanganyika Peoples Defense Forces, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January, 1964*. (Dar es Salaam: DUP, 1993). On peasant resistance see G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*. (Nairobi, Heineman, 1980).
12. For a presentation of ideological hegemony in this sense, see A. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*. Also note the then burgeoning literature on the containment of rebellion which, *inter alia*, resulted in the formulation of the J-Curve hypothesis.
13. See M. Baregu, The Arusha Declaration Paradox in *African Review*, Vol. 14 Nos. 1&2 (combined), 1987. Special Issue on Twenty Years of the Arusha Declaration.
14. M. Baregu and S.S. Mushi, "Mobilization, Participation and System Legitimacy," in R. Mukandala and H. Othman, *Liberalization and Politics: the 1990 Elections in Tanzania*. DUP, 1994.
15. Education for Self-reliance, p. 274.
16. Ibid. p. 280.

17. J. Cameron and W.A. Dodd, *Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania*. Oxford; Pergamon Press, 1970. P. 60. See also K.A.B. Okoko, *Socialism and Self-reliance in Tanzania*. London; KPI, 1987.
18. W.A. Dodd, *Education for Self-reliance in Tanzania*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1969.
19. Ibid. p. 6.
20. Ibid.
21. It should be pointed out that parents and teachers resisted the orientation of education towards work. See Dodd, op.cit. and Okoko, op.cit.
22. Quoted in Okoko, op.cit. p. 65.
23. While covering the 1965 elections in the rural areas I witnessed a young man confronting the District Commissioner on this issue. He showed him a rich and fertile valley extending for miles and said; "We can turn that valley into tons of food but not with our bare hands."
24. G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment with an Uncaptured Peasantry*. Berkeley: UC Press, 1980.