

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE CREATION OF DEPENDENCE IN TANGANYIKA

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1. Introduction.

At independence in 1961, Tanganyika was one of a group of 25 countries generally referred to as the poorest in the world. According to conventional economic indicators, the country's GDP was a mere 193.5 million pounds, and the annual income per head was 18.25 pounds (Stein, 1979). Moreover, 96% of its population of about 9 million still 'lived on the land', and died at the age of 35 on average (Stein, 1979). The 'industrial' sector employed only 22,000 workers (excluding such agricultural processing as sisal decortication and cotton ginning) and its contribution to GDP was only 3.4% (Tanzania Govt. 1969). The picture of an extremely low level of productive forces in the country at that historical point is clear. There are other illustrations that paralleled, and were often a consequence of, the low level of development in the economic sphere. For example, shortly before independence, out of 300 government administrative officers (considered the cream of manpower at that time), only 7 were Tanganyikans (Pratt, 1976: 92). It should be noted that the government was the largest employer, and that relative to the level of education and income in the country, the administrative officers constituted some of the 'cream' of the country's manpower. Also in 1962 there was a professional manpower of 580, comprising architects, engineers, physicians, lawyers, geologists and other scientists, but only 30 people were Tanganyikans (Pratt, 1976: 93).

Due to the extremely low level of industrialization, the demand for manufactured goods could only be catered for through import and the requisite earning of foreign exchange was dependent solely on the export of primary goods. In addition there was not a single instance of Tanzanian ownership or control of capital that could be considered significant in any sector of the economy. This economic vulnerability, itself an important aspect of dependence, was accompanied by a serious weakness in the government's financial position. For example, up to 1964, the Tanzanian government could still expect to fund 78% of its Central Government expenditure as well as 52% of its investment expenditure from external sources (Stein, 1979).

One factor that can be considered to have accounted for this situation is quite obviously the history of the country up to independence. Some may argue that Tanganyika's colonial history explains it, while others may say that some resilient pre-colonial factor is responsible for the low level of development at independence.

We shall briefly review that history here, emphasizing the factors which have a connection with the nature of development, and the seeds of an anti-dependence strategy in Tanzania.

2. The Pre-Colonial Period

2.1 The incidence of egalitarianism.

At the time of German colonization in 1885, societies which came to comprise the territory of Tanganyika were largely agricultural. The material forces of production were quite undeveloped, with only the simplest tools, chiefly the hoe, being used to cultivate land. Production was largely for the immediate consumption of each family. This does not mean that those societies were self-sufficient, i.e. non-trading. A significant amount of trade had been going on for many centuries both internally and externally with societies beyond East Africa (Sutton, 1977; Iliffe, 1979: 6-88); the increase in the activities of European traders inland as well as the exchange of ivory, rubber, salt and iron implements bear witness to this (Henderson, 1965).

The incidence of centralization in the state system and in the social organisation was markedly low (Iliffe, 1979: 21-25). The exception to this was in a few areas where external trade had become a dominant activity and whose leaders had acquired larger amounts of modern weaponry. Examples in this category were Uyao in the south, Unyamwezi in the west, and Tanga and Pangani on the coast. However, even here the tendency towards centralization waned almost as soon as trade and the military capability declined.

Corresponding to the low incidence of state centralization was the absence of land alienation, and, consequently, of classes engendered by this. The exception to this rule was Buhaya in the northwestern corner of the country, where feudalistic structures, including land alienation and serfdom, had appeared (Rweyemamu, 1973: 7-8; Hyden, 1980: 82-85). But feudalistic forms of production did not become dominant in that area either; some have estimated that as much as 90% of all land holdings still remained free of these forms (Mutahaba, 1969; Hyden, 1980: 82).

Slave trade had, of course, altered the situation significantly on the island of Zanzibar, where, with the addition of the race factor, the development of castes and even of classes based on the production of commodities was a firmer trend. Only in one community on the mainland could a similar occurrence be said to exist, and that was around Pangani, which had a noticeable incidence of the development of capitalist production. In this instance some slave traders amassed wealth and acquired slaves of their own so that they had labour at their disposal, which they then turned to producing sugar on plantations (Iliffe, 1979: 132).

Much has been made of the low incidence of centralized state systems and land alienation. By deduction from these factors it has sometimes been asserted that people did not own property, and that the concept of private property was non-existent. This has sometimes been generalized for the whole of pre-colonial Africa, and in the continent's early days of independence in the 1960's, such characterization became a familiar depiction of society on which to base future policies (Friedland and Rosberg, 1964). The supposed socialist orientation of Africans, and the development philosophy of 'African Socialism' can be said to be a direct result of the characterization of property in this way (Nyerere, 1966: 162-171; Friedland and Rosberg, 1964).

But it is clear that the considerable amount of state centralization, trade and social differentiation that existed in the famous Sudanic empires, as well as the feudal tendencies of the North-East (present-day Ethiopia and Somalia) and East-Central Africa (in the inter-lacustrine region), does not support the theory of a socialistic pre-colonial Africa (Oliver and Fage, 1962: 44-52; Abir, 1968; Omer-Cooper et al, 1968: 276-279). For the rest of Africa (including what was to become Tanganyika), where this was not the case, it is not correct to equate the lack of differentiation, based on land tenure and the non-centralization of the state, with communalism (defined as a community's sharing in the production and distribution of goods). The absence of land alienation in these places simply meant that practically everyone could find a piece of land for independent cultivation. One study has provided indications that whereas individuals in pre-colonial African communities co-operated in some productive tasks, they did not do so in others. In this way they were not unique. The Russian 'mire' and the German 'mark' had a similar feature during the historical period in which they were supposed to be communal (Kopytoff, 1964). Neither is it clear that the well-known 'community ownership' of land in the immediate pre-colonial times in Africa (Gluckman, 1777), or in earlier times anywhere else for that matter, precluded individual possession of usable land (Rweyemamu, 1973: 4; Mandel, 1968: 34-35). Similarly in the institutions and processes of decision-making, the absence of centralization meant only that grass-roots participation was the norm; it did not mean, as in the Rousseauian model, that everyone participated (Rousseau, 1973; Fralin, 1978).

2.2 Theoretical explanations of egalitarianism.

Attempts have been made at explaining the continued existence of egalitarianism in pre-colonial Africa, represented in the socio-political and economic spheres by lower levels of centralization and land alienation. Iliffe (1979) notes a coincidence between what he calls 'hoe agriculture' (the form of cultivation in pre-colonial Africa) and low levels of economic differentiation throughout human history, but falls short of an explanation. Rweyemamu seems to attribute the prevalence of egalitarianism in

pre-colonial Tanganyika to the nature of the market. He states that the market remained peripheral to Tanganyikan societies; that although they participated in exchange, people did not rely on the market to obtain the major part of their means of subsistence (Rweyemamu, 1973: 7).

For Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976), however, it is not trade itself but the position of the 'ruler' in that trade that is critical in determining change or the persistence of 'egalitarianism'.³ Having downplayed the importance of technology, as well as that of social and cultural structures, she argues that not only was long-distance trade vital in pre-colonial Africa, but also it enabled the 'ruler' to obtain a surplus product externally (by exploiting other communities rather than his own). This meant that there could be no pressure on the community to produce more of the surplus product since the ruler had already acquired his surplus (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976: 105). She describes this situation as being in some sense that of a dual economy in which two 'modes of production' could be said to co-exist, one community based, the other trade-based (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976: 104, 106). The trade-based 'mode of production', with the 'ruler' playing the central role in it, ultimately insulated the community-based one from the external pressures that would have broken it down.

If this indeed was the case, the 'ruler' would have had to possess the kind of unlimited power commensurate only with the most centralized state system to prevent trade from having an effect on society. We know that such was not the case even in the Sudanic empires, let alone those parts of Africa without the experience of centralization. But, more importantly, the theoretical proposition that the breakdown of egalitarianism was primarily dependent on the action of a 'ruler' is untenable.

There are many factors which contribute to the speed of the breakdown of an egalitarian society. Some of the well-known ones include geography - especially the proximity to important soil and water resources, better communication for the transmission of new knowledge, and the availability of important metals (Mandel, 1968).

In the past these factors no doubt provided the initial impulse towards the disintegration of egalitarianism due to the greater social product that they made possible. With the development of the tools of production and the knowledge to work them - and this is where the metallurgical revolution was probably critical - an even greater social product became available, permitting the freeing from direct production of a section of the population to specialize in crafts and in the exchange of goods. This ability of society to support a section of its population which does not engage in the direct production of the means of livelihood makes it possible to refer to it as having a surplus social product (Mandel, 1968).

It is not easy to ascertain the exact contribution of each factor considered to have provided the impulse towards the disintegration of egalitarianism, but once this had taken place the recurring factor in the actual disintegration seems to have been the type of tools of production used, combined with a deepening of the knowledge to use them; in short, technology. It is this factor that plays a determinant role, for without appropriate improvements in technology the surplus product available to permit specialization is greatly circumscribed. In a corresponding manner, the limited availability of a surplus product holds back a faster development of a privileged group from among the producers on the basis of which social classes are formed (Engels, 1950; Mandel, 1968: 23-71).

On the other hand, the consolidation of the privileged group and its continued expansion, or what others refer to as its reproduction, soon becomes chiefly dependent on exchange. Since exchange also promotes the need for and use of goods, it is in turn likely to lead to a further development in technology - for the purpose of producing more. In this way it becomes possible for exchange, by now the guarantor of the reproduction of the privileged group and a primary factor in the breakdown of egalitarianism, to dominate other factors, including technology. However, notwithstanding the dominance of the market at some point, technology appears to be the constant factor involved in the changes. In a simple sense, extension of the market depends on the availability of more or better goods. If limited technology persists, this will not happen, and the market will in turn be limited.

Obviously several factors involved in the breakdown of egalitarianism interact and influence each other, but the intention of the discussion here is to focus on the primacy of exchange and technology and the determinant role of the latter. That the technological factor played the determining role in the continuation of egalitarianism in pre-colonial Africa appears to be confirmed by the findings of Goody (1971). The trade-based explanations are not satisfactory - Rweyemamu's for not paying adequate attention to technology, and Coquery-Vidrovitch's for totally discounting it.

2.3 Egalitarianism and the rate of change or development

Some writers have concerned themselves not merely with the attempt to explain what they see as the 'reproduction' of egalitarianism before the advent of colonialism, but also with determining the extent of its contribution to what they perceive to have a lack of development. Some consider it to have had a decisive and lasting role.

Writing about Tanzania to demonstrate a general case for Africa, Hyden* (1980) argues that there has not been much development throughout Africa's known history, and attributes this to the survival of an egalitarianism built on 'household self-

sufficient production'. He indicates that this survival is now peculiar to Africa (Hyden, 1980: 9-12). According to him, what renders African 'egalitarianism' almost permanently opposed to development is a collective psychology, or communal attitude, that is apparently inbuilt in each person in Africa - demonstrated by the Tanzanian case. Hyden's perception of the pervasiveness of this 'egalitarianism' includes the present, covering even the non-peasant living in the same country (Hyden, 1980: 9-33, 96-123). The specific way in which these attitudes relate to the perceived lack of development is that undifferentiated peasants create a production ethic which shuns accumulation, and whose reason for production at all is merely the propagation of life in the basic biological sense (Hyden, 1980: 18-19). In this situation the loyalty of members of the society is towards their own clans with which they have stronger ties, rather than towards a larger rational unit such as the market; and their socio-economic and political decisions are propelled by the considerations of clan patronage rather than impersonal rationalizations. The sum total of these aspects is referred to as the 'economy of affection' (Hyden, 1980: 17-18). These attitudinal aspects that make up the 'economy of affection' are considered to be opposed to development, and are therefore the major causes of 'underdevelopment' (Hyden, 1980: 3-4).

It may be true that in pre-colonial times these were some of the attitudes of the people of Tanganyika and other places in Africa. But as attitudes, in the main they can only be the consequences, not causes, of egalitarianism. Of course they could have an influence on development, but it is difficult to see how, as consequences on the existence of egalitarianism, they could be successfully and permanently opposed to development. For they would be bound to change, as would egalitarianism, in correspondence with other changes in society - in the long run if not sooner. Above all, as will be revealed in the course of this paper, it is untenable to argue that these supposedly anti-developmental attitudes have continued to exist beyond the pre-colonial period, and that they overwhelm all tendencies towards development at the economic and politico-institutional levels.⁴

There is a need to emphasize that, in general theoretical terms, there appears to be no justification for treating the phenomenon of egalitarianism as a permanent and overwhelming barrier to development. It may be easy to be influenced by appearance; for example, during the time of colonialism egalitarianism existed in Africa, but not in Europe, which had attained a much higher level of development generally. From here it may be easy to subconsciously draw the conclusion that egalitarianism is the prime factor impeding development. This idea is built into the work of Hyden (1980) and clearly expressed as such, but is to an extent also implied by Rweyemamu (1973) and Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976).

But in Europe, as in parts of Asia, the breakdown of egalitarianism towards greater hierarchy and centralization was not always accompanied by development in the fuller social meaning. When capitalism ultimately rendered the final blow to egalitarianism in Europe, some unprecedented levels of development were also occurring. In considering the internal developments alone there is no doubt that, especially in relation to socio-economic systems, the nature of the organisation of production played a significant role in bringing about the higher level of development under capitalism. However, in the main this was not caused by the absence of egalitarianism but by the application of science and technology. In other words, the issue of development was substantially separate from that of the presence or absence of egalitarianism.

In the case of Tanganyika it can be argued that the rate of development and the process of the dissolution of egalitarianism were influenced by several factors, including communication, technology and trade, each being dominant in different historical circumstances. More importantly, it can be argued that egalitarianism and development remained separate issues while they were both consequences of the nature of these other factors. In particular we might emphasize that it was these other factors, and not egalitarianism, which shaped development. This is what we try to show briefly below.

We saw earlier that considerable exchange activities took place in pre-colonial Tanganyika - yet the market's inroad into society was still incomplete. In such circumstances the role of the market in weakening egalitarianism was limited. But this limitation in the deepening of the market itself needs to be explained. It seems that for Tanganyika, as it was for much of Africa, communication difficulties played a considerable role in limiting initially the expansion of trade inland as well as the spread of technology (Raum, 1965; Bates, 1965; Iliffe, 1979).

But the technological factor in turn influenced the future characteristic of communication; in fact in the long run it was limited technology that became responsible for the slower improvement in communication.

Interaction among inland regions improved near the beginning of the 19th century, and was accompanied by a surge in trading activities. This would have brought with it a greater possibility of the weakening of egalitarianism. However, the nature of the trade that became dominant at that time was such that it most likely precluded that process. The slave trade generated wars, killings, and unstable conditions of production in addition to the removal of able-bodied persons who would have been prime labour-power in their society. Slaves taken from Tanganyika in the period 1830-1873 were probably as many as 21 million (Silver, 1982). It is generally acknowledged that

slave trade was the primary negative factor in the regenerative capacity of the economy at that time and for many subsequent years (Alpers, 1967; Rodney, 1970; Rweyemamu, 1973: 9). We can specify the negative impact in the context of the present discussion as being its failure to stimulate technological improvements for production, as well as the inhibition of a faster growth in real trade, since it did not stimulate real production. It did not permit the retention of society's surplus product by an internal privileged group either. Ultimately the series of negative factors generated by the slave trade places a limit on the rate of development as well as on the weakening of egalitarianism. In fact it is likely that the slave trade increased the national appeal of egalitarianism; the majority of the people moved towards increased co-operation as a form of defence against capture. One physical manifestation of this - increased villagisation - has been recorded by historians (Iliffe, 1979).

This account shows egalitarianism as being separate from development, and does not show it to be definitely opposed to the latter. It also shows that both were dominated or influenced by other factors. One more point needs to be mentioned here, although it will again be taken up later. It relates to what some perceive to be a close connection between egalitarianism and change or development in present day Tanzania.

We have indicated that if we looked at human society in its entirety there was, particularly in the past, a relationship between egalitarianism and the level of development of the technical aspect of the productive forces, and with the level of exchange. But we have also pointed out that egalitarianism is itself explained by and dependent on these economic factors. Together with other institutions and attitudes, it constitutes what some call the 'superstructural' aspects of society (Engels, 1950). The point about these 'superstructural' aspects is that they are normally influenced by changes in the economic aspects, and that when they appear to live on stubbornly beyond their relevant historical time, they either change their function to correspond to a new 'basis' or they persist only because they are not yet in conflict with the new 'basis' (Plekhanov, 1974). The significance of this last point is that the appearance of egalitarianism in present-day society does not necessarily mean that fundamental changes in the economic activities of its peasant population have not taken place.

In bringing out the explanations for the persistence of egalitarianism and its relation to change or development we have sought to highlight the following. Firstly, egalitarianism is not a fundamental factor in social change, and its modification or abolition is possible with a change in other factors. This position makes it possible to argue against two views (themselves in conflict with each other). The first view, held by some Tanzanian and other radical African nationalists at the beginning of the post-colonial era, is that egalitarianism in Africa was wholly progressive in the sense

of being democratic and socialist. This view was correlated to another, namely that once a return to egalitarianism was made, development would be greatly enhanced. The second view is that egalitarianism is by definition anti-development. The point we have made in the section is that egalitarianism is neither an outright socialist form of organisation nor a permanent anti-development factor. We have paid greater attention to the second view because, although the first had some influence on development policies in Tanzania it has gradually been more or less abandoned while the second has wide currency at present.

As for the period immediately preceding colonialism, we need to stress only the following. The levels of the tools of production and of exchange in Tanganyika were relatively low. In the main, these factors accounted for the limited availability of a surplus social product, which in turn was the major explanation for the lack of social differentiation. To this lack of social differentiation corresponded various notions and practices of egalitarianism, including decentralized institutions and processes of decision-making, community ownership of land, and co-operation in production in some instances. These features remained in spite of the increasing market activity and the formation of classes in production on the coast at the end of the pre-colonial period, but this suggests neither the prevalence of communalism nor stagnation at the onset of colonialism.

3. The Colonial Period

Colonization in Tanganyika started with the granting of a protectorate status to a large area bordering the north-east coast which had been acquired through 'treaties' by a group of German entrepreneurs led by Carl Peters. In partnership with German banks, Peters' group formed the German East Africa Company, which, apart from trading, expanded colonial acquisitions in its more important colonial-administrative role. The company's military capacity was, however, inadequate for the suppression of local resistance, which first took the form of a full scale military engagement along the coast in 1888. Therefore in 1891 the German government took direct control of colonization and administration. From 1891 to the end of the Maji Maji War of 1905-1907, German occupation proceeded inland amid many wars of resistance, and this period is customarily treated as a military one with little information on production and exchange.⁵

What is of interest to us is the effect of colonization on socio-economic conditions in Tanganyika, and, in so far as it relates to the issue of development, the effect of colonial political structures and decisions. Two major factors appear to have had an overwhelming influence on socio-economic conditions. The first, which was prevalent in, but not confined to, the early colonial period was land alienation. The other,

which was dominant throughout the colonial period, was the development of commodity production.⁶ Let us briefly look at these two factors.

3.1 Land Alienation

Land alienation started in the Usambara highland region close to the north-east coast, where the German East Africa Company claimed to have concessionary rights and the land to have been sparsely populated (Iliffe, 1979: 126). The company leased and sold some of its land to settlers, but retained much of it for plantation agriculture. More than 56,819.2 acres of some of the best land in the country was held by the company in Usambara (including parts of present-day Tanga) after the initial selling-off (Iliffe, 1979: 127). Subsequently Usambara became the main area for plantation production.

Not all European-acquired land was in large tracts designed for plantations. Some of the settlers preferred smaller farms on which they could undertake a variety of agricultural activities. But even smaller farms could be obtained only through land alienation. In fact the smaller farms appear to have had a proportionately greater impact on the welfare of the local people than the larger company estates. The reason for this is that whereas estates may have included a large proportion of what their owners considered to be virgin land - it could have been merely fallow - the smaller farms often alienated cultivated land (Iliffe, 1979: 142).

By 1912 there remained very little land in the Usambara region to alienate in favour of Europeans, and the local people were severely hit by land shortage. In addition, since fallow land on which the local agricultural system depended was no longer available, food production declined (Iliffe, 1979: 143).

The other effect of land alienation, of course, was the coming into being of a sizeable group of landless people. Some of these became squatters, but many turned into labourers on both the plantations and the smaller farms. In fact labourers for Europeans were 'created' simultaneously with the taking of local lands.

It appears, though, that it required more than the mere economic compulsion of landlessness in Usambara to guarantee the availability of labour to farms, and it is recorded that labour shortage was one of the reasons why settler agriculture moved westwards to the Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Meru areas (Henderson, 1965: 144; Iliffe, 1979: 142).

Land alienation had occurred in Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Meru by 1907. Here the process towards dispossession appears to have been of a more determined kind than

in the Usambaras; to the extent that labour shortage was considered to be one of the problems in the Usambaras, the process and planning of land alienation in the newer areas were deliberately designed to cut off the local people from access to farming land beyond the immediate perimeter of their households.⁷ It was believed that this hemming-in approach would create an ever increasing labour force to satisfy settler farming needs. About 197, 632 acres of good farming land had been alienated in Kilimanjaro by 1913. Out of these, the settlers cultivated only 14,822.4 acres (Iliffe, 1979: 144). Taken in Meru were 93,168.4 acres. This constituted most of the arable land in the area.⁸ Again squatting and labouring on settler farms became a feature in these newer areas, as it was in the Usambaras. So did generalized hunger (Iliffe, 1979: 144). However, at about the same time, the colonial government initiated a policy direction that slowed down the process of land dispossession.⁹

The partial restrictions placed in the way of land dispossession emerged out of a debate among colonial policy-makers which has sometimes been inaccurately presented as one between those who favoured a plantation colony and those who wanted a commercial one (Henderson, 1965: 148). In economic terms the needs of settlers at that time can be summed up as having been the creation of an abundant and cheap African labour force. They thought that this goal could only be fully achieved if, in addition to direct labour compulsion, land alienation was thorough and Africans were prohibited from growing cash crops (Iliffe, 1979: 153-155). On the government side, the new policy direction that was developing could be seen as a short term response to the break-neck speed of land alienation of the initial years and its disastrous consequences. Two related factors were now to be considered from the point of view of German welfare. Firstly, what the settlers had set out to grow on large-scale estates, namely coffee, had not been suited to the Usambaras, and therefore European commercial farming in Tanganyika had not yet become productive.¹⁰ Secondly, those settlers who started mixed farms on which they produced saleable food crops for the plantation population did not know the local conditions well, and they too had failed to take off (Iliffe, 1979: 128, 143). Clearly only the local people could keep production going at acceptable levels, at least in the short run, and that required some protection from severe landlessness.

In addition the colonial government did not want another war with the local people. Both the settlers and the government in Tanganyika were convinced that the local people were about to fight back against land alienation to protect what they perceived as their very existence. Most settlers, and others in Germany itself, thought that only a more resolute form of suppression of local discontent would guarantee them land, cheap labour and freedom from competition by local commodity producers (Henderson, 1965: Iliffe, 1979: 149). Perhaps the government would still have gone along with this, considering the escalating strength of the settlers in terms of numbers

and organisation, as well as the great amount of support for them within Germany) (Iliffe, 1979: 151). But a war about the possession of land could have easily aroused the passions of other local people outside the northern regions, and could have swamped the entire country. Economically and militarily this would have been highly undesirable, especially with the lessons of the Maji Maji War still in memory. In particular, it would not have been immediately foreseeable how the value of production by a settler sector, which at that time consisted of less than a thousand farm owners, might supplant that of the combined Tanganyikan producers who numbered about five million (Henderson, 1965: 155; Iliffe, 1979: 141).

It has also often been reported that one of the reasons for the government to slow down land alienation was a keen commitment to prevent the development of a working class in Tanganyika. Perhaps the government did not make such a clear social cost calculation, but the phrases used by some officials, such as Rechenberg, governor of Tanganyika at that time, appear to lend credence to this theory. In opposing further land alienation in Kilimanjaro, for example, he mentioned that he was guarding against the proletarianization of the people living there (Henderson, 1965: 148; Iliffe, 1979: 144). We shall see later that as with other colonial economic practices, land alienation engendered new societal relations and a local economic response; its stoppage did the same, albeit with different outcomes. Generally the new land and production policies, which were to create local commodity producers, were resisted less than the squatter - producing land alienation practices.

3.2. Further development of commodity production in the agricultural sector

The new policy has sometimes been described as a compromise, constituted by governmental intervention and assistance to large-scale planters in securing labour on the one hand, and limited governmental promotion of commodity production by Africans for external markets on the other.¹¹ The impact of the latter on the future make-up of Tanganyika is now generally considered to be of great importance, and it deserves extended presentation.

It can be said that the economic inducement to widen commodity production first appeared in a significant way via the rubber and sisal plantations of the North-East. Many food growers in Tanganyika had long supplied the Caravan Trade routes that ran through the centre of Tanganyika, as well as the wider overseas market mediated by Zanzibar. Now some of them began to supply the plantations too. Those taking advantage of this opportunity were, of course, the ones living near the plantations themselves, and it is not surprising that the majority of the suppliers were the nearby Bondoi. But the stimulation to commodity production was wide and significant enough to win over many Wanyamwezi of Western Tanganyika, 'traditional labourers'

throughout the time of the Caravan Trade, to immigration into the northeastern parts in order to produce food for sale to the plantations (Iliffe, 1979: 152).

But there was another factor which went hand in hand with, and helped expand, commodity production. It was taxation. One of the important consequences of the compulsion of local people to pay tax, which was almost always done in cash, is that it brought most of them into the fold of the wider market, at the same time as it spurred those already incorporated to expand more energy in producing for the external market. Initially, the need to obtain the cash to pay taxes in order not to fall foul of the colonial authorities was probably the most important reason for those less incorporated in the market to adopt cash crop production. But later it was obvious that by devoting further efforts to the activity, personal prosperity could ensure. Concomitantly, the refusal of the early colonial government to depend solely on settlers, and the fact that Germany needed raw materials no matter who produced them (Iliffe, 1979: 154), facilitated the spread and intensification of cash crop production. A new element of petty commodity production was that peasants were not being pushed and induced simply to produce food for an 'external' market, but also to grow for the overseas market those crops that were likely to give them a regular and fairly stable income because of the greater demand for them in the new European industrial age.

3.3 Contrasting government behaviour towards peasant commodity production.

In order to hasten the production of important raw materials, some encouragement was given by the government to local people in certain areas to produce directly for the overseas market. Cotton growing in Tanganyika is the best example of this.

At the turn of the century the demand for cotton by European's textile industries was still rising, as was its price in the international market. In addition, at that time Germany apparently sought to free itself from American suppliers, and therefore initiated a great drive to produce the crop in its territories. In Tanganyika, this is demonstrated by at least two massive plantation projects for cotton established by German companies around Ruvu and Kilosa between 1907 and 1912. The projects collapsed and failed. Their failure is generally considered to have convinced the government and other German interests that large-scale farming of cotton was not practical in Tanganyika, and that therefore this all-important crop could only be grown by small-holder producers (Iliffe, 1979: 145). The mobilization of the latter towards this end in subsequent years was quite phenomenal by the standards of governmental involvement in the economy at that time. Iliffe (1979: 155) has written that between 1909 and 1913 cotton lint exports from Mwanza, the chief small-holder cotton-growing area, rose from 123 to 3,735 bales.

Coffee is another crop which the government encouraged the local people to grow for the overseas market. However, in the strict sense of the word, this encouragement appears to have been the case only in Bukoba, the second chief coffee growing area in Tanzania today. In the main coffee-growing area of Kilimanjaro, the government attempt to deepen cash crop production was tempered by the demands of the settler population, who were themselves growing coffee and thus opposed to competition with the local people.¹² Some of the settler-induced laws that the government instituted *vis a vis* the Kilimanjaro people could have completely stopped the latter from growing coffee. For example, the 'card system' obliged a local person to work for a European for one month in every four at a fixed wage.¹³ On the other hand, the government fixed the wage on African-owned farms just below the level of inducement to labour. By drawing labour away from the locally-owned holdings to expatriate farms while limiting the wage-rise possibilities, these laws added to land shortage and other problems of commodity production for the local people in the area.

This contrasting approach of the government to the intensification of commodity production - active encouragement on the one hand and covert prohibition on the other - remained a feature for a long time in the colonial era. It seemed to correspond to the nature and location of settler economic activity, and was not confined to German colonial rule. For example, throughout the British period the people of Kilimanjaro struggled to be accepted as competent coffee growers, and it appears that only the formation of their co-operative movement in 1925 ensured their survival as commodity producers, *vis a vis* the government and the settlers (U.K. Govt. 1937: 207; Iliffe, 1979: 276-278; McCarthy, 1982:95).¹⁴ 'Non-encouragement without prohibition' was later followed by the British government in other areas that took an interest in coffee production, but all of them were firmly persuaded not to grow the Arabica type already grown by the settlers and the local Kilimanjaro people, who were by now being accepted as coffee growers.

In later years the British colonial government took steps to prohibit coffee-growing in the newer areas of Arusha, Meru and Pare, which adjoined Kilimanjaro: coffee trees were uprooted and nurseries destroyed by government agents in Upare (Iliffe, 1979: 289-290). In the early 1950s the negative government reaction to the production of certain commodities by local people briefly spread to sisal. In response to a rise in world prices, the peasants of Lake Province, situated at the far end of the country from the sisal plantations, produced significant amounts of the crop, which the government continually discouraged until the local industry itself petered out in response to a later price fall (Ehrlich, 1976: 301-302). Government's contrasting policies were not confined to the economic sphere. Administrative measures and educational policies also showed the government promoting progress at times, and impeding at other times, as the following examples indicate.

3.4 Indirect Rule and the Reduced Enthusiasm for Economic Growth and Transformation

In a simple way, indirect rule can be defined as the opposite of direct rule, which is the governance of an indigenous population by an alien colonial authority in a direct, centralized and assimilationist way. To the extent that the German colonial government in Tanganyika used some indigenous people for local administration and was not assimilationist, though clearly centralized, it practised a limited form of indirect rule (Henderson, 1965: 147; Iliffe, 1979: 319). However, indirect rule as practised by the British administration in Tanganyika since 1925 was markedly different from this model.¹⁵

To start with, it was not seen as satisfactory merely to decentralise authority and devolve power to local or locally-constituted units of administration. It was important that the indigenous participants were people perceived as having traditional authority or legitimacy - real or 'manufactured' (Iliffe, 1979: 322-334). Above all, Africans were to be left as undisturbed as possible, as long as their activities did not prevent the government from running smoothly.

Obviously there were administrators who believed that indirect rule was an ideal method for the preservation of the identity of Africans, and most presented it officially as such. Other administrators favoured it for reasons of pragmatism and expediency, which, apart from avoiding the greater administrative costs of direct rule, consisted of securing order and stability.

The interpretation of indirect rule as a system of 'divide and rule' based on, among other things, the promotion of tribal differences, is well known and correct. Indirect rule achieved order and stability by precluding cross-tribal organization and unification. But there were other consequences. Indirect rule entailed the reconstruction of chiefly authorities which were new in substance but traditional in form. The colonial government created local governing councils known as Native Authorities. These were made up of traditional ruler and headed by a chief, all of whom were now appointed by the government (Clagget Taylor, 1963: 51). These native authorities, operating independently from each other, initially had a minor legislative role, such as the making of by-laws. But soon the British colonial Government extended their authority, strengthening them more than in any other phase of colonialism (Clagget Taylor, 1963: 49; Iliffe, 1979: 356-357). As anticipated by the colonial government, the effect of this was not only to confine the participation of the indigenous population in politics and other important issues to local affairs (Iliffe, 1979: 356) but also to deny the educated and traveled Africans any influence in the community (Iliffe, 1979: 322). If fully achievable, a further effect of this in

developmental terms would have been the construction of an edifice capable of insulating society from new knowledge. That did not happen, but the contribution to the slowdown in overall development is likely to have been quite significant.¹⁶

We must recall that the context in which all this took place was one of local resentment to alien rule, as well as a **distrust for much of what was new and modern**, which appeared to be linked with it. Indirect rule as described above created the perception among the chiefs that the colonial authorities were now returning 'their land' and restoring 'their sovereignty'. This perception became the ideological force of the new traditional authorities. In the meantime the colonial authorities went about discrediting those with ideas of change. It is the atmosphere of change that the system of indirect rule repressed, especially in the inter-war period of the British administration of Tanganyika.

The decision to leave Africans as 'undisturbed' as possible also had a great impact on the pace of educational development. Both at the level of official thinking and in implementation, the educational direction which became dominant was one that emphasized localism, simple agriculture and the acquisition of only simple literacy tools. It was not unusual for colonial officials to discourage Tanganyikans from enrolling at a school certificate level, lest they become 'political agitators'. The first Tanganyikan to enrol at school certificate level at Makerere, situated in Uganda, did so in 1930. In the next four years only 'a handful' of others joined, having obtained primary education outside the country. Up to the 1950s Tanganyika's enrolment quota at Makerere was frequently not filled. The educational situation was so bad that at some point even the local traditionalists complained that Africans were not being taught beyond a certain standard in order to suit particular colonial ends (Iliffe, 1979: 339-341, 445). But the indirect rule considerations continued to influence government attitude towards African education even when, after the Second World War, there were attempts to plan towards improvement in Tanganyika's development (Iliffe, 1979: 438-439).¹⁷ A description by Iliffe (1979: 326) sums up this period well: "Indirect rule became a means of social control rather than social progress..."

3.5 Commodity Production, Change and Differentiation Among Peasants

While there were many actions by the Tanganyikan colonial government that did not encourage progress, this did not by any means result in a complete lack of change or development. Obviously the rate of progress was extremely slow, but improvements took place in many aspects of life. In some areas, notably health, the improvement was directly a result of government action. Even in education, improvements on a quantitative scale continued to be made by the government. It can be noted that the expanded acreage and increased agricultural 'productivity' of

the late 1940s and early 1950s occurred at a time when, on the basis of the 1940 Colonial Department and Welfare Act, the British government adopted the post-war policy of a 'modernizing imperialism', through which colonial governments became relatively more positive about development (Creech-Jones, 1951, U.K. Govt. 1955).

Some improvements were bound to take place irrespective of the official attitudes and actions. In particular, once the economy's link with the external demand for raw materials was strengthened, as it was in the colonial period, **peasant commodity production** was in general bound to increase. Historical evidence shows a steady (and sometimes spectacular) increase in the production of cash crops introduced in colonial times, as in the case of copra, sesame and groundnuts in the early colonial period, and coffee and cotton in later times (Henderson, 1965: 144, 153; Iliffe, 1979: 274-295, 453). This was largely due to the normal 'economic rationality' of responding to comparatively favorable price regimes, as well as to the more general expectation of the betterment of life through increased participation in the commodity economy.

Other important changes among peasants also took place throughout the colonial period, notably in the organisation of productive activities, and even in the methods of production. For example, the introduction of cash crops that were in great demand outside the country not only led to the cash crop 'mania' that the colonial authorities at some point were quite uneasy with, but also to the rapid spread of capitalists relations in production. The Tanganyika case of the initial expansion of commodity production, in fact demonstrates that the freeing of labour from land, and the long duration of capitalistic gestation are essential to capitalism only in its establishment as a 'self-propelling' mode of production; in new areas, capitalist relations emerge without these preconditions. In the Usambaras and Kilimanjaro, African employers of labour emerged as soon as the production of the new crops was adopted by them. In Ujiji, which was situated in the heartland of the region supplying migrant labour, and historically considered to be the least developed, rice was being produced on farms their owners rarely worked. The local pioneers of cotton growing in the southern and eastern parts of the then Lake Region were all employers of labour who did not work on their farms at all, as indeed was the first indigenous coffee producers on the western side of the region, and some of those around Kilimanjaro. In this example the first growers of the new crops were also the pioneers of capitalist relations in production. This is because they were chiefs and opinion leaders who were exempted from compulsory labour, becoming virtually the local agents of government and settlers for the mobilization of labour, and thus having some labour at their disposal for exploitation. One entrepreneur in the Bukoba District of the Lake Region had in 1907 proposed a joint venture with a settler in which the latter would have provided the monetary capital while he provided the

labouring men (Iliffe, 1980: 182). In later years capitalist relations among commercial food producers, notably around Isimani in the then Southern Highlands region, became common (Awiti, 1975).

Of course capitalist relations among peasants on a wider social scale were not regularized yet, and here the fact that wage labourers were generally less detached from land, and that the extremely short period of capitalist commodity production had not provided adequate accumulated capital to support it, delayed the regularization. But it is clear that capitalist relations were no longer alien. There were other changes. Between the late 1940s and early 1950s increased productivity and expanded acreage became possible on a wide scale through the use of fertilizers and tractors, the pioneers here being Isimani in the south and Arusha-Mbulu in the north. Lorries too, for carrying produce, were bought in relatively large number at this time. The enthusiasm of the local people for the new methods of production was high enough for some of them to put funds in pools for the hire or purchase of tractors (Iliffe, 1979: 454-455; Raikes, 1975; Awiti, 1975).

There were times when the local people resisted important modern innovations. We have pointed out earlier that this was often the logical reaction of a conquered people. However, some of the innovations that appear to have been resisted at the level of the economy did in fact clash with other rational (often economic) criteria. For example in the late fifties the enthusiasm for tractors and ploughs began to wane in some areas of Tanganyika because there was evidence that these ultimately brought up the infertile subsoils while making it harder to terrace the farms against erosion—both of which were a threat to future production. This apprehension must be read in the context that there were still many unknowns regarding the entire set of the new methods of production.

These examples are opposed to the view, prevalent in the colonial years and popular among settlers, of the economic irrationality and unchanging conservatism of the African peasant producers. According to the theory, African peasant producers were neither interested in acquiring more goods, nor in bettering their lives through a disciplined participation in economic activities (Stahl, 1961: 72; Wrigley, 1965: 230; Jones, 1977: 112-113). A variation of the view assumes that peasants always place a higher value on pre-capitalist forms of culture in relation to transformational goals. It therefore perceives peasants as rationally forsaking economic and developmental goals in pursuit of 'superior' egalitarian objectives and leisure (Hyden, 1980, 1980: 18-19). That peasants are insensitive to economic progress is taken as a given fact by this view.

Several studies have shown that the 'theory' of an intrinsic economic irrationality peculiar to African peasant producers is untenable (Henderson, 1965: 188; Jones, 1977; Sabot, 1979: 32-33, 57). The Tanganyikan examples given above demonstrate that there was enough enthusiasm for commodity production and change, and that a significant amount of differentiation took place among peasants, even when colonial policies in some instances discouraged this.

3.6 Other Factors in the 'Underdevelopment' of Tanganyika

3.6.1. The Uncertainty Surrounding the Status of Tanganyika as a Dependency

It has often been stated that in the inter-war period the status of Tanganyika, as a trust territory rather than a colony in the formal sense, initially stood in the way of better economic commitment by British nationals. The deportation of resident German investors and the expropriation of German property which took place at a time of such little commitment also added to the atmosphere of economic neglect. Moreover, in the 1930s a discussion of Tanganyika's status was revived, with Germany being apparently interested in regaining it. There are historians who argue that the sense of uncertainty created by this discussion, and the mandate status, prevented a number of important investments from taking place (Ingham, 1965; Iliffe, 1979: 302). That may well have been the case, but there were other factors which also placed difficulties in the way of savings and investment, especially in the long term.

3.6.2 The Dominance of the Economy by Non-local Interests

The domination of the economy by non-local interests had several aspects. One of these was the absence of an internally-based authority with autonomy to influence the determination of the income of local producers. Others included the dominance of the export sector in the economy, and the domination of this sector by expatriate farmers.¹⁸ These aspects are easily illustrated by the way they manifested themselves in wages and commodity prices.

(a) Low Wages in the Economy

During the colonial period wages were extremely low. Obviously profit considerations by employers and the cynical repression of colonial conquest accounted for this. It is interesting to note, however, that most settlers and some government officials had found and adopted a view they believed to be an economic justification for low wages, namely that African wage labourers had definite cash goals beyond which they would not offer their labour. Such employers had become convinced that more pay would only make it possible for labourers to achieve the cash target in a shorter period of time (Sabot, 1979: 33).

Under colonial rule, low wages meant many incidents of half-pay (and sometimes even less) that accompanied the numerous occasions of (forced) labour conscriptions. Notable among these was the system of labour gangs of the 1920s and 1930s for the construction of public utilities, and that of the 1940s for the sisal plantations in aid of the war effort and post-war reconstruction (Ingham, 1965: 583; Iliffe, 1979: 371-372).

Where 'full' wages were paid, it is still possible to establish the fact of low wages by closely estimating the shortfall between real cash earnings and presumed fair wages during particular time slots of the colonial period. Iliffe arrives at the conclusion that wages were low for much of the colonial period partly by working out calculations of this kind (Iliffe, 1979: 354, 452, 469).

The fact of low wages is also demonstrated by the continuation of the non-wage sector as a source of the means of livelihood for wage labourers (Sabot, 1979: 63), which remained a feature of the Tanganyikan labour force throughout the colonial period.

The significance of the shortfall in income, resulting from subjective decisions by the government and the settlers to pay low wages, is the fact that the community of employers (including settlers) was largely expatriate.¹⁹ When this expatriate characteristic of the potential investment group is related with the generally negative attitude towards further or long term investment in Tanganyika, it becomes clear that in the long run the shortfall was **income foregone with little hope of it ever being ploughed back.**

The shortfall may also have been negative to the expansion of production. Wages which were consistently low would not have encouraged the increased and varied consumption that is necessary to ensure that production constantly improves and expands.

(b) Commodity prices and the economy

Similar conclusions can be reached regarding commodity prices. These were often kept below world levels. For instance, coffee prices were below world levels for quite a considerable length of time, a result mainly of a fixed contract with the British Ministry of Food, prompting some leaders of the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) to complain in 1951 that they were receiving only 2/3 of the value of their crop (Bowles, 1980: 175). Sisal prices were also constantly below world averages. In the 1941-1948 period, Tanganyikan sisal was sold through a bulk purchase agreement with the British government, which often resold the sisal

to the United States at twice the growers' price (Ehrlich, 1976: 300, 304; Iliffe, 1979: 344). The sisal arrangement alone is estimated to have caused an economic loss of 11 million pounds to Tanganyika.²⁰

Cotton also suffered a price shortfall. Here the relevant statistics alone show that the magnitude of 'short-changing' cotton growers was greater than in the other commodities. For example, cotton prices paid to the Tanganyikan government were below world levels throughout the 1943-1952 period. This resulted from the long-term contracts with the Raw Cotton Commission of Britain. But also the Tanganyikan government in turn often paid peasant farmers less than 1/2 of the price obtained for Tanganyikan cotton. Bowles has taken a closer look at this aspect and found that in the 1949-50 season the government had paid growers 25 cents per pound while it had itself taken 30 cents per pound. This practice provided the government with 5.2 million pounds from cotton alone in the three years 1949-1952 (Bowles, 1980: 176). Officially, the government intended that these funds be used to develop the particular crop industry, or agriculture as a whole. In practice, however, most of the funds were simply transferred to Britain for investment (Bowles, 1980: 174, 176).²¹ For Tanganyika, a consequence of this was, once again, lost investment.

There was another dimension to this shortfall of income to local producers. Frequently expatriate farmers were paid different prices. For instance, it appears that during the period, the few expatriate farmers engaged in cotton growing received the full unit price paid for Tanganyikan cotton, or twice what the local growers got. In fact there were many ways of providing better prices or income to expatriate growers of the same crop, or for crops chiefly grown by expatriate farmers, such as sisal, and, especially during the 2nd World War, wheat, maize and beans. In the latter category of crops the practice was disguised under schemes such as export tax reductions, guaranteed high prices if large amount were produced, and planting subsidies if large areas were planted.

In view of the incidence of income shortfalls affecting indigenous producers, it seems inescapable to conclude that local farmers were subsidizing the expatriate ones (Bowles, 1980: 167-168). Barring for the moment consideration of the blatant discrimination that accompanied this 'subsidization' in the colonial era, it may be argued that the practice is common even today in all countries, provided the branch or crop sector being subsidized is critical to the economy and the measure is temporary. Similarly there were those who sought to justify this 'subsidization' by regarding expatriate farmers as being involved in the all too important export sector or closely connected with it. The point though is that, with the assistance of governmental intervention in the exchange arena, more capital went to the expatriate community (including the government) which, in view of the community's reluctance

to commit large or long term investments to Tanganyika, resulted in a capital outflow then and in the future.

3.7. The Consolidation of Dependence in the Colonial Period

In Tanganyika, as in many other countries, the most important step towards the creation of dependence was the formal subordination of the local population involving in the main the control of major institutions and decision-making processes by a foreign power. For it is this classically **political** act (i.e., formal subordination) which breaks the ground for making decisions and erecting structures of greater economic significance. But it was the subsequent decisions and structures that were critical to the pace of development and to the establishment of the crucial aspects of dependence.

So far we have been discussing those specific colonial actions (and omissions) that could be said to have been negatively disposed towards development. In what follows we focus on those directly related to dependence. They too, as we shall see, can be considered to have made a contribution to a poor state of development, but we highlight them here for their role in the consolidation of dependence at the economic level.

3.7.1. Monetary Institutions and Processes

One of the prominent aspects of the monetary system of colonial Tanganyika was the absence of restrictions on the remittance of funds outside. This was facilitated by the lack of exchange control within the territory, and by the completely subordinate status of the country's currency and banking system in relation to British interests (Elkan and Nulty, 1976: 332). Perceived by nationalists as being a determinant factor in the development of a future Tanganyika, the monetary system was to become a priority area for change after independence, and was initially central to the non-dependence strategy that emerged (Nsekela, 1983).

Understanding 'monetary dependence' in Tanganyika requires an appraisal of the East African Currency Board and the related monetary arrangements.

Established for Kenya and Uganda in 1905, and covering Tanganyika as well from 1920, the Board had control over the issue of currency and, to an extent, over its use for credit purposes. The most significant and controversial aspect of the Board's authority was the rule that it could only issue additional amounts of East African currency if there were equivalent sterling assets held by East Africa in Britain. This emanated from the general British policy in many of its dependencies, that currency be backed pound for pound by sterling assets (Elkan and Nulty, 1976: 332;

Loxley, 1979: 76), and thus in a sense the East African Currency Board was only a regional agency for its implementation. The official reasons for the adoption of this 'sterling-exchange standard' included the need to provide a smooth convertibility of the currencies in question, which in turn presumably offered a greater access to cheap borrowing by the dependencies on the London credit market, as well as the stabilization of local economic conditions through the curtailment of monetary expansion (Hazlewood, 1967: 102; Nsekela, 1983: 4; Elkan and Nulty, 1976: 332). In reality credit availability for the dependencies was in no way facilitated by this arrangement. It took only a short time for the demand on the London market to become too great. Moreover, lending to persons or institutions in the dependencies remained dependent on other financial considerations, such as creditworthiness - a criterion that, for the obvious reasons of low income and comparatively low investment security, was heavily biased against the dependencies (Hazlewood, 1954: 304, 314).

It has been argued for Tanganyika that in fact more capital flowed out of the country than came in (Nsekela, 1983; Iliffe, 1979: 302), and that this was directly related to the nature of the monetary system. In curtailing monetary expansion through the restriction of the issue of currency, the monetary system no doubt helped hold down inflation (Loxley, 1979: 76), while insistence on a '100% backing' of the local currency by sterling assets ensured an astounding stability in the **balance of payments** situation (Hazlewood, 1954: 298; Nsekela, 1983:6). In reality this **monetary stability** was never a positive achievement, and we can show this by discussing this factor alongside other effects of the monetary system in terms of long term developmental possibilities.

The debate about the developmental consequences of the monetary system brings out three main questions. These are whether the 100% backing of local currency by sterling significantly restricted the entry of imports and investments funds necessary for greater developmental undertakings; whether the arrangements favoured the 'export enclave, and helped cement the orientation of the entire economy towards (primary) export production; and whether such a monetary system led to currency and credit scarcity to the extent that prices, exchange and production were retarded.

Although it is possible to find writers who have answered all three questions in the negative (Earle, 1954), most of those who have studied the issues theoretically and empirically are drawn towards the affirmative ('Analyst', 1953; Hazlewood, 1954). Among the latter, only the last question receives a qualified affirmation (Newlyn, 1952; Hazlewood, 1954). The qualification is that although the arrangements led to currency scarcity generally, they did not necessarily lead to credit scarcity in some territories, and as such the **total** money supply was not scarce.

Consideration of these three questions hinges on the fact that further currency issue in the dependencies had to be obtained only through increased exports or a decrease in imports, or both. The currency, to put it another way, had to be paid for in foreign exchange (Hazlewood, 1954: 294).

It was therefore important to forego importation to a great extent merely to avoid the contraction of the currency in circulation in a dependency, and the British authorities, including the Tanganyika government, ensured strict enforcement of this policy. This explains the apparently 'excess' foreign reserves that Tanganyika had throughout the colonial period (Hazlewood, 1967; Nsekela, 1983). The funds were instead used elsewhere, for it was part of the arrangement, strictly enforced by such agencies as the East African Currency Board, that most of the reserves be invested outside the territory which owned them mainly, in Britain (Hazlewood, 1954: 293; Nsekela, 1983:4). There can be no doubt that these reserves, useful elsewhere, would have been important as investment funds in large developmental undertakings in the territories which owned them.

It is also clear that since further currency issue depended on an increase in the export type of production, the foreign exchange earner, resources were drawn towards this sector. Hazlewood (1954:303-304) shows that this bias towards the export sector was usually accentuated by the expatriate nature of the other currency-creating agency, i.e., foreign investment funds, since investing in export production guaranteed profits that were redeemable in sterling pounds in future. With a low long-term investment priority tag placed on it, Tanganyika was not an exception to this trend (Seidman, 1972: 40-41). Later, we shall indicate how helpful the monetary arrangements were to the repatriation of expatriate funds when the nationalist wave of impending changes appeared to threaten them.

In considering whether the monetary arrangements were deflationary, we should keep in mind the assumption that such restriction on the issue of currency makes it scarce, depressing prices and arresting economic activities. We should recall that a similar opposition was voiced against the similarly 100% backed "gold standard" in the early decades of this century, to which the colonial monetary system was likened (Analyst, 1954). There seems to have been the case in Tanganyika of a stifled exchange when, in addition to the limited issue of currency by the Board, the government prohibited the use of local exchange equivalents. It was aimed, according to official policy, at the elimination of barter trading, and at the unification of the territorial market by the use of a single pan-territorial currency. Of course it would be difficult to gauge the extent of the 'deflationary drag' as a direct result of this, but it seems to have been significant: the local people were acutely aware of the scarcity, and therefore they conducted a great deal of currency hoarding. In a study devoted

to money operating in Tanganyika up to 1940, McCarthy (1976) has demonstrated the case of a currency-induced 'deflationary drag', enabling him to conclude that:-

"If one can regard the constrained articulation of a comprehensive, flexible transactions universe as a genuine form of underdevelopment, and if one can accept the notion that undergrowth results, in part, from limiting the vitality of exchange, then the place to begin the emphasis shift...is the arena of shackled exchange." (McCarthy, 1976:648).

McCarthy (1976) is right in noting that, at a particular historical point in Tanganyika, exchange was prominent in influencing the process of development (in this case slowing it down). But then he goes on to project this as the major explanation for underdevelopment while understanding its benefits to imperial interests (or even discounting it altogether). The final (and in our view erroneous) picture which he produces is that underdevelopment was chiefly the work of a currency-hoarding local population facilitated by a 'job-bungling' Tanganyikan section of the British bureaucracy.

While a slow down in economic activities is strongly implied, there is another way of looking at the currency scarcity. Even though the Tanganyikan government may appear in the historical record not to have planned for this result, it seems to us that the aggravated scarcity was in fact an additional method of inducing peasants to produce for export. The relationship between currency and export production can not be conceptualized only at the general level: individual peasants could only acquire their medium of exchange (or cash) if they sold more **export crops**. It can be stated then, on the basis of this, that the most pronounced effect of the 'deflationary drag' was on local markets and home production.

Currency scarcity was supplemented by the extremely low credit levels in Tanganyika, which were also skewed in favour of the export enclave (Seidman, 1972:41). This was in part due to the expatriate nature of the financial institutions, which made them reluctant to extend funds to long term undertakings, and to local people (Loxley, 1973; Loxley, 1979). The low credit levels were also due to governmental intervention, through regulations which effectively barred Africans from borrowing (McCarthy, 1982: 37-49).

In the mid-1950s, British monetary policy relaxed from the rigidity of the earlier period, and the East African Currency Board was given authority to effect a fiduciary issue of currency in 1955. This of course meant that for the first time the Board could facilitate government financing of major developmental projects. But it was still a long way away from being responsive to local needs: the prescribed ceiling on the issue, 10 million pounds initially for the whole of East Africa, would yield only

a small amount. In any case the maximum was never reached in the actual distribution. The investment by the East African Currency Board in the governments of East Africa was mostly in short term treasury bills, and it has been estimated that for the whole period after the relaxation, only 1/6 of it was in (the long term) securities of these governments. The rest of the investment remained in the London securities (Hazlewood, 1967; Nsekela, 1983; National Bank of Commerce, 1977).

From the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the colonial monetary arrangements played a significant role in the establishment and consolidation of dependence, as well as the continuation of underdevelopment.

3.7.2 Trade

If taken alone, trade flow statistics are misleading indicators of the magnitude of dependence, but they contribute significantly to its representation. One of the better documented aspects of trade flow is the volume of trade with the major buyers and sellers. In Tanganyika each colonial power tried through various mechanisms to become both the principal buyer and the major seller, so that the territory's major trading partner was always the colonial power administering it, save for the transitional interlude after the 1st World War. Thus, despite the 'pon-door' commercial policy attached to the territory's mandate status (Ingham, 1965: 550), British imports rose from 27% of the total in 1936 to 47% in 1948. The general multilateralism spearheaded by the United States reduced the British share after 1948, but it was still a high 37% in 1961 (Iliffe, 1979: 470). The percentages of Tanganyika's exports which went to Britain in the same years were 23, 52 and 36 (Stein, 1979; Iliffe, 1979: 470). These high percentages demonstrate the creation of a significant amount of vulnerability to a single powerful country, and of a pattern that would be self-perpetuating and hard to change in times of adversity.

3.7.3 Agriculture

During colonialism, the primary export sector was greatly influenced by trends in other economies. Both the volume and the value of export crops fluctuated from time to time depending on the lowering and raising of demand and prices, which in turn were dictated by trends in the consuming countries. This is nowhere better illustrated than by the fortunes of Tanganyika's chief export crop, sisal. Tonnage for this crop rose markedly between the wars following the disasters that struck its major rivals at the time, Mexico-based henequin and Manilla hemp. But prices fell during the depression years, and Iliffe (1979: 343) has made an interesting sketch of how closely sisal price followed foreign economic trends linking it with capacity utilisation in U.S. industry during those years. Then the demand, and the price, rose

between 1947 and 1951 due to post-war industrial recovery, and the rush for the stock-piling of important raw materials (especially in the U.S.) following the Korean War of 1950. The highest rise was in 1951, when the price for sisal went up by 167% from the previous year. In 1952 the price began to fall, achieving the heaviest fall in 1953 when it came down by 183% from the previous year. It did not recover for the remainder of the colonial period, partly due to new competition from synthetic fibres. In view of the dominance of sisal, and the country's resemblance to monocultural economy, these fluctuating trends had immediate and significant effects on other internal aspects of the economy. Iliffe (1979:344-345) has documented such effects by examining levels of employment and of food production.

The externally determined behaviour of the agricultural sector, represented by sisal trends and its internal consequences, can be understood better by splitting this external orientation into two aspects. The first one is that production is dominated by exports (high levels of which create vulnerability to a foreign buyer, especially where the latter has a monopolistic position. In Tanganyika's case this may be demonstrated by the fact that in 1954, exports were 46% of monetary GDP, and probably constituted 1/4 of all productive activity (Iliffe, 1979:470). The second aspect is that production is primary and not industrial. Although some studies have usually tended to emphasize the former, it is the latter aspect which is critical, for it is this that makes the external orientation vulnerable to trends in manufacturing economies. The significance of external orientation is **the weakness of primary production in its relation with manufacturing**, which tends to be the case as specialization advances, first in the national and then in the world economy. Proof of dependence then rests less on the fact that the export sector is dominant, and more on the fact that what is exported is primary and the country remains non-industrial. This is what gives the problem its structural and resilient character. In the following paragraphs we examine the pace of industrialization in colonial Tanganyika, a subject which sheds additional light on the point made here.

3.7.4 Dependence and Industrialization in the Colonial Period

During German colonization, no manufacturing plants were built. There was, of course, a relatively extensive use of machines, and the employment of a more or less specialist and stable labour force in certain sectors, notably in the railway-transport sector. This may have brought into being an embryonic 'industrial' working class, but there was no industrial sector as such at that time.

In many parts of the Third World, significant industrial activity took place in the 1930s, gathered pace through the Second World War, and continued to expand after the war. Often the government, indigenous or colonial, played an important role in

promoting industrialization, either as a necessary reaction to the depressed raw material markets in the industrialized countries, or in order to cater locally for a particular war need (Hirschman, 1968). However, it seems that on this aspect the colonial government in Tanganyika fell short of normal expectations. For example, whereas in the new post-war conditions the Imperial government in London demanded the drawing up of development plans which emphasized modern productive projects such as **industry**, the Tanganyika government ignored the new thinking and continued to rank primary education and elementary agricultural projects ahead of industry.²² It seems clear also that the establishment of several important industries was vetoed by the government, either because they were perceived to be threatening the growth of British companies in Kenya, or because they could have destabilized an established industry in Britain itself. Examples of this were the ban placed on the manufacture of sisal twine in Tanganyika, and the refusal to allow the establishment of a textile mill in the mid-1930s (Iliffe, 1979: 301-302, 439; Bowles, 1980: 182-183). The importance and viability of these two industries in Tanganyika were by this time not in question, but, as representatives of the British cordage industries expressed it to the Secretary for the Colonies, such undertakings were a menace to their own home market (Rweyemamu, 1973: 128-129).

Nevertheless, in the normal course of the expansion of business, a few factories were established in the late 1930 and in the 1940s. Almost all were subsidiaries of Kenyan-based industries that were themselves in turn subsidiaries of 'metropolitan' industries. The most important industry established in Tanganyika in the 1930s, in terms of capital employed and the scale of operations, was the brewery industry. Among its shareholders were Kenya settlers, but the most important ones were British companies (Seidman, 1972: 38). Also established in the 1930s was milling industry, dominated by the relatively large-sized Unga Ltd., which was based in Kenya but operated throughout East Africa. The 1940s additions were the Metal Box Company, a subsidiary of the British company of the same name; Tanganyika Packers, jointly established by the Tanganyika government and the British company known as Liebig to produce meat extract; a paint factory owned by Robiallac; and a Coca Cola bottling factory. Further expansions in the milling and brewing industries were also undertaken in the same period (Iliffe, 1979: 301, 407). Textile production did not take place in the country until the late 1950s, and even then it was only on a very small scale.

While the subsidiary nature of this 'late industrialization' is obvious, it can also be noted that industrial activities were unintegrated and confined to the consumer goods sector. That there were no capital and intermediate goods industries is clear. As suggested by general theory, to the extent that industry in colonial Tanganyika came late, was extremely small in scale and did not comprise critical industrial activities, it can be said that a structural mechanism for the reproduction of dependence and

underdevelopment was already in place. Ultimately, future policy on how to counteract these was likely to be tested by the way in which the question of industrialization was tackled.

4. Conclusion

We have generally presented the material in this article as evidence that many of the actions of colonial authorities in Tanganyika, and aspects of dependence founded after the formal subordination of the local population, were not conducive to development. But neither in theory, discussed elsewhere (Mukangara, 1991) nor in this material, have we proposed that dependence excludes growth. Moreover, it is clear that in a general sense there was more progress at the end of colonial rule than at the beginning.

In regard to the colonial government's negative disposition towards development, we have not suggested that it was somehow in its nature to scheme and make sure that development did not occur. It is entirely possible that any colonialism with the same set of considerations at that time would have behaved the same way. It may be that such behaviour was characteristic of a phase of administration which was overwhelmingly concerned with the stability and control of dependencies. In this way it ensured regular even if not optimal production - the phenomenon that has been referred to as 'the bureaucratic economy' (McCarthy, 1982).

It goes without saying that it is not possible to tell the exact level of development that would have been attained in Tanganyika had colonial behaviour been positively disposed towards development in those aspects in which it was not. The evidence in this paper simply suggests that greater development than occurred was possible.

The findings of this paper about colonial actions, and about dependence, cannot be said to constitute the entire explanation of underdevelopment in Tanganyika, except when, as in some uses by Frank (1972), underdevelopment is taken to mean the unemployment and 'immiseration' resulting directly from capitalist expansion and colonial expropriation of land from local owners. To the extent that underdevelopment merely refers to a low level of productive forces and implies 'undercapitalisation' (in money and technological terms), colonial actions and dependence are not the only explanations for its existence in Tanganyika, as the beginning of this paper indicates. What the evidence suggests is that the negative actions contributed greatly to the persistence of underdevelopment in the colonial period through to the independence era. This is especially so in regard to the policy actions and the structural characteristics of the economy that had a potential for long-term effects on development, including the nature of monetary arrangements and the absence of industrialization.

One of the major lines of thought which we think the material in this paper has refuted is that which sees the colonial era as not being responsible for underdevelopment in Tanganyika in any way.

The material in the paper also provides some of the important reasons why it could be possible in the independence era to argue for change in the anti-dependence direction. It also provides some insight into certain **characteristics** of the change when it occurred, such as the pre-occupation with financial institutions at the beginning of the change, and even its socialistic thrust when the change gained momentum.

Notes.

1. These are figures for 1959, but the situation had only marginally improved in 1961 (Pratt, 1976: 92).
2. As opposed to pastoralism, for example.
3. Coquery-Vidrovitch's argument is similar to that of Rweyemamu only in saying that African economies were internally unaffected by exchange.
4. A more comprehensive critique of Hyden's idea, which is not possible here, can be found in an article by Mandani (1985).
5. Except that the Maji Maji War has sometimes been treated as an isolated incident, quite separate from other wars of resistance to German occupation. The reference to it by some writers as a rebellion is an indication of this: it carries the inaccurate message that it occurred after the local people had accepted colonial rule. Sometimes this is also indicated by the citing of the major causes of the war as African rejection of cash crops and taxation. Yet available evidence suggests strongly that military resistance was continuous up to that of Maji Maji and that cash crops and taxation were only the immediate factors among many causes of the war (Henderson, 1965; Gwas 1973).
6. That is, the increase in production for sale. The phase 'cash crop production' can also be used to mean commodity production, but in Tanzania has often meant the production of the major export crops.
7. The local settlement pattern in these areas had consisted of homesteads on the plateau surrounding the hills and mountains. The homesteads some farms around them, but being smaller, they were never relied on to satisfy production needs. Thus larger farms beyond the homestead in the valleys below had been created.
8. Meru's small remainder of arable land, located close to the households, was much less watered. Thus dispossession almost immediately led to destitution.
9. Usambara, Kilimanjaro and Meru were the nerve-centre of settler farming; conflict connected with land alienation was acute there and rule policies tended to reflect that situation. Settlers were also present, and alienated land, in the Southern Highlands, Morogoro and Bukoba, they were few in these areas throughout the German period. With the increase of European immigration in the 1930s, land was as reopened for alienation. The areas most affected this time were West Kilimanjaro, the Southern Highlands and Mbulu District.
10. Later, coffee in the Usambaras was abandoned and grown instead in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba. The large Usambara plantations were then for rubber production. But soon Tanganyika was out-competed by South-East Asia, and rubber production was abandoned in favour of sisal which together with cotton, had been found by the Amani Biological-Agricultural Institute to be ideal to the country.

11. The German colonial government's intervention in the labour market and assistance to settler in securing labour included direct compulsion in some areas, the enforcement of often unjust contracts heavily weighted against labourers, and a particular application of labour laws (Iliffe, 1979: 151-163).
12. Iliffe (1979: 155) quotes one settler as saying, "We don't need black capitalists, we need black workers."
13. The 'card system' was also enforced against the local people living around the Usambara and Bondei plantations. The number of obligatory labour days may have differed slightly (Iliffe, 1979: 153-154; Henderson, 1965: 144).
14. The relevant co-operative movement, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), formed in 1925, was in 1933 reconstituted, government intervention, into the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU).
15. The British model appeared to have been well worked out in advance, having based itself on the written ideas of a policy-maker, Lord Lugard, the apparently experienced experimentation in other dependencies, especially Nigeria.
16. Even the 'plant more crops' government campaign of 1931, one of a few which might appear to have favoured development in that period, noted for its repressive form of implementation and for its concern with revenue rather than local welfare (McCarthy, 1977: 591-598; Iliffe 1979: 349-350).
17. For example, funds allocated to education continued to be less than the levels recommended by the London office, and four years of agricultural - oriented primary education were still being considered adequate in spite of increasing African opposition (Iliffe, 1979: 439, 445-445).
18. If we sketched the status of the settler in Tanganyika's agricultural production, we would find that although it was less significant overall GDP, it was nevertheless dominant in export production, commanding about 55% of the total (Ehrlich, 1976: 294; Iliffe, 1979:30) In terms of value, the sector itself was highly dominated by the plantation production of Sisal.
19. Although this makes nonsense of the use of the 'settler' concept, there is no doubt that almost all settlers remained expatriate, having stronger ties outside than inside Tanganyika. They often perceived an imperative to remit funds outside. A minor but illustrate example of this perception was the view that Europeans had to bring up their children outside Tanganyika due to their 'biological needs' to allocate some funds towards this end. The government gave recognition to this and took it into consideration in working out the obligations of individual European payers (U.K. Govt., 1937: 200).
20. That is equivalent to 120% of the average annual value of exports in the years 1941-1948, or 244% of the average annual government revenue: of that time. Calculated from tables in Ehrlich (1976: 297, 308, 317).

21. These shortfalls in earnings were also fairly common in other colonial territories. After the 2nd World War, Britain was desperately trying to marshal the necessary resources for the rehabilitation of its economy. It thus became more blatant and deliberate in using the short mechanism to raise some funds through the colonies. This now went hand in hand with the well known Marketing Board mechanism which, though officially designed to oversee the stabilization of prices of primary export produce, became primarily the agency for retention of the colonies' earnings in England, and for acquiring badly needed US dollars for British (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966: 40-41). Most of the colonies' earnings were held in British government securities at low interest, and they lost their value considerably over ... Overall, the depreciation and the delay in investing such large amounts of funds in the colonies can be considered a significant squandering development opportunity. Enormous economic losses through Marketing Boards have been shown to have occurred in other colonial territories, notably in Ghana and Uganda (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966: 41,46; Lury, 1976: 230-232).

22. In the British sphere of influence, the enthusiasm for planning and development in the dependencies, which began in the middle of the 2nd World War, was influenced by the impending imperial loss of India, and it resulted in the recognition of the importance of improving inco-operative and welfare to maintain industrial consumption and stem rebellion in those dependencies.

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PEASANT WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS AND LIBERATING RURAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF TANGA REGION, TANZANIA.

By
Dr. Amos Mhina

1. Introduction

That the contribution of women to agricultural production in Africa is very high. The issue of contention here is the percentage of this contribution. In this regard it has been argued that there has been a persistence of statistical under-reporting arising from the fact that much of women's labour is invisible in the sense that it is not counted officially.

Despite variations, it has been argued that we can generalize that in Tanzania women do around 70% of hoeing and weeding, 60% of crop harvesting, 80% of portering of crops, 90% of crop processing, 60% of marketing of surplus, 95% of the care and feeding of the young and the aged, 90% of water and fuel portering, 50% of the seed/planting/cutting and 50% of care of domestic animals (Macha, Kerner, Minde and Msonganzila 1992 p. 77).

All this mean a very heavy work load for rural women which can reach as many as 16-17 hours of work in a 24 hours day. The main problem here is the inequitable division of labour, but also that of lack of access to technology which can reduce considerably the drudgery of work for rural women.

The objective of the research has been to look at the efforts of rural women to liberate themselves through rural technology. This objective has two facets, the first is to see whether rural women alleviate the drudgery of labour and improve their well being through the adoption of agricultural technology, especially intermediate technology. This involves both the choice of technology, especially animal power and the means of raising capital for such technology.

The second facet has been to examine as to how women, organized in their own technology application groups can contribute to their liberation *vis a vis* the traditional division of labour through breaking socio-economic barriers and gender inequality.

Often rural women are not organized. If there are problems of organizing peasants in general, then there are even greater ones when it comes to organizing rural women. Such efforts come against many barriers, among them the inertia of the existing patriarchal social system which often hinder women organization in many subtle ways.