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State, Governance and Civil Society in Tanzania

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Introduction: Civil Society in Tanzania

In the quest for good governance the relationship between the state and civil society is very important. Since governance is concerned with the legitimacy of the public realm, civil society is relevant because it is the covenant that gives rise to the state. While civil society is composed of all citizens, with their rights and obligations, they are more effective when they are organised in civil society organisations.

This article traces the uneasy relationship between the state and civil society organisations in Tanzania during the single-party era. It then examines the reform decade of the 1990s by focusing on the relationship between the new wave of civil society organisations and their relations with the state. Particular attention is paid to the implications of state-society relations for good governance.

Defining Civil Society, State and Governance

Since it is non-military, the Tanzanian state draws its legitimacy from civil society, which is the covenant that gave rise to this State. It is a fact that is often forgotten, yet it is a reality that without the support of the majority of its citizens, the legitimacy of the state would be greatly undermined. Civil Society has been defined as "an arena where manifold social movements and civil organisations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests" (Bratton 1989, 417). From this definition we can draw the important point that while citizens in their entirety, with their rights and obligations, make up civil society, they are only truly active and effective when they are members of social movements and civil organisations that

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they create themselves. The relationship between the state and the civil society is therefore crucial for the development of a society.

Debate on the state has been influenced by the Liberal and Marxist traditions. The former sees the state as an organisation that is non-inclusive, with limited functions and, consequently, limited powers. The latter sees the state as an instrument of class domination. From the former came the concept of the minimalist state, and from the latter the argument that the state can not mediate class conflict and play a regulative role in society.

The experience of recent years has, however, shown that it is desirable to search for a good and effective state. An effective state needs legitimacy that is nurtured by legal authority. That is, authority should be exercised by legal processes within the limits of constitutional guarantees. A good and effective state is expected to have two important characteristics. The first is to foster justice through the rule of law. The second is to encourage progress through the active facilitation of the economic and social development of its citizens.

Government is part of the state. But the state is wider because it includes not only the institutions of the legislature, judiciary and the executive, but also the social and political factors which gave rise to the particular institutional arrangements of that society. The character of the Tanzanian state has, for example, been determined by a dominant executive operating with a powerful ruling party at the expense of the legislature.

The recent recognition of the importance of governance came with the realisation that a good and effective government is crucial for sustainable development. The belief that a minimalist state can bring about development is waning. Even one of its proponents, the World Bank, is changing its view on the matter. It is realised that while a minimalist state might do no harm, it can not do much good either (World Bank 1997, iii). Governance in this context therefore refers to the conscious management of regime structures with a view of enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm. It involves the generation of a set of rules accepted as legitimate, and the enhancement of societal values sought by individuals and groups. It has two sets of elements. The first deals with structural aspects of governance (rule of law), while the other is concerned with legitimacy and authority, which are qualitative aspects of governance (Hyden 1993).

The state is effective when it has legitimacy, which comes from the citizens who make up civil society. Autocratic domination can work in the short run but it cannot be effective in the long run. The civil society for its part needs to be informed and organised in order to participate effectively in the affairs of the society, and to engage the state. An uninformed and unorganised population cannot make its interests felt by the state, nor can it apply sanctions against an erring existing government.

Governance, therefore, is concerned not only with a good and effective government, but also with a literate, organised and active citizenry working to achieve human development. In this context the state has an interest in listening to and working in partnership with its citizens. Partnership in this case involves bringing the voice of the people, including the poor and marginalised groups, into the very centre of policy making. One of the best mechanisms for doing so is the ballot box. Using the universal suffrage principle, and despite some limitations in certain areas that tend to reduce fair play, voting is still one of the most important ways of tapping into the wishes of the majority.

However, the ballot box in itself is not adequate. A national leader who gets elected by a majority would be acting arbitrarily if, after the election, he did not consult with people's organisations and groups. It is important, therefore, that genuine intermediary organisations be allowed to emerge and be consulted in policy-making circles. These could be professional organisations, mass organisations (such as trade unions), and sector or grassroot based groups. Also important are local governments, which are crucial for the representation of districts. Local governments, in this context, should have an elective component made up of councillors elected through universal suffrage. Appointed local governments usually represent the interests of central governments and become local administrations, which do not represent the local people and their concerns.

Conceptualising Civil Society

It has been argued by some scholars that the idea of civil society is theoretically and practically not valuable for Africa because it is a concept that comes from the normative traditions of Western political philosophy. Indeed, the modern idea of civil society is attributed to Thomas Hobbes, whose concept of a "commonwealth" is based on mutual and voluntary agreement among individuals to forgo individual preservation by granting a higher individual the authority to provide security for all (Haberson 1994, 15). John Locke's civil society is more akin to today's concept of civil society

because it is a community distinct from, and ultimately superior to, government. Locke's view of civil society is superior because while Hobbes' "commonwealth" is "fictitious" in the sense that it is utilitarian in the search for collective security, Locke's community is real, based on a conscious and rational search for a society.

In Tanzania, where nationhood is advanced, and where there are efforts to create a real Tanzania society, it is not justified to deny the relevance of the quest for strengthening civil society. Some of the political values associated with civil society are culturally specific, but one cannot negate the universal rights and specific demands of Tanzania's citizens. To make the theory of civil society useful in this context, it is important to recast it in operational terms by looking at how civil society functions, the actors in civil society, their interests, their motivations, and the modes of consensus or conflict. It is also important to look at the modes of reciprocity in the interaction between the government, society at large and civil society (Haberson 1994, 21).

Haberson (1994) distinguishes society at large and civil society. Some would like to portray civil society organisations as marginal groups that are distinguished from society and are totally separate from the government. In our opinion the distinction between society at large and civil society lies in the fact that some sections of society are not organised. Furthermore, civil society is more than civil society organisations, since citizens can act collectively to express their feelings and interests even when they are not formally organised. They can, for example, make themselves felt through voting.

At the same time the relations between civil society and the state need not be inimical; after all in the Lockean sense it is the sovereign community that gave rise to the government and there has to be a responsibility for preserving the government for the benefit of the community. Civil society has rights given to it by the state but also obligations to a legitimate government, which has responsibility to the society as a whole. The government can apply sanctions to civil society organisations that threaten the survival of the community and the civil society should be able to support its government. In the same vein, civil society organisations have a responsibility to the community, and while they can be private organisations, in the final analysis they have to be accountable to the well being of the community as a whole. This is important to bear in mind when examining civil society organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which have become important actors in Tanzania.

Civil Society and Non Governmental Organisations in Tanzania

The question that needs to be posed here refers to the type of civil organisations that exist in Tanzania, and whether such organisations and NGOs are one and the same thing. If civil society refers to citizens with rights and obligations in a society who set up the covenant that gave rise to the state, civil society organisations have to be distinguished from those of the government. At the same time, these organisations also have to be distinguished from purely clerical organisations, though individual members of the clergy and lay religious organisations may be part of civil society organisations.

Theoretically, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are organisations that operate within the civil society but not controlled by the government. This makes NGOs almost synonymous with civil society organisations. At present, however, and despite definitional and taxonomic problems concerning NGOs, these organisations have acquired narrower meaning than that of civil organisations. NGOs have been defined as organisations formed on a voluntary basis but operating with paid staff, either for the benefit of members or to provide services to or on behalf of others (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995a: 1). In this definition, professional groups that operate for profit are excluded. These, however, are considered to be civil society organisations.

Taxonomically Semboja and Therkildsen (1995b) have classified NGOs into seven categories. However, only five of the categories are relevant because two of them fit into the categories of Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Member Service Organisations (MSOs). The first category is that of environmental NGOs. These deal with wildlife, tree and soil conservation as well as other environmental issues. In 1990, the NGO directory had six environmental NGOs, which are based in Arusha, Tanga, Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. The second type is religious NGOs. Most of these are affiliated to foreign groups and get considerable support from outside the country. These NGOs are found in most parts of the country and make up about 20% of all NGOs. Religious NGOs are involved mostly in the provision of health services, education, food relief assistance and funding for housing and economic activities. Examples of these include Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA), Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), Catholic Relief Tanzania (CARITAS) and the Tanzania Christian Refugee Services (TCRS).

The third group is made up of social service NGOs. Groups like The Red Cross, the Family Planning Association of Tanzania and Freedom From Hunger Campaign provide specialised social services to the public on health, education, food security and family planning. This category is the largest, making up about 60% of all NGOs. The fourth group is that of youth NGOs. Examples here include Girl Guides, Boy Scouts and groups engaging in productive activities.

The fifth group is made up of women NGOs, which are becoming increasingly important through their provision of a variety of services to members, including legal advice, expertise in establishing family projects or economic activities in general, training, and maternal and child care. Examples here include the Women Development Foundation, Women's Study Group and the Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA).

We can categorise NGOs by their functional aspects into three categories. The first involves the provision of traditional human services, which include health, education and personal social services. The second category includes NGOs involved in the improvement of economic conditions, the pursuit of economic opportunity, and the changing of general living conditions. These NGOs are engaged in job training, micro-enterprise development, housing, community development and economic development. The third category involves NGOs engaged in the preservation of culture, the promotion of artistic or other forms of self expression and the protection of human and environmental political rights (Johns Hopkins, 1996).

This categorisation can facilitate the analysis of NGOs in terms of their activities, consequently allowing more precision in the evaluation of the performance of NGOs, especially at a time when there is a proliferation of NGOs in the country, some of which may lack credibility. It has been observed that most NGOs in Tanzania are urban based, run by middle class professionals and having limited connections with the grassroots (Robinson and Swainson, 1998: 31). It is important, therefore, to pay attention to the two other types of civil organisations in Tanzania, the CBOs and MSOs, which reach the grassroots. The CBOs are formed by Tanzanians, usually at the local level. While they can get assistance from donors, these organisations are more grounded at the community level.

The Member Service Organisations provide services to members. These include such organisations as professional associations, trade unions and co-operatives. The last two are national and they qualify to be called movements because of the large number of adhering members. Co-operatives have traditionally involved smallholder farmers, while trade unions have recruited members from the industry, service and plantation sectors.

Civil Society and Its Impact on Policy Making

Involvement of civil society in the policy process is very important. When public policies do not take into consideration the needs and interests of the people, it is unlikely that they will be implemented, since citizens may stay aloof. At the same time, citizens are unlikely to have much impact on the government unless they are organised in-groups that can express their interests or lobby the government. It is realised that even the best intentioned government is unlikely to meet collective needs effectively if it does not know what many of the people's needs are, especially those of the poor and minorities (World Bank 1997, 10).

The question of governance in this context is closely linked to policy-making and implementation. The state, through its government, asserts its legitimate authority and pursues developmental goals when its policies are implemented in society. This implementation, however, will depend on whether civil society believes that its interests have been taken into account. It becomes important, therefore, that before the state attempts to involve its people in policy implementation, it should try to involve their civil organisations in the policy making process.

It is known that some African governments have tried to implement public policies through coercion, yet—quite often—this has not worked. Such an approach could lead to protests, but experience has also shown that civil society tends to withdraw from the orbit of the state, and to channel its efforts into the parallel markets. In such situations, when the domain of the operation of the state is reduced, a crisis of governance is indicated.

The issues that follow then are the ways and the capacity of civil organisations and NGOs to influence policy-making and implementation. NGOs have been introduced into the discussion of governance as a way of "stimulating greater citizen involvement" through channels by which national "policy makers" may be linked to the grassroots (World Bank, 1989, 62). A number of advantages in this domain have been attributed to NGOs and civil organisations. It has been argued that such organisations could

play an important political role, provided they offer ordinary people the opportunity to participate in decisions and to represent local interests. NGOs have also been seen to have the potential to assemble scattered social groups into integrated social movements. In that way they pluralise the institutional landscape and strengthen civil society.

At the same time the NGOs' comparative advantage is said to be greater when their work is with groups considered to be "illegal" or "victims", such as squatters, street children and petty traders (Fowler 1995, 54). In that way NGOs and CBOs can bring into the policy orbit social groupings that are politically marginalised and economically deprived. However, these are often only potential advantages. The reality is more problematic. Quite often NGOs do not have the capacity to mobilise the grassroots for more participation, especially since, despite expectations, they do not have democratic and participatory structures. Gibbon (1995, 148) has argued that NGOs should be looked at not only in terms of ensuring democratic accountability on the part of the government, but also in regard to reinforcing patron-client relationships (Gibbon).

In actual situations, therefore, a lot remains to be done in order to strengthen civil organisations and NGOs. If the state recognises the importance of such organisations in mobilising its citizens for participation in policy-making and implementation, then it has an interest in strengthening such organisations.

The Nature and Role of Civil Organisations and NGOs in Tanzania

To understand civil organisations in the current situation, one needs to have a historical perspective. Using a historical perspective highlights the characteristics of the relationship between the Tanzanian state and civil organisations and NGOs, as well as the legacies that have remained. According to Fowler, the term NGO can be traced to a United Nations (UN) resolution of 1950 that described non-state organisations (mainly Christian and Western charities) which could be accredited to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. In that regard, NGOs of such character have existed in Tanzania since the colonial times. They included such international NGOs as The Red Cross, and those affiliated to churches, for example the Christian Refugee Services (TCRS).

In Tanganyika, associations increased in number from the 1920s. Some of these were ethnic and geographically based, while others were national. The

Tanganyika African Association (TAA) of the early fifties, for example, was national, and it was later transformed into the nationalist political party that led the country to independence. Member service organisations ranged from the Taxi Drivers Association to trade unions under the umbrella of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL). There was a vibrant co-operative movement too. However, changes occurred after independence, especially after the mid-sixties.

The relative independence of trade unions and co-operatives was greatly reduced by these changes. The first method used by the state to curtail the autonomy of civil society was to increase its control by enhancing the powers of ministers responsible for these organisations. Later, these organisations became departments of the ruling party. Tribal and race based associations were banned very early after independence. At the same time Christian owned institutions providing social services were nationalised. The nationalisation of church hospitals, including Bugando in Mwanza and the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC), came after the Arusha Declaration, which formally installed socialism as a political system in 1967. The Education Act of 1969 created a single education system, which led to the nationalisation of missionary schools (Munishi 1995, 148). All financing and management of schools was taken over by the central government.

The question that follows is how to explain the nationalisation of NGOs, the banning of some CBOs and the reduction of the independence of member service organisations. There are two phases to consider when we look at the question. The first covers the period prior to 1975, which concerned the behaviour of the governing elite that took power after independence. That elite had promised rapid development to the people, and it believed in equal development for all areas of the country. The promises allowed this governing elite to take a frontal approach to development. The existing pace of development was seen as inadequate and hence the state went on to directly finance development. The belief in equity among the regions made the state limit the speed of development in certain areas in order to bring up those that were behind.

Some these decisions may have been wrong, but the intentions seemed well-meaning and benevolent. In fact, the banning of ethnic organisations and the nationalisation of religious organisations in the provision of social services helped the governing elite to build a Tanzanian nation without serious ethnic and religious divisions.

A major constraint to this model of development was that the state did not have adequate resources to support its populist policies. At the same time, equity among regions became the equalisation of poverty. The state obtained assistance from donors, who, according to Hyden, underwrote the many benevolent populist policies. The donors were apparently impressed by the commitment of the governing elites to reach all Tanzanians, especially the poor (Hyden 1995, 44). The nationalisation of church, health and education facilities did not lead to much protest. Sivalon (1995) has argued that some officials of the Catholic Church welcomed the nationalisation of church owned schools and hospitals because it released resources for other activities.

The second phase came after 1975, when party supremacy was declared. Party domination, since that time, can hardly be explained altruistically. The party sought to establish its hegemony over most aspects of the Tanzanian society. Consequently, most associational life had to be either sanctioned or closely watched by the party. In fact, the absence of associational life in the society was acknowledged by the party commission that proposed modifying the structure of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which came into being after the 1977 merger of the previous ruling parties—the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) of Mainland Tanzania, and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar. As an attempt to revive associational life, that commission proposed the formation of mass movements to mobilise sections of the population not represented by the party. These were the youth, women, parents, workers and peasants. When they were established they fell under the direct control of the ruling party. Such dominance would have continued if it were not for a crisis of governance that set in afterwards. The civil society had been largely marginalized. Although there was talk of people's participation, it was in fact very carefully controlled. As the people were denied the chance to act as a civil society they refused to be a civic society that gives support as a group of citizens to the state. Many took the exit option, going whenever possible into the parallel market.

In an attempt to win the people back into its orbit, the state re-established co-operatives and local governments. The move did not work for two reasons. In the first place, the position of the party vis a vis these institutions remained intact. Party screening and watching reduced independence of action. In the second place, the re-established institutions could not efficiently deliver the required services. In the 1960s, when co-operatives and trade unions were intact, there was tension over the control of these organisations between the "professional" co-operators or trade unionists on the one hand and national politicians on the other. Both the contending groups sough to win the support of ordinary members to justify their cases. In the 1980s, when the institutions were re-established, the governing elite had become monolithic and homogeneous. The same elite had positions in politics or in the party, in high government offices and in the parastatal system as managers or board members. The distinction this time was between the elite on one hand and the civil society on the other. The crisis of governance was that the state seemed to be all-powerful, while in fact its institutions were failing to mobilise the civil society for policy implementation. The crisis intensified after the drastic reduction of donor assistance, which had been underwriting the populist policies.

From this historical period we can summarise the problems of governance and civil society as follows:

> There was a growing rift between the state and the civil society. A relationship that had been productive in the 1960s declined in the 1970s and 1980s, undermining the authority of the state in the process.

> The NGO space was reduced because of state proscriptions. Consequently, when populist government policies could not be maintained, many people went without basic social services. Without these services they did not feel obliged to stay in the orbit of the government. At the same time professional bodies, which could have contributed to sectoral policies, were few and controlled.

> Citizens were alienated from member service organisations, such as co-operatives and trade unions, which were purported to be theirs, but whose leaders were more accountable to the political patrons who appointed them than to the members.

> Local and community initiatives were stifled by the absence of community-based people's organisations.

NGOs in the 1990s

Changes that came in the late 1980s with liberalisation culminated in the establishment of a multiparty system in 1992. This meant that the ruling party eased up on the existence of independent civil organisations. Consequently, new NGOs and CBOs increased.

Up to the mid-1980s many NGOs were largely considered subversive (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995b). By the 1990s the official position had changed. Most were now considered as partners in development. While in 1990 there were 163 registered NGOs in Tanzania, in 1993 the number had reached 244 (Kiondo, 1995: 110). The Prime Minister's Office estimates that the number is currently around 800.

The NGOs are varied. It should be noted that a good number of CBOs have also registered as NGOs. This does not necessarily present a big problem, but we need to distinguish them for analytical purposes so as to identity grassroots people's organisations. NGOs with foreign affiliation have been found to be relatively well established and have built up their capacity for independent operations, while others are quite inexperienced with inadequate financial resources.

Although NGOs often work independently, they can belong to umbrella organisations. In 1991 the Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE) had 41 NGO members while in 1998 its membership list showed a total of 76 NGOs. TACOSODE is considered to be close to the government. The government used to give it some subsidies, including paying for its executive secretary. This is, however, no longer the case. The closeness to the government has to be understood in the context of its origins. The precursor to TACOSODE was the National Council for Social Welfare, which was established in 1965. It had close links with the United Nations International Council for Social Services. Its members included the Christian organisations CARITAS, YMCA, TCRS and the Muslim organisation BAKWATA. The possibility of coming into conflict with the state was limited because there were no political overtones associated with the social services they provided, since they were usually in areas not reached by the government.

The other umbrella organisation is the Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO), which was established in 1985. In 1991 it had 65 NGOs under it. A more recent list from TANGO showed a membership of 271 NGOs. This organisation is not affiliated to the government, although it has been consulted by it with regard to NGO policy formulation.

Community Based Organisations (CBOs)
Between the early 1960s and the 1980s, development associations based on ethnic lines could not be registered. The fight against ethnicity has been a

progressive characteristic of Tanzania. Indeed, the development of a national identity was partly facilitated by this fight. This fear, however, led to the proscription of almost all locally based development associations.

Associations based on geographical areas (wards, divisions and districts) began to re-appear in the mid-1980s. It all started with District Development Trusts (DDTs), set up in urban areas to mobilise support for "home area" social services, especially education (Kiondo 1995, 111). The CBOs have expanded over time. They cover not only geographical areas but also specific interests and occupations. They range from those dealing with the handicapped, to those serving traders and journalists. Some of them have started to assert their interests. A Dar es Salaam traders' association, for example, has recently filed a case against the city commission to protest against tax hikes.

Although there are differences among the districts, the number of CBOs is certainly on the increase. A survey carried out in several districts in 1993 indicates such diversity. In Ilala district in Dar es Salaam, which is urban and relatively well to do, there were 1120 CBOs. Most were small, involving primarily women in trade activities. In the Hai district of Kilimanjaro, which is also well to do, there were a number of development trust funds dedicated to different social sectors, in addition to numerous NGOs. These included the Hai Education Fund, division based rural roads trust funds, and village health funds. In 1993 the registered CBO membership in Hai was around 3300 (about 17 persons per thousand). The existence of numerous CBOs in Hai provided impetus for NGOs and donors to support them. These included the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF), UNICEF, DANIDA, ILO and the FAO.

In Tanga district there were only 28 active CBOs and participation was low (approximately 3.1 per thousand). Other districts surveyed included Songea: 84 groups; Same: 81 groups; and Kondoa: 60 groups (approximately 4.4 per thousand). Bukoba rural had 80 groups with 4400 members (approximately 12.8 per thousand). Newala, like Tanga, had few registered CBOs, with a membership of only 108 (approximately 0.3 per thousand). Newala, however, had a very strong trust fund, the Newala Development Fund, organised by a group of important personalities with high government posts or with success in commerce, most of whom resided in Dar es Salaam (Kiondo 1995, 124-160). The survey indicated that associational life was slowly returning to the districts, although the groups were quite small.

Member Service Organisations and Movements

These are essentially large national organisations that are potentially capable of mobilising substantial sections of the civil society. In Tanzania, these include trade unions, co-operatives, the youth movement, women's groups and parents' groups. As it stands, the youth, parents and women's movements are still controlled by the ruling party. These are the pillars of that party and its leaders feel that relinquishing them would undermine the party.

Theoretically other associations and movements could emerge. However, hesitancy in the registration of a new youth council and a conflict between the government and a newer organisation with the characteristics of a women's council, and known as Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania (BAWATA), which was deregistered as an association, indicates a struggle between the ruling party and other groups for hegemony. In short, the ruling party is undermining the development of national civil society organisations with grassroots support. The establishment of such groups is imperative for diluting the ruling party's monopoly over civil society.

The trade unions and the co-operative movement are a bit different. Theoretically the ruling party has relinquished its control of these organisations, yet the links do not disappear easily. The General Secretary of the workers movement is also a member of the CCM National Executive Committee (NEC), and he has once sought to be a Member of Parliament through the ruling party. The leaders of the new co-operative movement fought and won a legal battle with the ruling party's apex co-operative body, WASHIRIKA, over the control the property of the co-operative movement that it had accumulated since colonial times.

The major problem facing the co-operative movement has to do with the loss of support from its members. Many years of state protection of corrupt co-operative managers and leaders have alienated a considerable number of co-operative members.

Can the Civil Society hold the State Accountable?

The relationship between the state and civil organisations and NGOs has been problematic in many African countries. These organisations have often been looked at with suspicion. The political activity of registered NGOs has been banned. States everywhere insist that voluntary organisations should be both non-profit and non-political (Fowler 1991, 53-84).

The 1990s saw a change of heart in the government of Tanzania. In 1992 the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) welcomed foreign and local NGOs to operate in areas of their interest, so long as established laws and national interests were safeguarded (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995b: 55). Indeed, apart from the incident with BAWATA, which was taken to the courts, the current government seems to allow NGOs and CBOs to operate without much interference.

NGOs at present come under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Vice President (VP), which is working on a national NGO policy. A draft policy has been drawn up by the National Steering Committee, whose members included delegates from the office of the VP, NGOs and the umbrella organisations, including the Association of NGOs of Zanzibar (ANGOZA) of Zanzibar. The question that remains to be answered is whether the government is going to use these institutions to enhance governance. Some of the professional groups have been consulted in some government decisions. The Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture (TCCIA) was consulted in the process of tax reform as well as on the budget. This is a new spirit on the part of the state, but there should be consultation with more civil society organisations, which also have an interest in putting forward sector interests.

The draft public policy on NGOs shows the political will to involve more NGOs in policy making and governance. It recognises the importance of working with NGOs because of their specialist knowledge and close partnership with poor communities, which fosters participatory development. It is pointed out, however, that many NGOs are still young and weak, and hence there is a need to put in place mechanisms that will enable them to grow and operate effectively. The draft policy has as an objective the exchange of more information between the NGOs and the government, as well as the monitoring of the activities of NGOs. Much regulation of NGOs is expected to be left to NGO umbrella organisations.

At present there are a number of advocacy NGOs that seek to influence policy and governance. An example is a local NGO, the Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA), which deals mostly with issues of women,

children and human rights. It has had good relations with the government. Through different advocacy mechanisms, it has influenced policies, especially on women and child oppression. One example of its influence is the passing of a sexual harassment act, known as the Sexual Offenses Special Provisions Act, 1998. The involvement of grassroots groups in the public policy process is, however, not widespread. This could be partly explained by the mobilisational weakness of the NGOs and CBOs. According to Fowler, some NGOs have limited absorptive capacity, inadequate delivery mechanisms and a lack of technical expertise (Fowler 1991, 61).

Patronage and brokerage has undermined the potential of NGOs and CBOs to foster general social and political accountability. There has been a linkage of CBOs and other development actors to particular individuals and patrons. The local leaders of CBOs usually act as brokers, linking members to a patron. This is done relatively easily because the development and trust funds seem almost deliberately designed to exclude popular participation.

It seems evident therefore that NGOs and CBOs cannot hold the state accountable when their leaders are not accountable to the members. There is a need to encourage democratic practices in the NGOs and CBOs. The empowerment of civil society can be encouraged but members of society must assert themselves to realise it. Through its regulative role, the state could create the legal basis for members to assert their rights.

Conclusion

It is evident that the present government has made moves to create a new partnership between it and civil society organisations. A good illustration is the efforts to establish a new NGO policy in consultation with the NGOs themselves. It is also evident, nevertheless, that more efforts are needed to strengthen civil society organisations by allowing them more freedom in their formation and their areas of action.

The expected role of the government is essentially regulative. In the case of NGOs, the task is to encourage improved capacity, transparency, accountability and co-ordination with the government at national and local levels. In the case of member service organisations, especially co-operatives and trade unions, the task lies in finalising legislation that will make them independent and accountable to their members.

The role of the government here is to ensure that the accounts are well kept and audited in a regular and timely fashion. The recent amendment to the Co-operative Act of 1991 is a step in the right direction. This amendment makes it mandatory for office bearers of co-operatives to produce audited annual accounts on time, or to lose their positions if they fail to do so. A new trade union legislation to repeal the Organisation of Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTU) Act, which linked trade unions to the ruling party, has been promised but has been slow in coming. As a result, the current temporally trade union organisation is operating without a permanent legislation.

The state can strengthen civil society organisations by making clear that the government position is that of partnership with NGOs and civil organisations, and that its intention is not to control them. The government reform committees need to elaborate the government position and make efforts to educate political leaders on the new partnership, as opposed to the previous hegemony.

There is need to examine ways in which the state can play a non-destructive regulative role: to assist in encouraging democratic and accountable civil society organisations, but also to encourage their penetration in areas where the state is unable to enter. Indeed, there is need to study NGOs' capacity and their potential contributions at the different levels of government. Civil organisations and NGOs are private organisations because they are not government owned but they are also public in the sense that they are owned by many members, which calls for transparency and public accountability. It is the government's regulative role to insist that such organisations be accountable to its members.

The state also needs to help member service organisations, such as trade unions and co-operatives, to reconcile with their members, especially through an attack on entrenched vested interests of long serving corrupt leaders who in previous times received ruling party protection. It is important to ensure democratic representation from the lowest to the highest levels, as well as strict financial control. There is need to encourage the growth of grassroots movements and to "network" them with the local government system. A detailed study of CBOs and their development capacity in the communities is an important step in this process of building such partnerships at the local government level, without any state attempts to absorb CBOs into government or party structures.

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Animal Husbandry in 19th Century Nigeria: A Study of the Etsako Practice

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Introduction

A highly neglected area in the economic history of Nigeria, and even of West Africa, is animal husbandry. For example, in R.O. Ekundare's 450 page book *Economic History of Nigeria*, only about a page is devoted to livestock.[1] A.G. Hopkins 336 page *Economic History of West Africa has* only half a page on livestock.[2] G. Ogunremi, in his chapter contribution to *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History*, was more interested in the use of animals as beasts of burden than on animal husbandry, since his focus was on transportation.[3] This neglect is surprising, because animals have a long history in Nigeria as beasts of burden,[4] sacrificial objects[5] and table fares.[6] Therefore the history of animal husbandry, showing developments in rearing animals for their various uses, is an important aspect of Nigerian economic history. This paper is, therefore, an attempt to redress part of the neglect.

The paper is also a micro-study of animal husbandry in 19th century Etsako, during the last century of her pre-colonial history. Studies of pre-colonial African economic activities are difficult because of the scarcity of relevant source materials. Even the oral sources that are available, and their accurate interpretations, are threatened by the rapid rate at which knowledgeable elders are dying off.[7] Economic historians of Africa must therefore focus more on the pre-colonial period so as to reconstruct Africa's economic activities for posterity, before the sources get permanently lost. Detailed expositions in micro-studies, such as this, show that contrary to the views of Trevor Roper, pre-colonial livestock activities were not the result of the gyrations of barbarous tribes,[8] rather they were often based on scientific

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