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The Roles, Functions and Performance of Political Parties in Multiparty Tanzania[1]

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Abstract

This paper attempts to assess the performance of political parties in Tanzania. It explores the traditional roles of parties, such as interest articulation and aggregation. The performance of Tanzanian political parties is discussed in relation to these roles, and in the context of the 1995 General Elections. Although other factors favouring a better performance by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) are discussed, organisational strength and the ruling party's historical legacy are highlighted. The opposition is found to be playing its part in many traditional party roles, but it is found to be lacking in efforts to organise for its own survival, thus contributing to a picture of an uncertain future for plural and competitive politics.

1. Introduction

In this paper we have defined the roles and functions of political parties as understood widely, and have proceeded to discuss the activities of Tanzanian parties in and around the 1995 election in relation to those known roles and functions. The discussion is dominated by material relating to Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), largely because it has been around much longer, it is better researched, and its activities are more visible.

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2. History and Definition of Political Parties

As we know them today, political parties are no older than a century and a half. Although distinct and politically active groups organising specifically for elective office began to appear in certain Western countries, especially England, towards the end of the 17th Century, they existed only in the legislature, not outside it, and they lacked permanence until the middle of the 19th Century. That is also the time when they started to operate in America. With the expanded enfranchisement of the period, it became necessary to organise the new voters and to strengthen the co-ordination of electoral politics by centralising their organisations. In this way the already distinct politically active groups acquired the following characteristics:

> ➢ Cohesiveness or near-cohesiveness, organisation and permanence.
> ➢ Deconfinement from the legislature and the establishment of extra-legislative groups, many with links and political goals similar to the legislative groups.
> ➢ A sustained engagement of both legislative and extra-legislative organisations with the voters.

These largely historical characteristics of political parties, especially as they formed in Britain, are a good basis for thinking of a definition of political parties.

The simplest definition is one that acknowledges a political party as any organisation that is given that name (Epstein, 1967), or any organisation that regards itself as a party and is generally so regarded (Hodgkin, 1961). There is nothing really wrong with this, except that it is too simple. A better understanding of a political party would consider it to have the following characteristics:

(a) An organisation with a degree of sustenance.
(b) The organisation engages in political contests, including elections, in order to place its members in positions of influence in the political system, especially in the legislature and the executive, for purposes of influencing decisions or winning state power.
(c) It is distinguishable from other political groupings.

3. Roles and Functions of Political Parties

In the specialised conceptualisation of political science and sociology, functions mean activities conducted in pursuit of the sustenance of 'the system' over time (Almond, 1960). Although these may include activities fostered in the maintenance of a conceptually larger or more important

system, otherwise known as roles, a focus on functions tends to stress the 'internal' mechanisms of sustenance or perpetuation. Thus functions of political parties include activities 'designed' to perpetuate the political life of a nation as a whole, in which case they can also be called roles, but denote more those activities and attributes that perpetuate parties as parties per excellence. The latter include such activities as organisation (itself comprised of efficiency, permanence, centralisation, internal democracy, cohesiveness, effectiveness and responsiveness), as well as socialisation and recruitment for the party (as distinct from the political system as a whole).

The functions of political parties that denote roles played for the larger political system are generally understood to be the following:

(a) *Political socialisation*. This refers to the process of induction of members of society into the existing political culture by the shaping of attitudes towards the political system. This role is performed by the family, schools, religious organisations, the media, governmental structures and political parties. Systems differ in the degree of utilisation of these agencies of socialisation, but this role is performed in all systems, openly and in disguise. In this role a political party is only one among many agencies, and in some systems the party agency may be extremely minor indeed.

(b) *Political recruitment*. Political socialisation inevitably tends to produce a special set of values and skills that prepare people to fill roles as political actors in the system. This inevitable function of preparing political actors is called recruitment, and political parties share in performing it. It is sometimes seen more as a sub-function of political socialisation than as a separate function.

(c) *Interest articulation*. In any political system there are numerous opinions held. They make political sense when or if they are expressed as claims or demands. That activity of expressing demands is known as interest articulation. In a relatively free society there is a diversity of demands (corresponding to the multiplicity of interest groups) and a variety of methods of expressing those demands. Since political parties often give or add voice to existing claims, and are themselves an interest group in the first instance, they share in the articulation of interests.

(d) *Interest aggregation*. This function is about sorting and compiling the various interests articulated so that they become coherent references for the making of decisions. This is the function most suited to

political parties, and they are the primary players in that role. In this role parties clarify the issues not only for the decision-makers but also for the electorate, which variously expressed them in the first place.

(e) *Rule making.* This is basically a function of the government, not of parties directly, and it is best suited to the legislature, although the executive branch legitimately makes a great many of the rule details. Legislatures, however, are made up of political parties, so that parties have a short, even if indirect, route to travel to the making of rules of the political system. A party in single-party rule has, of course, a more direct role in the making of rules, the existence of the legislature notwithstanding, since it is usually a central party organ that finalises rule-making (Msekwa, 1977). The function of rule-making is sometimes referred to as policy formulation, but that concept is somewhat narrower than the range of activities that rule-making describes.

It is important to mention that traditionally it is only 'interest articulation' and 'interest aggregation' that are regarded as functions performed by political parties for (the larger) political system, but, as seen above, parties share in roles not traditionally associated with them. Perhaps it is easier to see parties playing these roles if one avoids too strict a separation of agencies (often known as structures) and their roles. On the other hand it is equally easy and tempting to have too liberal an interpretation of roles. For example there are those who ascribe to political parties the entire role of governing, arguing, somewhat compellingly, that in modern non-military polities, political parties are synonymous with everyday governance (Ball, 1987). Yet it is quite clear that both empirically and conceptually this function is easily recognisable in a separate agency called the executive and the role is better referred to as rule implementation (Khan and McNiven, 1984).

4. Political Parties and Multipartism in Tanzania

The expanded enfranchisement of formerly colonised peoples at independence necessitated a proliferation of groupings and organisations expected to channel the concerns of the new voters into the political system, and to exercise a tighter co-ordination of these concerns. This was quite similar to the circumstances of the liberalised suffrage of the mid-Nineteenth Century in Western Countries mentioned earlier. The current wave of democratisation, epitomised by heightened pluralist conscietization and multipartism, improves enfranchisement and brings forth the necessity of

political co-ordination and the centralisation of organisation in a similar way. In Tanzania, as in Britain, America and Europe long ago, this improved enfranchisement, its varying forms notwithstanding, is the essential explanation for the birth of political parties.

5. Party Organisation and Electoral Performance in Tanzania

5.1 Background

In this section the attempt is to focus on two factors as the major explanations for the way political parties have performed in elections in Tanzania, especially in the national election of October 1995. The two factors are (i) *Organisational strength and* (ii) *the choice, articulation and aggregation of campaign issues.* Other factors that usually contribute to electoral results, and may have contributed to party performance in Tanzanian elections, will also be mentioned. These include the attraction of the top leader or leaders to the electorate (the personality factor), the level or type of electoral participation (e.g. whether a significant part of the electorate that could have modified the results did not participate), and the fairness of the entire electoral process, referring to whether there were no deliberate acts of hindrance to voting or rigging.

There are not many studies on Tanzania that focus on political parties per se, let alone parties as organisations. It is not usual to have studies, research or theoretical papers purely on political parties in Tanzania, and therefore this area is relatively undeveloped. Among the reasons for this situation are the fact that in the past Tanzanian society and politics did not develop the complexity warranting that kind of specialised study, and the fact that there was only one political party for nearly 30 years (thus denying any possible study the facility of comparison with other parties operating in the same environment). A study of the single ruling party as an organisation among other organisations, and in comparison with them, which was sometimes done, occasionally promised to be interesting. But there was always a disincentive for further study of that kind among the dominant liberal scholars because all evidence pointed to a very highly institutionalised, efficient and responsive organisation that was the ruling party. Scholars studying and confirming this fact risked producing what could have amounted to a boring celebration of the strength of the one-party system. So the tradition in Tanzania has been to study the political party in relation to other political issues, and to focus on the *politics* in and around the party rather than party organisation. Thus the party has often been studied in

relation to development issues; its responsiveness to people's demands and needs at specific times and in specific areas; its policies on democracy, equality and participation; and its ability to conduct and manage elections. Even in the numerous election studies conducted since 1965 by the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam the emphasis has not been on a political party as such but on other aspects of politics in which the party features.

The recent development of multi-party politics, beginning in 1992, promises to offer complexity and comparison, thus creating a greater likelihood of specialised studies of political parties. Two researchers (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994) at the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam have started this.

This presentation focuses a bit more on political parties in Tanzania than is traditionally the case, to the extent that it examines the characteristics of parties that might have been responsible for the kind of electoral results so far obtained by each, and by pointing to the primacy of organisational strength among those characteristics.

5.2   Institutionalisation and Bureaucratisation

One of the essential attributes of modern organisations, which is thought to give them life, endurance and longevity, is institutionalisation. As an organisation, a political party is thought to require a degree of institutionalisation as well. But the necessity of institutionalisation in organisations often gives rise to the alienation of their central elements from their bases of support, in turn undermining democracy and organisational sustainability. A theoretical and concrete discussion of these issues is attempted below.

5.2.1 A Definition and a Theory of Institutionalisation and Bureaucratisation

Angelo Panebianco, who has identified several sources and types of party institutionalisation, has given a definition of institutionalisation that is suited to all other organisations by characterising it as a situation in which an organisation ceases to be a means to an end, slowly losing its character as a tool, and becoming valuable in and of itself — its goals becoming inseparable and indistinguishable from it (Panebianco, 1988:53). He argues further that although parties do so in varied ways, they all must institutionalise to a certain extent at some point in order to survive (Panebianco, 1988:54). It follows from this that institutionalisation is one of the most important

attributes of a political party as an organisation, and a critical measure of its development and maturity. The concept of party institutionalisation, therefore, refers to a situation in which a party has a life of its own beyond any individual, and beyond the charisma or manipulations of a leader or a section of leaders. That is to say, the survival of the party, and indeed even its electoral performance, does not depend on particular leaders.

Institutionalisation is closely tied with bureaucratisation. Party institutionalisation is generally perceived as an instance of Weberian bureaucratisation, which refers to the rationalisation of organisation - itself considered inevitable for all organisations in modern society (Weber, 1962). Among the main ingredients of bureaucratisation/rationalisation is the decline of recruitment to office by personal ties, as well as the decline of the traditional and charismatic authority of organisational leaders. In their place offices are assigned hierarchical ranking, office activities governed by rules, office holders given clearly demarcated areas of authority and obligation, employees appointed through qualification and merit, and the entire bureaucratised/rationalised organisation erected as an impersonal edifice that is increasingly divorced from people and emotions. Aided by belief in the inevitability of rationalisation, Weber in a sense anticipated that bureaucracy would at least rule all organisations, if not all society.

Michels (1968) concretised the Weberian notion of organisational bureaucratisation in his study of political parties by arguing that the development of organisation inevitably led to oligarchy in leadership. Once a party moves beyond direct democracy and establishes organisation and the specialised performance of specific tasks within it, the office bearers, not mass membership, assume control of the party, despite internal democratic structures where they exist. Michels argued that such a situation arises because:

(a) Salary-earning officials become 'middle-class' and acquire interests opposed to that of mass membership

(b) Officials come to identify wholly with the organisation, determined to preserve its life and continuity under all circumstances, at times perceiving new demands of mass membership as threatening to destroy the organisation

(c) Officials have far greater resources, so that policy and strategy are likely to be determined by officials thereafter.

However, Ware (1996) has responded to Michels' characterisation of party organisation by pointing out the following:

(a) The party may in the process of institutionalisation come to be influenced more by its elected legislators than its 'professional' officials

(b) Officials may themselves be divided into factions, with each faction necessarily relying on mass support within the party, thus guaranteeing a continuing influence of the membership

(c) It is not always true that when party officials become 'middle-class' by reason of their salaried status their interests change from those of their membership - one example being that if their incomes and sustenance depend precisely on such membership they will not change their policies/strategies. So whether the growth of party organisation and the attendant change in the status of its officials are at the expense of membership depends on whether the interests of the two actually differ - a matter of concrete research on each party.

In addition to Ware's response, it must be said that although, as Michels argues, instituting internal democratic structures does not eliminate the tendency towards oligarchic organisational leadership, having those structures in combination with other deliberate democratic decisions will keep such leadership in check.

The issue therefore is to institutionalise a party in order to free it from the whims of the political leadership, and to create processes and structures of internal democracy as well as responsiveness to membership and society at large — so that the party continues to play its roles of interest articulation and aggregation properly.

5.2.2 Party Organisational Experience in Tanzania

For reasons of a long history and greater visibility mentioned earlier, the ruling party in Tanzania offers the clearest picture of institutionalisation/ bureaucratisation and its possible effect on party electoral performance. Since 1977 the ruling party has been CCM. It was the only party until 1992. It succeeded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was the only party on the mainland from 1965 to 1977, and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the only party on the Islands of Zanzibar between 1964 and 1977. TANU and its successor, CCM, had a long history of organisation, first traceable to its pre-cursor — the proto-political welfare association of mainly

civil servants with the name Tanganyika African Association (TAA) that was started in 1926. The association's formal transformation into a political party, TANU, in 1954 represented a milestone in organisational development, since it brought together disparate economic and socio-political interests, and defined the party's political agenda as well.

TANU's, and later CCM's, organisation quickly moved to institutionalisation because there were not many factors to inhibit such organisational development. First, although it soon came to represent all important social groups, its membership was mass and direct, without the obligation or propensity to channel their claims through any special group. Thus, there were no strong groups tearing at the fabric of the organisation when it was still growing. Even the trade union movement, with which TANU had a brief rivalry, did not stand in the way of a single centralised party organisation once its important leaders, such as Rashid Kawawa and Michael Kamaliza, became top leaders of the political party, TANU. Secondly, although TANU's and CCM's leader, J.K. Nyerere, was charismatic and therefore expected to hold the party together as a cohesive organisation only as long as he remained at the helm, the reality was different. Received wisdom on charismatic leadership is that an organisation tends to disintegrate once the leader holding it together relinquishes the leadership, since his charisma will have inhibited the erection of permanent structures and bureaucratisation. But Nyerere was himself so given to procedure and institutionalisation that he periodically conducted campaigns to strengthen the institutionalisation of the party throughout his leadership, and up to the time he retired from party positions in 1990. In one telling incident, two years after independence in 1962, he had to resign as Prime Minister in order to devote a whole year on the organisation of the party. This means that J.K. Nyerere was a charismatic leader with a difference; charisma did not stand in the way of institutionalisation as may be supposed by the traditional characterisation of that attribute.

By the 1980s CCM as an organisation was very highly institutionalised. It had elaborate internal structures; clear functions of various organs; and rules and procedures for internal nominations, elections, dismissals from leadership or membership, the conduct of meetings and the taking of decisions. All these measures were guaranteed by a written party constitution, which was always and immediately updated in correspondence with changes. Moreover, the consolidation of institutionalisation in the form of further elaboration of governing rules and procedures became imperative

at the end of the old independence leadership in the late 1980s, as the party sought to expunge the personal imprint of any leader past, present or future in favour of only the party as an institution.

Naturally, such emphasis on the consolidation of institutionalisation of the party in the late 1980s also quickly promoted a huge party bureaucracy. This was seen as a liability to the party at the dawn of multi-party politics in the early 1990s. First, it became clear that officials tended to care more about careerism than about the consolidation of the party standing in the electorate. Second, with the abolition of governmental subsidies on the costs of party activities that accompanied multipartism, the party could no longer afford to pay for such a huge bureaucracy. Both these factors necessitated a thoroughgoing 'purge' of the party bureaucracy, with emphasis on a smaller bureaucracy that was also highly sensitive to the needs of the electorate. What all this meant is that when multipartism got into full swing CCM was already highly institutionalised, but without too heavy a bureaucracy that might be an electoral liability.

5.3 Decentralisation/Centralisation of Power

CCM was and is still a centralised party. Because it is a highly organised party with a long tradition of how to do things the party way, this means that established procedures, laid down policies and central guidelines dominate spontaneous and local initiatives, generally speaking, although as we shall see later, this has not resulted in a significant alienation of central organs of the party, or the party as a whole, from its lower organs, the membership or the populace at large. The structure of decision-making among organs of the party displays, on the face of it, strict hierarchy: higher organs are empowered to overrule lower ones, for example. But this is not as frequent as might be expected (Mukangara, 1998:59-61; Van Donge and Liviga, 1990:1-3). Lower organs are in fact represented in the higher organs, and the highest organ of decision-making, the National Conference, is a cocktail of all groupings, status and hierarchies, with a strong presence of grassroots representation. The most important organ, though, is the National Executive Committee (NEC), since it meets more frequently than the Conference, has more influential full-time politicians with superior political knowledge than most of those in the National Conference, and it is empowered to make final decisions on many crucial issues. These include the dismissal of a member from party positions or the party itself, and the final approval or selection of a parliamentary candidate.

In terms of the relationship between the party organisation and its parliamentarians, the latter are ultimately subordinate to the former at the higher levels of the party, especially the National Executive Committee. This is both a function of internal party legislation as well as the state constitution. At the party level members of parliament (MPs) automatically become members of most party organs, including the National Conference, but not the NEC, which has a large element of election. This means that there is no guarantee that an MP will influence the NEC individually or that they dominate it as a group. In regard to the state constitution, there are no independent candidates and therefore no independent legislators (URT, 1992); any member of parliament who ceases to be a member of his party loses his seat automatically, meaning that the party organ that has the power to expel a party member, such as the NEC of CCM, has more than a leverage over its MP. In the era of the single-party system, when party supremacy was guaranteed by party and state constitutions, and by the absence of an alternative party, this hold of the party over the national legislator was total. The hold of party organs over elected officials was so great that even the power of removing the state president from office in case of wrongdoing or sickness resided not in the legislature (as the case is now) but in the NEC of the party (JMT, 1985). It is in this sense that the much-talked about reduced power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, and its attendant 'rubber-stamping' role in approving legislation (Tambila, 1999:18), was more a function of its de jure subordination to party organs than to the presidency.

In terms of the selection of candidates, parliamentarians can have an influence on the selection of others or their own re-election, but in the past there was little chance of a parliamentarian dominating the selecting District Conference, since he or she was only one person in sufficiently diverse, open democratic elections involving grassroots delegates who numbered between 300 and 1200.

If CCM has been so highly centralised and so powerful over its legislators, does this not logically lead to the absence of internal democracy and a lack of responsiveness to society?

5.4 Internal Democracy

5.4.1 Elections

CCM has an element of election in the composition of each unit and organ. When there is an election it is by secret ballot (CCM, 1997:12). Conducting party elections does not only hold the consolidation of influence and domination by professionals in check, but also enhances a tradition of internal democracy.

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Although the elective positions within the NEC are openly contested, the positions of the chairperson and vice-chairperson are voted upon by the National Conference in terms of a 'yes' or 'no' vote after selection by the NEC. The secretary-general of the party is voted upon only by the NEC after being proposed by the chairperson. Due to the elective element in the composition of party organs, and owing to the secret ballot, these organs have continually recruited new members, though some people have tended to dominate them over a period of time. Such a tendency has been a function not of a lack of a democratic mechanism to remove incumbents, but of their ability to canvass for votes, their popularity among relevant party electors, and the advantage of incumbency itself. Furthermore, there were extremely few party leaders, apart from the foremost nationalist leaders, Julius Nyerere and Rashid Kawawa, who could retain their positions in the most influential party organs for a long time, and most influential leaders continually contested and shifted to other positions in the party or in the government, making it difficult for any discernible group to consolidate itself in one power centre. Once again this was ensured by the element of election, but also by the deliberate intervention of the foremost leaders mentioned above.

5.4.2 Decisions

Party discussions and decisions have often been closed to the general public, but have always been open among participants, with party leaders or the more permanent professional politicians holding no discernible advantage over grassroots delegates or ordinary members other than the normal one of having superior information generally. CCM has shared this characteristic with socialist-oriented parties.

5.5 A Summary of the Organisational Profile of CCM

The picture of party organisation that is displayed by CCM is therefore one of centralisation, epitomised by the leadership of the NEC, but with a significant voice and input by competing national and lower party organs. This is similar to the typically institutionalised parties even in mature democracies (Webb, 1994; Farell, 1994). In the single-party era the party as a collectivity had the ultimate controlling influence over its parliamentary wing (Msekwa, 1977), but because of the counteracting practices described above this may have meant merely that party organs and seasoned party leaders had more influence than newer parliamentary recruits. This bureaucratisation without the creation of an oligarchy was brought about by the erection of sufficiently responsive structures, the institutionalisation of internal elections, the deliberate anti-oligarchy interventions of the leader,

and the periodic purge of sections of the party bureaucracy—themselves dictated by an acute philosophical and historical sense of self-preservation and responsiveness, as elaborated upon below.

6. Party Image

6.1 CCM'S External Character (or TANU/CCM's Historical Role)

6.1.1 The Popular, Mass-orientation Image

The mass and popular character of CCM's predecessor, TANU, was verified in comparative terms by political scientists in the early 1960s (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964). One of the most important uses of parties of that nature for the political system and the leaders is, of course, to enhance system legitimation and the electability of leaders (Hyden, 1969). This was probably demonstrated at the pinnacle of the single-party era, notably by the population's system support even on occasions on which there was potential dissent—such as at the start of socialism, during the nationalisation of property, and upon the start of villagization in the 1960s and 1970s. But it often went unnoticed or was dismissed by many writers as merely a reflection of controlled thinking. Yet it was precisely in these years that impetus was given to the popularity and mass character of the party through a deliberate participatory approach that was felt at most levels of society, including the grassroots or local levels (Maguire, 1969).

6.1.2 Respect for Human Rights

For a long time the government led by TANU/CCM had no clear declaration that it would respect and promote human rights. There were no such rights written in the Constitution until 1984. In practice the TANU/CCM government abridged the exercise of individual rights in the civil and political arena by having a single-party system; limiting the number of newspapers, radio stations and other means of information dissemination; and having statutes that could curtail the movement, change the residence and confine a member of a dissident group to a specific area. Yet there was a declaration of respect for life and human dignity in the party constitution in all those years. This was understood largely in terms of group rights—for example respect for human dignity, and against enslavement or colonisation or any form of subjugation of a people. In practice the TANU/CCM government had a credible record not only in terms of group rights but also on some fundamental individual human rights. This was exemplified by the absence of state-supported killings, the reluctance of the President to endorse judicial killings and the relatively low incidence of political imprisonment.

For a Tanzanian populace that was less Westernised and individualised, this latter human rights practice positively counteracted the former.

6.1.3 Grassroots and Development Orientation

TANU's devotion to a grassroots orientation in policy and exercise was mentioned earlier in this paper. TANU was also single-mindedly devoted to development, especially of the interior. We must of course continue to debate whether its development path was the right one, and there are no simple answers about development in late-starting countries, but there is no doubting the single-minded commitment of the TANU regime to 'the masses' and to development.

6.1.4 A Generally Self-less Leadership

Many leaders of TANU appear to have been selfless. They are now objects of derision when they are found not to own much property. Sometimes they are perceived to have been so drunk with power that they thought they would stay in office forever, forgetting to (financially) tide up their lives or put away something for later. Ironically, this picture also forms the basis for attacking the new element within CCM, which is seen by many as corrupt, uncaring and ready to grab - like its counterpart in state-owned companies and the general society. The fact is that much of the 'traditional' leadership of TANU/CCM would have sneered at the accumulation of material possessions because, idealist as they may have been, they believed in self-less service to the nation. It is not surprising that when the new clement in CCM appeared to endorse the 'wealth-grabbing' attitude of the emerging elite in society, the ever-satirical urban observers, accustomed to the traditions of a self-less TANU leadership, reinterpreted the CCM abbreviation to Chukua Chako Mapema (Grab Yours Early) since the latter seemed to be abandoning these traditions.

6.1.5 The Consolidated Party Character and Image

The discussion above explains the existence of a monolithic political system with a lot of controls, and even with the exclusion of certain elite groups from central power, yet with mass support generally. The system remained genuinely a pro-people regime in attitude and immediate practice—even if in long term effect it may be debatable that it was wholly so. It was authoritarian in some ways; democratic, caring and developmental in other ways. It is these characteristics that gave the party life among the people. Even when the CCM era began to slowly eat away at this attributes, they still had enough strength to continue making the party acceptable to the people.

In this way CCM continued to ride the wave of popularity that was created and belonged almost exclusively to TANU. This is why the Nyalali Commission (JMT 1992), investigating whether to abandon single party rule, found the population extremely critical of CCM but still ready to be led by it, and even prepared to maintain the single-party system. The Nyalali Commission, in explaining itself on why it recommended multipartism in spite of its rejection by a large majority (73%), tried incredulously to say that the people's support for a one party-system while critical of it was 'really' a hidden, whispered rejection of it. Unaccustomed to this seemingly paradoxical attitude of the people, and perhaps directed by their training to look for an explanation of forcible compliance or brain washing, intellectuals may have missed the essential aspect of the TANU/CCM relationship with the people. And yet this relationship may have been critical to the outcome of the by-elections of 1993-94 and the General Elections of 1995. In the minds of the people, the location of the TANU/CCM attributes had not shifted to the opposition yet, while opposition leaders, not understanding them fully, did not try to wrest them away from TANU/CCM.

7. Choice, Articulation and Aggregation of Campaign Issues

7.1 Challenging the Legacy of TANU/CCM

In the period starting with the formalisation of multiparty politics and ending with the election of 1995, the opposition challenged what TANU/CCM stood for. They started off by completely denying that TANU/CCM had a development or 'revolutionary' record. The majority of them initially said that they were anti-socialist and fully capitalist in their ideology. Since the election campaigns took place at the height of the liberalisation and privatisation advocacy, pronouncing oneself anti-socialist and pro-capitalist was fashionable among the elite and laudable to donors. It seemed that the opposition was concentrating at that stage on seeking the support of those two 'constituencies'. At one point the opposition focussed their campaign against abstract laws and constitutional provisions—important in the democratisation process but hardly popular electoral issues in the circumstances. Only when one of them, Augustine Mrema of the National Convention for Constitutional Reform (NCCR), raised popular issues, though unclear in presentation, did opposition parties start to make major inroads into popular support.

The kind of culture which still exists and is very strong is that a party or a government in Tanzania ought to be strongly nationalist and welfarist, and

in some way equalitarian. That means it must not openly embrace capitalism or endorse everything Western. Two parties, NCCR and Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), made this mistake in their early orientations and suffered for it. Initially NCCR and its leader, Mabere Marando, declared that they opposed socialism and were out and out capitalist. CHADEMA supported all privatisation moves and had an early exhortation of the IMF's and World Bank's capitalist-leaning policies. One of them, NCCR, quickly realised this mistake in its formative year, and changed to a declaration of social democracy. Only one party, the United Democratic Party (UDP), did not learn this, and continued to declare itself wholly anti-socialist and fully capitalist, with dire national electoral consequences. In fact, as all sensible parties came to know, a socialistic, or perhaps a social-democratic, outlook was so important to the electorate that major opposition accusations against the ruling party, designed to strike a cord with voters, later became CCM's abandonment of welfarism, and its embracement of the rich and foreign.

So it is quite clear that in terms of a broad visionary orientation, even opposition parties came to recognise that it is nationalism and welfarism that were likely to win over ordinary people in Tanzania. And the point about the continued strength of CCM in this important area is that it is the one which helped develop this orientation, it still pledges allegiance to it, and most important of all, the opposition has not been able to articulate it strongly enough to wrest it away from CCM.

7.2 *The Record of TANU/CCM*
The Opposition kept saying that the record of CCM's performance was bad. Indeed there was ground for discounting that record. Among the elements of such a record was the state restriction in the exercise of individual, civil and political rights, as mentioned earlier. Also included was its exceedingly poor record on the economic front, beginning in 1978. This economic record, which lasted from 1978 to 1990, was triggered by the 1978-79 War in Uganda, as well as a general fall in the prices of major Third World commodities around the same period (Mukangara, 1991: 269-270). It was exacerbated by a levelopmentally well meaning but practically over-ambitious industrialisation programme that was too expensive to capitalise, and too dependent on foreign currency, external inputs and donor funding (Mukangara, 1991: 245-260). In addition, the socialist organisation of the economy and its attendant employment policies were not particularly suited to productivity (Mukangara, 1991: 273).

The problem for the opposition leaders, especially the leading ones, Augustine Mrema and Ibrahim Lipumba, however, was their decision to condemn the entire 34 years of the TANU/CCM leadership as poor on all fronts. As seen earlier, there were grounds for judging the record as credible even on some human rights considerations. Its mass, grassroots, development and welfare orientation was a vote-getter. Though found wanting on the immediate productivity front, its economic orientation was based on a sound economic philosophy, namely the construction of basic industries to spawn further industrialisation, the expansion of a home market, and the reduction of the vulnerability of primary goods production. Its employment policies were in part welfarist by design, as was the entire development outlook that had resulted in free education, health service and many amenities. As others have argued, that was probably a premature strategy for a poor, small economy that is Tanzania, but it brought in tremendous support for the system from the population, which no politician should have ignored. Moreover, the performance of the economy in growth and diversification terms was satisfactory and comparable to many similar economies in the period 1961-1977 (Mukangara, 1991: 212-242). When one adds to this the good Tanzanian record on the liberation, diplomatic, national unity, stability and peace fronts, it becomes clear that tackling the record of TANU/CCM needed a knowledgeable, subtle and sophisticated presentation, not a casual and lightweight negative commentary.

This picture was generally clear to the population, which, though short of academic degrees, had been until then relatively knowledgeable, especially from the mammoth 1970s efforts at universal primary and adult education—not to forget, of course, the post-Arusha conscientization. Opposition politicians tended to erroneously perceive the general population as uneducated and malleable to manipulation, refusing to acknowledge it as having a rational and intelligent choice when, especially in preceding minor elections, the electorate voted overwhelmingly in support of the incumbent party. This arrogance translated itself into a lost opportunity for the opposition to do better political work among the population before and during elections.

7.3 *Other Election Issues*
There were important constitutional and institutional issues raised by the Opposition, but, as seen earlier, these were abstract and not worth immediate 'percentage points'. The issue of unemployment was also raised and kept alive by the Opposition, though it appeared to be only hazily perceived by

them. It was unfortunate for the opposition that this issue was not seized upon and articulated, because the World Bank and IMF reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, to which the CCM government had finally agreed, had generated a lot of unemployment and resentment. Had it been nurtured and presented correctly by the Opposition, especially in terms of a clear plan of remedy, it would have been a good vote-getter for them.

Another potential vote-getter for the Opposition was considered to be the issue of corruption. It affected the lives of many people in terms of interfering with justice in police actions, the courts, the hospital services and the public service generally. The Opposition raised it, and perhaps too much was made of it, as if it was the number one issue. It was not. All decent opinion polls (such as those conducted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1995) indicated that corruption 'took a back seat' relative to economic issues, in terms of priorities as perceived by a cross-section of the populace. Moreover, no superior solution or programme of eradication of corruption was offered as an alternative to that of the incumbent party or government - the opposition preferring to insist on the lack of success of the government and the possibility that a single person, the main opposition presidential candidate, would somehow do the job without trouble. Such an intangible appeal for a belief in one man was certainly not convincing.

There was also the issue of localisation/indigenisation, or 'uzawa' in Kiswahili. The economic reforms had modified ownership of property and capital in Tanzania, which was now perceived by some to be the prerogative of former colonial masters and other non-native people. The perceived diminishing ownership of property and capital by indigenous Tanzanians was thought to be generating considerable national resentment. Again this was only hazily perceived by those among the opposition ranks who raised it. What is more is that this is never an issue in rural households, i.e., beyond the 3-5 big cities where the non-indigenous groups are found.

7.4 Campaigning

Campaign by the opposition was negative almost throughout the 1995 elections. This was mostly in terms of mudslinging and in pronouncing that there would not be peace if the opposition did not win. In addition, the opposition leaders directed a lot of personal attacks on leaders of the incumbent government. These attacks were vituperative, the expressions generating not only disbelief but also revulsion in people accustomed to

friendly disagreements and to a little more respect for leaders even when they had shortcomings. Examples included many public occasions on which opposition leaders branded the outgoing top government leaders as thieves, and vowed to imprison them if and when the opposition took power. Among those mentioned by some of the opposition as deserving immediate imprisonment were a former president, a former minister, and a former chief of the public service.

Like the opposition, the ruling party also appeared to say that there would be no peace if it did not win, but the difference was that during its 30-year rule there was peace and stability, while neighbouring and other African countries were at war, which appeared to be associated with the more visible presence and strength of the opposition there. CCM built part of their campaign on this apparent and perceived correlation of support for the opposition and conflict. CCM's appeal to give the opposition 'time to learn' by denying it electoral victory, and to support 'the devil they knew' (Baregu and Mushi, 1994: 125) — which as seen earlier was not that devilish after all — resonated with the populace.

In terms of campaign organisation, CCM's was superior, except in relation to the Civic United Front (CUF) on the Islands, which clearly matched it in this area. A simple example epitomised the organisational differences between CCM and some of the Opposition: There was one spokesperson in CCM, while there were many spokespeople in NCCR, UMD and PONA, thus denying these parties a co-ordinated campaign.

8 The Voting Context:

8.1 Candidates and their Selection

Except in a few constituencies, such as Musoma Rural, Mwibara, Mbeya and Karatu, where the most popular aspirants at the party level were not nominated, leading to electoral losses, selection in CCM was careful in reflecting the general wishes of the populace. This presented a picture of a stable ruling party that was not insensitive to the populace as alleged, and which appeared dignified in dealing with possible internal rifts. In contrast there appeared to be very little concern in the opposition to select electable candidates. Part of the reason for this was the lack of organisation and resources in much of the opposition, leading to poor information on aspirants, as well as the absence of institutionalisation — leading to selection by the arbitrary and personal whims of the leadership in many cases.

8.2 Perceptions by the Electorate and the Voter Context

Perceptions, even if wrong in fact, are important for electoral support. There was a perception by the larger section of the electorate that an important part of the opposition was sectional and provincial, or even racial and religious. For example, the UDP was generally perceived to be provincial, as was the NCCR to a certain extent. As for the NCCR in particular, its urban support appeared to be cosmopolitan but its peri-urban one was overwhelmingly provincial. The Civic United Front, matching CCM in electoral strength in Zanzibar but more or less confined there, was a particular target of the accusation that it was race-based. Together with the National Redemption Alliance (NRA), it was also seen to be heavily reliant on religious support.

The important thing about this is that the perceptions of the electorate about opposition parties appeared to solidify as the campaign progressed. Perhaps there was nothing that could be done by such parties to right those images, but it certainly drove some of those who oppose sectional politics or a particular section of the population away from such parties.

8.3 Electoral Rules

There is a debate on who draws or should draw up the rules of the game in the continuing contests of multiparty politics. It is obvious that the primary responsibility is that of the government, provided that a government is politically representative of the populace. Here the government must be understood in the proper sense, referring to all of its three major components - the executive, legislature and judiciary. It is desirable, as a constituent of democracy, that participation of political actors other than those occupying positions in the three government components be included in the formulation of the rules. The TEMCO report (1997: 17-18, 23) shows that the drawing up of the rules of the game in Tanzania, for that period and for any other previously, has tended to be the preserve of the establishment in these three components, themselves dominated by CCM. However, whereas non-participation by government outsiders, notably opposition parties, should legitimately be a cause for protest and consternation, it ought to have little effect on determined and competitive opposition parties, unless the rules are so partial to one party or a group of them that it is impossible for their opponents to operate. This was clearly demonstrated by a strong Opposition in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya, where, despite skewed rules, it still either won or came very close to winning the elections.

8.4 The Voting Process

The most important question asked in this area in relation to the Tanzanian elections of 1995 is whether the final segment of the voting process was free of intimidation, manipulation and cheating so as not to result in disenfranchisement and rigging. There was a significant amount of knowledge in Tanzania about how this could happen. First, the country had consistently held elections at regular five-year intervals from the time of independence. Second, most of the commissioners in the National Electoral Commission, as well as many leaders of what would become the independent local monitoring group, TEMCO, had vast experiences of electoral rules and practices from their observations of other multiparty elections. These included elections in Kenya, South Africa and Mozambique, as well as internal by-elections in Kwahani, Ileje, Kigoma and Igunga. Although lessons had shown many voting process problems to be results of administrative errors, it was also held that in other instances there was a deliberate manipulation of voting, counting and declaration of results. A notable way of rigging was believed to be the filling of ballot boxes with extra and 'customised' votes for a particular candidate (assuming that the seals would be tempered with first), or the substitution of genuine boxes with pre-filled ones. It was thought that such methods of rigging were facilitated by the lag in time between the end of voting and the arrival of the ballot boxes or the beginning of counting at the central counting stations.

The most outstanding requirement that came out of these observations was that of transparency in voting, counting and declaration of results. As a response, rules were put in place to ensure that the number of voters in a polling station was severely curtailed to no more than 300, that votes would be counted out loud at the station in full view of all present, that results would instantly be declared and posted publicly at the station, that party agents would be encouraged to monitor the voting, that parties would receive some funding for the monitoring activity, and that party agents would be provided with copies of results, which they could use to verify additions and reconciliation at constituency level. In addition, both local and foreign observers were accredited to provide further monitoring. These 'safeguards' made it difficult for anyone to try and manipulate voter choices at the polling station. There were so many people, sometimes up to 18 in a polling station, watching no more than 300 votes, that it was an effective deterrent against rigging. Although TEMCO (1977: 172) points to the possibility of other kinds of rigging, the organisation concludes that "it was almost impossible to rig the votes at the counting post."

Earlier we pointed out the credible claim by analysts that the rules of the game were drawn up basically by the ruling party, CCM. There are many who have argued further that specific rules of the game in processes taking place before voting, such as in voter registration and in campaigning, were designed to favour the incumbent party. Many of these arguments generate acceptable hypotheses that, however, are still in need of accurate research. There is, for example, a counter hypothesis, that many Tanzanian voters are normal adults who have voted in many secret ballot elections since independence, well aware that the ballot is really secret. They have often used that tool of the secret ballot to oust powerful but unpopular incumbent representatives even during the single-party era (Van Donge and Liviga, 1990). They could vote that way again despite a tilted playing field if that were their inclination. In any case these hypotheses should be considered alongside those we have focussed on in this paper, including the incumbent party's organisational strength, as well as its historical legacy.

9. Party Adaptation and the Role of the Opposition Parties

If the dawn of multipatism in Tanzania started with such overwhelming odds against the opposition parties in relation to a ruling party so organisationally formidable and so dominant in political socialisation, interest aggregation and rule-making, is there a role for the opposition, and are various parties likely to make adaptations as the political terrain changes?

Clearly CCM had been prepared early for possible adaptations. One of the adaptations it made was the reduction of the size of its bureaucracy and the attempt to professionalize it even more just before the formal launching of multipartism. Prior to that it had shown its willingness to antagonise its traditional mass constituency a bit by bringing the 'newly rich' into its fold, and by the near-wholesale adoption of the free-market preferences of international financial institutions. This stand, which remains controversial in its traditional constituency, was proof of a readiness to change with the times. The times were and are still dominated by those institutions, and they are characterised by the growing strength of the 'new rich'.

There have been other adaptations by CCM. They include an increasingly permissive National Executive Committee in selecting non-cadre candidates for elective offices, and the creation of a special quota of seats in the NEC for serving legislators. Both are designed to meet the challenges of greater political competition brought about by multipartism, the first to dispel the possible perception of CCM as an exclusive club and the second to guard against the possible alienation of its parliamentary group from the rest of the party leadership. In this, CCM may have been prompted by two events. The first was the 1996 crisis within the NCCR, in which the top non-parliamentary leadership was clamouring for more control of its parliamentary wing, while the legislators were fighting for greater freedom. The second was the temporary but significant autonomy of the group of 55 CCM legislators who were pushing for a government of Tanganyika in contradistinction with party policy.

Perhaps the boldest step towards adaptation taken by CCM was the opening up of candidate selection procedures, which extended democratisation in the existing parliamentary 'primary' and gave more choice of possible presidential candidates to the selecting organs. Although these adaptations to changing times have brought CCM other problems, such as how to retain control of the process and maximise the electability of candidates, they have given more members the chance to express their political aspirations, which may reinvigorate their loyalty to the party.

The opposition parties have not fared as well in adapting to the situation. Selection is still largely by caucus and even by the leader's appointment, with only NCCR attempting to open up and democratise the parliamentary selection process. Part of the problem for the new parties is that it is only a short period since they started, and they have not stabilised or professionalized their ranks yet—a requirement for bold internal democratisation. Furthermore, almost all major opposition parties—NCCR, CUF, CHADEMA and UDP—are embroiled in internal leadership struggles and crises, so it is going to take a while before they adapt to the requirements of competitive politics. Nevertheless they are all quite vigorous in the struggle to place their members in positions of influence in the political system, since they keenly contest elections and speak up in parliament.

There is in fact a great potential for the opposition to make up for the less-than-satisfactory performance at the 1995 elections in the roles of interest articulation and interest aggregation. There are numerous winning issues no party has seriously and systematically tackled, and CCM is at a loss to deal with. These include unemployment, development generally and industrialisation in particular, the mode of the provision of social services, and the marketing problems of agriculture.

10. Conclusion

We started out by describing the roles and functions that we expect parties to play in society and to perform for their own survival. Both the ruling party and the opposition are vigorous in trying to leave their particular imprints on Tanzania's political culture. Both contribute to a political socialisation that is plural, and a political recruitment that is professional and democratic rather than traditional and monolithic, if only because they continually compete with and challenge each other as multipartism and democracy generally assigns. These roles cannot diminish; to the contrary they can only expand with multpartism.

The role of articulation of interests will continue to be played, and played better since the plural character of multipartism can only add more voice and expression, helping to free those voices that are either repressed or have a 'natural' fear of expression under the monolithic organisation that is single-party rule. Similarly the act of gathering and channelling the demands of the citizenry into coherent basic statements of claim on the political system, done by the parties, is bound to increase in quantity and quality, partly because the role is essential to the survival of political parties in competitive electoral politics. In the 1995 general elections CCM's ability to play this role of interest aggregation was superior to that of the opposition, because it had history and experience, as well as a monopoly of political talents (including former President Julius Nyerere). In this role CCM was contending with an opposition characterised by understandable infancy, particularly in the art of selecting issues for campaigns. But political development at the level of parties can surprisingly be quick. As an indication, in the by-election of Temeke, coming later in 1996, the opposition's aggregation of interests—especially in pointing to the lack of social services, unemployment and other economic problems - appeared closer to reality and superior to CCM's. There is potential for a serious opposition to get better in the selection and presentation of popular or burning issues, since CCM and its government have scarcely tackled these issues in their rule-making and rule-implementation roles respectively.

In terms of the rule-making role in Parliament, the opposition parties have had a significant contribution, most notably in the 1997 reading of the bills, including the aborted bill for raising the pay of the highest officials of the executive branch and the proposal to privatise or split the National Bank of Commerce. That their number in the legislature is small is not important in this context. That they are a minority who cannot win on an issue partisanly

opposed by CCM is not anomalous to multipartism. What is vital is that they participate, and that having a partisan opposition in the Tanzanian legislature creates the probability that they will raise important issues that could have been ignored or suppressed by the partisanship of monopartism.

The function in which opposition parties seem to have failed, and in which CCM seems to have excelled, is that of self-preservation and self-perpetuation. In this paper we took the organisational factor as the indicator of these. The evidence is that opposition parties are at the lower end and CCM at the upper end of the spectrum in organisational strength and self-perpetuation, with no discernible change in sight. Since we have pointed to organisation as ultimately the most important aspect of a political party, the worst-case scenario for this 'atrophy' in organisation is the early death of opposition parties. Unless splits occur in CCM, and new alliances or mergers with parts of the opposition are effected to keep multipartism alive, or fresh talents from among erstwhile fence-sitters start their own political parties, multipartism and pluralism in general are truly threatened in Tanzania. It would, of course, be a severe blow to democracy were the current opposition parties to die or even just stay this enfeebled in organisation.

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