

## State Multiple Regional Membership as a threat to Peace and Security in Eastern and Southern Africa

**Jacob Lisakafu**

Lecturer, The Open University of Tanzania

E-mail: jaclisakafu@yahoo.com

### **Abstract**

*It is an indisputable fact that since the 1990s overlapping membership in regional organisations has become a matter of debate among concerned officials and interest groups. Such overlaps, which continue, to date, with different shapes and forms, have serious implications in trade, peace and security particularly in Africa. This paper analyzes challenges of state overlapping membership in regional organisations in search for lasting peace and security in Eastern and Southern Africa regions with particular focus on Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and International Conference of the Great Lakes Regions (ICGLR). The paper argues that existing overlaps of state membership in regional bodies lead to failure of concerned states in their efforts to simultaneously fulfil their obligations. Regional experiences indicate that a country with multiple membership often finds itself grappling with regional arrangements that offer highly social, economic and security benefits. Multiple regional membership further leads to loss of focus and disrupt regional bodies' core desire and aspiration for strategic collective security. The paper suggests that concerned member states should consider taking necessary steps to review their involvement in regional arrangements for concrete realization of economic cooperation and integrated political synergy, peace and security.*

**Keywords:** Africa, EAC, SADC, Peace, Security

### **Introduction**

In recent decades, Africa has witnessed creation of diverse Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of multidimensional character all with the central goal to overcome challenges facing the African continent. As noted by Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) and Söderbaum (2016), old regional organisations have been revived, new organisations have been formed and there are calls for strengthening existing regional arrangements. Formation of regional organisations is enshrined in Chapter VIII of the 1945 UN

Charter and reaffirmed under Article 33, Chapter VI of the same Charter. Such decisions call for member states in regional arrangements to “make regional efforts to settle local disputes.” Similarly, Article 28 (1) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (also called the 1991 Abuja Treaty), calls for Member States to the treaty to strengthen existing RECs, to establish new similar organizations where none exists and to ensure gradual establishment of a consolidated African community (OAU, 1991). The UN Charter and African Treaty form bases for establishment of RECs and other regional arrangements in Africa and in other parts of the world. Regional organisations make it possible for member states to have a wide choice for joining an organisation for the purpose of increasing inter-state links and cooperation for political, economic and security purposes. Even so, the tendency of states to join more than one regional organisation, for whatever interest, can lead to serious confusions when it comes to conflict prevention and resolution.

Currently in Africa, there are more than fourteen (14) RECs. Out of fifty four (54) states, twenty six (26) are members of two regional bodies and nineteen (19) are members to three regional bodies. Two states, namely, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Swaziland are members to four regional bodies.<sup>1</sup> Only six states maintain membership in one regional body (Franke, 2007). Specifically, in Eastern and Southern Africa regions, only Mozambique maintains membership in one regional body, SADC, while each of all remaining states belongs to more than one regional body. Since most regional organisations have almost similar peace and security concerns as well as programmes, the possibility is high for states to duplicate regional efforts and programmes and fail to attend meetings and to honour financial obligations to RECs. Involvement in more than one regional organ forces the concerned member state to grapple with cooperation arrangement that offers a lot of benefits given resource constraints facing every African state and consequently, failures to pay due contributions and to meet obligations. As a result, most regional organisations in Africa often experience financial difficulties as well as failure to implement agreed programmes. In addition, they fail to address critical issues related to regional peace, security and socio-economic development as well as stability.

In examining implications of state overlapping regional memberships against promotion and maintenance of peace and security, this paper

identifies viewpoints held by concerned member states. So far, most literature on importance of membership and proliferation of regional organisations indicates the critical need to promote trade and economic integration (Draper, 2010; Söderbaum, 2004). Existing literature pays little attention on impact of state overlapping membership in regional bodies on peace and security issues. The regional arrangements considered in this paper include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference of Great Lakes Regions (ICGLR). One of the reasons for choosing these three regional organisations and not the others is that all three RECs have peace and security among their main concerns.

The methodology used in the study involved qualitative research approach combining largely literature review, field research through key informant interviews and desk research. The study analysed SADC, the EAC and the ICGLR protocols, communiqués, reports as well as *ad hoc* initiatives, all in an attempt to identify and explain the impact of state overlapping regionalism and group memberships in the Eastern and Southern Africa regions. Reviews of legal and official documents were complimented with literature review on international regimes in International Relations (IR). The study incorporates outcomes from interviews with experts in security, regionalism and regional integration. Interviews were held with officials from regional organisations under the study, academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Such interviews were carried out in Gaborone and Arusha between October 2016 and March 2017. Semi-structured interview questions were used to address cross-cutting issues related to state over-lapping membership in Eastern and Southern African regions.

The four main sections of this paper include introduction, which addresses the main concepts on regionalism and pertinent theoretical framework. The second section provides a historical overview of developments and overlaps in African regionalisms from the 1960s to the present. The third and highly extensive section provides review of state regional memberships and impacts of relevant membership on Eastern and Southern Africa regions. In particular, the section highlights tensions between principles guiding establishment of regional bodies, individual member states and group member states in addressing such issues as security of states in the regions. The last part of the paper provides a summary of issues analysed

and draws lessons learnt as well as considered, suggestions and recommendations for the way forward.

### **The Concept of Overlapping Regionalism and Regime Complexity**

Use of terms region and regionalism have had a complex history in IR and share common features with those used in the post-Cold War era. IR has had difficulties in defining the terms due to divergence of views on whether or not regionalism is an effective or desirable organising mechanism in global politics (Fawcett, 2004; Godehardt and Nabers, 2011; Paul, 2012). This is because the term region is an ambiguous word with no clear consensus on what exactly it means (Hurrell, 1995; Hettne, 2008). In this perspective, several definitions of region and regionalism exist and range from economic perspective, which includes any type of productive activity undertaken by different actors in a region. In the political arena, the term “region” refers to space and place (that is, territorial unit/geographic area such as Africa, Europe or Asia), whereas “regionalism” denotes an aim or objective related to a regional project (Paasi, 1996; Tavares, 2004).

In some literature, regionalism and regionalisation are used interchangeably with reference to process of increases in regional interactions and activities. In any case, in defining the term region, several authors consider the role and importance of states as being linked together in geographical proximity (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Godehardt and Nabers, 2011; Söderbaum, 2016). For instance, Nye (1968) defined a region as a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and degree of mutual interdependence. Thompson (1973) regarded region as patterns of relations or interactions within a geographical area that exhibit a particular degree of regularity to the extent that change in any point in such patterns affects all its members.

These definitions show that regionalism and state power do not stand in opposition to one another. States remain as essential building blocks from which regional arrangements can be developed. Based on the presented definitions, this paper regards regionalism as willingness of states in a region to co-operate in order to deal, in unison, with common problems or challenges. However, willingness of states to team up into regional organisation(s), for defined purposes and largely without reference to each other’s special interests can lead to proliferation of regional organisations with diverse interests and aspirations. Several schools have dubbed such

phenomenon as overlapping regionalism or overlapping regimes (see Young, 1996; Meunier and Karen, 2009; Hofmann, 2011). State overlapping memberships in regional organisations for economic and political goals such as the Eastern and Southern Africa and Africa, in general, illustrates regionalism.

Alter and Meunier (2009) note that state overlapping regionalism ensues when multiple institutions have authority over an issue of unique interest to both individual states and a region. In overlapping regionalism, each regional bloc can create authoritative rules and legal interpretations over an issue of common interest. Such agreements are not usually mutually exclusive of one another. Alter and Meunier's (2009) argument is in tandem with events characterising the Eastern and Southern Africa regions. Since the early 1980s, the two regions saw emergence and expansion of a range of regional projects alongside overlaps in state membership with matching, by individual states to benefit from the projects. Establishment and expansion of the EAC and SADC together with desire of individual states to access benefits accruing from regional projects forced some member states to seek membership with projects under the East African countries as well as with the SADC region.

State overlapping memberships in contemporary regionalism is a puzzling phenomenon. It is not very clear why states join regional blocs for issues such as commerce and trade, which are already catered for under established regional blocs. One of the AU audit reports highlights that member states that belong to more than one regional grouping find themselves burdened with technical, administrative and financial demands of multiple membership (AU, 2007). Similarly, Tavares (2010) considers regionalism and state overlapping membership in regional organizations to be an inconvenience to states such that they lead to low accountability about regional issues, ineffective use of resources and unnecessary political competition.

Malamud and Gardini (2012) have similar critical views about overlaps in regionalism in Latin America. They contend that multiple memberships in sub-regional organisations create frictions between concerned organisations and individual states thereby they lead to divisions instead of unity in the region. Weiffen and Wehner (2013) also note that an ambiguous consequence of overlaps in regional organisations emerges in

form of forum-shopping. Forum shopping refers to existence of two or more distinct institutions with overlapping mandates and memberships, which prompt concerned actors to seek for alternative institutions and most favourable policy preferences for decisions that favour actors' interests. The current situation in EAC, SADC and ICGLR fits well into forum-shopping arrangements described by Hofmann and Merand (2012). Weiffen and Wehner (2013) also argue that forum-shopping mitigates the zero-sum logic, which characterises single organisations (Blosig 2011). Zero-sum logic offers the possibility of willing states to cooperate more formally while at the same time accommodating unwilling states without bitterness.

Tensions can be created within regional blocs when there are two or more contesting organisations or individual or groups of member states under multiple membership or overlaps, acting in parallel with one another. Several scholars refer to such situation as a regime complexity (Aggarwal, 1985 1998; Raustiala and Victor, 2004; Oberthur and Gehring, 2012; Orsini and Young 2013). Raustiala and Victor (2004:279) define "regime complexity as a group of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions providing governance for a particular issue or area."

According to Alter and Meunier (2009), there are different pathways through which regime complexity can shape decision-making strategies and choices of state as well as non-state actors in influencing politics of international cooperation. First, regime complexity contributes to fragmentation of international laws and rules. This allows states to implement political and other cooperation avenues in line with selective interpretation of laws and political beliefs. Overlapping regimes facilitate strategies for cross-institutional and political agreements, such as forum shopping, regime shifting, and eliminate inconsistency in agreed strategies. All these strategies can influence political contexts of cooperation arrangements.

Regime complexity may deepen reliance on heuristics by increasing relevance of experts and contributes towards small group dynamics. There may also be reverberations and feedback effects across overlapping institutional functions that may facilitate or hinder smooth cooperation. Several scholars (see, for example, Boas *et. al.*, 1999; Hettne, 2005; Ghering and Feude, 2013; Gomez, 2015) have noted competitive dynamics that

emerge between institutions with overlapping mandates and memberships.

While competition may promote innovation and productive experimentation, it can also trigger struggles for resources, members as well as functions and may create inefficiencies that undermine effectiveness of joint efforts in addressing international problems. Different pathways of regime complexity are reflected in the case of overlapping regionalism between EAC, SADC and ICGLR. In order to better understand overlapping regionalism in Eastern and Southern Africa regions, this study analysed the phenomenon from the perspective of international regime complexity. It led to development of a framework for the study of regional overlaps and multiple memberships in regional cooperation arrangements. This concept and view are useful tools for analysis of overlapping regionalisms and membership.

### **Overview of Overlapping Regionalism in Africa**

The genesis of overlapping regionalism in Africa is linked to the first regional initiatives which began in the 1950s and early 1960s in Europe with establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The EEC was established to forge common economic and political affairs among its member states. The initiative by Western European countries was quickly adopted in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

In Africa, regionalism received considerable impetus and gave optimism in post-independence periods of the early 1960s. Such optimism culminated in formation of Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Consequently, many states in Africa felt the need for regional integration as strategic means for economic and political cooperation among themselves as well as with multilateral institutions. But the question of how the unity had to be achieved ended up with a split of member states as exemplified by the gradualist (then the Monrovia group) led by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and fast-trackers (then the Casablanca group) led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Walraven, 1999). While the gradualist group wanted to steer a low course towards African Unity, the Casablanca group called for a 'united Africa now.' The contest between gradualists and fast trackers was resolved with formation of the OAU in 1963. It happened after the Heads of African State and Government opted for both continental institutions for political and security integration based on respect for sovereignty and

territorial integrity coexisting alongside sub-regional political and economic arrangements (Khadiagara, 2013:112). This paper notes that the proliferation of RECs between 1960s and 1980s is an outcome of the gradual process of forming the African unity. Scholars regard this period as one of the first wave of regionalism or old regionalism intended mainly to push for economic cooperation and later on, peace and security (Fawcett, 2000). Today, African leaders have adopted what they call a gradualist approach to African unity by strengthening sub-regional organizations for the eventual integration of the continent. In addition, African leaders advocated consolidation of existing regional economic arrangements as building blocks and necessary conditions for a United States of Africa.

In an African perspective, regionalism not only represents an extension of the Pan-African vision, but also significantly an African development strategy. OAU/AU key documents indicate that the African development strategy had already been adopted in the OAU/AU development framework as exemplified by the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which emphasized on the need for strengthening existing regional economic communities as well as establishment of other communities where they do not yet exist (OAU, 1991). The said thrust of regionalism in Africa has resulted in new sub-regional organisations based on matters of common interest for member states. Most sub-regional groupings identified problems they intend to solve with common fronts. Among issues of critical concern were and continue to be maintenance of peace and security as well as cooperation in commerce, trade, research and common positions relating to globalization and roles of the so called development partners. This was the period of second waves of regionalism or new regionalism in Africa (Dinka and Kennes, 2007).

Hettne and Söderbaum (1998:7) define new regionalism as a comprehensive multifaceted and multidimensional arrangement, implying change of a particular sub-region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to such dimensions as culture, security, economic policies and political systems. New regionalism is not a completely new pattern in Africa. Most sub-regional groupings are a continuation of the old regionalism, which has undergone transformation in order to address multidimensional issues such as globalisation, peace, security and internationalisation of trade in social services such as education and so forth (Söderbaum, 2016). Push and felt obligation of regional bodies to



participate in addressing and resolving local conflicts in different parts of Africa, are strong signals for a strong link between regionalism and the need for greater security on the continent.

The African security strategy resulted in the continent being divided into large and small regions based on common characteristics and identity of concerned member states. Under such arrangements, several new regional organisations were created, each covering small geographical spaces and involving a few states rather than the former larger continental organisations comparable with the European Union (EU) and the OAU. Those relatively small regional organisations also commonly known as sub-regional organisations/groupings got engaged in an array of regional schemes ranging from political to economic cooperation. Most such sub-groups aimed at seeking for solutions to African economic crises of post-independence era of the 1970s to 1980s. Among the referred sub-regional organisations are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the SADC, the EAC and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

In the late 1990s, regionalism underwent several reforms due to need for increased security after the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Berlin Wall. Specifically, several organisations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC) and African Union (AU), began to establish normative frameworks, and action-oriented peace and security architectures to address the entire conflict and security spectrum of Africa in a highly systematic manner. The framework led to collective mechanisms that came to be known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the auspices of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). The arrangement aimed at responding better to mounting security challenges within the continent. Hettne (2008) refers to this type of regionalism as security regionalism or regional dimension of security in Africa. He defines security regionalism as an attempt by states and other actors in a particular geographical area to transform security issues into harmonious interstate and intrastate cooperation for conflict resolution for peace and security. Scholars sometimes refer to this new arrangement as the new regionalism or the third wave of world regionalism, which

continues to emerge in different parts of the world even today (Söderbaum, 2004, Söderbaum and Hettne, 2010).

Buzan and Waever (2003) note that approaches by regional or sub-regional bodies on security issues give more encouraging results than conventional bilateral, nation-to-nation consultations and dialogues. Several scholars refer to this approach as security regionalism, which advocates the importance of regional approaches, when compared with other previously used models such as national or global, non-state actors ( Buzan, 1991; Shaw *et. al.*, 2003; Hattne, 2008; Söderbaum and Hettne, 2010).


Most sub-regional bodies in Africa have developed comparable or almost similar peace and security mechanisms and programmes of action including early warning systems, standby brigades, protocols and so forth. All intend to forge efforts for peaceful settlements of disputes and use of force as a last resort in very rare cases where peaceful settlement fails [see AU, 2000: Article 4(j)]. Such mechanisms were developed by regional organisations largely without reference or consultations with one another. A careful examination of behaviours of member states involved in such regional groupings and agreements indicates commonality of political and economic purposes.

### **Overlapping Regionalism: The Eastern and Southern Africa Experience**

The first regionalism in Africa was establishment of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910. It was the world's oldest regional organisation. SACU was followed by the OAU established in 1963 thereby bringing together over fifty member states in Africa. The OAU continued to grow and became large, diverse and able to meet all needs of individual African member states (Clapham, 1996). Initiatives were made to bring together neighborhood member states with similar or closely related characteristics for ease of managing their matters of common and urgent interests. Consequently, there emerged such regional organisations as the EAC and COMESA, all have their genesis in the mid-1960s. The SADC was created in the 1980s, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) was created in 1982 and the IGAD was established in 1986 and the ICGLR was established in 2006. This makes Eastern and Southern Africa an area in Africa with a large number of regional bodies with matching threats in modes of membership and strategic approaches to issues.

Currently, the Eastern and Southern African region has seven regional organisations, whose member states belong to two or more of the regional bodies. Specifically, out of fifteen member states of SADC, eight are members of the COMESA, five of the SACU, three of the IOC, and one - Tanzania - is also an EAC member (Lisakafu, 2013). Figure 1 below illustrates the overlaps in regional memberships in the referred geographical areas of Africa.

**Figure 1: Multiple membership in the Eastern and Southern Africa Regions**



**Source:** Bhagwati (1995), UNCTAD (2007) and modified by author.

Figure one illustrates overlaps and multiple memberships of the Eastern and Southern Africa region and shows that all but one of the fifteen SADC member states belong to other regional groupings. Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar belong to both the SADC and the COMESA. South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, DRC, Namibia and Swaziland belong to both the SADC and the SACU, while Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar are members of three organisations, namely, the IOC, COMESA and SADC. Angola and the DRC are members of ECCAS, ICGLR and SADC, while Tanzania has membership in EAC, SADC and

ICGLR. It means that within the SADC, only Mozambique does not subscribe to other regional groupings. Should enthusiasts of Pan Africanism and aspirants of the AU not wonder why, Mozambique, unlike the other African States, has remained firm as a member of only two regional arrangements, namely, SADC and the continental organisation, - the AU.

All EAC member states belong to more than one regional grouping.<sup>2</sup> Hence, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi belong to COMESA, ICGLR and the EAC. On the other hand, Kenya and Uganda belong to both the IGAD and the EAC; while Rwanda belongs to the EAC, ICGLR and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).<sup>3</sup> All EAC members and the DRC have membership in the ICGLR. All regional groups referred to above except SACU and IOC have established their common peace and security mechanisms. Such multiple and overlapping memberships in regional organizations constitute what has come to be referred to by scholars as a “spaghetti bowl,” which implies waste of financial resources and has created operational technical as well as administrative difficulties for concerned member states (Blosig 2011). Multiple memberships in regional organisations hinder smooth regional cooperation as regions in such crucial matters as peace and security. Overlaps in regional groupings complicate arrangements for political discourse and institutional collaborative requirements, which, in turn, add to costs of conducting intra-regional peace and security meetings and/or draw the needed programmes. A report by the tripartite taskforce on COMESA-EAC-SADC recognized that the EAC grouping also acknowledged that state overlapping membership in regional organizations is one of the main challenges facing the referred tripartite cooperation framework (EAC, 2011).

The challenge was proven by events surrounding the approved 2012 EAC protocol on Defence and Cooperation. The protocol met resistance from Tanzania, which postponed ratification of the pact until some of the clauses relating to defence were amended. Tanzania’s position resulted from similarity in wording of the EAC and SADC Defence protocols. Tanzania pressed for clarification on the EAC protocol clause on “attack on a member state” and campaigned for it to read “attack on all member states” (EAC, 2012). The SADC Mutual Defence Pact provides that “an armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all State Parties” (SADC, 2003). Although both clauses from the EAC and SADC

protocols serve to avert similar risks, the EAC clause places Tanzania in a difficult position because, as a member of the SADC grouping, the country (Tanzania) was required to comply with the SADC clause, which conflicted with that of the EAC protocol (Mwapachu, 2012).

In the EAC Defense Protocol, Tanzania also pressed for a clear clause on what could happen should a member state be involved in war and specifically whether or not it would mean that the whole region would be seen to be at war. Moreover, what would happen in the SADC arrangement if such an attack was provoked by one of the EAC member states? Overall, Tanzania opposed the EAC clause that required Partner States to assist each other in a war situation (*Daily News*, 2012). The late Samwel Sitta, then Tanzanian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the East African Cooperation, once said that Tanzania is a state party to the SADC Defence Pact and therefore, needed clear understanding of its role in respect of the two protocols (*Daily News*, 2012). This is a sensitive issue, which should not be underrated. It also demonstrates administrative burdens, implications for policy decisions, frustrating legal procedures that arise as a result of a member state being involved in multiple treaties and overlapping memberships in regional organizations.

In respect of the presented impasse, the EAC finds itself in a turning point. The community faces two questions. The first question arises, how serious is the EAC in forging to achieve its promises and aspiration to become a political federation and institute common security and defence arrangements? The second question pertains to whether or not the EAC can remain stable when it comes to matters of regional multiple memberships, making land part of the integration process and conflicting interests of member states. In addition, internal power struggles within individual EAC member states suggest that there is an absence of a dominant power within the community and it has undermined common dynamics for political, peace and security aspects in the region.

These questions also apply to the 1990s events in the Eastern part of the DRC whereby thousands of lives were lost and millions of people were displaced following an outbreak of political conflict. Historically, the DRC conflict has alerted the region about the urgent need for inter-state security cooperation. Such an arrangement involves the SADC member states, the EAC and the ICGLR. In the first case, the SADC member states

openly disagreed about how best to deal with the DRC crisis (Nathan 2004, 2006). For example, Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa pushed for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, while Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola had already deployed troops in Kinshasa to support President Kabila's government by preferring for military means to end the DRC crisis (Malan, 1998; Nathan, 2006). The recent case emerged in 2013 after the Tanzanian government decided to contribute troops for peace keeping in the area under the auspices of the SADC as part of the United Nations (UN) peace keeping mission in the Congo.<sup>4</sup> The forces aimed to neutralize the armed rebel groups including the so called 23 March Movement (M23).<sup>5</sup> In that way, Tanzania, with backing from the SADC, joined the UN intervention forces in the DRC. The move caused intense political and economic rifts among parties to the EAC and ICGLR. Uganda and Rwanda were strongly opposed to military intervention in the DRC and preferred non-military settlement in the matter. This is because both Rwanda and Uganda, among other things, have political, security and economic interests in the DRC in regard to natural resources, land and cross-border trade (Lezhner and Prendergast, 2013). To allow military intervention means to continue disrupting security and trade in the DRC and it has affected both Rwanda and Uganda.

Fred Mukasa Mbidde, a Ugandan representative in the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) tabled a motion opposing Tanzania's military support to the UN and SADC peacekeeping offensive force in the DRC. He asserted that such support by Tanzania was a matter of double standards since Tanzania is also a founding member of the EAC. The legislator reaffirmed that the EAC had adopted a peace and security protocol, which provides that in matters of security, the region would determine matters as a regional group. Therefore, he requested the Tanzanian government to withdraw its support for the SADC (so called war resolution) because that position was against the EAC stand that military intervention can escalate not end war in the Eastern DRC (Mulondo *et. al.*, 2015). Such view was supported by Rwanda, whose position was that the issue should be resolved through Kampala peace talks between the government of the DRC and rebel M23 group. The Rwandan position on the matter was, in fact, an initiative of Heads of State of the ICGLR under the chair of Uganda's President, Yoweri Museveni.

It is rational to note that Mbide's position makes sense due to the fact that when Tanzania was Chair to the SADC Troika-Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation,<sup>6</sup> she demonstrated her conflicting obligations and allegiance to the EAC and the ICGLR by leaning on SADC position in regard to the DRC question. In due regard, Tanzania remains on collision course with Uganda and Rwanda. The two countries, namely, Uganda and Rwanda remain unwilling to accept deployment of troops under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and such situation puts Tanzania in a difficult position in her relations with the EAC, the SADC, the ICGLR and indeed, the African Union.

During the SADC 32<sup>nd</sup> Summit held between August 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 2012 in Maputo, Mozambique expressed great concern over security deterioration in Eastern DRC, where many lives continued to be lost (SADC, 2012). The SADC Summit also expressed concern that such situation was being perpetrated by DRC rebel groups with assistance from Rwanda. The meeting urged Rwanda to cease its interference with internal affairs of the DRC and so stop threat to peace and stability, not only for the DRC, but also for the whole of the SADC region. The Summit further agreed that Rwanda should stop military support to armed rebels in the DRC particularly to M23 (SADC, 2012). The situation puts the SADC states in a difficult position with respect to the EAC and ICGLR member states, notably Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.

In order to avoid escalation of regional antagonism, the SADC 33<sup>rd</sup> Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government held in Lilongwe, Malawi between August 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 2013, emphasized on the need for an urgent joint Summit between the SADC and ICGLR officials. Thereafter, several joint meetings were held in Luanda, Angola since 2014 to-date, involving Chiefs of Defence and Security of the ICGLR and SADC. The latest meeting was held on 8 June 2017 in Luanda, Angola to discuss security situation in the DRC in furtherance of agreements by the SADC summit. All such confusion is a consequence of overlapping memberships in regional blocs, particularly Eastern and Southern Africa regions. It also shows that individual members of SADC, ICGRL and the EAC have diverse mindsets and approaches in addressing peace as well as security issues of the DRC and the Great Lakes region, in general. As things are, there are no commonly

agreed principles to guide deliberations and reach consensus on issues of peace and security in Africa.

The 2015 Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State of the ICGLR was an important opportunity for the regional bloc to review principles governing the organisation and to reach consensus as well as embrace a common purpose. Instead, the former President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and President Joseph Kabila of the DRC opted not to attend the Summit. As a result, the ICGLR summit ended without offering any regional solution or indicators that would resolve the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the Eastern part of the DRC (Daniel, 2013). Non-attendance of the meeting by the said leaders who were key to finding a solution to the DRC conflict was due to the existing rift between leaders themselves on the issue of deploying UN-backed intervention forces to neutralise the role of rebels in the Eastern part of the DRC.<sup>7</sup> This also suggests that lack of hegemonic power in the EAC and the ICGLR is another reason for inadequate stability in the region. The theory of hegemonic stability asserts that the role played by a hegemonic power is to create and maintain stability in international economics as well as politics (Sashes, 1989; Yazid, 2015). It means that given the current situation of overlapping regionalism and membership without strong hegemonic power, realization of regional stability will continue to be difficult.

### **Conflicts in Membership in Different Organisations and the Role of Regional Institutions**

The presented discourse establishes that the DRC peace process under the umbrella of different regional bodies all with the same mandate for peace and security has been the major source of misunderstanding between member states of the ICGLR, EAC and SADC. All role players have differed in approaches and modalities of assessing as well as resolving the DRC crisis. The Rwanda government is unhappy with Tanzania's move to send troops to the Eastern region of the DRC under the umbrella of the SADC. One senior official of Rwanda government asserted as follows,

We were shocked to see the SADC, through its Defence and Security Committee, chaired by Tanzania, discussing the DRC security issue and issuing a joint communiqué, without inviting us Rwanda as the concerned party. He continues.... As if that wasn't enough, the same country (that is Tanzania), having dispatched its troops to the Eastern



DRC<sup>8</sup> urged Rwanda to initiate peace talks with the Forces for FDLR<sup>9</sup> a group that has been involved in the genocide against Tutsi and the moderate Hutus.<sup>10</sup>

Tanzania, on its part, strongly defended its position and decision to send troops into the DRC troubled Kivu Province by saying the move aimed at restoring calmness and to protect innocent civilians following the uprising of the M23 rebels (*Daily News*, 2013b).

As already noted, both Tanzania and Rwanda were absent from the ICGLR Nairobi Summit of 29<sup>th</sup> July 2013. The two Presidents skipped the meeting and avoided each other. Such pattern pointed to seriousness of the matter, which did not augur well with the spirit of the EAC regional bloc of six countries, namely, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan, all committed to teaming up for full economic and security integration of the region. Such development could easily lead to break-up of the EAC due to emerging and growing lack of institutional respect. Such sorry situation raises suspicion that the EAC seems to be a project of Heads of State of partner nations and not a people-cantered bloc. The EAC seems to have weak institutional arrangements to support the region's political and economic integration processes.

The presented discourse has advanced major issues related to overlaps of state membership in regional organisations. Overlapping membership in regional organisations such as those characterising Tanzania, Rwanda and DRC makes it difficult for concerned states to fulfil their obligations to more than one regional body in relation to regionally agreed common goals and objectives. Overlaps in membership can lead to a member state to provide counterweight to one regional bloc at the expense of another. On these grounds, it appears that there exists a forum shopping for a strategy by actors in the limelight of "pick and choose among the mechanisms that best fit the actors' individual political agenda" (Raustiala, 2004; Forman and Segaar, 2016; Blossing, 2011). If not rationally and objectively analysed as well as addressed, an emerging inter-state distrust can lead to loss of cooperation in both the EAC and the SADC regions. The said sorry situation can also lead to a regional body, such as the EAC, failing to effectively pursue one of its key goals of ensuring regional peace and security. Conflict of interests of a member state's dual membership to more than one regional body can potentially widen the gap of mistrust among members

of the regional body on matters related to cooperation in political, economic, peace and security.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, most Heads of State in the referred entities prefer to promote their interests as individuals instead of acting in the interest of the regional organisations to which they are affiliated. They directly implement regional projects only when the projects are in line with their state interests. Misunderstandings between Tanzania and Rwanda over the DRC exemplify this situation. The situation puts regional blocs, particularly the EAC into defining moments in their history, namely, how to deal with individuals in member states who tend to reduce or annul power of regional bodies for personal interests. Individual interests in member states can and do destroy established institutional governing and technical machinery of the regional bodies and so hinder capacity to overcome undesirable tendencies. An analysis of peace and security mechanisms together with decision-making frameworks has shown that regional bodies in Eastern and Southern Africa have little political decision-making powers on matters related to peace and security. Instead, they provide limited rather than all-encompassing administrative and secretariat services to Summits of the Heads of State. Article 10A (6) of the SADC Treaty clearly demonstrates the situation.<sup>12</sup>

Several scholars have also noted that secretariats of the regional bodies play more coordinating rather than decision-making roles and therefore, they are not free from influences of leaderships of the member states (Oosthuizen, 2006; Franke, 2007; Hull and Deblom, 2009; Van Nieuwkerk, 2011). More specifically in relation to the SADC, the presented observation is applicable as noted by Orbon (2012) who argues that the "SADC was and still is largely an association of governments specifically of Heads of States." Consequently, most decisions and programmes related to peace and security are, in most cases, overshadowed by interests of the Heads of the member states. The question here is: how can institutions perform against influences from Heads of Government? It means that regional bodies will remain weak until Heads of State commit themselves to strengthening decision-making powers of established technical institutions. Bach (2016) observed that efficiency of regional organisations in Africa heavily depends on inter-personal relations between concerned Heads of State. Therefore, individual personalities and leadership qualities remain crucial as well as decisive for smooth functioning of regional organisations.

This study has established that there is lack of concrete commitment and common values among leaderships of member states of the EAC. Hence, while Tanzania embraced the SADC bloc decision to adopt a proactive military action in pursuing DRC peace and security, Rwanda and Uganda desired non-military dialogue in resolving the DRC conflict. Furthermore, diplomatic tension between Tanzania and Rwanda over the FDRL rebels and the DRC is an indicator of persistent lack of common objectives and values among members of the regional body. Multiple memberships of the EAC member states are prone to make conflict resolution, prevention and management in the region highly challenging. It is a serious weakness at the core of the EAC functions and modes of operation of the EAC. Genuine desire and commitment by state leaderships for social, economic and political integration are the most important of all requirements for an accelerated all-round unity of the EAC. The EAC Heads of State need to reaffirm their commitment to working together for a genuine common goal of regional integration and dissociate from membership of other organisations that have clauses, which can disrupt the defined EAC commonality of purpose.

Officials from the three regional bodies, the SADC, EAC and ICGLR, confirmed that shortage of funds and resources made implementation of agreed activities under peace and security programmes difficult.<sup>13</sup> Such shortage of funds is attributed to member states' failure to contribute funds to cover agreed programmes. Both the EAC and the SADC regional bodies are heavily reliant on member states for financing daily activities to promote peace and security.<sup>14</sup> The problem that arises can best be summarised that "he who pays the piper dictates the tune." In other words, leadership of the member states that meet cost of running the SADC, EAC and the ICGLR has a great say and influence on how affairs of the organisations are run, leaving the secretariats to only receive directives. The situation affects decisions-making and delays implementation of the integration program thereby rendering the secretariat ineffective.

## **Conclusion**

This paper analysed challenges of peace and security against tendency of nations to overlap their memberships in regional blocs with particular focus on Eastern and Southern African regions. The study shows that each of the EAC, SADC and ICGLR, was established in its unique way, leading to clear overlaps in mandates of three bodies in such matters as they relate to

economy, peace and security. The EAC and SADC appear to have duplicated provisions on peace and security of the AU, which are *de facto* overarching matters for the continent. The analysis of findings from the study shows that overlapping and dual membership in the Eastern and Southern Africa organisations are driven by interests of member state individual members' economic or political desires. Individual member states, on one hand, and the organisations, on the other, remain in controversy over authority in pushing for their desires and interests. The overlaps also create tensions among individual member states against regional bodies thereby resulting in low accountability, ineffective use of resources and political competition. Membership overlaps and regionalism can create risks in regional security as exemplified by recent trends in both Eastern and Southern African regions related to the DRC. It is also clear that while state leaders profess support for political federation, "now" most are still nationalistic and more concerned about security of their individual states than the region. On matters of regional security, leaders of the EAC and SADC blocs are still disconnected and lack clear commitment to common purpose including vision for regional and continental integration.

The paper established that reduction or elimination of dual membership and overlapping regionalism is in the hands of leadership of individual member states' desires to come together into a bloc. Such risky relationship among concerned nations can be resolved by member states taking necessary measures to review their positions and to resolve whether or not they still want to continue being members to more than one regional bloc or to stick as one bloc for full realisation of cooperation and integration in political, economic and security concerns. For example, in October 2000, Tanzania decided to withdraw from COMESA for economic reasons. The former President of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa said that, "we are party to too many regional trading organisations and our membership is too costly to sustain. We must, therefore, rationalise our participation in such ventures." African leaders need and should meet the soonest to resolve and revisit the frameworks for every regional organisation to which they are members with the view to synchronising objectives and modes of operation for each such organisation. In addition, they should ensure that each is responsive to the overarching goal of integrating African states into a realistic United States of Africa.

## Notes

1. Swaziland belongs to SACU, SADC, COMESA and AU. DRC is member of SADC, ICGLR, ECCAS and AU.
2. South Sudan is newest member of the EAC block which raises EAC membership to six. The 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary EAC Heads of State Summit in Arusha, Tanzania, resolved to admit Africa's newest nation into the economic bloc on 12 April 2016.
3. See also Mwai, C. 2015. "Rwanda re-admitted into ECCAS", *The News Times*, May 27, 2015, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-05-27/189185/>
4. The UN Security Council at its 6943<sup>rd</sup> meeting, on 28 March 2013 adopted Resolution 2098 (2013) which authorized the deployment of an intervention brigade within the current United Nations peacekeeping operation in the DRC to address imminent threats to peace and security [www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B.../s\\_res\\_2098.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B.../s_res_2098.pdf)
5. The M23 rebels is an armed group established to carryout terrorism activities in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and have been involved in several human rights atrocities that include murdering innocent civilians, rapping helpless women and girls and looting mineral resources.
6. Chairperson of the SADC Organ is elected by the SADC Summit on the basis of rotation from among the members of the SADC Summit. According to the Article 4 of the SADC Organ Protocol, the term of office of the Chairperson is one year. Tanzania was elected to chair SADC organ on 18 August 2013 during the SADC Summit held in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique on 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> August 2012 (SADC, 2012).
7. Interview with EAC officers, January and May 2016 respectively, Arusha, Tanzania
8. Tanzania contributed 1283 soldiers in the DRC peacekeeping mission to form the UN force intervention brigade made up of 3,069 soldiers (*Daily Newspaper*; 29.07.2013 "Government finalizing plans to send soldiers to DRC-Official"<http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/20488-government-finalising-plans-to-send-scribes-to-drc-official>).
9. The FDLR rose from the ashes of the 1994 genocide to form a strong Hutu extremist army, which then transformed itself into a political

- party with a mission to oust the Kagame regime “at any cost through the barrel of a gun.” the Rwandan regime sees the Hutu rebels as their biggest threat.
10. Interview with a Rwanda Senior Official from the inner circle of the Rwandese top administration (09.08.2013). His name is disclosed because of security purpose and he isn't the authorized spokesperson for the Rwandese government.
  11. Article 5:1 of the Treaty Establishing the EAC states that the objectives of the Community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, economic, and social for their mutual benefit.
  12. See the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, as amended. Gaborone: SADC, 17 August, 1992. Article 10A (6). For similar observation see also Van Nieuwkerk, A.2011 “The Regional Roots of the African Peace and Security Architecture: Exploring Centre-Periphery Relations”, *South Africa Journal of International Affairs*, 18, 2, pp. 169-189. Routledge.
  13. Interview with ICGRL, SADC and EAC officials at Regional Organisations liaison offices at African Union, Addis Ababa, 16.10.2016.
  14. Ibid.

## References

- Aggarwal, V. 1985. *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Aggarwal, V.1998. *Institutional Designs for a Complex, World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Alter, K. and Meunier, S. 2009.”The Politics of International Regime Complexity”, *Perspectives on Politics* 7, (1): 13-24.
- AU (African Union). 2007. *The High Level Panel: Audit of the African Union*. Addis Ababa: African Union, 18 December. Addis Ababa: Ethiopia.
- Bach, D. 2016. The Diversity of African Regionalism, *Great Insight Magazine*, 5 Issue 4, July/August.
- Bhagwati, J. 1995. "U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger. *The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements*, the AEI Press.

- Blosig, M. 2011. "Overlap and Interplay between international organisations: theories and approaches," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18, (2):147-167.
- Boas, M. Marchand, M.H. and Shaw, T. 1999. "The Political Economic of New Regionalisms", *Third World Quarterly* 20, (5):897-910.
- Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. 2003. *Regions and powers: The structure of international security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B. 1991. *Peoples, States and Fear: An Agenda of International Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Clapham, C. 1996. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Daily News. 2012. "EAC Bows to Tanzania Demands", *Daily News Online Edition*, 30 April 2012. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania. <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/home/?n=26013&cat=home>, accessed 30.04.2016.
- Daily News. 2013a. "Government finalizing plans to send soldiers to DRC- Official" <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/> accessed 29.8.2018.
- Daily News. 2013b. "Stop threatening Tanzania, Member warns M23 rebels". *Daily News*. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. May 5, 2013, <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/> accessed 29.8.2018.
- Daniel, K. 2013. "Member pull apart: Is the beginning of the end of EAC?" *The East African*, November 2, 2013. Nairobi. Kenya. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Is-this-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-EAC/2558-2057530-87aapkz/index.html>.
- Dinka, T. and Kennes, W. 2007. *Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges (ECDPM Discussion Paper 74)*. Maastricht.
- Draper, P. 2010. "Rethinking the (European) Foundations of Sub-Saharan African Regional Economic Integration: a Political Economy Essay", OECD Development Centre Working Paper no. 293. DEV/DOC 10.
- EAC (East Africa Community). 2012. *Protocol on Peace and Security*. Arusha: EAC.
- EAC. 2011. "COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Framework: State of Play," Report by the Chair of the Tripartite Task Force. Arusha: EAC.
- Eluoch, E. 2012. "Dar Delays signing Security Protocol", *The East African*, January 29, 2012. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Dar-delays-signing-security-protocol-/2558-1316028-vh8esdz/index.html>

- Fawcett, L, and Hurrell, A.1995. "Introduction". In Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fawcett, L. 2000. "Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present", In Fawcett, L and Hurrell, A. (eds) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order*, Oxford University Press.
- Fawcett, L. 2004."Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism", *Journal of International Affairs* 80:429-46.
- Forman, S. and Segar, D. 2006."New Coalition for Global Governance: the Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism", *Global Governance* 12, (2): 205-225.
- Franke, B. 2007. "Competing Regionalism in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture", *African Studies Quarterly*, 9, (3):32-65.
- Ghering, T. and Faude, B. 2013. "The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Micro foundations and Systemic Effects," *Global Governance* 19,(1).
- Godehardt, N. and Nabers, D. (eds.). 2011. *Regional Powers and Regional Orders*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gómez-Mera.L.2015."International Regime Complexity and Regional Governance: Evidence from the Americas", *Global Governance* 21:19-42.
- Hettne, B. 2005. "Beyond the New Regionalism", *New Political Economy*, 10, (4), December. Routledge.
- Hettne, B. 2008. "Security Regionalism in Theory and Practice, In Globalisation and Environmental Challenges", *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace*, Springer: Berlin-Heidelberg.
- Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. 1998. "The New Regionalism Approach", *Politeia*, Jg. 17 (3):7.
- Hofmann, S. 2009. "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The case of NATO and ESDP". *Perspectives on Politic*, 7, 1.
- Hofmann, S. 2011. "Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49:101-120.
- Hofmann, S. and Merand, F. 2012. "Regional Institutions a la Carte: The Effects of Institutional elasticity", in T.V Paul (ed). *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.



- Hull, C. and Derblom, M. 2009. *Abandoning Frontline Trenches: Capabilities for Peace and Security in the SADC Region*. Stockholm: FOI.
- Hurrell, A. 1995. "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics", *Review of International Studies*, 21, (4):11.
- INCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2007. Trade and Development Report. New York, Geneva.
- Khadiagala, G. 2013. "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration", in: Cheeseman, N, Anderson, D, and Scheibler, A (eds) *Routledge Handbook of African Politics*. Routledge: Tylor and Francis Group. London.
- Lezhner, S. and Prendergast, J. 2013. Rwanda's Stake in Congo: Understanding Interest to Achieve Peace. Enough Project.org. Washington DC.
- Lisakafu, J. 2013. *The Peace and Security in Africa: The Interfaces between the African Union and the Southern African Development Community*. PhD Dissertation, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Social Sciences and Philosophy (Unpublished).
- Malamud, A. and Gardini, G. L. 2012. "Has regionalism peaked? The Latin American quagmire and its lessons", *International Spectator*, 47, (1):116-133.
- Malan, M. 1998. *SADC and Sub-Regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis*, Monograph No 19. Pretoria: ISS.
- Mansfield, E. and Solingen, E. 2010. "Regionalism," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13:145-63.
- Meunier, S. and Alter, Karen, J. 2009. The Politics of International Regime Complexity. *Journal of Cambridge* 7, 1.
- Mulondo, E, M. J. and Mande. 2015. M.SADC-Learning Tanzania to Face EALA over M23. *The East African*. Retrieved from <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/>.
- Mwapachu, V.J. 2012. *Challenging the Frontier of African Integration: The Dynamic of Policies, Politics and Transformation in the East African Community*. Dar es Salaam: E&D Vision Publishing.
- Nathan, L. 2004. The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003 Working Paper No.50. London, LSE: Crisis States Research Centre.
- Nathan, L. 2006. "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-2003", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32: 3:605-622.
- Nye, J. 1968. *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

- OAU. 1991. *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*. Addis Ababa: African Union.
- Oberthür, S. and Gehring, T. 2011. "Institutional Interaction: Ten Years of Scholarly Development," in Oberthür, S and Olav Schram O.S, (eds), *Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Oosthuizen, G. H. 2006. *The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, Its Policies and Prospects*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Orbon, H. 2012. "SADC and Conflict Mediation in Southern Africa", in: Engel, Ulf (ed.). *New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts. Global History and International Studies IV*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.
- Orsini, A., Morin, J-F. and Young, O. 2013. "Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?," *Global Governance* 19, (1):27-39.
- Paasi, A. 1996. *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*. John Wiley and Sons.
- Paul, T.V. 2012. "Regional Transformation in International Relations", In Paul, T.V (ed.), *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raustiala, K. and Victor, D.G. 2004. "The regime complex for plant genetic resources", *International Organization*, 59, 2.
- SADC (Southern African Development Community).2003. *SADC Mutual Defence Pact*. Gaborone: SADC.
- SADC. 2012. Final Communiqué of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government Maputo: Mozambique, August 18.
- SADC. 2013. Communiqué of the 33<sup>rd</sup> Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government Lilongwe, Malawi: August 17-18, 2013, Gaborone: SADC.
- Shaw, T.M, Söderbaum, F, Nyang'oro, J. E and Grant. A. 2003. "The future of New Regionalism in Africa: Regional governance, human security/development and beyond". In: Grant, J. A and Söderbaum, F (eds). *The New Regionalism in Africa*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Sachse, V. E. 1989. "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Examination." *LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses*. 4740. [http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool\\_disstheses/474](http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/474).
- Söderbaum, F. 2016. *Rethinking Regionalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Söderbaum, F. and Hettne, B. 2010. "Regional Security in a Global Perspective", in: Engel, U. and Porto, J.G. (eds.). *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Söderbaum, F. 2004. *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tavares, R. 2004. "The State of the Art of Regionalism: The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline", *UNU-CRIS e-Working Papers No.W.10*. United Nations University.
- Tavares, R. 2010. *Regional Security. The Capacity of International Organizations*. London: Routledge.
- Thompson, W. R. 1973. "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly* 17, (1):89-117.
- UN Security Council 7505<sup>th</sup> Meeting, "United Nations Shares Responsibility for Peace with Regional Organizations, Says Secretary-General, Opening All-Day Security Council Debate," 18 August 2015, SC/12011, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12011.doc.htm> for similar observation.
- UNCTAD, 2007. *Regional Co-operation for Development Trade and Development Report*, New York and Geneva. United Nations.
- Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2011. "The Regional Roots of the African Peace and Security Architecture: Exploring Centre-Periphery Relations", *South Africa Journal of International Affairs*, 18, (2): 169-189.
- Van Walraven, K. 1999. *Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Weiffen, B., Wehner, L. and Nolte, D. 2013. "Overlapping regional security institutions in South America: The case of OAS and UNASUR", *International Area Studies Review* 16, (4):370-389.
- Yazid, N. M. 2015. "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability, Hegemonic Power and International Political Economic Stability", *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*: 3, (6):67-79.
- Young, O. R. 1996. "Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives", *Global Governance*, Lynne Rienner.