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Why Political Parties Failed Democracy in the 2000 Elections in Tanzania

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Introduction

The second multiparty elections since the reintroduction of multipartism in Tanzania were held in October 2000. Twelve out of thirteen registered political parties took part in the October 2000 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in the mainland of the United Republic of Tanzania. Most admirers of the multiparty system expected the opposition parties to perform better and secure many parliamentary seats by using the experience gained since 1995.

However, the election results indicate that the opposition parties are worse off in these elections than in the 1995 general elections. Meanwhile, the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) performed better in the 2000 elections than it did in 1995. However, CCM is accused of having flouted basic rules of competition during its nomination process. Corruption is said to have been rampant during the nomination process.

Furthermore, CCM is also accused of using public property for private gains during their election campaigns. Thus, the conduct of both CCM and the opposition parties in the October 2000 elections has disappointed many democracy watchers in Tanzania. The future of multiparty democracy in Tanzania appears gloomy. The question analysts ask is whether the opposition is losing the support of the electorate, or is its performance simply a reflection of its disorganization and lack of a proper strategy to garner enough voter support?

This paper examines the manner in which political parties participated in the 2000 elections. It analyses how political parties nominated their candidates, how they campaigned, i.e., what issues they raised in their election campaigns. It also examines both parliamentary and presidential results with a view to finding out how these results reflect party support in these elections.

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Significance of Political Parties in Multiparty Elections

The importance of political parties in democratic elections cannot be overstated. Democratic elections require effective competition among key players, namely political parties vying for elective political office. According to the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as the election laws all candidates have to be members of a fully registered political party, and have to be nominated by such a political party. This means that political parties determine the kind of candidates available to individual voters. Thus, political parties are supposed to recruit politicians to serve the public through the electoral process. Therefore, if political parties make wise choices in the nomination process, voters will also be availed with a good crop of candidates to choose from. However, if political parties nominate unsuitable candidates, it means voters will choose from the bad lot. Weak party candidates can easily be rejected by voters who have a final say on who will represent them in Parliament or who should become their chief executive.

Political parties can make wise choices of candidates if they empower constituency members (potential voters) to have a voice on who among its membership is likely to represent them better. Given that the "essential feature of a democratic polity is its concern for the participation of the member in the process by which the community is governed" (Tussman, 1979:105), party members become crucial in deciding which person can compete with other election competitors. A wise choice is a choice presented and ratified by party members.

Thus, in choosing candidates for any election, political parties have to be sensitive to and responsive to the demands of their members. In short, as far as candidate selection is concerned, the party leadership should not make decisions for members, rather members should be allowed to make such decisions themselves. Political parties are mere implementers of the wishes and aspirations of their members. Political parties can only ignore these wishes at their own peril in any election contest they may take part.

Apart from restricting candidate choices, the participation of political parties in an election helps to enlighten citizens on the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in their country. Indeed, according to Rod Hague, "the mere fact of participating in an election and the associated task of learning party symbols and some facts about the party's philosophy, may also facilitate national awareness among the population" (Hague, Harp and Breslin, 1992:191). It is

during election campaigns that political parties provide information regarding the candidate and policy choice to the electorate. Voters use this information to make informed decisions on who should represent them.

Thus, political parties play a crucial role of creating citizen awareness particularly during election campaigns. Even the party nomination process can also be used as an opportunity to create citizen awareness. Citizen awareness is made possible when ordinary party members participate in the nomination of candidates. If political parties ignore this process, they risk nominating candidates who lack grassroots support. Such candidates imposed by the party elites at the national level stands the risk of losing the elections to rival candidates elected by the rank and file membership.

Political parties use the nomination process as well as the election campaigns to capture political office and nurture popular citizen support. As Katz (1986) suggests, all serious political parties use elections as a "strategy for cultivating public support". Worthy candidates and worthy programs aiming at improving the quality of life of all society is crucial in winning public support for a serious political party. Election results, therefore, indicate how much support a political party has managed to cultivate during the campaigns.

Political parties should offer voters policy options that can help them make up their mind on which candidate to elect. These options are provided in party election manifestos that are elaborated during election campaigns. Most keen political parties are quick to realize that a good program meant to improve the well-being of the citizenry is their main insurance to win an election. Investment in a well-articulated election manifesto that deals with all aspects of the social, economic, political and environmental factors that affect the electorate is an imperative a serious political party cannot afford to ignore.

Voters are rational beings who would not want to throw away any opportunity to make their life better. Those candidates and their political parties that are perceived by the voters as more likely to fulfil their aspirations and expectations of a better life beyond elections are likely to win more votes than other contestants. An election period is therefore crucial for political parties, as it is to the voters. Their legitimacy and status depends on how they perform

in the elections. Political party performance in elections is itself dependent on the ability of the party and its candidate to convince voters that they will be better-off if they elect them to office.

Winning electoral support is a lease of new life for any viable political party. It is a mandate to govern, and an opportunity to deliver on their election promises. In the course of executing election promises, a winning political party also gets the opportunity to implement its policies as elucidated in the ideologies. Winning an election therefore provides political parties with opportunity to put into practice their ideologies.

Nominating Candidates as a Winning Strategy

As intimated earlier, serious political parties take the nomination process seriously. It is at this stage when a political party starts to test its support among its members and followers. Selected candidates will carry the party flag. These political party flag bearers have to really represent the voice and choice of the party members. The voice of party members is crucial in the nomination of candidates given that it is the party members who form a critical mass that political parties use for winning the election. In any election, the higher the number of party members in a given constituency, the better is its chances for winning the election. In addition to party members, the party has to appeal to its party sympathizers. One major step in winning this sympathy is to nominate a candidate who is considered by the party electorate as "one of them".

A candidate that party members can identify with helps a political party to sail through in the election. This is mainly because in addition to casting votes in favour of own candidate, party members normally canvas for votes from friends, neighbours, relatives, and all compatriots in the neighbourhood. Party members who easily feel that the candidate reflects their best aspirations and ambitions usually canvass for votes. This is in addition to their votes.

When party members feel alienated because they cannot easily identify with their candidate, under normal circumstances they do not vote for that candidate. As a matter of fact they can cast their vote to opposing candidates in protest to a candidate imposed to them by the party. A winning candidate is thus a consensus candidate that both the party bosses and party members can jointly lay claim of ownership. If a candidate is owned by the party but disowned by the members winning, chances for such a candidate are very slim.

Moreover, a candidate is often seen as a role model in the constituency and in society. This is an additional reason why the party choice of a candidate has to be a careful selection made in close consultation with party constituency members. Constituency members are in a better position to know the weak and strong points of a candidate that can form the springboard for support or attack in election campaigns. A keen political party is bound to listen to what party members have to say, unless of course they have additional resources to spend to convince the electorate otherwise.

In the October 2000 elections, the nomination process was marred by various accusations of different abuses that undermined democratic norms. Within the CCM, observers pointed out that the nomination of candidates for Members of Parliament and for Ward Councillors was undermined by "intrigues, corruption and spite (*fitina*)" (Chachage & Tambila, 2000:10). It was reported in many papers that the rich managed to buy their way through the nomination process. This led the CCM Chairman to declare that "the party was not for sale". Eventually, several CCM aspirants suspected to have used unconventional means to win majorities in the primaries were barred from the race by the party's National Executive Committee. This was the party's effort to placate disillusioned members and sympathizers.

The nomination process within the opposition political parties was not democratic either. The Civic United Front (CUF), Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), National Convention for Constitutional Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi) and the whole opposition all lacked a transparent and democratic nomination process. These parties had less competition as in most areas they lacked more than two candidates. Records from the National Electoral Commission indicate that these parties failed to field candidates in some constituencies. In some areas they waited for CCM drop-outs, while in other areas they searched for rich contestants as the party lacked enough funds to sustain their campaigns. Accusations of favouritism and intrigue in the nomination process were also common in these parties.

Meanwhile, in the case of other smaller political parties such as the United Democratic Party (UDP), Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA), Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD), Popular National Party (PONA), Tanzania Peoples Party (TPP), United People Democracy Party (UPDP), and National League for Democracy (NLD)

the top brass of these parties essentially handpicked candidates. In some occasions, even the party bosses were unaware that they had candidates since some candidates for these small parties simply declared themselves candidates for their respective constituencies without consulting their members nor their party bosses at district, regional or even party head offices. Some of these parties do not have district and regional offices. The NRA did not field a single candidate for the parliament.

Nomination within the National Electoral Commission (NEC) went smoothly save for a few incidents caused by politicians that undermined the democratic process. Some candidates tried to use foul means to eliminate other candidates. A good example was the Kwela constituency in Sumbawanga district, Rukwa region, where on 18th August, 2000 the NEC nominated both the CCM and NCCR-Mageuzi candidates as candidates. However NEC later received a letter purported to have been written by the NCCR-Mageuzi candidate alleging withdrawal of his candidature. A letter from the NCCR-Mageuzi Rukwa regional offices supported this withdrawal letter. When NEC announced the withdrawal of this candidate and declared the CCM candidate unopposed, the NCCR-Mageuzi candidate wrote denying withdrawing his candidacy. NEC investigated the claim and found out that the letter of withdrawal submitted to NEC was forged. Consequently, NEC countermanded the election process in that constituency and announced a new election date after reinstating the candidacy of the NCCR-Mageuzi politician.

The use of false information in the nomination process is not only undemocratic, but also criminal under section 91A of the Elections Act, 1985, which states that a

person who knowingly, by utterance, print or broadcasting, publishes any statement of withdrawal of any candidate for the purposes of promoting the election of another candidate commits an offence of illegal practice and shall be liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of up to two years (NEC, 2000:36-37).

The Tanzania Electoral Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) reports also point to strange stories about the withdrawal of candidates, which smacks of corruption. One of the reports point out that "in Rungwe (E) the person who had been passed by the TLP to contest on their ticket, suddenly had no money to deposit on the 18th of August. In Handeni the CUF aspirant claims to have been kidnapped. But he ended as a member of the CCM campaign team" (Chachage & Tambila, 2000:20).

Bribing a potential candidate to withdraw so that another candidate can sail through unopposed is undemocratic. Citizens are denied choice that could have helped them make a right choice regarding which citizen should represent them in decision-making bodies. Multiparty democracy that requires effective competition is effectively undermined by such illegal conducts. Moreover, such actions are also criminal in nature. Indeed, according to Section 91B of the Elections Act 1985:

Any person who corruptly includes or procures another person to withdraw from being a candidate to an election in consideration of payment or promise of payment, and any person who withdraws in pursuance of such inducement or procurement, commits an offence of corrupt practice and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of up to five years (NEC, 2000:37).

Nomination by NEC was also afflicted by election fever that witnessed 140 objections being raised against ward councillor contestants, and 56 parliamentary contestants. It was merely election fever in attempts to win easily in closely contested areas. Out of the 140 councillor objections, only 25 (17.9%) of all objections had merit, and were therefore upheld. A total of 115 objections, equivalent to 82.1% of all objections, were rejected because they lacked merit. Objections regarding parliamentary candidates, however, appeared to be more credible. For instance, 25 objections for parliamentary candidates were upheld, equivalent to 44.6% of all MP objections, while 31 objections (55.4%) of all objections in this category of contestants were rejected.

In the 2000 parliamentary elections there were less frivolous appeals compared to the 1995 elections. In 1995 there were 62 appeals against the candidates for Member of Parliament out of which 14 (22.6%) were allowed compared to 48 dismissed appeals, equivalent to 77.4% of all appeals.

The nomination process in 2000 was also characterized by a number of unopposed candidates. Arusha Region led in the number of unopposed candidates from 8 constituencies: Hanang, Ngorongoro, Mbulu, Monduli, Arumeru East, Simanjiro, Babati East, and Babati West. Dodoma had 2 unopposed candidates from Kibakwe and Mpwapwa, while Singida Region had only Iramba East Constituency unopposed. Kagera Region also had one unopposed candidate from Biharamulo East. Likewise, Mbeya had

only Rungwe East unopposed. Mtwara had Lulindi unopposed; while Rukwa had Nkansi Constituency unopposed after the Kwela debacle. Ruvuma had Mbinga East unopposed, while Tanga Region had Handeni constituency unopposed. Makete constituency in Iringa Region was unopposed, and so was Kahama constituency in Shinyanga Region.

The high number of unopposed candidates in the 2000 parliamentary elections came as a shock to democracy watchers in the country, especially because there were no unopposed parliamentary candidates in the first multiparty elections in 1995, following the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. Given that all the unopposed candidates belonged to the CCM ruling party, the opposition parties appears to be loosing rather than gaining political ground.

To many people, the high number of CCM unopposed candidates is an indicator that the opposition has weakened further and are therefore afraid of competing with the ruling party. Such tendencies do not augur well with democracy that entails choice to the electorate. It also has denied voters in these constituencies the opportunity to exhibit their support or displeasure to most of these contestants.

Democratic elections give citizens an opportunity to ensure that those elected become accountable to the electorate. Thus, when party members and their sympathizers are not happy with the performance of the incumbent Member of Parliament they reject him in the elections. A case in point was the Member of Parliament for Kigamboni constituency. The CCM nominated the incumbent MP, but its members were dissatisfied with the nomination, and thus on the election day they cast a protest vote for the opposition (CUF), not because CUF had more followers in the constituency but because voters wanted to penalize the CCM candidate for a poor performance record. Thus, the CCM candidate won only 43.6% of valid votes, against CUF's total of 46.1%. However, the CUF presidential candidate got only 39.4% of the valid votes in this constituency, compared to the CCM candidate who received 55% of the valid votes. This is indicative of the fact that the CUF Member of Parliament won by the protest votes against the CCM candidate whose performance record did not meet the expectations of the voters in this constituency. It therefore appears that in Kigamboni the problem for CCM was that of a candidate as a person and not his party. Accountability to the electorate is therefore undermined when many candidates get to parliament unopposed.

It is also interesting to point out that even where the opposition did not nominate candidates for parliamentary elections they still had followers. In Handeni constituency, for example, the CUF disappointed some 6,167 members who voted for the CUF presidential candidate. This means that they abandoned about 10.9% of voters by not fielding a candidate for the parliamentary elections. In Iramba East constituency—another constituency not contested by the opposition—the CUF abandoned 3,926 members or 11.1% of voters who voted for the CUF presidential candidate, while UDP disappointed their 1,269 fans who voted for their presidential candidate.

Indeed, in all areas where the opposition did not field candidates in parliamentary elections, their presidential candidates secured some votes. Given that parliamentary candidates campaign for their party by selling to the electorate their party's policies and programs, failure to field candidates is failure to recognize the need to mobilize additional support for the party and its presidential candidate. Such actions discourage potential members, and undermine the viability of a political party. Unopposed candidates means lost opportunity for the opposition to recruit new members, and to build a strong and viable opposition capable of keeping the ruling party more focussed on serving the people.

It is especially worrying when transparency is also lacking in the way some potential candidates either withdrew under dubious circumstances, or never showed up on the nomination day. In Arumeru East, a CHADEMA candidate withdrew without even the courtesy of informing his party bosses at the District and Regional level. The CHADEMA leadership came to learn that their candidate had abandoned the party when he failed to show up in the party's rally convened specifically to kick off their election campaigns in the constituency.

The nomination process seriously affected transparency and accountability, which are cornerstones for competitive elections. Democracy was the main loser in this endeavor. Both the CCM and the opposition failed democracy and the Tanzanian people by ignoring the will of their party members in the nomination process in some constituencies. Seeking the opinion of only party committee members (a party Electoral College constituting of a few party bosses) is inadequate for any meaningful, constructive and serious internal party democracy. It is often easy to buy a few

party bosses and derail intra-party democracy. All constituency party members in their villages or wards should be consulted in secret ballots if corruption is to be avoided in the party nomination process.

The glaring corruption that marred the CCM nomination process in some constituencies was also a shame to democracy. It was as if the CCM party nomination was on sale to the highest bidder. How can such leaders be said to care about the poor and the poverty that afflicts them? Rich people nominated on account of bribes means they are not seeking public office to help the poor and the vulnerable members of society but are seeking public office for their own private gain.

Overall, it can be said that the party nomination process in the 2000 elections undermined democracy because the determining factor was not the voice of party members expressed through laid-down nomination procedures. Even where these procedures exist—as is the case with CCM—such procedures were generally ignored. Instead, corruption and favouritism dominated the nomination process. Wealth and illegal acts became the norm rather than the exception.

Other parties simply handpicked their cronies to contest the elections without consulting their members. Some nominated themselves to contest in the elections even where the party in question lacked grassroots support in the constituency as will be shown later. Rather than promoting multiparty democracy, political parties used the nomination process to undermine participatory democracy.

Election Campaigns and Democracy

A citizen's voting behaviour can often be translated as an expression of loyalty to her/his political party. The assumption here is that party members would like to see their party win the election. Thus, first and foremost, voters closely identify with their party by voting for the candidate carrying the party banner. In this instance, the number of votes a party secures reflects the size of its support in society. As Hague put it, "in a normal election, voting directly reflects partisanship and the party with the greatest share of party identifiers wins the election" (Hague, Harp and Breslin, 1992:204). This means that whenever a party takes part in an election, it calculates its winning chances based on the number of its perceived supporters. Election campaigns are also organized keeping a close eye on their loyal supporters who they would not wish to offend, while enticing sympathizers and other voters to

join their supporters to vote for the party. It is the party supporters that form the critical base for winning the election.

There are, however, instances where party members may cast protest votes because the candidate was not their choice. As mentioned earlier, when candidates are imposed on them, members may react negatively by rebuffing the party choice in the election. In other instances, the party loyalty may wane depending on the issues presented by their party, and the personality of the party candidate compared to other candidates. Candidates' personal attributes may help to explain the phenomenon of protest votes, particularly to incumbent candidates.

In addition to political events and how the media reports them, both electronic and print media may influence the behaviour of voters. If a negative image—say an image of violence—is frequently broadcast, it may have a negative impact on the behaviour of voters. According to Paldam (1981), voters may support or curse the ruling party because of its performance record. Thus, voters believe that governments should be penalized for poor performance, and rewarded for better economic performance.

In similar vein, Fiorina (1981) argues that voters' behaviour is more business oriented and certainly not restricted to party support alone. Voters would vote to office a political party that promises them a better future and not otherwise. Election campaigns are critical for any competitive democracy because they enable voters to choose among policies and programs sold to them by candidates and their political parties.

Elections can also be won or lost depending on the strategy used by the contending parties. When numerous parties compete with a well-established ruling party they are likely to lose the elections. A better strategy would be for the numerous parties to combine efforts by fielding a single opposition candidate to compete with the ruling party. These parties should pick a candidate who appears to have more local support than the other opposition candidates.

Thus, election campaigns provide an opportunity for potential voters to compare different party programs, and candidates who are to oversee the implementation of those programs, before they decide who deserves to win their votes. As pointed out earlier voters do political parties present rational beings that will carefully select the best candidate to them?

Campaigns serve other functions in a democracy. They provide an opportunity for political parties to impart voter and civic education to potential voters. For instance, political parties teach voters how to cast their votes by using sample ballot papers. It is to the interest of candidates and their parties that people know exactly how to vote and in particular how to place their votes in slots provided for the particular candidate.

On the other hand, candidates and their political parties find it expedient to educate voters on their rights and obligations in society. Raising the level of civic competence of voters is crucial for an informed electorate makes informed judgements about candidates and their political parties. Such knowledge is an imperative given the short history of multipartism in this country. The shadow of single party syndrome still permeates all aspects of citizen's political life. The culture of competitive politics is still in its infancy and has to be developed and nurtured by all political parties.

In the 2000 elections, campaigns revealed an array of shortcomings in competitive democracy in Tanzania. The opposition parties failed to campaign effectively for lack of resources when compared to the CCM. Most of the smaller parties—save for the CUF in Zanzibar—failed to reach potential voters in their campaigns because they lacked funds for transport, hiring loud speakers, amplifiers, etc. Even CUF could not reach all voters. The ability of the opposition to reach the electorate was generally severely limited by lack of adequate resources.

The presence of weak opposition in the grassroots also greatly undermined its ability to organize credible and effective campaigns at the grassroots. Except for the CCM, and the CUF, most of the opposition parties did not have a sizeable presence at the district level in most parts of the country. In particular, the smaller parties even lacked permanent offices in the constituencies to the extent that the UDP, UMD and TADEA shared a single room with one table and three chairs and two benches in the Singida North Constituency (TEMCO, 2000:6). This supports the contention that "many political parties concentrate their activities in capital cities, and remain dormant until election time" (Mukandala, 2000:7). Political election campaigns cannot be effectively organized under such conditions.

Many political parties lacked credible policy programs well-articulated in election manifestos. In this regard, only four political

parties had election manifestos. These were CCM, CUF, TLP, CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi. Even where political parties had well-articulated election manifestos, campaigns they squandered their opportunities to win support as in many instances candidates dwelled too much on individual personalities and mud-slinging and trivialities rather than on issues. Some candidates and their parties spent too much time criticizing CCM mistakes without offering alternative solutions. In short,

many parliamentary and council contestants campaign messages were on individual experiences, and capabilities to deliver on promises rather than on manifestos...even when a candidate talked about policies, at most this was just in passing, much of the time being spent on self aggrandizement (TEMCO, 2000:21).

Indeed many political parties and their candidates spent a lot of money on posters showing their portraits and party symbols. Little time and resources were spent to explain how to improve the welfare of the voters. However, in some instances CCM and CUF tried to use their manifestos especially at the presidential level. Issues debated by the two political parties' candidates were education and health care. The election results, however, indicate that opposition statements did not convince most voters as they ended by voting for CCM candidates.

Some opposition candidates also spent their meagre resource to organize campaigns that undermined other opposition parties. The inter-party conflict, which manifested itself in negative campaign statements against each other, further undermined the credibility of the opposition in front of voters. Such negative campaigns against other opposition candidates helped to bolster the CCM campaigns that the opposition was not mature enough to be trusted with the management of the nation's political, social and economic welfare.

Animosity, rather than competition, that overwhelmed voters—particularly the unsophisticated rural voters—characterized many opposition and CCM campaigns. Violence in some CUF campaign rallies in Temeke and Jangwani, and in particular their "tooth-for-a-tooth" slogan, may also have scared away some voters. Voters translated such slogans negatively to mean vengeance policies that would inevitably undermine peace and tranquillity in Tanzania, the rallying point of CCM campaigners. In short CCM effectively used their campaign machinery to gain voter sympathy by painting the CUF as violent bullies by using the very CUF slogan.

The opposition on the other hand decried the use of public resources by CCM candidates. The use of public vehicles, personnel, and public media undermined equal competition. The political ground became more unequal particularly for the presidential hopefuls, hence undermining competitive multiparty democracy. In addition, opposition candidates also complained of some CCM top brass whom they alleged to have used veiled threats against the business community in their campaigns in efforts to cow and retain them within the CCM fold.

It is not easy to verify how many votes were won by the CCM because of these negative campaign tactics. However, one thing is clear: the use of public property and the use of threats are contrary to the code of conduct signed by political parties in the 2000 elections. Such a conduct undermines the essence of multi-party democracy epitomized by effective competition among candidates and their political parties.

Comparing Political Parties' Performance in the 2000 Elections

Election results are indicative of the various limitations pointed out in this paper. Among other factors, the lack of coordination and cooperation among the various opposition parties led to their defeat in the last general elections. For example, results from the 2000 elections indicate that there are at least 8 constituencies where the opposition parties lost although they had a majority of votes, while CCM won by a minority of votes. Table 1 shows how the lack of cooperation among the opposition led to their defeat.

Table 1: Constituencies where the Opposition Lost by a Majority of Votes

Constituency	Valid votes	CCM valid Votes	CCM % valid Votes	Opposition Valid Vote	Opp. % Valid Votes
Temeke	151,537	65,973	43.5	85,564	56.5
Kigoma North	47,288	21,593	45.7	25,695	54.3
Tarime	60,117	29,283	48.7	30,834	51.3
Mwanza Urban	59,302	27,410	46.2	31,892	53.8
Songea Urban	35,516	16,409	46.2	19,107	53.8
Meatu	22,071	10,995	49.8	11,076	50.2
Bukene	31,237	15,128	48.4	16,109	51.6
Kondoa North	58,634	29,029	49.5	29,605	50.5

Source: NEC Election Statistics.

Table 1 shows, for example, that the opposition parties lost Temeke Constituency to CCM although CCM got only 43.5% of valid votes compared to the opposition's 56.5%. A close analysis of the election results is indicative of the damage done by divisiveness within the opposition. In this particular constituency, the opposition votes were shared among 8 political parties as follows: UPDP won 408 votes (0.3%), NCCR-Mageuzi won 989 votes (0.7%), UDP secured 1,115 votes (0.7%), UMD won only 529 votes (0.3%), NLD won 846 votes (0.6%), while TPP managed only 688 votes (0.5%). Even if only TLP and CUF had fielded a single joint candidate, they would probably have won this constituency since CUF alone scooped 60,872 votes (40.2%), while TLP secured 20,117 votes (13.3%) of the valid votes.

The story is similar in the Kigoma North constituency where CCM won only 45.5% of the valid votes, while the opposition lost by a majority of 54.3% of valid votes. The opposition again squandered their winning chances by sharing their votes among 3 parties: UMD which had 353 votes (0.7%), CHADEMA with 10,966 votes (30.4%), and NCCR-Mageuzi with 14,376 votes (30.4%) of valid votes. Had even CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi combined their efforts by fielding a single candidate they would have won the constituency.

In Mwanza Urban constituency CCM won by a minority of 46.2% of valid votes compared to the oppositions, 53.8% because the opposition shared votes among 6 opposition parties. TPP won 354 votes (0.6%), CHADEMA 404 votes (0.7%), NCCR-Mageuzi 595 votes (1.0%), UDP 4,778 votes (8.1%), TLP 6,828 votes (11.5%) and CUF won 18,933 votes (31.9%).

Songea Urban constituency was no exception. The lack of cooperation cost the opposition, giving CCM chance to win the constituency by a minority of 46.2% of valid votes compared to the 53.8% majority loss of the opposition. Like in other losses, in this constituency, the opposition also squandered their winning chances by sharing their votes among various political parties. CUF, for example, had only 1,475 votes (4.2%), TLP 13,705 votes (38.6%) and NCCR-Mageuzi 3,927 votes (11.1%) of valid votes.

As can be seen in Table 2, out of the 13 fully registered political parties, 12 fielded candidates for the parliamentary elections. Only the NRA failed to field a single candidate in Mainland Tanzania in the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections. Out of those that fielded candidates, it was only CCM that had candidates in all the 181 (100%) Tanzania Mainland constituencies, securing 4,387,156 votes (65.1%) of all valid votes; and 167 Members of

Parliament (92.3%) of all mainland Members of Parliament compared to 14 parliamentary seats won by the parties in the opposition camp.

Table 2: Party Performance in the 2000 Tanzania Mainland Parliamentary Elections

	No of seats contested	% of seats contested	Total valid votes won	% of valid won	No of seats won	% of seats won
CCM	181	100	4,387,156	65.1	167	92.3
CUF	88	48.4	780,978	11.6	2	1.1
TLP	85	46.7	651,385	9.7	4	2.2
UDP	55	30.2	314,937	4.7	3	1.7
CHADEMA	51	28.0	297,944	4.4	4	2.2
NCCR-M	69	37.9	254,499	3.8	1	0.5
NLD	6	3.3	2,507	0.0	0	0
UPDP	12	6.6	14,048	0.2	0	0
UMD	14	7.7	7,041	0.1	0	0
TADEA	12	6.6	8,176	0.1	0	0
PONA	19	10.4	10,895	0.2	0	0
TPP	13	7.1	10,206	0.2	0	0
NRA	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL			6,739,772	181		

Source: NEC Election statistics

As can be seen from Table 2, seven political parties did not manage to win a seat in the elections irrespective of seventy-six candidates they fielded in the parliamentary elections.

If we take votes won by each political party and the number of seats won in the 2000 parliamentary elections as an indicator of party support, it seems CCM is the dominant political party in Mainland Tanzania. The party won 69.3% of valid votes, and 92.3% of parliamentary seats. Statistics in Table 2 show further that four opposition parties have substantial support. These are CUF, followed by TLP, UDP, CHADEMA. NCCR-Mageuzi had 3.3% of valid votes and 0.5% of parliamentary seats in Mainland Tanzania. The rest of the opposition parties appear weak and not competitively viable individually because they each had less than 1% of total valid votes cast and zero parliamentary seats.

In competitive elections, one strategy to win an election is for the opposition parties to carry out a SWOT analysis, examining their strengths weakness, opportunities and threats before embarking on the competition. Moreover, the opposition parties could consider combining their efforts against CCM. Unity among the opposition improves their winning chances.

Concluding Remarks

The performance of political parties in the 2000 General Elections can be said to be a disappointment to democracy. Our analysis has mainly centred on the notion that democracy is only consolidated when political parties compete freely and effectively. Transparency has to be the norm rather than the exception. But most important is the voice of the electorate. We do not doubt in any way the voice of the general electorate.

However, it was disappointing to many democracy watchers to observe political parties trampling the voices of their members. Corruption marred the nomination process within the ruling party, CCM, and in some opposition parties. For the opposition, intra-party democracy was further ignored. Without consulting party members, party bosses handpicked most of the opposition candidates. In some cases opposition candidates self declared themselves as candidates without even informing their parties.

The presence of 24 unopposed constituencies was another blow to democracy. Electoral competition is essential for democracy to thrive. In these constituencies the opposition simply folded their arms in despair at the expense of their followers in these constituencies. Moreover, the opposition squandered the opportunity to recruit new members and to consolidate their position in society. Given that election time is also accounting time for the incumbent MPs, voters in these constituencies were denied the opportunity to make their MPs accountable to the electorate. Multiparty democracy thrives only where political party competition is effective. Lack of competition in elections as is the case with unopposed seats, denies voters a choice among the various registered political parties in the country. In future the electorate has to be empowered to make their verdict on unopposed candidates by voting yes or no as is the case in neighbourhood and village council elections.

Democracy was also undermined by campaigns that ignored party policies and programs. Most candidates spent their time on self-aggrandizement rather than on selling party programs. The opposition wasted time criticizing CCM without providing alternatives, and voters rejected them. Campaigns that focus on competition in the use of foul language instead of raising issues and alternative policy options do not help democracy at all.

The performance of the opposition, as noted in Tables 1 and 2, was very dismal. In the 1995 elections, the opposition managed to field candidates in all Tanzania Mainland constituencies, and was rewarded handsomely. In the 1995 presidential race, CCM got only 61.8% of total valid votes compared to over 70% in the 2000 elections.

It appears that the opposition has lost political ground to the CCM in parliamentary elections for in 1995 they won over 38% of valid votes compared to only 34.9% of valid votes secured in the 2000 elections. The difference can be attributed to their failure to nominate candidates in 24 constituencies in the 2000 elections, forgetting those parliamentary candidates also campaign for their party presidential candidates. The low number of opposition MPs following the 2000 elections is further indicator that these parties have lost political ground. The frequent intra- and inter-party squabbles among the opposition may have disappointed and further discouraged their supporters and the electorate in general.

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