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Campaign Issues in the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania

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Introduction

Electoral issues constitute some of the most important aspects of elections. Issues are normally presented as promises that a given political party or candidate will fulfil once in office. As such many promises can be given in the attempt to woo voters, but in many cases only a few of those end up being fulfilled. This is more so in the developing world, where resources to implement policies are scarce. Given the possibility of a volatile economic, social, and political post-election period, in some cases there can be a total digression from whatever that was promised. This can happen given that the general policy discourse from which political parties (and individual candidates) articulate webs of issues and present them as formal programmes keep changing, just as the social conditions that gave rise to the issues do.

Vote seekers are expected to adhere to what they promise on party or other platforms on their way to political office. Issues that competing parties and candidates discuss in various avenues of communication with the voters may enhance or break a party's chances of winning an election. Issues can also be determinant in candidates' chances of winning positions they are competing for. Normally, political parties and candidates present issues to voters through party election manifestos, election campaigns, posters, debates among competitors, and the use of political advertising in the electronic and print media. In this paper, we intend to discuss the first two – election manifestos and campaigns – with regard to what transpired in the Tanzanian general elections of the year 2000. We shall focus on six political parties. These are Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), Civic United Front (CUF), Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), United Democratic Party (UDP), and the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR). The rationale for picking these parties is that they have representatives in Parliament, and they have been prominent among the thirteen registered political parties.

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Theoretical Perspective on Campaigns, Issues, Voters, Parties and Candidates

As we have noted above, election manifestos and campaigns will be our focus. Election manifestos are normally elaborated, translated and discussed in election campaigns. A campaign has been described as the principal institution that links politicians and the electorate (Kelley, 1956: 3). It has also been argued that, when they are well staged, campaigns provide a compelling incentive to the population to think about government (Riker, 1989: 1). They are, at any rate, a very important part of the electoral process. Campaigns would in some way encompass the various strategies a contender and his or her campaign team decide to take. At the centre of campaigns, however, are the issues that are of importance to the voters and the general citizenry. Before the 1970s issues in campaigns were downplayed as factors in the winning of voters (Abramowitz, 1997: 211), but things have since changed. Researchers on voter behaviour have now confirmed that policy differences on some issues have in certain elections swayed large numbers of voters (Pomper, 1972; Miller et al, 1976; Nie et al., 1979). It is now agreed that policy issues are some of the key factors in voters' decision-making. Some add that policy issues become central in voters' decisions where contenders – whether parties or candidates – differ significantly on the solutions or approaches to be used to address an issue.

Discussing the issue of campaigns and how they affect the potential voters, Ansolabehere et al (1997: 149-53) identify three models. These models have a time dimension since they came into being with transformations in the running and management of campaigns. The first is the *hypodermic model*, by which campaigns win voters if they 'inject' them with appropriately designed messages, thereby restoring party affiliations to life. The 'injection' arouses prior beliefs, values and attitudes that are favourable to the party and candidate in question. So, what is needed is just a well-financed campaign in which the right messages are delivered in time and in the right conditions. The messages are none other than the issues that touch individual voters. The second is the *resonance model*. In this one, it is held that the contents of the hypodermic model alone do not suffice. This is more so in the current era, where some issues that touch potential supporters come to the surface and need to be addressed as they arise. The resonance model, therefore, categorizes what the hypodermic model contains as belonging to long-term (dispositional) influences, and those which arise and need to be addressed there and then as short-term (circumstantial) influences.

Both influences need to be taken care of in the campaigning. The last model is the *competitive model*. This model attaches particular importance to the strategic interactions between the candidates. Indeed, as Greer (1998: 188) remarks, the types of appeals that are most rational for candidates to promote are "a function of not only the parties' strengths and the weaknesses but also of the candidates' personal qualifications and those of the opposition". In the earlier two models, the candidates are seen as actors who just need to maximize their position vis-à-vis the voters, leaving out the actions and the strengths of the opponents. The competitive model, on the other hand, sees the effect of any particular message as conditioned by the effects of the competitor's messages (Ansolabehere et al, 1997: 153). The model recognizes the interdependence among candidates.

Again the messages of the competitive model are nothing more than the issues of importance to the electorate, and how a candidate would want to handle them – of course with the party stand on the issues in the background. Conway and Hughes (1997: 192) note that in some elections, candidates and political parties address issues of great public concern to enhance voter interest in the elections, the candidates and the campaigns. The position a candidate takes with regard to a certain issue will determine the support that may come from the potential voters (Greer, op. cit.: 187). Studies have shown that issues come to the fore when contestants take different positions on them. This is where the so-called 'search for the difference' comes in: Dearly held beliefs, such as morality issues, are brought into the campaign to identify like-minded candidates. In some instances, especially in the older democracies, there is the concept of 'issue ownership' whereby some policy areas are known, or are believed by many to be better handled by a certain political party or leader. In the battle between candidates with regard to a given issue, a candidate is likely to avoid an issue where one considers oneself weaker than the opponent, raising other issues instead in an attempt to neutralize that opponent. In doing so, one picks issues that highlight one's own strength. This is more important in situations where, as Norris (1997: 75) remarks about present-day campaigns, shifts from cleavage and issue-based conflicts to character-based personalization of politics are likely to occur.

However, voters may need more than the issues at hand in order to be interested in the campaigns and ultimately in the voting. It is also believed, for example, that the affiliation an incumbent has with his or her constituency can keep that constituency safely in

the member's hands, but only when there are no new issues detrimental to the incumbent (Jacobson, 1997: 45). For those who are looking to be re-elected for the first time, and if they win, the payoff is the so-called the "Sophomore Surge". In this surge, statistics from researches carried out in the US suggest that the winning margin is likely to increase by some 7 to 9 per cent (Zaller, 1998; Alford and Brady, 1993). Another factor that may influence voters and bring them into the political process is the presence of (peer) groups. Interest groups including community-based groups, candidates' groups and so on do have a role to play in the entire electoral process (Leighley, 1990; Verba and Nie, 1972). These groups can bring their followers to the political process through personal influence, or through their activation, reinforcement or changing some deeply held beliefs and attitudes through contact with voters (Dalton, 1988; Harris, 1994). Some have associated level of education, levels of income and employment as characteristics that render potential voters more accessible and, therefore, easier to mobilize (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1993).

The 2000 Election Manifestos in Tanzania

Election manifestos are documents prepared and owned by the contending political parties. In these, the parties outline their broad political agenda from which if they are voted into office, development policies are formulated and programmes are drawn. In this sense political parties are crucial instruments for the electoral process and the political system in general. Parties are the organizing instruments for electoral contests that are fought over competing issues which are articulated in policy packages. The parties articulate the issues after carefully studying the needs of communities where the voters live. Political parties are also important in the post-election period because the winning party (or coalition of parties) is responsible for the conduct of governmental affairs.

As noted above, the six political parties' manifestos touch many similar areas. These are the areas any government in power would have to formulate policies on. There are, however, areas where the parties differ as we shall show later in this section. The general trend was that the opposition parties had similar agenda also where the opposition in general differed from the ruling party. The differences that appeared as far as the opposition parties were concerned were the cases where one party having an issue which the other did not address at all. First let us start by the key policy areas where they address similar issues.

The Economy and Economic Development

The economy is obviously the first area where each political party should address. All six parties committed a substantial space in their manifestos to tell the electorate what the economy needs in order to get going. They admit the fact that the economy is in bad shape and a lot needs to be done in order to keep Tanzania's economy in order. They then mention even the sectors that are crucial, including mining, industries, science and technology, modernization of agriculture, energy, communication, finance, the environment, infrastructure, tourism, trade, marketing strategies and so on. The promise was that all these would be accorded the right attention so that they would contribute to the economic growth of the country. The state of the economy then and now has been very unstable. The government has been implementing some reforms, which, unfortunately, have had adverse outcomes to the very poor in the society. This was, therefore, an issue in which the opposition parties could score some points against the ruling party.

Social Services Provision

All parties addressed the issues related to the provision of better services in the areas of water, health, education and housing. They also touched such areas as the care for the handicapped, the old, and other disadvantaged groups in society (NCCR, part iv; CCM, part iii; CHADEMA, part ix and x; CUF part 13-15; and TLP, part iv). Given the status of the economy as discussed above, and the reforms which are being implemented, the sector changed most of the rules of its operation. The cost-sharing policies which make service seekers pay part of the cost have not been well received. The opposition parties, again, could score some points here but they failed to say what they were going to do that would be significantly different from what the CCM government had been doing.

Rule of Law, Democracy and Good Governance

The parties' manifestos have a section on the need for rule of law and the creation of a professional social service delivery machine. They also mention the need to improve the chances for a truly democratic society. Included in this section is the need to fight corruption in Tanzania. Much as each of the parties has something to do with the above-mentioned areas, there are others where they completely differ or address the issues in significantly different ways. The reasons for these differences range from party's background, experience of the 1995 elections, party's stronghold in terms of territorial space and sections of society, and so on (TLP, part ii; CUF, part ii; CCM part iv; NCCR, part i). Let us turn to some of these issues.

On the Ruling Party History

CCM has a section that the other parties could not have had because of their different histories and background. CCM was the ruling party and for the past five years it was trying to implement the 1995 election manifesto. As such it had to tell the electorate what it achieved and, therefore, the justification for being given another five-year term. In this section the CCM highlighted the areas where it scored some successes although modest when one looks at the miserable conditions many Tanzanians live in. The CCM also reiterated its intention to continue with the public sector reforms as well as consolidating the economic liberalization process. The other parties did not have such a section because they never were in power – and more so when it comes to national level leadership.

Constitution and constitution writing

For years since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania, the opposition parties have demanded that a new constitution be written because the current constitution is defective in that it does not fit the current political arrangements. Rather than keep it they have always demanded that a new constitution is overdue. As such the manifestos have a section addressing the need for a new constitution (NCCR, part ii; TLP, part ii; CUF, part i; CHADEMA, part ii). CCM's manifesto is silent on this issue. It can only be said by implication – given the stand of the government in the past five years – that CCM favours the amendment of the current constitution whenever the need arises. This issue was and it is still for many ordinary Tanzanians rather esoteric. The population is concerned with more of the "bread and butter" issues. As it happened, they would not be excited by the inappropriateness of the constitution.

The Structure of the Union Between Tanganyika and Zanzibar

The structure of the Union has been a big issue in Tanzanian politics. At some point it brought the late Julius Nyerere on a confrontation course with some CCM leaders when the so-called G.55 (in the Union parliament) advocated for the formation of a Tanganyika government thereby making the Union have a three-government structure. CCM is adamant in its manifesto (CCM, s. 116) that the current structure of two governments – one for the Union and another for Zanzibar will remain in place. The other parties categorically stated that were they to take power they would review the structure of the Union creating a third government – that of Tanganyika (CUF, s. 1.2; CHADEMA, s. 2.0, vii; TLP, page 11; and NCCR, s. 2.3).

Human Rights

The CUF manifesto has a section on human rights which does not appear in any other manifesto (CUF, part i). The CUF would see to it that human rights are upheld and it would do that by, first making sure that a new constitution was in place. The section also talks of the introduction of an independent Human Rights Commission. However, the post-election CCM government has made steps towards this anyway, by passing a bill for its formation in 2001. The commission was finally formed, and replaced the then existing ombudsman – the Permanent Commission of Inquiry.

Government Expenditure

The CUF and TLP parties have a section on the size and expenditure of the central government. They were of the opinion that the government expenditure was too high mainly because of the size of the government bureaucracy. TLP went further to argue that there was need to do away with the District Commissioner post in an attempt to trim government expenditure, while at the same time trying to pay key personnel such as medical doctors a better salary than it was then. On the part of CCM, although not directly stated so, one can argue that the public sector reforms that were and are being undertaken could mean the same as what these two opposition parties were claiming to do were they to be elected into office. The good governance movement has as its component part, the scaling down government activities in economic sphere as well as reducing the size of the government bureaucracy. The CCM government had gone quite a distance in this direction by the time the elections were held in the year 2000 (CUF, part iii; TLP, p. 11).

Privatization of Public Assets and Indigenization

All parties have something in their manifestos about privatization. Much as they agree that is an economic reform strategy, they however differ on how. The TLP and CHADEMA parties' manifestos argue for a privatization that takes care of the indigenous entrepreneur. They would see to it that those who came to invest are advised to invest in new projects rather than buying the existing public enterprises. But on the issue of taking care of the local entrepreneurs, two other parties – CUF and NCCR – are also for selective and purposeful strategy that would see them having an advantage over foreigners. As for the CCM, practice has shown that they have done it in an open-for-everybody style which is the ideal style as per the free market and free trade conventions. This has been not so preferred by local entrepreneurs. It was also an issue when the Minister for Industries and Trade aired his views that

indigenous bidders in such sales as those of parastatals should be given preference (TLP, part vi; CHADEMA, part iii and vi; CUF, part iii; CCM, part ii).

Traditional Leadership

The TLP manifesto has a section about its intention to revive traditional leadership, which was banned in the early 1960s. TLP leadership believe, according to the manifesto, that although the abolition of traditional leadership was useful in the early days of independence (it helped fight tribalism), it was time to revive it in order to restore national ethics. The basis for the belief that the traditional leaders would help in the fight against vices in government does not come out very clearly though. Though some countries (such as South Africa and Uganda) have reinstalled the traditional leadership structures into the formal state structure, they did not attach this to the issue of ethics. And, in many places in Tanzania the inter-tribal interactions would make the revival less relevant today.

Proportional Representation and Governments of National Unity

The TLP's manifesto has a section on the need for changing the way representatives are picked – from the first-past-the post to proportional representation. It is on that basis that "every vote would have some weight". Further, TLP was advocating for the formation of government of national unity – in which ministers and other political posts would be distributed among all political parties with a certain percentage of the popular vote.

Issues at Campaign Rallies

Whereas the election manifestos of the political parties can be said to have been comprehensive in coverage, it was not the case when it came to what was said in campaign rallies. At the rallies parties used selective topics; apparently there are several reasons for this selectivity. Firstly, there were issues that were "crowd pullers" and which each and every candidate would want to talk about. Issues about corruption and related aspects, employment for the youth, pay to the civil servants, taxation and so on, were all issues that many of the voters wanted to hear about. Secondly, although some of the issues cover the entire nation as issues for public policy, different areas of the country are differently affected by the issue problems. As such it all depended on where the candidate was at any particular time. Thirdly, at the rallies it was party candidates who were articulating the issues; each candidate had areas where they felt they were strong and in some they were not. As it has

already been referred in the theory part, the use of the areas one is strong in can pay. Candidates would not take the risk of addressing an issue in which they were not entirely very strong, as it has been suggested in the theory section above. This strategy will be shown in the next part where we indicate the issues that presidential candidates tended to discuss in key campaign meetings. Fourthly, for the presidential campaigns, the candidates had to use their record to impress the electorate. As such the TLP presidential candidate Mr. Mrema would not leave out corruption, as this was his strong area. He was sacked from the government in the early 1990s because of disagreement with the cabinet over issues related to the way corruption should be fought, and self cleansing of the government. For the CCM candidate, it was inevitable that he would highlight the few areas where the government had performed relatively well. Things like debt relief and cancellation under the HIPC arrangement, peace and security and so on would be in the menu wherever he was campaigning. Let us look at the key issues that were covered by the parties and the reaction by the opponents. Here we are looking at the ruling party against the opposition in general. However, this does not mean that the opposition was united in every issue, and where they were, it was not all the time.

Ruling Party Track Record

The inaugural campaign rally for the CCM focused on the areas where the government did fairly well – at least from CCM's standpoint. As such the entire top brass from the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, party secretary general, and other senior ministers outlined the following areas as areas of success. This being the case the voters were urged to ignore the opposition because the opposition was not in a position to do any better – and "they never had the experience of running a government"! The issues were:

- Government's good record with regard to the management of the economy that led to positive growth for several years running and which led to debt cancellation by creditor countries;
- Successful privatization of some public enterprises which have now happened to be big tax payers to the government such as Tanzania Breweries, cement factories at Tanga, Mbeya and Dar es Salaam, and Tanzania Cigarette Company;
- Successes in the control of inflation;

- The intensification of the war against corruption;
- The relatively peaceful country that Tanzania is compared to the rest of Africa;
- CCM government as the initiator of the political reforms which led to the reintroduction of multiparty politics; and
- Some improvement has been recorded in the infrastructure sector – roads, communication etc.

The opposition on the other hand had other ideas about what the CCM leadership was claiming to be a successful five-year term in office. The first area to be attacked was the state of the economy. Actually the government had little to prove it to the common Tanzanian that there was an improvement in the economy. All opposition parties in concert insisted in their campaigns that the state of the economy was bad and that all this was a result of bad economic management by the CCM government. Several areas of the economy were picked for this attack. Firstly, the opposition noted the declining agricultural production and the lack of markets for the little that is produced. In fact the problem of marketing is critical in all parts of Tanzania as the liberalization of the economy did not bring competitive prices for agricultural products, but the dictation of private buyers of the prices they would want to pay. In some areas, the poor infrastructure made it impossible for the buyers to reach the peasants, thereby having peasants who did not know what to do with their crops. This is after the collapse of the cooperatives, which had the reach and tolerance that private buyers lack. No wonder, the government that was formed after CCM won the elections has a Ministry for Cooperatives and Marketing!

Secondly, when it comes to industries and their impact on unemployment, the few factories that Tanzania had have come to a halt as far as production is concerned. Only those which were making profit, and which interested buyers were divested. The non-profit makers have been lying idle, with no investors to bail them out, and as a result this is keeping thousands of workers in the dole. Unemployment had been and is still rising. Institutions of higher learning, secondary schools and primary schools are producing graduates who do not want to stay in villages – perhaps justifiably so because there is little hope of making a meaningful livelihood there. The 1999 estimates by the Vice President's Office which is charged with the poverty alleviation programmes of the number of graduates (from primary, secondary and tertiary institutions) entering the labour annually is at 700,000 while only 40,000 get absorbed into the formal-sector employment. The private and informal sectors on which the government pins its hopes to

reduce the levels of unemployment are yet to show great increases in investments. The result is a large number of unemployed in Tanzania's urban centres. It is estimated that 30% of the Tanzanian youth are unemployed (URT, 1998: 4). Those engaged in small holder agriculture are also partly unemployed during off-season periods. The civil service reforms that have been taking place since 1991 have had their toll on the employment figures in government as well. Statistics show that since 1992 when the retrenchment exercise started, the total number of government employees has come down from 355,000 to around 270,000 today (Ntukamazina, 1999).

Thirdly, several regions are literally cut off from the hub of administration (Dar es Salaam) during the rainy season due to bad roads. This means that economic activity in these areas slow down during several months of the year. The feeder roads in these regions and the rest of the country are, obviously, in a worse condition. The status of the other infrastructure needed for development such as railways, electricity and so on are also in limbo as the privatization process is hanging on them, and may drag for several years to come. This indecision has a negative effect on productivity.

Fourthly, the tax regime was attacked as being too severe for the common Tanzanian. This was cited in such areas as customs and excise duty, VAT, and other taxes that have made imported goods cost more in Tanzania than in the region. For example, the CUF Presidential candidate noted that petroleum products were sold at a cheaper price in Malawi – a country that has to pay for the port charges and road transport from Dar es Salaam to that country.

Second area of attack was the handling of the social services by the CCM government. At some point in 1985, those who could read and write were 91% (UNICEF, 1998); these percentages have gone down to 81.7% for men and 62.0% for women (UNDP, 1999). Universal Primary education scored an 98% in 1981 (Ishumi, 1990: 20); now it is around 75%. Between 1987 and 1990, 75% of Tanzanians living in urban areas and 46% of those living in rural areas were getting clean and safe water (UNDP, op. cit.). During the same period 72 rural dwellers and 99 urban dwellers could get health services; (calculated using time needed using local transport means to the health facility). Now the situation has grossly changed. Going to the hospital without having the money for the cost-sharing component will not help much. Many would-be patients in government hospitals have now turned to traditional medicine instead. Generally, despite government efforts – such as increasing the percentage of the education budget – things have moved from bad to worse.

Another weak point on the part of the government was the fight against corruption. This has been a tricky area for the government and it was not going to go off the agenda of the opposition parties. The government has been trying to fight corruption but the perpetrators have also advanced in their means to transact this vice. As such the government had by 2000 made very little headway. The opposition pounced on this, and argued that the CCM and government officials are all corrupt and as such they cannot pretend to be fighting corruption.

The situation was made no better by the intra-party nomination campaigns in the CCM which took part earlier in the year. These preliminaries which are run in each political party witnessed the CCM's process as being the most corrupt processes of all. While some parties had the preferential vote by the members, some had a committee system and some had direct appointment by party chiefs. CCM had the preferential vote system – and it led to its tarnished image as far as fighting corruption was concerned. For the CCM leadership the preliminaries were a disgrace to the party. This was so because a party that had promised to be in the forefront in the fight against corruption should have, in the first place, been clean itself, before trying to tell the public that a government formed from its ranks would be corruption free. The catalogues of the tactics used to win preferential votes – and which were not approved by the party – are documented in several publications, including the TEMCO report (2000: 158) on the elections.

The Opposition Alternatives

The opposition parties did have their own proposals. Some of these were somehow well thought out but others cast doubt whether they were not for purposes of publicity and cheap popularity in order to sway unsuspecting would-be voters. Others were controversial altogether. All were talking of improving the social services provision institutions were their parties voted into office. They would not say exactly where the money would come from. For instance the CUF promised to build the Mwanza-Dodoma road, Dar es Salaam-Lindi road and repair rural roads. This is a gigantic task that needs donor money as the local economy cannot finance such big projects. Seif Sharif Hamad promised to build a modern Zanzibar in 100 days in power! South Africa with all its economic might could not fulfill such a promise by former President Nelson Mandela after being voted President of that country in 1994! Where would Zanzibar get the resources? This, the campaigners did not tell the electorate.

UDP, TLP and CUF would offer free education as well as health care. In other words they would do away with the cost-sharing arrangement which had been put in place after arduous negotiations between Tanzanian negotiators and the International Financial Institutions. Short of such arrangement, Tanzania would not, for example, be given aid or get this debt cancellation. At the same time some opposition leaders congratulated President Mkapa for that achievement, i.e. the cancellation of Tanzania's debt by some creditor countries and international financial institutions. Now how come they would do away with the arrangements that led to the positive image that Tanzania had built in front of the donor community? To say the least, the proposals were all out to put Tanzania in a collision course with the international financial institutions as well as other bilateral donors.

Another controversial proposal by the opposition candidates was concerned with taxation. While most promises made by the opposition candidates implied higher expenditure by an opposition government compared to that of CCM, they at the same time claimed that there was room for reduced tax rates. They would do, among other things, abolish development levy (CUF), reduce taxes in several areas including income tax (all parties), tax holidays to investors (TLP), and so on. This is on top of the scrapping of the cost-sharing arrangement in large social service sectors like education and health. The latter would certainly incense the donors thereby making jeopardizing the flow of the much needed aid. The former would make the government realize less income thereby making it less able to improve the livelihood of the population. The two juxtaposed situations do not augur well with the needs of an economy that is fighting to extricate itself from dependence and abject poverty.

The government of Tanzania is one of the poorest in the world and this has contributed importantly to its inability to implement even own made policies without the help from outside the country. The problem comes when the policy process moves from the formulation to implementation. Resources to implement policies are, in most cases, expected from outside the country. Donor pledges are not always fulfilled or delivered in time. As such, programmes and projects that are dependent on the donor community have no guarantee of receiving the required inputs for implementation. This donor dependency has, as a result, led to a reduced government commitment to the development budget, leaving it to struggle with the recurrent budget. Realizing more from internal sources should be the strategy, rather than institute measures that do the opposite. A fair assessment of the situation is that, while the government's

capacity is constrained by inadequate financial resources, the little that there is should be increased where possible and used judiciously. One would want to believe that what the CCM government has been doing with regard to the size of government and increased revenue collection is good for the country at large. Since a large proportion of government revenues go into the wage bill, the downsizing of the government workforce as well as the rationalization of local government employment is likely to have an impact on the government's ability to effect some of its policies with less assistance from outside.

CCM, through its presidential candidate, reiterated again and again that taxes would not be scrapped or reduced. From CCM's point of view reducing taxes would mean slower pace for the national development plan implementation. Why then would the opposition candidates want to reduce and/or scrap some taxes, which we are absolutely clear that they are essential for the economy and the running of the government bureaucracy? There are several explanations, some of which we discuss below. First and foremost is, of course, the search for cheap popularity. By promising big things like the abolition of the development tax one expected that would-be voters were likely to be swayed to the other side of the fence. Secondly, and this is linked to the first, given the level of understanding of taxation of many Tanzanians, radical moves like abolition was likely to have stronger appeal than reduction or adjustment here and there. We are saying that it is linked to the first because only those who do not understand the way governments work would buy the ideas like the possibility of totally doing away with certain nationwide taxes. In order for the message to reach the intended, therefore, radical promises were needed. Thirdly, on the part of the government, the candidate had his hands already tied in that the government has had agreements with donors, agreements that include the tax component in the management of the national economy. As such the CCM presidential candidate had to adhere to other commitments made earlier. Given that the CCM candidate was the substantive president during the campaigns, his words would have been taken seriously by the outside world. He therefore did not have the luxury the opposition candidates had – that of promising the moon to the electorate.

Assessment of Campaigns and Issues

The theories revisited earlier in this paper suggest several things that are expected from the campaigns and the messages delivered as a whole. We are looking at these and see whether the Tanzania

campaigns showed similar patterns or not, and whether the situation in Tanzania contribute to this situation. First we start by asking the question: were the able to make people interested in what is happening about their government? The answer to this is certainly not. The reason for this is the majority of Tanzanians are not literate enough to bother about what their government is doing even when there are things like election campaigns. The majority of the people are rural dwellers who do not have the means of communication to know each and everything that is about to take place. Television, radio and newspapers are inaccessible because of either the service is not supplied in the area, or for that which is available the people cannot pay for it. These rural dwellers who are easily swayed by tricky politicians, depending on what tangible they (politicians) can offer on the day. For instance, the CCM mass-produced T-shirts, khangas, and so on which they used to distribute to the "unsuspecting" rural dwellers in order that they vote for the CCM. These were quite effective – as the election results showed. The majority rural population hardly cares about the issues that are discussed in campaigns. They are more interested in their immediate problems like lack of clothing, lack of food, lack of water and so on. Their interest is immediate and the earlier that need is met then they would tend to respond to the one who feeds that need.

Further, the feeding of the need can come in various ways. It may take the form of a bribe. It may take the form of a genuine campaign offer, and it may also take the form of a threat. The politics of Tanzania provide the opportunity for all the three to take place either singly or simultaneously. For instance, Tanzanian voters in some the parts of the country were threatened that if they did not vote for a certain party then law and order would have disintegrated and Tanzania would turn into another Rwanda. The T-shirt (the carrot) would come first and the threat (stick) would come later. The recipient – especially the rural based ones, are likely to bow to the threat.

Secondly, we can ask whether the campaigns covered, in dimensions, the three theories on right messages, long outstanding and short term issues, as well as being strategic relying on party strength and so on. In fact all these were in one way or another covered by all parties. The crowd-puller issues mentioned earlier were an attempt by the candidates to strike the right issues and make an impact. The issues raised about mining and privatization were but issues of short term dimension meant to capture the

memories of the electorate. The use of party choirs, music bands and famous personalities, was a way of making use of the party strength in order to successfully woo voters. The search for opponent's weaknesses was a strategy to be more competitive vis-à-vis opposition candidates, thereby taking advantage of whatever slips they might have made in the course of the campaigns.

It would look like the people in Tanzania, most of whom are busy thinking about the next meal, would not be easily leave their daily struggles and focus on election campaigns. As such we can say that the majority of Tanzanians were not made to be interested in the issues of governance and government in general by the campaigns. This is evidenced in the fact that, parties had to make sure that there was a minimum possible audience in their campaign meetings by "buying" young men and women to accompany party candidates in crucial meetings. The youth would be promised some cash and food for the day they would accompany the candidate. They were able to move from one region to another - which implied a lot of money would have been spent from the parties finances. This was the case with parties like the CCM, CUF and TLP. We however, cannot deny the fact that there were also committed members - albeit only a few - who would accompany party candidates without being promised something. For one, to be interested in politics there has to be some minimum (living) conditions that would afford them the time to follow whatever is happening in the political circles. These minimum conditions are not available to most of Tanzanians. It is no wonder that during the single-party era, people were forced to attend such rallies as well as other political meetings, like when a politician was visiting the area.

Conclusion

The manifestos of the parties did have a comprehensive coverage of the issues that must be addressed in a political system. These ranged from the constitutional order, the major roles of a government - social services, defence, international relations and so on; major problems that the country is facing including diseases, archaic production techniques, corruption, drug trafficking and so on; unemployment, to the government size and expenditure. The campaign rallies did not have as comprehensive coverage as the manifestos mainly because the candidates focused on local issues depending where they were immediately after mentioning one or two issues of national dimension.

The changes in the law, which allowed house-to-house canvassing, did affect the role of open campaigns in the whole electoral process. This is much so because the role of the platforms in convincing the electorate to vote for one's party was quite limited by the fact that contestants could deliver the message in much more secretive places like the homes of would-be voters. It can be said that maybe even issues were not raised in such circumstances; rather it was for the contesting candidate to use other means (legal or illegal) to convince the would-be voters to give them their votes. This was part of the explanation as to why some political parties never held campaign rallies in some constituencies. However, the serious parties did have a mixture of all possible and allowed platforms to put across the issues, which they believed would be addressed by their political parties were they to be voted into power. To a large extent the parties and the candidates covered the key issues and used the allowed platforms well.

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Defence and Security Forces and the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania

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"...The textbooks on criminology like to advance the idea that prisoners are mentally defective. There is only the merest suggestion that the system itself is at fault..." (Jackson, 1971).

Introduction

Little attention has been paid to the role of defence and security forces on democratization processes (including elections) in Africa. This general observation is also true in the case of Tanzania. This may not be accidental. Part of the explanation is that defence and security forces are usually (not inevitably) insulated from public scrutiny and scholarly enquiry. An excessively high degree of secrecy and lack of transparency within these organs raise a question regarding their position and role in society. If these are really public institutions, one would expect them to have a reasonable degree of public accountability and be somewhat accessible to public scrutiny.

The 2000 general elections in Tanzania were characterised by a distinct feature that has never been witnessed in the country in the past elections since independence. During the 2000 elections coercive organs of the state, particularly the police force, and to some extent, the army occupied a conspicuous profile in the electoral processes at various stages. The police force was invariably deployed to "maintain law and order" during the election processes. It was involved in verbal wrangling with the opposition; and in a number of incidents it was involved in physical confrontation supporters of opposition parties. Police commanders constantly issued statements of political nature that were supposed to be given by politicians. The army was mobilised, deployed and kept on alert¹. Given the sensitivity of elections particularly in young democracies such as Tanzania, undoubtedly, coercive organs of the state ought to assume a prominent position in maintaining law and order so as to facilitate the conduct of electoral processes. What raises the main concern

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