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East African Community: the Challenges Ahead

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Introduction

"Doors of opportunity have been opened. The movement of people across our national borders to facilitate increased trade is now possible. But it is one thing to open a door; it is another to get people to walk through it."

President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi of Kenya

"If indeed some kind of devil was responsible for the break up of the (defunct) East African Community, by these signatures we are sending the devil back to hell."

President Benjamin William Mkapa of Tanzania

"The Treaty that we have just signed should serve the interests of our people. We must therefore ensure the peoples full involvement and create the necessary environment for them to conduct their business."

President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda[1]

The lure of a regional approach to economic development has been strong in Africa, even before the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. Since then numerous regional organisations have seen the light of day. One lesson that can be drawn from past experiences is that although a great number of these regional organisations have been long sustained, they have not been successful in making progress towards the larger goal of African cooperation and integration. The economic crisis facing Africa explains the increasing voices for regional integration as one way out of the mess of underdevelopment. This was especially evident

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[1] All these statements are excerpts of the Joint Communiqué of the East African Heads of State Summit, Arusha, Tanzania, 30 November 1999

when, in 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action to spearhead continent-wide cooperation.

On June 3, 1991, at the 27th Summit of the Organization of African Unity in Abuja, Nigeria, 35 heads of state and government (the largest such attendance since the founding of the OAU in 1963) signed the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), with a timetable for the phased removal of barriers to inter-African trade. At this gathering it was also agreed to strengthen existing regional initiatives towards African co-operation, eventually leading to the creation of an Africa-wide monetary union and economic community by the year 2025. To achieve these objectives, the AEC Treaty intends, among other things, to strengthen existing regional economic communities, establish other communities where they do not exist, and conclude agreements on harmonisation and co-ordination of policies between existing sub-regional and regional economic communities. It is within this broad African goal that the new East African Community was formed.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the challenges and prospects of the new East African Community (EAC). First, a brief overview of the history of East African cooperation is highlighted. This is followed by a discussion of the efforts that led to the launching of the treaty for EAC in January 2001. Thirdly, a discussion of the challenges is undertaken. The paper concludes with an analysis of the prospects for EAC to drive regional economic growth.

The East African Experience: An Overview

In 1921, the colonial territories of Kenya and Uganda united to form a free trade area, which Tanganyika joined two years later. In 1927, the three territories became a customs union with a common external tariff having been adopted earlier in 1922. From 1926 to 1950 various services common to the three colonies evolved under joint control and formed the nucleus of the East African High Commission, established in 1948, and later renamed the East African Common Services Organization. Until 1965 a common currency, the East African shilling, was the legal tender in the three countries as well as in Aden and Zanzibar. Arguably, these were the first attempts to create economic integration, although admittedly under British colonial sponsorship. During the nationalist struggles for political independence between the 1950s and the early 1960s, calls for an East African Federation were

strongly voiced. This was never achieved, and the three colonies - Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya - became independent in 1961, 1962, and 1963 respectively.

The second attempt to consolidate East African co-operation was a result of Uganda and Tanganyika's complaints concerning losses accrued by the virtue of their membership in the common market. In 1961, as a result of the Report of the East African Economic and Fiscal Commission (the Raisman Commission), a scheme was suggested to redistribute tax revenue as a means to make good for the loss of revenue for the competing partners. In 1964, when all three countries were already politically independent, the Kampala Agreement was negotiated with the main aim of decreasing trade deficits and the industrial imbalance between Tanzania and Uganda, on the one hand, and Kenya, on other. Unfortunately, the agreement did not take off, partly because Kenya never ratified it, insisting, among other things, that the single currency be maintained in East Africa, a condition that was unacceptable to the other partners. In June 1966 Tanzania created its own central bank and publicly announced plans to introduce its own currency. A period of deterioration in East African co-operation followed.

The third attempt to foster economic integration in East Africa occurred on December 1, 1967 when the Treaty for East African Co-operation, anchored on three broad categories—economic policy, common institutions, and a common market—was signed in Kampala, Uganda. The treaty was, essentially, founded upon the goal of a more equal distribution of the benefits of economic integration and accepted that free trade was not beneficial to the three East African countries. Indeed, the Treaty advocated a restricted trade (e.g. imposition of transfer tax system) for short-term goals, but with a longer-term objective of eventually moving to free trade within a common market arrangement.

In 1977 the East African Community collapsed, almost a decade after it was established. In 1984 the three countries signed an agreement for the division of the assets and liabilities of the former East African Community. Ironically, it was during the division of assets and liabilities that the three states agreed to explore and identify future areas of cooperation, thus providing the genesis for the current effort. However, with regard to the current effort to promote regional integration, a haunting question remains: will history repeat itself?

The New East African Community

On 30th November 1993, the heads of state of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania met in Arusha, Tanzania, and signed an agreement to revive co-operation among the three states - 16 years after the collapse of the East African Community, and nine years after the countries agreed on the division of assets and liabilities. This meeting was pursuant to Article 14.02 of The East African Community Mediation Agreement of 1984, which provided for the exploration and identification of areas of future co-operation. As a beginning, the leaders established a Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation to promote co-operation in various fields, including political, economic, social, cultural and security, among the states for their mutual benefit. In addition, the leaders urged the Commission to speed up the process of resolving outstanding issues of the defunct East African Community, as stipulated in the East African Community Mediation Agreement of 1984 (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1993).

On 14 March 1996, the Secretariat for the Permanent Commission was launched with the headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. In April 1998 the Secretariat circulated a Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community for debate by East Africans. On 30 November 1999, President Moi of Kenya, President Museveni of Uganda, and President Mkapa of Tanzania finally signed the Treaty establishing the East African Community. On 15 January 2001 the East African Treaty was officially launched in Arusha after ratification by the three countries. To further the process of consolidating integration efforts, the three presidents inaugurated the East African Legislative Assembly, and the East African Court of Appeal on 30 November 2001.

A careful reading of the Treaty suggests that gradualism is the strategy to realize its aims. The principles that govern the institutional decision-making call for political consensus among the partner states. In evaluating the prospects of the new East African Community, a retrospective examination of integration efforts in East Africa is necessary to do justice to the question: how are the East African states going to prevent a repeat performance of the past? The experiences of African undertakings in regional integration suggest that national performances will be affected by both global and internal factors.

The Global Scene

Of course, prediction is most hazardous, and only the foolhardy would presume to be forecasting confidently the new shape of the East African co-operation in this increasingly globalized world. These are hard times for regional integration schemes in Africa. This is not the first time that African leaders have shown an interest in regionalism. The record on implementation has been as disappointing as has the general performance of African economies since independence. To a large extent, East African co-operation will be shaped by developments at three interrelated levels: global economy, regional economy, and individual member state's economy.

The new East African Community is being created at a time of enormous change in the international system that is dominated by post-cold war era politics and globalisation. The overriding influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the regional economy and the resource constraints faced by East African countries has necessitated the adoption of structural adjustment programs and reforms. These are to a large extent defining the parameters in which issues of regional integration and cooperation have to be discussed. Globalisation for Africa is not a new phenomenon, but the continuation of developments that have been in train for some considerable time. It is a process that can be traced to the end of the 19^{th} century during the growth of monopoly capitalism where, for example, the economies of Africa were integrated into, and exploited by, the capitalist system as colonies. Thus, despite winning political independence, African countries have never convincingly been able to address the economic problems of the African continent (Amoako, 2001).

Current discourse on globalisation refers to a process, which progressively integrates national commodity, capital, financial and currency markets into a single global market, operating according to a set of rules in which transnational corporations, multi-lateral institutions, and the governments of advanced industrialised countries are in the driver's seat in the context of huge technological developments, particularly in information and communications. These developments have transformed the way in which the dominant forces in the global economy define their interests outside their home base. Among others, globalisation seeks to ensure access to cheap raw materials, removal of barriers, free movement of commodities and capital across national borders, and free location of production processes in any part of the world. Of critical importance to note here is that the East African countries face pressures through the rules of the World Trade Organisation and the conditionalities of international financial institutions to go along with this process. In short, regional cooperation in East Africa will be pursued within the parameters of global capitalism, with further regional marginalisation on the agenda.

A decade ago, the South Commission Report noted that the world is in a process of rapid transition in which political alignments, economic systems, and social values are being transformed. The bottom line of these changes is the acceleration of scientific and technological advancement, which has propelled the move toward globalisation. Increasing globalisation has, in particular, been characterised by the growing role of transnational corporations aided by growth in international private financial flows. As a result, direct foreign investment is influencing both the location of exporters and trade patterns. An important message put across is that technological differences are a fundamental force in national development. Like so much that is apparent, Africa gains only marginally, and in some cases the trends are negative (South Commission, 1990).

Furthermore, significant developments in the global trading system have resulted in the creation of powerful trading blocs, which present challenges to Africa's trade prospects. These include the European Union, whose countries have moved closer to unity after a series of treaties. EU enlargement profoundly changes previous trading arrangements particularly the Lome Conventions that have shaped relations with Africa for the past thirty years (Gibb, 2000). Following the collapse of the Soviet communist system, a new dimension has been created. In the past, some African countries enjoyed being wooed by cold war blocks but with the enlargement of the EU trading bloc and its increasing attention to Eastern Europe, it is likely that this will lead to further EU disengagement from the African scene. Africa is progressively viewed as high risk with undeveloped financial markets and poor infrastructure.

The East African Condition

An important lesson that has to be deduced from the history of East African cooperation is the relevance of political reform as the basis for effective economic reform. A democratic political consensus is essential for the successful initiation and consummation of workable regional integration. A stable foundation for legitimate

and formal democratic procedures provides a climate in which longer-term economic reforms can be pursued. Despite the eloquent articulation of multi-partyism, the state in East Africa is neo-colonial and a politically independent entity within a basically unchanged economic system. It therefore makes sense to argue that political leadership can only pursue the people's interest by adopting a development strategy that must begin by addressing inherited institutions. To put it differently, unless the structure of the state is changed, the created regional arrangement will not flourish to serve the interests of East Africans.

If there is any lesson to be learnt from previous East African experience it is the lack of popular participation or empowerment of the people effectively in structures and in designing policies and programmes. Participation is dependent on the nature of the state, and the ability of a government to respond to popular demands. The fact is that the state in Africa has not yielded political space for people's participation. Consequently, there is a need to involve civil society, galvanize and tap people's energy, and promote accountability in the new East African Community.

The experience of the defunct East African Community demonstrated that the institution depended on national political leaders: heads of state, cabinet ministers, members of parliament, and political appointees. However, the fact is that politicians are sometimes more concerned with short-termism: public image, amassing power, political clientelism, and wealth accumulation. In the words of Gasarasi (1992):

> "African economic co-operation is a long-term matter. The principal agents of such a long-term project ought not to be politicians, lest it be trivialised and overshadowed by their mundane culture: ceremonials, whim, rhetoric, manipulation, intrigue, etc. When conflict breaks out between two or more African political leaders, one of the areas, which suffer, is economic co-operation."

To continue to assume that politicians will champion economic co-operation is to forget the lessons of history. It may be recalled that Julius Nyerere of Tanzania refused to sit at the same table with Iddi Amin of Uganda at a critical time for the survival of the defunct East African Community. Suppose politicians' interests are selfish? In a way, President Moi's past call on politicians in Kenya is indicative of what politicians can or cannot do.

"I call on all Ministers, Assistant Ministers and every other person to sing like parrots on issues I have mentioned. During Kenyatta's period, I persistently sang the Kenyatta tune until people said this fellow has nothing to say except sing for Kenyatta. I say I didn't have ideas of my own. Who was I to have my own ideas? I was in Kenyatta's shoes and, therefore, I had to sing whatever Kenyatta wanted. If I had sung another song, do you think Kenyatta would have left me alone? Therefore, you ought to sing the song I sing. If I put a full stop, you should also put a full stop. This is how this country will move forward. The day you will become a big person, you will have the liberty to sing your song and everybody else will sing it" (Akivaga, 1993).

Suppose President Moi's song did not have a favourable verse on The East African Community? Would other politicians in Kenya compose a favourable East African song? The real issue here is whether we should always accept the claim by politicians that they are working for the interests of the people, and therefore entrust them with the task of building a new community.

Indeed the case of Tanzania is also illustrative and interesting. During Nyerere's presidency, politicians sang the song of Ujamaa (African socialism) for two decades. When Mwinyi became the president in 1985, politicians sang a different song of liberalization, marketisation and privatisation until Mwinyi's term ended in 1995. When President Mkapa came into power, the song of reform and foreign investment was composed. Although the monolithic system is slowly giving way to a pluralist tradition, the only competition that is on the agenda is capturing state power. As for Kenya, the current "majimboism" debate (creation of regional governments more or less based on ethnicity) is an indicator of political determination to cling to power. Indeed, even the return to monarchical traditions in Uganda is an effort to create political space to hold on to state power.

This view strengthens the argument that new efforts towards co-operation have to begin by exploding the myth that politicians should have the monopoly in overseeing co-operative undertakings. Clearly, the new wave of co-operation would have to empower other actors in the political arena. This shift not only results from the limited intellectual exposure of politicians, but is due to changes in East African behaviour which have, on important occasions, eroded faith

in the usefulness of politicians. In short, the issue is the domination of politics by the manipulation of state resources that form the base on which patron-client networks are constructed for the purpose of political hegemony and legitimacy. The result is the transformation of the state into self-serving prebendal institutions, giving rise to the personalisation of leadership and authoritarianism (Francois, 1991).

There is also a concern about the conflict between community goals and individual state goals. A major reason suggested for the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 was the lack of reconciliation of individual state sovereign desires and community desires. The argument here is that one of the basic problems of regional integration schemes is that the economic costs of participation for members can be immediate, while the economic benefits normally accrue only after a long period, are uncertain and, in most cases, unevenly shared among member states. Typically, the costs include a decrease in government revenues when tariffs are reduced. Another common cost is the possibility of the collapse of local firms as they find their survival difficult because they are unable to compete with firms from other member countries, resulting in a loss of income and employment. For example, in the new formulation of the current treaty, Tanzania insisted on the exclusion of trade protocols before signing the treaty, partly because of its dependence on import duties for government revenue (up to 33 percent). It is this revenue concern that explains why Tanzania has been reluctant to ratify the double tax requirement (The East African, 2001). This kind of situation leads to the perception that the poorer members of an integration scheme are losing opportunities for industrialization, and therefore demand some form of compensation.

In light of this, current efforts must not overlook deep-seated and long-standing rivalries in development among the three countries. No doubt, these rivalries are rooted in the conception that national economic development is a zero-sum game. During the defunct East African Community days, this point was well-articulated by Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, then Kenya's Commerce and Industry Minister:

"Every time we wanted to take a decision, a firm decision in the field of economics, we had to get the approval directly or indirectly from our neighbours, and if they did not believe the way we did, well that just had to be put on the shelf" (Hazlewood, 1975).

There is no doubt that the pace of regional cooperation was stonewalled by the absence of strong institutions with powers to enforce collective decisions, including the provisions of the treaty. For example, if there was one member that did not agree, decisions on the issues were postponed until a consensus was reached. This meant that those countries that moved the slowest dictated the speed of economic integration. This excuse would go on year in and out to the downright dissatisfaction of states honouring decisions. Indeed, among other things, the failure to honour decisions led to the disintegration of East African Community (Chussi, 2000).

It must be emphasized that the other context in which East African Community will be developed will also depend on the general regional economy. First, it has to take into account other integration schemes in the region such as the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) to which Uganda and Kenya belong but from which Tanzania withdrew in 2001; the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in which only Tanzania is a member and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in which Kenya and Uganda are members. Because of this, there is the issue of multiple loyalties. Tanzania's recent decision to withdraw from COMESA is a clear expression of conflicting multiple loyalties. In the words of Hon Jakaya Kikwete, then Tanzania's Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation:

> "We were faced with the option of either getting out of SADC or COMESA.... We therefore opted to pull out of COMESA because we have already invested so much in SADC....We opted to stay in SADC because unlike COMESA whose thrust is to create a common market for selling goods, SADC's emphasis is to develop capacity building for producing goods" (*The Guardian*, 1999).

Against these factors it must be accentuated that the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and the emergence of a new democratic South Africa has brought in an important actor in regional politics. Recently, Rowlands has pointed out that on the important measures of national power - people, land, military might and economic activity and knowledge - South Africa's dominance is beyond question in the region. For example, it accounts for almost 75% of the goods and services produced in SADC (Rowlands, 1998). A major reason for South Africa's dominance is because of a more diversified production structure leading to complementarity between South Africa and her neighbouring countries. Indeed, South African's presence in Tanzania led one newspaper, *The East African*, to proclaim "the South Africanization of the Tanzanian economy."

South Africa's decision to join SADC was strategy based on the emphasis on investment and industrial integration of the region rather than on market integration preferred by COMESA. In short, the East African region should be ready for both regional and international competition.

It may be rather disheartening to note that there is a belief among East African political leaders that integration efforts should be anchored in lowering tariffs. But, at the very least, a case can be made that the existence of tariffs is not the sole, or even the primary impediment to trade among the countries of East Africa. In a major respect, the reason for the low level of trade is found in the economic structures of the countries. The economies of virtually all of them are directed to the export of primary produce, and the import of manufactured goods. By and large, the countries cannot satisfy the import requirements of an East African country, and therefore intra-regional trade as a proportion of total trade is very small.

Table 1: EAC Countries — Selected Basic Indicators

	Population	Area in sq km (000s)	GDP in million $	GNP per capita $ 1999	Total Debt $ billion	Main export Commodities	Percentage value of debt to export ratio *
Kenya	29.84	580	9095	327	6,893	Tea,coffee fruits, vegetables	177
Tanzania	32	945	3602	251	7,603	Tea, coffee, cotton, minerals	484
Uganda	22	236	5655	308	3,674	Coffee, tea cotton	492

Source: Jubilee 2000 UK, 2000.

Note: *According to The World Bank, if a country's ratio of its external debt to its export of goods and services is more than 275%, then it is severely indebted and this meets one criterion for classification as a HIPC.

It is clear from Table 1 that the present economic situation in East Africa is not very conducive to integration and expansion of intra-regional trade. The three economies are not complementary: they produce the same range of primary commodities exported to the industrialized countries, and import manufactured goods; leaving a shaky foundation for intra-regional trade. Second, the wave of liberalisation, privatisation, reforms and the adoption of structural adjustment programmes will have an important bearing on the process of integration. Unfortunately, much of the required economic adjustment such as civil service retrenchment and further jobs cuts in the wake of privatisation entails dislocations with a high potential of creating instability. Conversely, if these countries do not follow reforms agreed with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund expeditiously, they face the prospect of losing any access to external resources, including debt rescheduling.

The other factor to note from the Table 1 is that Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are classified as High Indebted Poor Countries. Furthermore, these countries are ranked 123rd, 140th, and 141st respectively out of 162 countries in the 2001 Human Development Index (a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living) compiled by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2001). What all this means is that the road to regional integration will not be an easy one.

As with global and regional developments, what happens at the national level is critical to achieving regional integration. This includes peace and political stability, provision of reliable and adequate infrastructure, and sound management of the economy. It is true that the Kampala Forum on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa acknowledged that every African state is sovereign. However, the document pointed out that the security, stability and development of every African country is inseparably linked with those of neighbouring countries (Africa Report, 1991). In short, the instability of one African country is likely to affect the stability of another African country.

Another point that needs attention is Fukuyama's observation on efforts towards successful business. According to Fukuyama, successful business needs a series of supportive underlying

attitudes including trust, reciprocity and mutuality—and these attitudes are at the very foundation of the development process. If these attitudes are present, economic growth and political democracy can be expected; where they are absent, economic atrophy and authoritarian rule are likely (Fukuyama, 1995). Fukuyama's observation should be viewed in light of the pervasive corruption problem in the East African countries. According to the Corruption Perception Index 2001 that reflects the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda scores 2.2, 2, 1.9 respectively out of 10 (highly clean). Out of 91 countries ranked, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are viewed as being more corrupt and are ranked 82nd, 84th, and 88th respectively (*Business Times*, 2001). To achieve successful results in overall development, this negative factor must be overcome.

Lessons from Past Experience

After some postponing, the essential framework for the East African Community has at last been put in place. The challenge now is to give content to the Treaty. At the signing ceremonies of the East African Treaty, the three presidents gave good speeches. Can these leaders, who were not at the helm of leadership at the creation of the first East African Community, confound the pessimists about East African co-operation? In the light of what has been discussed above, one may argue that if the above issues can be resolved, those enthusiastic for co-operation might hope for an advance to further East African co-operation. For the moment, the Treaty suggests three possible future roads: closer economic integration, movement toward an East African Federation, or building common institutions.

The institutional road looks the least promising. The daring ideas of the early days of the East African Community were right when national sentiments were not very strong among East Africans. Today, nobody would take seriously the notion of a East African Legislative Assembly or the various East African Corporations as a nucleus for further integration in East Africa. The existing East African Legislative Assembly comprising 27 members and three ex-officio members, which was inaugurated on 30 November 2001, is viewed as a key organ to articulate the concerns of citizens and give legal direction. However, the manner in which members are elected in their respective countries does not render them directly accountable to the people. Rather, they are accountable to national legislatures. Furthermore, as the Treaty stands now, it is clear that the Assembly is given a mandate to discuss all matters pertaining to the Community but is not empowered. The emphasized feature in the Treaty is that the summit comprising the three presidents and it retains the final authority in all matters. But as a strategy to improve institutional capacity, the voice and partnership of the public and other non-governmental actors should be institutionalised to provide feedback to the states on their performance.

Second, is greater political co-operation the likely road? Perhaps this would be the best road to cement co-operation initiatives. However, the spirit of the Treaty is the respect of the sovereignty of the partner states. Obviously, it seems that states are reluctant to surrender their sovereignty to a supranational organization. While it is stated that the ultimate aim is to establish a political federation, it should be emphasized that political will - discipline and commitment to pursue and implement what has been agreed upon and to accept decisions reached - will be much needed. If the foundation is not well-built, what lies ahead could be political disintegration (witness for example, the never ending debate in Tanzania over the need to have a Tanganyika government).

The third road is through economic integration, and it is the one that the East African leaders agreed to pursue when they signed the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community. The defunct East African Community was still had a long way to march to an East African Common Market, although it had a program to smash the uncommon market. In the current arrangement the aim is to have a customs union by 2004,and create tariff free regional trade with a common external tariff. This is a tough call in view of the feeling that Kenya has the advantage over Tanzania and Uganda in trade terms. Indeed, in October 2001 Tanzania announced more goods that will attract a 20% duty charged over and above the preferential tariff rates in force among the three partner states (*Family Mirror*, 2001). The experience gained indicates that the best way to create a genuine common market is not to rely on harmonisation of trading rules alone. These measures have to be accompanied by policies to increase the productivity of

goods among the trading partners. In short, a credible viable and fundamental transformation of their national orders is required and, thereafter, it might be possible to talk of transforming the region through co-operation and integration.

Conclusion

This paper presented an overview of the new effort to develop regional cooperation among the three East African countries. The first conclusion is that while the creation of the East African Community is in line with the overall objectives of the African Economic Community in terms of consolidating cooperation with a view to bringing about equitable development and thereby uplifting the living standards of East Africans, promoting the sustainable utilisation of the region's resources and maintenance of peace and security in the region: the challenges ahead have to be faced with political will and commitment. This is the message contained in the words of the three East African presidents but which have been lacking in the past. Secondly, past economic practice is not encouraging. Therefore the current optimism that creating a trade regime to remove tariffs will lead to increased trade integration is not convincing.

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The Role of International Election Observers on National Politics

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"The important thing to remember is that the group in power retained power peacefully, and this sends a very positive and hopeful message about the future of the country's political stability ..." (An Election Observer).

Introduction

Election monitoring and observation today forms an important as well as seemingly inevitable part of an electoral process in Third World countries. This is a result of the "recent wave of democratisation and spread of political pluralism in these countries, which has also led to a significant increase in the number of organisations sponsoring election observation missions" (IDEA 1995: 7). Election observation, which was initially viewed as a component of 'democracy in transition' from single party and military rule to political pluralism [or in the ending of a long term of conflict], continues even after elections are held for the first time. Continuation of this practice is justified on the basis that these states are "weak and transitory" democracies which need to be supported (Rothstein 1991: 39). Elections in Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, have attracted both local and international observers and monitors. In Tanzania, for example, both international observers as well as local monitors were involved with the 1995 and 2000 general elections, including Zanzibar's elections.

The 2000 general elections in mainland Tanzania (for union president, members of parliament and councillors) and Zanzibar (for president of Zanzibar, representatives and councillors) were the second multiparty elections since 1995. Like the 1995 Union and Zanzibar general elections, a number of international groups participated as observers. They included IFES, the United Nations (UN) Observer Group, the European Union (EU) Observer Group, the Commonwealth Observer Group, the South African Development

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