

In Search of Security without Guns: The Role of Grassroots Institutions in addressing Conflicts and Injustice in Tanzania from a Gender Perspective

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Abstract

Over recent decades there has been an increasing recognition that a sizeable share of justice and security provision takes place outside state structures. Consequently, there has been a mounting interest in studying non-state actors in security and justice provision including grassroots community structures. Although there is a plethora of studies on the role of grassroots security institutions in Africa, such studies remain largely gender-blind. This article contributes to the existing knowledge on community organized-security mechanisms by exploring the manner in which gender roles and relations are socially constructed at the grassroots structures of justice, peace and security.

Keywords: Tanzania, Grassroots Institutions, Community Security, Gender, Peace

Introduction

Amidst increasing threats to peace and security in Tanzania, how do women and youth organize themselves in addressing conflict and injustice in their communities? This is the key question that this paper attempts to explore by paying attention to the community-organized security mechanisms in Tanzania. For many years since its independence in 1961, Tanzania has never recorded major political or civil strife leading into horrifying bloody conflicts as it has been the case in neighbouring countries. Indeed, according to the 2015 Global Peace Index, Tanzania ranks the 64th country as being peaceful out of 162 countries in the world, and 10th in the sub-Saharan Africa. In the East African region, Tanzania ranks ahead of Kenya (133rd), Rwanda (139th) Uganda (111th) and Burundi (130th). Similar trend was observed in the 2016 Peace Index ranking where Tanzania remained to be ranked as being peaceful compared to other East African countries (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015,

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2016). Similarly, the Regional Centre on Small Arms (nd.) for 2010-2014 reports that Tanzania records small number of armed crime incidences in East Africa. Consequently, for many years Tanzania has been characterized as an island of peace in a turbulent East Africa and even Africa at large.

However, with the beginning of the new millennium, signs of the shrinking of civic peace in Tanzania have been on the rise. The 2001 post-election violence in Zanzibar, the 2013 civil uprisings in the southern region of Mtwara, a series of bomb attacks in Arusha, village storming and killings in Tanga in 2016, attacks on police stations, mutilation and killings of persons with albinism in the Lake Zone and the 2016/17 killings targeting local party and government leaders in the Coastal region are major peace endangering events that shocked the country. Some of these incidents are discussed in detail in section four of this study. Moreover, there have been increasing incidents of fatal fighting between farmers and pastoralists over land ownership, citizens *versus* investors, occasional religious tensions in some regions and increased discontent and perceived injustices among people and growing political intolerance. Indeed, violent incidents have been on the increase wedging up the rock of the famous "Island of Peace." These emerging trends are beginning to be detected by various indexes including Mo Ibrahim index which indicates that the rate of 'safety and rule of law' in Africa has been on the decline for the past decade (2006-2015), registering a negative trend over the decade, falling by 2.8 score points in the past ten years. In 2015, 64% of African citizens lived in a country where safety had deteriorated. These countries include Burundi, Central African Republic, The Gambia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Somalia and Tanzania (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016).

In this regard, although historically Tanzania remains relatively stable politically and less polarized country in the region (Kessler, 2006; Lofchie, 2013; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015, 2016), the prevailing situation suggests that the country's civic peace is highly at risk. Indeed, other factors come into play in aggravating the security threats including stifling political space amid increased political and electoral competition, growing sentiments of political, religious and regional marginalization amid rising global and regional terrorism; high poverty levels and increased youth unemployment amidst diminishing economic opportunities.

In addition, Tanzania, just like many other African countries, has almost all the necessary ingredients that might foster civil unrest and political instability. According to Posner (2004), Tanzania has the highest ethnic diversity and tops up the list of ethnic fractionalization index. The population is evenly split between Christians, Muslims and Traditionalists. Land abundance, which Green (2011) sets as an explanatory variable for Tanzania's civic peace, is increasingly thinning mirroring into land conflict between citizens and investors, communities and government

institutions, or between farming and pastoral communities. The accommodative post independence institutional and policy framework that Tripp (1999) and Miguel (2004), attribute to Tanzania's political stability and civic peace is no longer as resistant to social unrest as it had been in the past because divisive politics is increasingly gaining space. Since culture is dynamic, this is also the case with the subject political culture that Kessler (2006) had earlier considered as an ingredient of Tanzania's political stability.

In responding to the increasing threats to peace and security, the state has deployed various ways including involving non-state actors in addressing conflicts and insecurity and in providing avenues for early warning and prevention. Also, based on the real or perceived fear of crimes, citizens have organized themselves in providing security through various ways. It is in this context that the role of community-organized security groups becomes imperative. In many of the African countries, there has been a proliferation of community-organized security mechanisms, which operate parallel to the state security institutions. The prevalence of this phenomenon is what Baker refers to as "fragmentation of policing" in Africa (Baker, 2008:6). Policing here basically refers to "any organized activity, whether by the state or non-state groups, that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches and punishment" (Baker, 2008:5).

Whereas there are a plethora of studies on the role of community security mechanisms in Africa (Ruteere, 2017; Baker, 2008; Clapham, 1999; Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Loader, 2000), they invariably portray community-organized security groups as being homogeneous and undifferentiated. As a result, these studies tend to ignore how gender roles are being socially constructed in these community-led security groups. While Walwa's work touches on issues of gender and security, the study only focuses on the number of women in community organized security groups and less is said on the roles that women and men play as members, leaders and users of community organized security mechanisms (Walwa, 2017).

This study sets out to go beyond the mere characterization of the community groupings and attempt to unpack the community-led security groups by exploring the manner in which gender relations and roles are constructed within various social groups as they strive to bring about peace and security in their localities. Also, it is important to underscore that community-led security groups do not operate in a vacuum and hence they should not be studied in isolation from the grassroots institutions of governance. Indeed, it is the grassroots institutions that regulate the operation of community organized security groups as they navigate their terrain between the state and citizens. The interaction between community groups and the lowest tiers of local government in the provision of security and social order without

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entirely relying on state coercive instruments is a critical element in the peace and security architecture at the grassroots level. Based on the societal approach to stable peace, this paper argues that while the perceptions and actions of the community are very critical elements in bringing about stable peace, the functioning of community-led security structures tends to be mediated by the manner in which gender roles are constructed in the provision of peace and security as various social groups strive to mitigate conflicts, addressing injustices and securing social order. More importantly, these community-led security groups are able to deal with security-related matters and exercise enforcement strategies largely based on trust, respect and social norms without relying on the state security forces.

The paper is structured in the following ways: First is the introduction followed by the analytical framework in section two. Section three presents the methodology of the study, followed by section four, which presents a brief account of emerging conflicts in Tanzania. Section five presents how the peace and security architecture is organized at the grassroots level. The findings on the gender dimension of the community organized security groups in bringing about peace and security as well as in addressing emerging conflicts are presented in section six. The last section provides a conclusion.

Analytical Framework

The study employs a societal approach to peace from a gender perspective in analysing the functioning of community-led structures at the grassroots level in Tanzania. It borrows from Boulding (1978) thesis that peace maintained through use of threat and guns is less likely to be stable. Rather than relying on state coercive apparatus to maintain peace, communities in Tanzania, through grassroots institutions and leadership, have developed their own mechanisms in addressing conflict and injustice in their localities. This is in line with Vayrynen's emphasis on the perceptions and actions of the community in bringing about stable peace. He specifically asserts that in order to attain community security, "the actors do not react only to objective external conditions, but they also draw upon intangible resources such as knowledge, trust and predictability" (2000:157). As opposed to the materialist approach to stable peace, which finds security to be associated with observable factors such as military or economic power, the societal approach tends to put more emphasis on political participation and social transformations, that is, the social construction of security (Vayrynen 2000). This is in line with Baker's argument that in large part, the non-state policing agencies tend to be valuable for advancing safety and security especially among the poor, and therefore there is considerable value to "consider security from the point of view of the experience of the citizens rather than from the governance perspective of the political authorities"(Baker, 2008:27).

However, the focus on societal approach to stable peace should be enhanced further by interrogating the role of various social groups, namely, youth and women. Based on the feminist critique, many of the studies of peace and security have traditionally been guided by the realist conception that wars are usually fought by men, and women, who are vulnerable and powerless, should be protected (Hendrick, 2001). This gender-blind analysis of peace and security is challenged by a number of feminist scholars who advocate for the integration of gender discourse in the debates and policy interventions in security and peace studies (Hendrick, 2001; Vincent, 2003; Hudson, 2005; Lewis, 2006). This paradigm has broadened the concept of peace to include a wide range of multiplicity of actors whereby women are portrayed not just as victims but as actors, targets and peace builders. In the same context, the youth have often times been regarded as vulnerable, dangerous and a threat to peace and security. However, this negative perception is now being challenged as youth are increasingly being seen as a force for positive agents for peace building (UNOY, 2017). However, it is important to recognize that youth involvement either as perpetrators or peace builders is very much moulded by gender relations and norms in their respective communities (UNDP, 2007).

Moreover, the operation of community-organized security groups tends to be influenced and at times coordinated by local government structures and processes. Yet, this interaction between the state at the sub-national level and the community-organized groups is by no means preventing the later from multiplying and proliferating. In Tanzania for instance, there exist several forms of community organized security groups in many parts of the country, and some of them being coordinated by local government structures. As a result, there is an elaborate network of peace and security architecture at the grassroots level that comprises of peace and security committees at the local government structure as well as various forms of community organized security groups. Indeed, various approaches of community policing tend to capture this interaction between state and non-state actors in the provision of peace and security in Africa. A 'Multi-Choice' approach emphasizes on the presence of competitive and parallel alternatives of policing that are available to citizens in meeting their security requirements (Baker, 2008). Based on extensive fieldwork in Uganda and Sierra Leone, Baker explores the nature and implications of state and non-state policing by demonstrating interplay of various actors and choices that citizens have in seeking for different levels of security services. The interaction between the state and non-state actors in the provision of security is equally built in the 'Multilateral policing' approach which makes distinction between sponsors and providers of security service (Bayley and Shaering, 2001). Similarly, in his approach known as 'Plural network' policing, Loader (2000) stresses on what he calls 'security networks' which entails the relationship and cooperation between the state, market and community groups in providing shared control, order and authority in a certain

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locality. It is in this perspective that the role of sub-national level structures particularly the wards, streets (*mitaa*), villages, hamlets and ten-cell households (*Nyumba Kumi*) in coordinating various forms of community-led security groups is equally examined.

Methodology

This paper is based on a qualitative study that was carried out in August –September in 2017 in the eight regions of Tanzania. These regions are Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar urban, Mtwara, Tanga, Arusha, Kagera, Mwanza and Coast region. The study employed in-depth interviews, participant observation and intensive literature review of relevant documents. A total of 150 Key Informants were interviewed of which 54 of them were women. Again, 49 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted. Respondents were purposefully selected and were drawn from regional, district, ward and community levels. They included Regional Commissioners (RCs), Regional Administrative Secretaries (RASs), Senior Police Officers, District Commissioners and District Administrative Secretaries, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and religious leaders, District Community Development Officers, Youth and Women Coordinators, Government officials and leaders at the lower tier of government including Ward Executive Officers and Councillors, *Mtaa* and Village Executive Officers, Villages and Vitongoji Chairpersons, *Nyumba Kumi* Leaders, opinion leaders, Women and Youth Community Groups and community members.

Selection of research areas was purposefully done targeting those districts that have experienced some forms of extreme violence in recent years. A total of 15 districts were selected from the eight regions, namely, Kibiti, Rufuji, Mtwara Urban, Mtwara Rural, Tanga Municipality, Mkinga, Ilemela, Nyamagana, Arusha Urban, Bukoba Urban, Bukoba Rural, Kinondoni, Temeke, Zanzibar West (B) and Zanzibar south.

Violence and Conflicts at the Grassroots Level

First and foremost, it is important to point out that there are various forms in which conflicts are manifested in the eight regions selected for this study. Many of them involve disputes among family members or community members on issues of divorce, land ownership, inheritance and gender-based violence. However, other conflicts are collective in nature involving institutions such as mosques or churches, groups such as farmers and pastoralists or the entire community. In the focus group discussions, participants were asked to describe the incidents of violent conflicts occurring in their communities in recent years. A few cases can be cited. In Arusha region, religious discontents were mentioned citing frequent disputes between Muslims sect of Ansar sunni against the authority of the Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA); the 2013 bombing of a Roman Catholic Church in Olasiti that recorded four deaths and more than 60 injuries; the 2013 bombing at a CHADEMA campaign rally at Soweto grounds in Kaloleni ward where three people were killed and several others injured; the 2014

bomb attack at the Arusha Night Park (bar) which left 17 people seriously injured; the 2017 abduction of eight children in Murriet and Olasiti wards whereby two of them were killed by the kidnappers.

In Coast region, religious discontent is believed to have fuelled some social disharmony in the community whereby the Ansar Sunni members stopped praying with their fellow Muslims at Umwe Mosque and decided to construct their own temporary mosque, commonly known as *Mabanzi* Mosque. Meanwhile, beginning January 2015, the area witnessed an escalation of brutal killings of local party and government as well as the police officers accompanied with a number of attacks on police stations in Ikwiriri, Rufiji and Mkuranga. In a period of two years, a total of 40 local leaders and the police officers were killed (Daily News, 29.6.2017). Just in one ward of Bungu at Kibiti district, five local leaders reported to have been killed including two *Vitongoji* (Hamlets) leaders, the Village executive officers and the Village CCM secretary.¹ Indeed, the local government structure at the lower level in Kibiti-Rufiji area ceased to operate for about 2 years as leaders fled for their lives abandoning their offices and homes. This situation created a great sense of fear in the community and a high sense of insecurity.

Other reported conflicts in the Coast region included land conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, as well as between investors and local communities. It was reported that majority of the arable land in the area is controlled and managed by either the Rufiji Basin Development Authority (RUBADA) or external investors. RUBADA is also accused of facilitating the accessibility of land plots to some external investors. Reacting on RUBADA's possession of arable land in their areas as well as its influence on the possession of arable land by external investors, on 18 August, 2017 more than 400 residents of Mashambani neighbourhood at Nyoti village in Umwe ward, Ikwiriri town reportedly invaded the land owned by RUBADA with the intention of dividing it among them.

In Mtwara, the respondents brought the painful memories of the 2013 civil uprisings in the region, whereby the people of Mtwara waged one of the most violent civil uprisings ever taking place since independence in 1961 in protest against the construction of the 542 km- long gas pipeline from Mtwara region to Dar es Salaam. The chaos led to several deaths and destruction of property amounting TZS one billion (Heilman and Jingu, 2015, *New African Magazine*, 19.3.2013). In Mwanza, cases of religious discontent were prevalent as exemplified by the conflict over the control of mosques and burial grounds by various Muslim groups in Ilemela, the killing of two Muslim believers and one *Ustadhi* at Mkolani Ward in an area called Utemini in May 2016², conflict over burial grounds at Nyakato National involving two Muslim Groups each claiming rights over the area.³

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
In Zanzibar, apart from incidents of election violence, there have been cases of violent attacks waged against the tourist industry, bombing of the Night club, the Mufti's house and Christian churches, acid attacks to a priest of Catholic Church in Zanzibar, two female tourists from the United Kingdom and to a Moslem leader. In Kagera, similar violent incidents were reported including burning of churches and mosques that occurred between 2015 and 2017. In Tanga, religious discontent between Muslim sects in Mkinga and Tanga districts as well as the killings conducted in May 2016 by the armed bandits in Amboni Caves, which resulted to the death of eight people in Kibatini Street did cause a high level of insecurity in the region.

It is important to point out that in dealing with these violent acts, the state coercive apparatus had to intervene through conducting military operations in the affected areas including establishing military bases as witnessed in Kibiti-Rufiji and Amboni area. Thus, the role of the community-organized security groups should be analysed not in isolation from the state but in their interaction with the grassroots institutions. The next section describes how these institutions operate.

Peace and Security Architecture at the Grassroots Level in Tanzania

Provision of security and justice at the grassroots level in Tanzania can be understood in the context of decentralization and local government structure. Tanzania runs a unitary structure of state administration although there is a separate arrangement for Zanzibar. The central government is the highest administrative structure of the state. The country is subdivided into a geographically multi layer administrative divisions running from regions to districts, divisions, wards, villages (*mitaa* for urban areas) and *vitongoji*. The administration of state at sub-national local level follows a Napoleonic system of devolution and deconcentration. The central government structure extends from the cabinet to regional commissioners, district commissioners and divisional secretaries, as the lowest deconcentrated government structure. This structure runs parallel with a devolved system of local government that includes district, town, municipal and city councils operating at district level and township authorities, wards, villages/*mitaa* and *vitongoji* at sub-district level as shown in Figure 1. The grassroots structure extends from the ward downward to the households level. *Kitongoji* and *Mtaa* are lowest grassroots organs and are constituted by households, which are in turn made of families and individuals.

Figure 1: The Local Government Structure and Grassroots Security Institutions



Source: Drawn by the authors based on the Local Government (Urban Authorities) and Local Government (District Authorities) Act (1982)

Peace and security organization at the grassroots level in Tanzania draws from the constitutional and legal framework. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977) provides for the involvement of citizens in ensuring peace and order. Article 27 (1) of the Constitution states that “every person has the duty to protect the natural resources of the United Republic, the property of the state authority, all property collectively owned by the people and also to respect another person’s property”. Furthermore, Article 28(1) states that “every citizen has the duty to protect, preserve and maintain the independence, sovereignty, territory and unity of the nation.” Moreover, the Constitution empowers the local government authorities (LGAs) to “transfer authority to the people” (Article 146 (1)); and to involve them in the planning and implementation of development programmes. LGAs are also charged with the function of ensuring enforcement of law of public safety of the people (Article 146(2b). Similarly, both Local Government (Urban Authorities) and Local Government (District Authorities) Act (1982) stipulate local government functions, one of them being, “It shall be responsibility of each urban (and district) authority to maintain and facilitate the maintenance of peace, order and good government within its area of jurisdiction” (section 54 (1a)) of Urban authorities Act and section 11 (1a) of District authorities Act.

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The security architecture at both national and sub-national level is also governed by the National Security Council Act, 2010. The Act establishes Regional Security Committee and District Security Committee at regional and district levels respectively. Although this legislation is silent on grassroots security organs, Ward Security Committee and *Mtaa*/Village Security Committee exist under separate arrangement and they do operate. The Ward Security Committee is responsible for maintenance of law and order and coordinating peace and security function at the ward. It is chaired by the Ward Executive Secretary (WEO). Other members of the committee include all village/*mtaa* chairpersons in that particular ward and other three members with qualifications on maintenance of law and order recommended by the Ward Development Committee. In most cases, these are retired Police or army officers. Each ward is assigned a non-resident police officer known as Police Kata who serves as the committee's advisor and secretary and linking the Police Force to lower tiers of local government. Police Kata is stationed at the District Police Headquarter and his/her availability at the ward is affected by other assignments he/she gets at the district level.

Furthermore, the maintenance of peace and security is one of the core functions of grassroots governance structures at the village and *mtaa* levels. The *Mtaa* Committee has the duty to advise the ward on matters pertaining to security in the *mtaa* area as security matters is a standing agenda of the *Mtaa* meetings. *Mtaa* Security Committee has six members and is chaired by the *Mtaa* Executive Officer (MEO). Other members include the *Mtaa* Chairperson and other four persons appointed by the *Mtaa* Assembly.

The Village Security Committee has a slightly different organization. It is one of the three standing committees of the village council. It is chaired by the village Chairperson and is constituted by all vitongoji chairpersons in that particular village. The Village Executive Officer (VEO) is the secretary to the committee. It is also constituted by other members appointed by the Village Council amongst its members. The committee duties are: to put in place peace and security strategies for protecting citizens and their properties; to ensure that training for participatory policing is conducted and monitor its conduct; share security information about crimes with the District Security Committee; prevent the conduct of illegal business; ensure citizens participation in security and combating drug activities such as marijuana farming (Luhende, 2011).

The Ward Tribunal is another important sub-district institution. It is established under section 3 of Ward Tribunals Act, 1985. As per section 8.-(1) of the Act, the primary function of the Tribunal is "To secure peace and harmony in the area for which it is established by mediating and endeavouring to obtain just and amicable settlement of

disputes". According to section 8(3), the tribunal has and exercises jurisdiction in relation to "All matters and disputes arising under all laws and directives passed by the appropriate authority, and laws and orders for the time being in force in relation to or affecting the business and affairs of the Ward made or passed by a local government authority or any other competent legislative authority within the area of the Tribunal". The law requires that in matters relating to a dispute, the tribunal is required to first attempt to settle a dispute by mediation before exercising its compulsive jurisdiction. Therefore, Ward Tribunal exists to assist parties to arrive at a mutually acceptable dispute settlement other than imposing penalties. Notwithstanding, a Ward Tribunal has powers to impose penalties and upon endorsement of its order by a Primary Court a convicted person can be committed to imprisonment.

Although a Ward Tribunal is a grassroots institution, it is not entirely a local government organ. Its connection to local government is loose and its decisions are not subject to determination by the local government authority. Nonetheless, the district council or urban authority is by the law, mandated as the appropriate authority of the tribunal. The district/urban authority is responsible for general policy regarding operation of the tribunal and is required to ensure, facilitate and promote smooth and efficient performance of the tribunal (Section 5-(7) of the Ward Tribunals Act, 1985). Also, upon recommendations from the ward, it is the district/urban authority that appoints the Chairperson and the Secretary of the tribunal. The Ward is composed of a minimum of four and a maximum of eight members elected by the Ward Development Committee.

Moreover, the Land Disputes Courts Act, 2002, the Land Act, 1999 and the Village Land Act, 1999 confer to a Ward Tribunal a status of a court on any matter concerning land within its area of jurisdiction. Similarly in some communities, the Ward Tribunal may serve as the Marriage Conciliatory Board established under section 102 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971. The Village Land Act establishes two other grassroots institutions below the ward tribunal namely the Village Adjudication Committee and the Village Land Council. The Village Adjudication Committee is appointed by the Village Council and Approved by the Village Assembly. Among its functions is to determine boundaries of and interests on land which is subject to adjudication, investigate and adjudicate in accordance with customary law any question referred to it by a person with interest in the land. Section 55 of the Village Land Act provides room for any person aggrieved by the decision of the adjudication committee to appeal to the Village Land Council and if a person is not satisfied with the decision of the Village Land Council may appeal to the Ward Tribunal. The Village Land Council is established under section 60-(1) of the Act. It consists of not more than seven persons appointed by the Village Council and approved by the Village Assembly. The function of the Village Land Council is to

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mediate between and assist parties to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution on any matter concerning village land.

Furthermore, it is important to underscore the fact that the dynamics of peace and security architecture at the local level corresponds with the history of political participation in Tanzania stretching from the time of single-party system (1965-1992) to a multi-party competitive system, which was re-introduced in the country in 1992. The structure of the nationalist party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) largely informed how the grassroots structures and processes were designed and operated. During the single-party period, citizens were highly mobilized to be patriotic and be ready to protect the country against both internal and external enemies.

The security function was decentralized further to a lowest sub-unit known as *ten-cell households* famously, *Nyumba Kumi*. Historically, *Nyumba Kumi* structure was established in 1965 as TANU grassroots structure with a primary function of political recruitment and membership mobilization. Following the adoption of a single party system and subsequent merger of party and state functions, the *Nyumba Kumi* automatically became a formal government institution and so its structures. The *Nyumba Kumi* structure was headed by a leader locally referred to as *Balozi* who was one of the heads of households in ten-house cell group appointed amongst them. Usually, he/she was an elderly citizen and a person with a remarkable record of integrity. The leader served to his/her life time unless removed because of misconduct. Sometimes in case of death, the title would be transferred to the spouse. The *Balozi* played a basic role in ensuring peace and security through conflict resolution among and between families in the neighbourhood, monitoring residents' movements especially strangers and guests moving in and out of his/her jurisdiction and introducing residents to higher level government organs or other institutions. *Balozi* was a voluntary post and for them, serving the people was a great pride. With the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, the *Nyumba Kumi* ceased from being affiliated to the government structure but remained CCM basic unit with the *Balozi* operating more as a party (CCM) functionary.

The decentralized structure provides space for local leaders to address issues of public safety and security in their respective areas. For instance, in Arusha, after realizing that diplomatic approaches could work better than coercion, the Ward Security Committee of which the *Mtaa* chairpersons are members, in collaboration with Muslim leaders in Arusha have been working to resolve the religious dispute through peaceful mechanisms. As one member of the Ward Security Committee reported that "We just finished a meeting today in trying to resolve a conflict between Ansar Muslim fundamentalists and those of BAKWATA..."⁴

The accessibility and proximity of the local leaders to the community has made it convenient for them to be directly involved with disputes and conflicts in their areas. As one *Mtaa* Chairperson in Mtwara urban narrates,

Unfortunately, I do not have an office and I work at home where people come all the time in need of my advice or intervention in resolving a certain misunderstanding or conflict e.g. marital problems. Usually, I receive about 6-7 people a day. I don't have time to rest ... We are busy all the time, day and night. At times, I sleep at 3am...⁵

In addition, the Ward tribunal, which was previously preoccupied with resolving land-related conflict in Ziwani ward, Mtwara, has to expand its role in dealing with all types of conflict due to increased demands for its services. According to the Committee chairperson, the tribunal holds its meetings every Wednesday attending about 2-3 cases. These cases include issues of marriage, divorce, inheritance, land or violation of rules and regulations on environment conservation, to mention only a few. One case can be cited as an example. Upon violating the regulations in cleaning their surroundings, 60 people were brought before the tribunal by the Ward Health Officers. They were charged for not cleaning their environment as required by the Village by-laws and required to pay some money to the village government.⁶

The study in all the eight regions found two major non-state (community) models of security and justice organization at the grassroots, the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* (Community Policing) and the *Nyumba Kumi* Model. In most cases, by virtue of their positions, the local leaders at the local government level are the main coordinators of the community-organized security groups as it will be shown in the discussion below.

The Ulinzi Shirikishi Model

Like in many parts of the world, Tanzania adopted Community Policing model of security in 2006 whereby communities are encouraged to be involved in ensuring their own security in their respective neighbourhoods. Indeed, community policing is designed in order to improve the citizens' trust in the Police force (Cross, 2016). Ideally, the community policing is expected to improve police-community relations, strengthen the accountability of the police force to the citizens and to bring about public safety and security environment (Djurdjevic-Lukic, 2014). The findings from this study show that the functioning of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* is coordinated and supervised by the local leaders including ward, street/*mtaa*, village and hamlets leaders as well as Village and Ward Executive Officers. The security committees of the respective levels are also directly involved. While the Police force is responsible for encouraging the community to be involved in ensuring security of their neighbourhoods, the

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establishment of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* at a particular area depends very much on the community' sense of insecurity, the volunteerism spirit and responsible leadership.

Following the need for collective security, the village/*mtaa* assembly empowers their chairperson to coordinate the establishment and coordination of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups. It is therefore a typical bottom-up approach to security management. In some areas, the security committees make critical decisions regarding the recruitment and the management of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups. They decide, among others, the amount of monthly contributions each household and business owners have to contribute for *Ulinzi shirikishi* (Tsh. 1,000/= to Tsh. 10,000/=). This money is used to secure tools including uniforms and mobile telephones for communication. The groups report on daily basis to the *Mtaa* chairperson who is also the *Mtaa* security committee chairperson. Most of the groups operate in patrol units of 10 to 20 people. They are mandated with stopping crimes, investigating, arresting and searching of suspects. The Police officers are required to accord any necessary assistance to the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups. As one Police Officer narrates about the importance of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* saying that,

Because of the shortage of personnel in the police force, we found it important to have the assistance of dedicated community members who could work to maintain peace and security on our behalf without necessarily having to be paid salary by the government...thus we have trained the youth both male and female to help on this matter and in many areas they are doing a good job.⁷

In Arusha, most of the 25 wards in Arusha city have community security groups known as "*Ulinzi shirikishi*". Indeed, compared to other regions in the study, Arusha stands out as having active *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups accompanied with vibrant local leaders who seemed to be highly supportive of the community policing operations. The performance of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups tends to vary from one ward to another depending on the rate of insecurity, leadership and the residents' commitment to organize themselves. In Arusha, the two wards of Levolosi and Kaloleni were found to be active, strong and outstanding largely due to the efforts done by the streets and ward leaders in mobilizing funds to pay the group members as modest compensation for their work. Table 1 indicates the number of *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups in 25 wards in Arusha region.

Table 1: *Ulinzi Shirikishi* in 25 Wards in Arusha

Division	Ward	Number of Mitaa	Number of <i>Ulinzi shirikishi</i> groups
Themi	Themi	6	6
	Kaloleni	3	2
	Levolosi	2	2
	Unga Ltd	6	6
	Daraja II	6	6
	Ngarenaro	5	5
	Sekei	6	6
	Kati	2	2
Elerai	Elerai	13	13
	Sakina	6	6
	Osunyai	3	3
	Lemara	5	5
	Sokoni I	7	7
	Sinoni	7	5
	Engutoto	5	5
	Olmot	1	1
	Olasiti	5	5
	Terrat	1	1
	Murriet	2	2
	Sombetini	3	3
	Suye	Moivaro	3
Baraa		2	2
Moshono		3	3
Oloirien		6	3
Kimandolu		4	4

Source: Office of the Regional Coordinator for Community Policing and Field data

In Zanzibar, it is the security committee at the Shehia level that is charged with the task of recruiting members of *Ulinzi Shirikishi*. The committee is led by the *Sheha*, who is a local leader appointed by the government. On matters of peace and security, the *Sheha* is assisted by the security committee, which consists of at least 10 members in

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each *shehia*.⁸ It was revealed that youth and adults, both male and female, form these units (*Ulinzi Shirikishi*) in the *shehias*. Apart from working on peace and security, members of *Ulinzi Shirikishi* also provide timely response in times of any trouble in community such as a fall of electric polls or floods during rain season by coordinating with responsible government authorities. Just like in other regions, not all *shehias* have established *Ulinzi Shirikishi*. For example in Urban West region, about 70% of the existing 121 *Shehias* have established *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups.

One notable community-organized security group in Zanzibar is found at Stone Town (*Mji mkongwe*). Unlike other groups, the Stone town security group is a well-established unit with a patrol car, walk talkies and uniforms for its members totalling around 45. The unit appears to have a good leadership with some of its leaders being retired army officers. Its tasks are the same as any other *Ulinzi Shirikishi* unit in Zanzibar that is, being vigilant in the community on security issues by conducting patrols and particularly at night, singling out criminal elements and even apprehending them with the help of the police force. Following its organizational strength in conducting patrols and monitoring security threats, the Zanzibar Municipal Council decided to extend its role beyond security matters to include revenue collection from the market and parking lots in few streets including the Unguja port. The Unit is allowed to retain a certain percentage of the revenue collected. By extending its scope outside the security service provision, the Mji Mkongwe *Ulinzi Shirikishi* group is caught in a tug-of-war with the government and with some law-makers due to its unique operations. This has been an area of contestation, which in turn threatens its survival as the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* group.

Overall, it was commended that *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups have played a significant role in minimizing crime and ensuring community security since some wards do not have police stations. Indeed, a sizeable number of disputes and conflicts are resolved at the community level and only a few of them find their way to higher government authorities. As one Police Officer points out in a focus group discussion that, "In the provision of peace and security, the required ratio is 450 people per one police officer. However, in our situation in Kagera region, it is one police officer serving 2,700 people. This is six times the capacity the police officer can possibly handle. Thus, having community structures responsible for security is quite a relief for the police department."⁹

'Nyumba Kumi' Leaders

The findings from the eight regions show the presence of *Nyumba Kumi* in certain areas operating as the lowest tier of the ruling party's structure. Due to significant population increase, the ruling party has decided to extend the *Nyumba Kumi's* jurisdiction from 10 to 50 households. Currently, the "Nyumba 50" leader is still

referred as the *Balozi*, who is assisted by four selected members from the party. Following the introduction of a multi-party political system, the role of *Nyumba Kumi* in many parts of the country has declined due to the fact that members and supporters of opposition parties tend to regard the *Nyumba Kumi* as the ruling party organ. In certain areas however, the *Balozi* have continued to retain some legitimacy and are still involved in family conflict resolution. In some areas, where the *Mtaa* Chairperson belongs to CCM, *Nyumba Kumi* is still used as reference point for someone to prove his/her residence. This is largely because the *Nyumba Kumi* remains the lowest unit of administration in many areas in the country particularly in the urban areas. In the rural areas, where the *Kitongoji* as the lowest organ of the local government structure tends to remain relatively small in terms of the population size, the *Nyumba Kumi* structure seems to have lost its influence.

Although the relevance of *Nyumba Kumi* as a governance institution seems to be eroding, the personality of its leadership, the *Balozi*, continues to keep *Nyumba Kumi* in existence. In the past, the *Balozi* were appointed based on their integrity, wisdom and trust. They were able to serve without expecting monetary compensation. They did not have tenure but rather continued to serve the community in return of respect and cooperation. As one respondent narrated his story in Mtwara urban “I have been a *Balozi* since 1975 and am still playing my role of resolving disputes without being paid any salary.”¹⁰

In case a male *Balozi* died, his wife was appointed to take over if at all she possessed some similar leadership attributes. One woman reports in Mtwara urban after she became *Balozi* in 2002 after her husband died.¹¹ Also, the community members still contact them for assistance and some of interviewed *Balozi* regard peace and security as their primary responsibility. In places where they exist, the *Nyumba kumi* system performs the following activities:

- i. Identifying residents through the *Nyumba 50* register and introducing them to other agencies, organizations and companies.
- ii. Mobilizing people to participate in meetings, environmental cleanliness and contributions for *Ulinzi Shirikishi*.
- iii. Helping the defence and security organs at all levels to identify the suspected criminals. Usually, security organs including the police and *Ulinzi Shirikishi* would consult the *Nyumba Kumi* leaders before a house search or an arrest is carried out in their administrative places.
- iv. In some places where *Ulinzi Shirikishi* is run through shifts, they coordinate the availability of people to participate in night patrols.

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There are efforts to revive the structure of *Nyumba Kumi* in Ilemela district in Mwanza region. Buswelu and Kahama wards have been selected as pilot sites for the structure responsible for security and other societal issues. This revived structure is known as *Uratibu wa Nyumba Kumi*. In Levolosi and Kaloleni wards in Arusha region, the *Nyumba kumi* (*Nyumba 50*) leaders have been pivotal in mobilizing people to contribute for the *Ulinzi Shirikishi*. They have the actual number of residents and a convenient access to the households, which makes it easier to collect the dues. In Zanzibar, it was reported that a number of CCM *Balozi* were also members of defense and security councils in the *Shehias*. In Dar es Salaam, Kinondoni, during the interview the Police Officer confirmed existence of *Nyumba Kumi* as he/she stated "I only know of their existence because other people would report their cases to us with a recognition letter from their *Balozi*, and I know they still have that role of providing introduction letters to their residents."¹²

Furthermore, the '*Nyumba Kumi*' structure has turned out to be a center of contestation for youth and women as they strive to address conflict, violence and injustices. In areas where opposition parties dominate, the legitimacy of the *Nyumba Kumi* structure is highly questioned and challenged due to partisan politics. This is because the *Nyumba Kumi/50* is seen as an institution of the ruling party thus those belonging to the opposition were questioning its legitimacy and acceptability. As one *Balozi* narrates in Arusha that "We do a lot but our efforts are rarely recognized. Most of the *Mtaa* chairmen belonging to CHADEMA do not give us any cooperation. They even tell people not come to us for introduction letters. They say introduction letters should be given by the legitimate authority, which is the *Mtaa* chairperson."¹³

The same views were reiterated in Mtwara whereby one *Balozi* in Mtwara Urban asserted that members of the opposition especially youth do not respect her authority in the same way as those from her own party, CCM. In Temeke, Mbagala, the *Mtaa* Chairperson complained that "I did not get the necessary cooperation from the *Balozi* to implement Sungusungu programme despite several attempts".¹⁴ It should be noted that the *Mtaa* chairperson comes from opposition (Civic United Front-CUF) while the *Balozi* are from CCM.

For proper and effective functioning of the *Nyumba 50*, many participants suggested that there is a need to transform the *Nyumba 50* and turn it into an official government structure. This means the local government structure would begin with the *Nyumba 50* as the lowest tier of the local government system. Others suggested that the *Balozi* should be remunerated as they do a commendable job in their places. Yet, another group was of the view that the *Nyumba Kumi* structure should be abolished since the *Mtaa/Village* leaders tend to execute similar duties just like the *Balozi*. In general however, the findings of the study indicate that the role of grassroots

institutions in mitigating conflict at the community level cannot be underestimated and therefore they should be nurtured and maintained.

Overall, the findings from the eight regions show that the ordinary citizens are more comfortable in engaging with grassroots institutions than the Police. Based on trust, predictability, knowledge and accessibility, the community tends to rely on their local leaders as well as on security committees and groups in handling issues of public safety and civic peace. Interviewees and FGD participants were of the view that in case of breakdown of peace community members are more comfortable to report to grassroots leaders or peace and security committees than to the police. One of the reasons for this is lack of trust with law enforcement organs especially in protecting informants and in demanding for bribe. Some members insisted that they would go to *Mtaa* chairpersons or *Ulinzi Shirikishi* leaders to report their cases other than going to the police station where they are very likely to be asked to give some sort of bribery.

In Mtwara, the Chairperson of the Ward Tribunal shared similar views regarding the community mistrust towards the Police Force by narrating a story of the young man whom they arrested for allegedly raping a 70-year old woman and sent to the Police station in the nearby ward, only to be released a few days later and he repeated the same crime to another old woman.¹⁵ In Tanga, following the Amboni Caves killings which took the lives of eight people, one soldier and badly injuring four police officers, it is reported that the community members have been hesitant in cooperating with the security forces due to the concerns that the state security organs failed to respond in time to reports from the citizens regarding the presence of the gangs in the Amboni caves.¹⁶

In addition, there were concerns by some community members in Arusha that the police force was acting in hostility towards the members of the opposition parties. It was alleged that the police was working in favour of the ruling party especially by restraining political rallies. One respondent stated “When you report your matter to the police and you are well known that you belong to CHADEMA, they would rarely treat your case with seriousness.”¹⁷

It is important to note that Arusha region especially the urban area, is a strong base of opposition party, CHADEMA. According to the city elections officer, 24 councillors are from CHADEMA and only one comes from CCM following the 2015 general elections. At the local level, there is a cut-throat electoral competition whereby 76 *Mtaa* chairpersons belong to CHADEMA and 78 come from CCM.

Similarly, other studies have revealed that grassroots justice and security institutions are mostly preferred because they speak peoples’ language, are cost-efficient, operate

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through familiar procedures and in terms of proximity are easily accessible (Scheye, 2009; Baker, 2008; Kimathi, 2005). In addition, Police misconduct, brutality and inefficiency of state enforcement organs have been considered deterrence factors for people to seek services from state organs and thus to prefer community structures (Derks, 2012). Indeed, where the grassroots institutions are threatened, the state of security in a particular area tends to be highly jeopardized as it was the case in Kibiti-Rufiji area. The dismantling of the grassroots institutions in Kibiti and Rufiji contributed very much to the escalation of violence in the area. The perpetrators attacked and destroyed the very structures of peace and security. As Wayne (2008) asserts, peace is successfully endangered when perpetrators of violence succeeds to separate the state from the society and often they achieve this by targeting grassroots institutions infecting them with destabilizing ideologies or disrupting their efforts. Killing of local leaders in Kibiti-Rufiji not only disrupted their efforts in countering the violence but also created security panic and disorganization.

Generally, the findings above show the criticality of grassroots security and justice structure maintenance of peace and security. In fact, without using guns, the grassroots peace and security architecture is able to deal with security-related matters and exercise enforcement strategies largely based on trust, respect and social norms. The significance of grassroots institutions in maintenance of peace and security is manifested in three ways. One is through their ability to utilize customary and social norms to settle and resolve disputes amicably which otherwise would grow and turn into violent conflict. Second is their ability to utilize local knowledge to monitor the conduct of individuals in the locality and prevent potential behaviour that is endangering peace and security in the community thereby preventing perpetual violence. Third is through interaction with sub-national level structures and serving as avenues for early warning of potential threats to community and national peace.

Inclusivity and Gender Roles in Grassroots Organs for Peace and Security in Tanzania ***Gender-based Composition of Grassroots Organs for Peace and Security***

While there is an elaborate peace and security architecture at the grassroots level, there is a high level of gender imbalance in the grassroots security organs. This is more evident as one examines gender dimensions in decision-making organs of the local government structure in Tanzania. For instance, looking at the composition of ward councillors, data from the National Electoral Commission (NEC) indicate that during the 2015 general elections, out of 3,946 elected councillors in the country, only 204 councillors were women, which is equivalent to 5.2% of the total number of councillors in the country (NEC Report, 2015:74). An additional 1,404 female councillors were selected through affirmative action to fulfil a minimum legal threshold requiring one-third of all councillors in a council to be women. The minimum number of women councillors has got serious implications on the selection of women as leaders of

various committees at the local level including peace and security committee. According to the study done in eight regions by the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) in 2017, the proportion of women as chairpersons and secretaries in the Ward Development Committees (WDC) for the period of 12 years since the 2005 elections is very low compared to that of men. Women constitute only 18 % and 21.7% as committees' chairpersons and secretaries respectively. Moreover, whereas the *mtaa* and village chairpersons play such an important coordinating role in matters of peace and security in their own localities, female chairpersons constitute only 6.8% of all chairpersons of village councils and *mtaa* committees elected from 2005 to 2017 in the studied eight councils. The situation is even more discouraging in the defence and security committee at the *mtaa* and village level where women constitute only 1.6% in the eight districts.

The situation is the same in all the regions selected for this study. For instance, in Mbelekeletela village located in Ziwani ward in Mtwara District Council, the village defense and security committee comprises of eight members and only two of them are women.¹⁸ In Tandika ward in Mtwara Mikindani municipality, out of seven members of the defense and security committee three are women.¹⁹ In Arusha, out of 25 wards, only four wards have women Ward Executive Officers (WEOs). These wards include Kaloleni, Levolosi, Olasiti and Sinoni. It is important to point out that WEOs are the chairpersons of the Defense and security committee at the ward level. Thus, it can be argued that the leadership of the grassroots institutions remains to be male-dominated particularly in the committees dealing with issues of peace and security. Yet, it is these grassroots institutions that play a key role in the coordination of community-organized security mechanisms.

Moreover, the gender imbalance is observed in the composition of the community-led security groups in all the regions. The male youth form a greater part of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups in all the regions surveyed. In contrast, women seem to lag behind. For instance, in Arusha region, majority of streets do not have women at all as members of the *Ulinzi Shirikishi* groups. Only 5 out of 31 streets have a few women as members of the community organized security groups. In Mleni Street in Mkinga district in Tanga, majority of those who engage most directly in security matters are men rather than women.²⁰ The invisibility of women in the grassroots organs for peace and security is largely due to cultural gender roles and division of labour whereby women are assigned to perform domestic related activities. This is compounded by the perception that women are weak and vulnerable and hence cannot be involved in the provision of security especially when it involves conducting street night patrols. In the focus group discussion with women in Levolosi, Ngarenaro, and Unga Limited in Arusha, one participant narrated that,

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Ulinzi shirikishi needs one to get out during the night, what kind of husbands would allow their wives to go out? Also, we (women) choose to remain indoors not because we are scared, it is because we think of how other people will perceive us... You know the (social) system believes that men have strength to go out at night and face the criminals.²¹

The commentary above by one of the FGD participants also indicates that women are discouraged from participating in night patrols by the fear of being perceived by the society as unfaithful in marriages.

Roles of Women and Youth in Grassroots Organs for Peace and Security

Whereas there is a minimal woman's participation as members in the community organized security groups, the findings show that women play a very significant role in sustaining the operation of these security groups through their financial contribution and informing. In almost all the regions, women have been asked to pay some money that is used to pay the members of the community organized groups as incentive for their participation. This payment is done by women as a compensation for their inability to provide security services as active members of the community-organized security groups. Also, this money is used to buy some equipment used for night patrols such as torches and batteries. For instance, in Kisosora Street in Tanga city, through community meetings, it was agreed that all men should take part in night patrol activities. For those women without husbands, they were supposed to pay Tshs.1000/= to *Mtaa* chairpersons for buying security torches and batteries to facilitate smooth night patrols.²² In Oyster Bay , Dar es Salaam, the residents including women who could not actively be involved in street patrols are required to pay Tshs. 10,000 per month as an incentive to the members of the street security group.²³ Indeed, some of the community-organized security groups have ceased to operate partly due to lack of monetary incentives. Given the high level of unemployment, participation in the community organized security groups is regarded by some youth as a form of employment to earn modest income. In a focus group discussion with youth at Unga Ltd and Levulosi in Arusha region, it was reported that, "In the daytime we engage in our personal activities and during the night we go for patrols. At the end of the month we are paid some money as a small token contributed by the community members and life goes on."²⁴

In some ways, this practice of providing financial compensation to the members of the community-organized security groups has led to what we call as the 'commercialization' of community-organized security mechanisms. However, in some areas the community organizes itself to provide security for its neighbourhood without providing any monetary incentives to the participants. Those members of groups that do not receive monetary incentives stated that they were motivated to be responsible

and take action largely due to an increased rate of crimes, which threaten both their personal and community safety. The following opinions emerged during an FGD with community members in Ngarenaro: "Money is not everything. You cannot sit there and always watch your mother or sister being robbed of their phones and money, and you call yourself a strong youth. You have to do something even if you are not paid to do it."²⁵

Furthermore, the findings show that women are the main users of the grassroots organs for peace and security. In all the eight regions, the *Mtaa* chairperson (urban areas), the Village and the Hamlet (*Kitongoji*) Chairperson (district/rural areas) were mentioned as being the first leaders to be contacted by both women and youth in case of breach of peace or an incident of injustice. Moreover, local leaders have been involved in mitigating conflicts in their respective areas on issues of marital disputes, violence against women, divorce and land ownership. In fact, these are the leading cases brought before the local leaders and their respective committees for reconciliation and resolution. Through focus group discussion, it was established that more women than men are the main users of the grassroots institution for peace and security. However, some women raised concern that some of the decisions tend to overwhelmingly favour. This is largely due to the patriarchal system that still dominates in many parts of the country. As a result, some of the decisions taken at the community level are largely guided by cultural and traditional norms that tend to discriminate women in favour of men. In Mtwara for instance, through interview with the Community Development Officer, it was revealed that some of the decisions reached are unfair to women as they seek justice through the ward tribunal or the local leaders especially on issues of divorce, early age pregnancy and property ownership.²⁶

Moreover, based on the findings, the youth are seen as playing a dual role both as perpetrators of violence and peace builders. In all the regions, it is the youth who happen to be the members of the community-organized security groups. In so doing, they become a positive force for peace and security. Yet, it is important to emphasize here that these are largely male youth. In certain areas however, it was reported that youth have been involved in inciting violence or commit other crimes such as robbery. The youth engaged in what is popularly called 'Boda boda' (motorcycle) business are accused of being a threat to peace and security. For instance, in Kibiti and Rufiji, it is reported that some youth were recruited to join the criminal networks allegedly involved in the killings of the local leaders.

Conclusion

Grassroots security institutions play an important role in maintenance of peace and security in Tanzania. They do this by responding to and addressing conflicts and

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potential security threats that emerge in the communities such that without them, peace and harmony would be in jeopardy. More importantly, community-led security mechanisms are able to deal with security-related matters and exercise enforcement strategies largely based on trust, respect and social norms without relying on the state security forces. However, the findings have indicated that the functioning of peace and security architecture at the grassroots level tends to be mediated by the manner in which gender roles are constructed in the provision of peace and security. The leadership as well as membership of the grassroots institutions for peace and security remain to be male-dominated despite of the fact that it is women who are the main users of these institutions in mitigating conflict and in seeking for justice. This calls for the need to have in place gender-responsive security mechanisms at the community level. Also, the *Nyumba Kumi* structure that used to be the country's basic effective unit of security organization has turned out to be a centre of contestation between incumbent and opposition political groups. However, its role remains as relevant as ever and especially now given the turbulent security situation and emerging extremism in the East Africa region. The *Nyumba Kumi* Model continues to be an important peace and security organization that needs to be institutionalized in the country's governance system. However, unless it is depoliticized, the *Nyumba Kumi* structure can turn out to be a potential source of insecurity along partisan lines.

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Notes

1. Interview, WEO Kibiti District 15.8.2017
2. Interview, Mkolani WEO, Mwanza, 2.9. 2017
3. Interview, former Iemela District Commissioner, Mwanza, 23.8.2017.
4. Interview , Ward Security Committee Member, Arusha, 20.8. 2017.
5. Interview, the *Mtaa* Chairperson, Mtwara Urban, 28.8. 2017.
6. Interview, the Chairperson of Ward Tribunal, Mtwara Rural, 28.8,2017.
7. FGD (Police Force) Kagera, 20.08. 2017.
8. *Shehia* is an administrative unit that is equivalent to *kata* (ward) in Tanzania mainland. *Shehias* vary in size with total population in each *shehia* ranging from 500 to 9,000.
9. FGD, Police Force, Kagera 22.8.2017
10. Interview, *Nyumba Kumi* Leader, Mtwara Urban 25.8.2017.
11. Interview, *Nyumba Kumi* Leader, Mtwara Urban, 25.8. 2017.
12. Interview, OCD/Kinondoni, 26.8.2017.
13. Interview, *Nyumba Kumi* leader Arusha
14. Interview, Mtaa Chairperson, Temeke Dar Es Salaam, 24.8.2017.

15. Interview, the Chairperson of Ward Tribunal, Mtwara Rural, 28.8.2017.
16. Interview, *Mtaa* Executive Officer and the *Mtaa* Chairperson, Mleni Tanga, 24.8. 2017.
17. Interview, 20 August 2017 Arusha
18. Interview, the Village Executive Officer, Mtwara Rural, 26.8.2017.
19. Interview, the Mtaa Chairperson, Tandika Temeke Dar es Salaam, 28.8.2017.
20. Women FGD at Mleni Tanga, 24.8. 2017.
21. FGD (Women) ,Arusha 26.8. 2017
22. FGD (Women), Kisosora Tanga, 27.8. 2017.
23. Interview, Security Committee Secretary, Oyster Bay Dar es salaam, 25.8. 2017.
24. FGD (Youth), Arusha, 22.8. 2018
25. FGD (community members) Arusha, 25.8.2018
26. Interview, Community Development Officer, Mtwara, 23.8.2013.

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