The Ups and Downs of Popular Demands for Accountability in Tanzania

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Abstract

This article sets out to examine the extent of popular demands for accountability (PDAs) in Tanzania. Given the limitations of elections and public watchdog institutions in holding public officials to account, the role played by citizens in directly demanding accountability is of paramount importance to the democratization process. This article focuses on identifying citizens' direct action that calls public authorities to account in the multiparty political system in Tanzania. The analysis in the article is informed by the nature and form of societal accountability that places citizens at the centre of the accountability process. Societal accountability, which may also be called bottom-up accountability, involves explicit actions by citizens to demand accountability directly rather than using watchdog institutions as agents for holding leaders accountable on their behalf. Findings show that the extent of popular demands for accountability has varied over the years since 1992. During the last term of President Mwinyi's administration (1992-1995), Tanzania witnessed a proliferation of PDAs expressed by workers, students and ordinary citizens. However, the number of incidents gradually declined from the mid-1990s up to 2005 during Mkapa's administration. From 2006, PDAs were on the rise once again, up to 2007 during Kikwete's administration. The data was collected through content analysis of newspaper reportage covering the period since the introduction of the multiparty system in Tanzania in 1992 to mid-2008.

Introduction

Popular demand for accountability (PDAs) is one of the major pillars of representative democracy in checking the power of political leaders, bringing about government responsiveness, promoting people's participation as well as enhancing the rule of law. As a concept, accountability denotes a

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relationship between citizens, on the one hand, and their leaders in various levels in government, political parties, civil society organizations and other institutions, on the other. Under this relationship, leaders are not only obligated to honor their promises, but they are also compelled to do what the constitution and the laws demand of them. On their part, citizens ought to be able to demand better services, proper spending of public funds, proper conduct of public institutions and explanations for various decisions made by their leaders. Mushi's (2008) characterization of public accountability captures the meaning of accountability in a rather useful way. According to him, accountability is like a two-sided coin. On one side is the 'demand side' that comprises citizens demanding answers and actions to be taken by the wielders of authority. The second side is the 'supply side' comprising public authorities. Public accountability therefore implies 'the rendering of account for matters of public interest' (Bovens, 2006: 12)

In most African countries, elections are regarded as a key instrument for holding leaders accountable. Nevertheless, this instrument proves to be inadequate largely because it is periodic and tends to occur infrequently. At times, in many African countries, elections are neither free nor fair. Also, certain decisions are made by non-elected officials who cannot be voted in and out. Apart from elections, certain institutions are also used to hold leaders, government officials and state organs accountable. These include the Parliament, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Ethics Secretariat, courts of law, the Central Bank and the Audit Office. However, in certain instances, these institutions fail to play their watchdog role because of weaknesses in both the legal provisions and the way they discharge their duties, thereby making these institutions incapable of holding the leaders accountable.

Limitations of both the electoral processes and the public watchdog institutions indicate that the role played by citizens in directly demanding accountability is of paramount importance in the democratization process. Yet, the ability of citizens to bring the public authorities to account depends greatly on the level of their political competence. Citizens have to possess a certain level of confidence to participate actively in politics and to call their leaders to account as well as to actually demonstrate their ability to do so by taking action (Mushi, 2001: 170). To what extent do citizens struggle to secure accountability from below? It is in this context that the concept of *societal accountability*, as originally developed by Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000) based on the Latin American experience, becomes useful in assessing the efforts of PDAs in Tanzania.

The primary focus of this article, therefore, is to examine the bottom-up demands for accountability in Tanzania, concentrating on identifying citizens' direct actions that call public authorities to account in a multiparty political system. In this context, citizens will be defined to include two categories of groups, the first being of ordinary citizens, including, peasants, pastoralists, petty traders, food vendors, and small miners; the second comprising workers and students.

The article is organized in three main sections. Following this introduction is an explanation of a theoretical perspective on accountability as a concept and as an analytical tool. The next section discusses the facilitative and constraining factors affecting accountability followed by a section that examines the trend of PDAs in Tanzania for three different presidential administrations.

Accountability - Theoretical Perspective
The intrinsic role of citizens in the accountability chain draws a lot from John Locke's classic theory of representational democracy, which is built on the notion of government by the consent of the people. Locke asserts that rulers are to maintain the original contract and its covenants to guarantee 'life, liberty and estate'. However, if the rulers fail to adhere to the contract with a series of tyrannical political acts, the people have the right to bring the government to account, including the right to revolt (as quoted in Held, 2006: 64). Over time, the concept of accountability as an analytical tool has acquired multiple meanings and forms leading to what Lindberg (2009:2) calls, "a conceptual nightmare". This is largely due to the fact that the term accountability is potentially ambiguous, multi-layered and multidimensional, thereby making it rather difficult to define and operationalize (Lindberg, 2006). In a similar vein, Bovens (2006: 7) points out that, "as a concept, accountability has become a hurrah-word, like 'learning', 'responsibility' or 'solidarity', to which no one can object. It is one of those evocative political words that can be used to patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of trustworthiness, fidelity, and justice, or to hold critics at bay."

This article borrows a definition of accountability that is deliberately defined in a narrow and operationalized manner as a "relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the

actor may face consequences" (Bovens, 2006: 9). Drawing from a principal-agent model, the actor is simply an agent - perhaps a public official or public organization. The forum is a principal and may be a specific person such as a minister or journalist or an agency such as parliament, a court, the audit office or the general public. This definition relates very closely to what Schedler calls the three main features of accountability, which are information, justification and punishment or compensation (Schedler, 1999). Availability of information on the actions of public authorities is an important prerequisite to enable the people to hold the leaders accountable whenever they fall short of fulfilling their promises or divert from the laid down procedures. Justification, on the other hand, refers to the explanations or answers given by the public authorities to account for their actions. Punishment is the consequence imposed by either the electorate or public institutions based on the assessment of the information and justification provided regarding certain public decisions or actions.

The imposition of consequence by the forum, in this case citizens, upon public authorities may not be in the form of sanctions per se, but it can include implicit or informal consequences such as negative publicity or a tainted public image generated by debate or popular protest. Thus, even when formal sanctions as means of punishment are missing, in the context of societal accountability, these other measures can play an effective role to control   public officials, and indeed pave the way for more formal mechanisms of accountability (Arugay 2005; Bratton and Logan 2006; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000).

Moreover, the concept of accountability is commonly classified into two types according to the nature of the obligation, as originally developed by O'Donnell (1994). The first type is horizontal accountability and the second is vertical accountability. According to O'Donnell (1994: 61) vertical accountability entails "making officials answerable to the ballot box". This is the type of accountability which citizens, as voters, can demand from their officials in the course of campaigns and elections. The performance of the incumbent is reviewed and evaluated, policy alternatives debated and the voters either reward (re-election) or punish (defeat) the incumbents (Diamond and Morlino 2005). According to O'Donnell (1999), horizontal accountability relates to the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered to take actions spanning routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions that may be qualified as unlawful, perpetrated by other agents or agencies of the

state. This means that horizontal accountability is the capacity of a network of relatively autonomous powers to call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of given officials. In other words, horizontal accountability is the capacity of state institutions to check abuses of other public agencies and branches of government. This type of accountability is well demonstrated by work done by such institutions as the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), courts of law, the police, the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance and the National Audit Office (NAO) in checking the activities of other institutions. Thus, while vertical accountability refers to the relationship between citizens and the state, horizontal accountability is broadly internal to the state structure itself (Arroyo and Sirker, 2005; Jayal, 2008).

The third wave of democratization in many countries of the world has given rise to another form of accountability termed 'societal accountability' (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000). It is defined as "a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of control that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens' associations and movements and on the media, actions that aim at exposing governmental wrongdoing, bringing new issues onto public debates, or activating the operation of horizontal agencies" (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000: 149-50). This form of accountability "uses voice rather than vote. It remains vertical but – unlike individual citizens - it does not need to wait for elections to be announced; it can be catalyzed 'on demand' as and when the situation requires such mobilization; and it can be directed towards single issues, policies or functionaries" (Jayal 2008: 106). In this new politics of societal accountability (also called bottom-up accountability), the accountability seekers include more ordinary people seeking to engage directly rather than rely upon intermediaries or watchdog institutions to make their leaders account for their actions (Goetz 2005). In this case, societal accountability can be regarded as one of the voice strategies employed by citizens to bring about accountability of public officials. Based on voice-exit model, it is argued that when faced with a deterioration circumstance, people can either leave (exit) or stay and make their dissatisfaction known (voice) (Hirschman, 1970).

The analysis in the article is, therefore, informed by the nature and form of societal accountability that places citizens at the centre of the accountability process. It is the people's voice demonstrated through direct actions in demanding accountability that constitute the key elements of investigation in

this study. These actions include demonstrations, group petitions, placards in public rallies, boycotts, public gatherings, locking in/out of managers, road blocks, sit-ins in government offices and making threats. Some of the actions may seem insignificant but they signal the prevalence of the people's quest for accountability. Some of these incidents include refusal by remand prisoners to get off vehicles to demand the courts speed up the proceedings of their cases or disabled petty traders lying in the middle of the road protesting against their eviction from their business premises. Such actions may occur at the village, district or national level. They may also occur at work places, business premises and school and college compounds.

In examining the extent of PDAs in Tanzania, the data was collected through content analysis of newspaper reportage covering the period since the introduction of the multi-party system in Tanzania in 1992 to mid 2008. The unit of analysis is an incident signalling a collective demand for accountability. The coding was done by recording whether or not such an incident was reported in the news. A total of ten newspapers were examined in order to be as comprehensive as possible. The newspapers included both government and private newspapers - *Uhuru*, *the Daily News, Majira, Nipashe, The Guardian, Tanzania Daima, Habari Leo, Mwananchi* and *Mtanzania*. The coding was done by two graduate students who worked as research assistants for the study.

Facilitative and Constraining Factors for Popular Demands for Accountability
On the whole, initiatives by citizens to demand accountability do not take place in a vacuum but rather are influenced by six factors. The first is the nature of the political system, which "consists of the regime, that is, the political institutions, both input (political parties, interest groups, mass media) and output (legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, courts)" (Diamond 1994: 8). Virtues such as transparency, tolerance of diverse and opposing views, and freedom of expression are important attributes in seeking new avenues for holding leaders accountable. The presence of an independent media is also crucial for enabling citizens to hold their government accountable. The media, including community media, provide a platform for demand-side actors to raise their voice. This goes hand in hand with the constitutional right that entitles citizens to seek and receive information without hindrance. The easier the access to information the people are afforded, the more they improve their understanding and readiness to make demands for accountability.

The second factor is the awareness of the citizens about their rights and duties. People can only make demands for accountability upon comprehending that they are not only voters but also citizens legally entitled to their rights, a realization that effectively makes them accountability seekers. Consequently, the citizens become monitors of both elections and the actions of the leaders after elections. Otherwise, as Bratton and Logan (2006: 6) argue, "accountability remains incomplete because of individuals' limited conception of political rights, of reasonable expectations, and of their own public roles and responsibilities". The third factor is the level of citizens' participation in decision making. The more citizens consciously and knowledgeably participate in the decision making process, the more likely they are to hold leaders accountable for their words and promises in their localities.

The fourth factor in PDAs is the presence of an accountability system in the country's laws, rules and regulations. A conducive legal regime is needed to facilitate accountability in a particular polity. For example, on the one hand, the absence of PDAs does not necessarily mean that citizens lack the ability to put pressure for accountability; rather it could indicate that the political system in place is rather responsive to people's needs. On the other hand however, lack of PDAs may also be an indicator of lack of freedom of expression in the political system. The fifth factor influencing PDAs is the level of political trust of the people in their government and leaders. Citizens' lack of trust in their government and leaders, for whatever reason, brews dissatisfaction, making the people suspicious of the answers and explanations given by the leaders. For instance, when people perceive the existence of a crisis of governability in the country, they are more likely to rise up and demand for accountability of public officials and the government as a whole. On the other hand, when people have enormous political trust they can tolerate even the most bizarre decisions or actions, believing perhaps the problem was beyond the capability of the government.

The sixth factor in demanding accountability is the customs, traditions and culture of the society. The question here is whether public accountability is regarded as a virtue or treated with contempt by the people and those who are in power. The answer to that question constitutes an important independent variable in assessing the extent of accountability in any given society. For example, citizens may shower praise on an errant leader instead of getting him/her to account for what might otherwise seem to be a breach

of leadership and employment ethics. This is because different societies have different interpretations of what amounts to accountability. In research conducted in Arumeru district in Tanzania, Kelsell found that only a certain actions may move the society to mete out punishment or hold wrongdoers accountable for actions perceived by the society as being in breach of ethics according to traditional and cultural beliefs.

All the factors above are largely mediated by the leadership style of the President and his/her government. Accountability mechanisms and arrangements may be very effective given the political will of the President in holding his/her officials to account. Yet, despite the significant constitutional reforms associated with the democratization process in Africa, studies have shown that Africa's presidents may have been term-limited but not quite tamed yet (Prempeh, 2008; Cranenburgh, 2009). Presidents in many African countries still accrue a great deal of power even amidst democratic institutions and processes. Freedom of expression and association may be protected under the law but restricted by the executive in certain instances.

Based on the discussion above, it is therefore hypothesized that the extent of societal accountability could have taken different forms under various phases of the presidential administrations during the multi-party era in Tanzania. Whenever it is evident that the government and its leadership is tolerant of alternative and opposing views, citizens are more likely to choose a voice option and organize themselves as a group so as to make collective demands for accountability. From the outset it must be noted that actions by citizens to demand accountability in Tanzania were intensified by the introduction of the multiparty system. During the single party system citizens could still, though to a limited extent, find courage to hold their leaders accountable. The limited space was caused by the fear of the single party authority, which did not provide a conducive environment to exercise freedom of expression. As argued by Baregu, the ideological hegemony and internalized fear of political coercion in the single party rule created a quiescent and submissive political culture that made the majority of people follow edicts and directives and comply with laws and regulations even when they were against their interests (Baregu, 2001).

This article focuses on the practices in a multiparty system, which unlike the situation in the single party political system, affords citizens numerous opportunities for airing their views. There are currently 17 political parties and hundreds of non-governmental organizations. Likewise, there has been a

tremendous growth of both private and government media in Tanzania. According to records of the Registrar of Newspapers, Tanzania has a total of 63 active newspapers and magazines - 16 daily newspapers, 4 bi-weeklies, 33 weeklies and 10 monthlies (Registrar of Newspapers, June 6, 2008). Freedom of expression, freedom of association, as well as freedom of assembly is guaranteed in the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. However, it is important to point out that these freedoms of association and expression are circumscribed by other laws in the constitution, thereby limiting their effectiveness. For instance, freedom of opinion and expression of the media is limited by the Newspaper Act (1976) and the National Security Act (1970). According to the Newspaper Act, the Minister of Information is empowered to ban any newspaper at any time he/she deems necessary to do so. Also, the right to access information is limited by the provision of the National Security Act that grants absolute discretion to government to determine what should be disclosed or withheld from access by the public.

Three phases of presidential administrations are assessed in this study. The one between 1992 and 1995 was under the leadership of Ali Hassan Mwinyi. This was the second phase of presidential administration that followed the departure of President Julius. K. Nyerere in 1985.[1] The third phase lasted from 1995 to 2005 under the leadership of President Benjamin William Mkapa. This was followed by the current fourth phase, headed by President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete.

The Trend of Popular Demands for Accountability in Tanzania
Overall, the extent of PDAs has varied over the years since 1992. In the early 1990s (1992-1995) Tanzania witnessed a proliferation of PDAs expressed by workers, students and ordinary citizens. However, the number of incidents gradually declined from the mid-1990s up to 2005. From 2006 PDAs were on the rise once again, up to 2007. Given the fact that this study extends to mid-2008, the direction of popular demands for 2008 cannot be established at the moment. Figure 1 shows the general trend.

Figure 1: The trend of demands for accountability**: 1992-June 2008**

During the period under review (1992-June 2008), a total of 129 incidents of PDAs were reported by the ten (10) newspapers that were reviewed. Whereas President Mwinyi's last four years in office witnessed 52 incidents of popular demands, President Mkapa's 10 year period reported a total of 43 incidents. Only two and half years in office, President Kikwete's period has already witnessed a total of 34 incidents of PDAs. It is more likely that the number of popular demands during President Kikwete's phase will increase as will be discussed below. Table 1 shows the trend clearly.

Table 1: Incidents of PDAs (1992-2008)

Year	Presidency	Incidents of Popular demands
1992-1995	Ali H. Mwinyi	**52**
1996-2005	Benjamin W. Mkapa	**43**
2006- June 2008	Jakaya M. Kikwete	**34**

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1992-June 2008	All	**129**

As shown in Table 1, the first period (1992-1995) coincided with the last term of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. It is important to point out that this period was a turning point in Tanzania's political history, marked as it was by the re-introduction of a multiparty political system. It was during this period that Tanzania witnessed the emergence of many political parties seeking permanent registration. Nearly 50 political parties were formed but only 13 were able to meet the conditions and attain permanent registration (Mpangala, 2004). Also, the period coincided with the unprecedented growth of private media and the expansion of civil society organizations (CSOs). The availability of such freedoms was partly the reason for increased reportage of incidents of PDAs in 1992-1995. In addition, privatization of the economy was also taking place. During the period 1992/93 – 1995/96, a total of 158 parastatals were privatized or were in the process of privatization. This period was known as the "ruksa era," literally meaning "the permissive era" The privatization of parastatals was accompanied by a series of scandals involving government officials and the private sector. For instance, between 1990 and 1994, a total of 703 government scandals were reported by the media (Chachage, 1996: 82). Most of the incidents were actually protests against the policy of privatization, demands for a pay raise and improvement of personal emoluments, demands for the removal of bad and oppressive leaders, and calls for the sacking of embezzlers and bad managers of public funds and property.

As illustrated in Table 2, during the last term of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1992-1995), there were a total 52 major incidents of demands for accountability reported in newspapers. Most of the demands were made by workers through strikes, locking in or locking out leaders and managers, protest marches towards government offices, and carrying of placards bearing messages of demands for accountability. Of the 52 incidents, 43, i.e. 82.7 percent, involved workers, 9.6 percent involved students and 7.7 percent involved ordinary citizens.

Table 2: Incidents of PDAs during Mwinyi's phase: 1992-1995

Year	Incidents	Group Involved
1992	15	Workers
1993	24	Workers, students , ordinary citizens

1994	8	Workers
1995	5	Workers
Total	*52*	

Furthermore, of the 43 incidents involving workers, 24 (56%) had to do with locking in or locking out leaders for several hours and some even for a whole day. For example, on October 27th 1992, there was a report of workers at the Kibo Paper Industry in Temeke District locking out their managers. The workers remained adamant, even when the Minister for Industries and Trade appealed to them to open the gates. They accused the managers of embezzlement, favouritism, and underpayment of the workers. One placard placed on the gate read in Kiswahili, "*Tupo tayari kufa kuliko kuwaruhusu viongozi wabovu kuendelea na kazi*" literally meaning "we would rather die than allow bad leaders to continue occupying their offices" (*Uhuru*, Tuesday, October 27th 1992). In another incident, workers of the Moshi Leather Industry locked out their General Manager, Chief Accountant and other managers accusing them of failing to run the company properly, thus occasioning losses amounting to millions of shillings (*Uhuru*, Saturday February 19th 1993). It must also be noted that it was during Mwinyi's presidency that an unprecedented number of complaints against corruption and tax evasion were reported, leading to the suspension of donor funding. This could be one of the reasons for the sizeable number of incidents of PDAs during the 1992-1995 period.

PDAs continued throughout Benjamin Mkapa's administration. During the 10-year period of his rule, 43 incidents of PDAs were reported, including strikes and demonstrations. Most of these incidents involved workers (46.5 percent) as compared to the incidents by ordinary citizens (32.6 percent) and students (20.9 percent). In this period, the greater number of demands brought forward by ordinary citizens concerned issues of land, housing, exploitation of natural resources such as minerals, participation in decision making as well as access to information on income and expenditure in local government authorities. It is important to note that this period ran concurrently with the implementation of local government reforms. One classic example of demands in this period was that by villagers at Miyuka in Dodoma region who gave a five-day ultimatum to the Village Executive Officer to hand in a report on income and expenditure (*Uhuru*, 4th January 2000). Similarly, citizens of Arumeru West confronted and quarrelled with the leadership of the district council for almost six months in a dispute that made the citizens boycott payment of the development levy in an effort to

pressurize the authorities to submit the income and expenditure report (*Majira*, 7th June 1998).

There were also demands for accountability in natural resources. For example, elders in Loliondo in Arusha region staged a demonstration demanding State House intervention in a land conflict pitting the villagers against a hunting company known as Otherlo Business Corporation (OBC). The elders argued that the company's activities destroyed the environment and endangered the security of wildlife (*Majira*, April 11th 2000). There were also incidents of skirmishes between artisanal miners and large scale miners at Mererani Arusha (2000) and Bulyanhulu (1996). There were further incidents involving the disabled, food vendors and petty traders protesting against evictions from their business premises.

However, the rate of demands for accountability declined during Mkapa's presidency (third phase government) compared to the Mwinyi administration (the second phase government). Whereas in Mwinyi's last term (1992-1995), there were 52 incidents, the number dropped to 25 during the first term of Mkapa's presidency (1996-2000) as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Incidents of PDAs during Mkapa's phase: 1995-2000

Year	Incidents	Group Involved
1996	6	Workers, students, ordinary citizens
1997	4	Workers
1998	5	Workers, ordinary citizens
1999	5	Workers, students, ordinary citizens
2000	*5*	Workers, students, ordinary citizens
Total	25	

The number of demands continued to decline in Mkapa's second term (2001-2005), with only 18 demands reported in the newspapers reviewed (Table 4). Mkapa's leadership style may partly account for the declining trend of societal accountability actions like strikes and demonstrations. Mkapa's presidency witnessed extensive use of state instruments of coercion in suppressing demonstrations and strikes. For example, state power was evident in the confrontation between the police and various groups including

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the artisanal miners, villagers and supporters of political parties (Bakari 2002).

Table 4: Incidents of PDAs during Mkapa's last term : 2001 - 2005

Year	Incidents	Groups Involved
2001	5	Workers, students, ordinary citizens
2002	4	Workers, ordinary citizens
2003	5	Workers, ordinary citizens
2004	2	Workers, students
2005	2	Students, ordinary citizens
Total	**18**	

Ironically, the other reason for the decline of PDAs is related to the people's favourable opinion regarding the government's performance. According to opinion polls held by the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam, many people expressed their satisfaction with the performance of Mkapa's administration. The declining rates of inflation as well as the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were some of the fundamentals that made people shower praise on Mkapa's administration (REDET opinion poll, 1999). 60 percent of the respondents in the 1999 opinion poll reported that they were very satisfied with the performance of the government. A year before President Mkapa left the State House (in the REDET 2004 opinion poll), 70 percent of the respondents still said they were very satisfied with the government's performance.

The fourth phase government under President Jakaya Kikwete has not been spared by PDAs. Within a period of two and half years since he came into power, a total of 34 demands were recorded, involving workers (47 percent), ordinary citizens (32.4 percent) and students (20.6 percent). As in the previous phases, most demands were made by the workers. Though the demands were largely about seeking accountability, the tone of the demands was different from those in other administrations.

Table 5: Incidents of PDAs during Kikwete's first term: 2006 – June 2008

Year	Incidents	Groups Involved
2006	7	Students, ordinary citizens
2007	15	Students, ordinary citizens
2008	12	Ordinary citizens, students, workers

Total	34	

While in the past expressions such as embezzlement of public property were frequently used, during Kikwete's period, corruption and "*ufisadi*" (graft) became the buzz words. A few examples can be cited. The former workers of the defunct East African Community camped at the State House to pressurize the government to effect their outstanding termination payments with a placard reading, "*Ufisadi ulianzia katika mafao yetu*" meaning "graft began with our outstanding termination pay" (*Tanzania Daima*, July 25th 2008). The same word "*ufisadi*" (graft) was commonly used by groups such as petty traders resisting their eviction from Kariakoo (Majira, October 5th 2006) as well as primary and secondary school students protesting against a fare rise by city bus operators (*Majira*, August 2nd 2007). Moreover, a greater part of the demands made by ordinary people was in the form of protests against forceful evictions by the municipal/district authorities from their residences. These cases included evictions of the residents of Tabata Dampo, Kibamba, Wazo Hill, Chasimba and Kwembe in Dar es Salaam as well as Pongwe villagers in Bagamoyo. Moreover, unlike demands for accountability in past regimes, which were unequivocally directed at individual suspects (managers and leaders of local councils), current demands seem to be aimed at both individual suspects in their official capacities and the government and leadership in general.

Analysis of the PDAs during Kikwete's administration portends a future increase, given that his government had only served for two and a half years at the time of the study. As shown above, while in the last term of the five years of President Mkapa's reign there were 18 incidents of PDAs, 34 cases of demands for accountability had been registered in just two and a half years of President Kikwete's first term. The remaining period of Kikwete's tenure up to 2010 could witness a greater increase in such demands. The prevalence of PDAs during the initial years of President Kikwete's administration was partly caused by the freedom of expression afforded to the citizens and the media in reporting diverse and opposing views (MISA Report, 2008: 101). President Kikwete has praised the role of the media and encouraged the media to report on problems facing society without fear, bias or interference from external forces.[2] This freedom has removed fear among the people, thereby improving their readiness to demand accountability from the government and its officials.

The other reason for the increased demands for accountability during Kikwete's administration is the high level of expectations and aspirations of people both as voters and citizens during the fourth phase. A famous slogan "better life for all", made during President Kikwete's election campaign, raised a great deal of hope among Tanzanians. It is probably the perceived gap between the promises and actual gains that has led to the increased rate of PDAs under Kikwete's mid-term administration. Economic hardship is to blame for the increasing number of PDAs, as citizens try to ensure that the country's resources and public funds are properly utilized in an endeavour to improve the living standard of the people. Opinion polls have also indicated that there is a systematic decrease in the level of people's satisfaction with the performance of Kikwete's government, hence the propensity of citizens to demand accountability. Increased complaints about corruption in mining and electricity generation contracts as well as the escalating losses of millions of shillings in public funds may have all contributed to the observed rising trend of PDAs.

Characterizing Popular Demands for Accountability
The analysis in this article indicates that a large number of PDAs are actually made by workers who are relatively better organized as an interest group. Demands involving ordinary people are comparatively minimal. One main reason for this trend is the low level of civic competence among Tanzanians (REDET, 2008). According to the REDET survey on civic culture in Tanzania, the civic competence of citizens, particularly in influencing national policies, is still on the low side. This holds back many people from taking measures whenever their rights are abrogated or laws and procedures are breached by the leaders. One question asked in the 2008 REDET survey was: what would you do should the Parliament enact legislation that is, in your view, oppressive or harmful? 70 percent of the respondents (904 respondents) said that they would not do anything giving the following reasons; they would not be listened to, the Parliament is a very powerful organ, or they did not know what to do. Only 30 percent of the respondents said they would take action, including seeing an MP, using the media, consulting the leadership and staging demonstrations. When asked if they had ever tried to influence decisions at the district level, only 17.2 percent (222 respondents) said they had tried while 82 percent (1064 respondents) said they had never participated. Therefore, many people lack the relevant civic competence to take action to influence decisions especially at the district and national levels.

Also, another reason as to why workers are leading in all administrations in expressing their collective demands for accountability relates to the methodology used to gather information. Many newspapers tend to report more on urban than rural events. Yet, according to the national census, about 73 percent of the Tanzanian population live in rural villages (National Census, 2002), where the media seldom visit. Despite these limitations, the findings in this study have shown that the rate of popular demands by ordinary citizens rose steadily over the years. Whereas incidents of popular demands by ordinary citizens were only 7.7 percent of all the incidents between 1992 and 1995, the number increased to 32.6 percent in the period between 1995 and 2005. In just two and half years of Kikwete's administration (2006 - mid -2008), 32.4 percent of all incidents of PDAs were expressed by ordinary citizens.

Conclusion
This article set out to assess the extent of societal accountability in Tanzania. The key question of the study was - to what extent do citizens struggle to secure accountability from below? The findings have shown that pluralist politics in Tanzania has opened up space for citizens to organize and mobilize themselves in demanding accountability at various levels. The study has shown a series of bottom-up accountability incidents where citizens have resorted to non-electoral mechanisms in exposing government wrongdoing or calling for government action over a certain issue. In addition, the extent of PDAs tends to be influenced by various factors, including the extent of freedoms availed to citizens at a certain point in time. As the findings have shown, the rate of demands was high during Mwinyi's administration with a record of enhanced political and economic liberalization and comparatively low during Mkapa's administration with a record of suppressing people's opinions and media freedom. The impact of the observed incidents of PDAs on the functioning of the government is an important area for further research.

End Notes

[1] The first phase covers the period since independence in 1961 to 1985 under the leadership of the first President of Tanzania, Julius K. Nyerere. The second phase commenced in 1985 when Ali Hassan Mwinyi came to power. The multi-party system was re-introduced in Tanzania during Mwinyi's second term in office in 1992.

2 'JK tells media to write without fear' Daily News (Tanzania) 8 January, 2008; 'Kikwete endorses media fight against social evils' The Citizen (Tanzania), 25 March 2008; When the editor of *Mwanahalisi* was attacked by a group of assailants, President Kikwete visited the Editor at the hospital

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