

## Why do Ruling Parties lose? Taking Stock of the United National Independence Party in Zambia

*Alexander B. Makulilo\**

### **Abstract**

*In the last two decades in Africa, democratic elections occasioned the replacement of some military as well as single-party regimes. Taking Zambia as a case, the question addressed in this article is why the democratic transition caused the defeat of Zambia's United National Independence Party (UNIP). The main argument held is that when the ruling party and the state are fused, the party enjoys hyper incumbency advantage thereby increases its chance of victory. Based on data from documents and interviews, the study found that the fusion between Zambia's former ruling party and the state was relatively weak, leading to its defeat. This was mainly owing to elite factionalism and the personalisation of the party by President Kenneth Kaunda.*

### **Introduction**

Zambia underwent a bottom-up democratic transition. Usually, this transition path forces the regime in power to allow a relatively higher degree of democratic reforms. Notwithstanding some legal reforms prior to the 1991 elections, President Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) enjoyed from the link between the state and the party. Kaunda once said, "Now we are going multi-party, like Britain, the party in power will use all machinery to promote itself and not the opposition" (Andreassen, et al. 1992). True to this statement, the strength of UNIP used to depend on the state-coercive instruments and resources (RZ, 1972: 1-2). It should however be emphasized that until 1991, UNIP was a one-man political organization. Cherry Gertzel (quoted in Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003:4)

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\*Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam.

posits that although the regime was called a one-party state, the presidency, not the party, was the predominant institution. In addition to the vast constitutional powers which the president enjoyed under the multiparty system, during the 1970s, the era of the one-party state, the presidency became increasingly the locus of power in the state. Indeed, UNIP was Kaunda and vice-versa. In concrete terms, Bates and Collier (1993:391) observe that Kenneth Kaunda controlled 40,000 patronage positions in Lusaka alone during the 1980s through UNIP, the party which he dominated. This made the phrase "it pays to belong in UNIP" an order of the day. Besides, Kaunda bypassed the formal party channels and decided alone. In 1969, for example, he issued a presidential party decree to dissolve the Central Committee and abolished the post of party president and vice-president. Temporarily, he created a National Committee to deal with routine affairs. He called himself secretary-general of the party (RZ, 1970). Against that backdrop observers contend that the party's constitution was not adhered to (Kabwe 1987:150-151; Scott 1982:402-406). This tendency, while strengthening Kaunda's power as a president, it weakened the party (Sabine 2002:65; Phiri 2006:148; von Soest 2007a:625; von Soest 2007b:65-66). Throughout the country, although UNIP had been declared a mass party, barely 5% of the total population of Zambia (of about 5 million in 1977) were paid up members of the party. In October 1976, the Secretary-General of UNIP, Grey Zulu noted that of barely 1,185,000 people living in the Copperbelt Province, only 3% were paid up members. In Monze, only 2% of the population were paid up members; while the number of card-carrying members of UNIP in the same area was 2000 out of an estimated population of 115,000. Yet, in 1977 only 5% were paid up members of UNIP in the Central Province which had the population of about 519,000 (Mwanakatwe 1994:96). In such circumstances, it is an inescapable fact that the fusion between the party and the state must have been weakened. This article revisits the relationship between the party and the state and its impact on the 1991 elections. It argues that the defeat of UNIP was largely attributed to the personalisation of the party by Kenneth Kaunda as well as elite fragmentation.

### **Conceptual Framework**

The argument of this article is based around the concept of state-party fusion. Under state party formulation, the ruling party takes an advantage of the state instruments and resources to survive. This state of affairs may happen

either constitutionally or simply by practice. It is indeed a typical feature of an authoritarian regime. It has also to be noted that in most African countries this was the case immediately after independence until 1990s. After the third wave of democratization, however, most regimes underwent some changes. This could not nevertheless end up the authoritarian tendencies of the old one party state order. For example, in Tanzania, the constitution of 1965 made the country constitutionally a one party state. Although in 1992 multiparty system was restored, the practice and tendencies of authoritarianism have not ended. In all the previous elections since then it is observed that the ruling party takes an advantage of the state instruments and resources. This is not new as Bratton and Van Walle (1997) noted that a regime transition from one party to multiparty system is a struggle between the ruling regime and the opposition groups over the rules of the game and the resources with which to play the game itself. When the rules of the game are skewed in favour of one actor against the other, it is clear that the favoured actor will have a chance to win an election. This would mean that whenever the state and the party are separated, that alone would allow all actors to compete as among equals. There are two main ways by which the state and the party linkages can be weakened and ultimately ended. One way is through personalisation of a party by one man. In that situation, the ruler detaches himself or herself from the political party as an institution. He or she simply relies on the state as an individual hence the notion of "one man rule". In order for this ruler to succeed, he or she must resort to the use of patrimonial arrangements whereby his or her support will depend much on what is being provided to the groups in a society. When the ruler becomes unable to deliver favour to different groups, his ruler-ship is challenged and weakened (Brownlee 2007). Ultimately, the regime organised around this nature collapses since it lacks both the institutional support as well as support from different groups. Yet, that regime is likely to lose in an election if the rules of the game are organised in such a way that all actors are treated fairly and impartially by the electoral management bodies.

### **Zambia: A Brief Political History**

Zambia got its independence on 24 October 1964 from the British colonial power based on a multiparty system. The United National Independence Party (UNIP) became the ruling party with a Republic constitution embracing freedom of political expression and association (Bratton 1992:82). Other parties at that time were African National Congress (ANC) and the

National Progressive Party (NPP). The pre-independence elections in Zambia saw the opposition parties winning some seats in the House to the extent that the first internal government of 16 December 1962 was a coalition government between UNIP and ANC. UNIP won 14 seats while the ANC got 7 seats (Phiri 2006:111). While UNIP managed to get 55 seats in the 1964 elections and formed the government alone, still the ANC had 10 seats. It should be kept forth that UNIP had an intention to form a one-party state. It maintained that one-party system was to be formed voluntarily through the ballot box and not by law (Mwanakatwe 1994:86; Chiluba 1995:35). However, the 1968 elections indicated that the opposition, and especially ANC, scored electoral gains at the expense of UNIP (Bratton 1992:83). This made UNIP and President Kenneth Kaunda to abandon their earlier expectation and introduced the one-party system by law on 13 December 1972. Other political parties were banned and some leaders of the opposition parties were co-opted to UNIP.

Between 1968 and 1969 Zambia carried out massive nationalization under the banner of a specific form of African socialism, called "Humanism". The state came to own all major means of life. It was during the 1970s and 1980s that Zambia experienced a severe economic crisis as a result of a decrease in world market prices for copper, the 1973/1974 oil crisis, food crisis etc. (Ihonvbere 1996:58-61). As usual, the IMF/WB and the donor community intervened to rescue the crisis with the SAP package associated with conditionalities to political and economic liberalization. As the situation deteriorated, trade unions together with other civil society organisations as well as political opposition groups pressured for change. This culminated to the fall of UNIP and the rise of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) as the ruling party in 1991 after the latter had won a landslide victory in the first multi-party elections since 1968. This phenomenon moved most scholars to celebrate democracy in Africa (Bratton 1992:81; Tordoff and Young 2005:403). But the 2001 and 2006 elections had indicated a clear retardation of democracy in Zambia.

The literature on Zambia advances three major reasons on the downfall of UNIP. These include the role of civil society (including the lawyers and churches), economic crisis as well as external actors and events. The role played by civil society and particularly the trade union, the Zambia Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) however is overstated. Most literatures have come to

take it for granted that civil society organizations (CSOs) were strong and vibrant in demanding for multi-party democracy. This view is held strongly by Michael Bratton and Panter Brick (Bartlett 2000:430). Rakner (1992:138-139) extensively shows how trade union defended its autonomy from UNIP and the state and above all the one-party system. While this analysis is convincing and popular, it fails to account for the sources of the strength of such organizations. It just narrates several occasions where trade unions resisted UNIP's policies and its government. The most omission to that kind of analysis is to ignore to pay a deserved attention to the strengths of UNIP and its government and particularly on the issue of strategies and timing of the same to consolidate itself against these societies. One could want to know for example, why did the vibrant and strong trade union in Tanzania finally give in to be a party organization? Although it is important to look into the organization capacity, resources, leadership etc of the trade union itself, it is equally important to revisit the strategies employed by the ruling party and its government to weaken the unions. It is along this line of reasoning that Bartlett (2000:444) argues that political liberalisation in Zambia was in large measure the results of regime weakness, weakness that was exposed by UNIP's inability to continue to direct parliamentary affairs on the one hand, and by June 1990 riots on the other. Thus liberalization was the only alternative open for a regime that lacked the will for, or the means of, repression. But second, the civil society approach assumes that a distinctive boundary exists between CSOs and UNIP/Government to the extent that CSOs are viewed as a homogeneous entity fighting the party and government. A deeper analysis, however, shows that the CSOs themselves are parochial. Bartlett (ibid: 430-431) puts it explicitly that:

These analyses of the Zambian transition has not proved useful. My own research into this pragmatic case illustrates that it is the critics of the civil society perspective who have opened up rewarding avenues of inquiry into the nature of political change during the transition period and since the 1991 elections. Rather than the democratic credentials that theories such as Diamond have attributed to civil society, civil society has proved to be the site of power relations, exploitation, and conflicts that are often an impediment to democratization. Communal and neo-traditional elites, family heads, and religious leaders are often authoritarian anti-progressive. They, and the professional and economic institutions universally

considered as important elements of “civil society” are often related to the state in ways that advance parochial and sectional interests and the purposes of the state itself. Much associational life has little to do with establishing democratic, liberating or progressive socio-political norms or civil “space”.

Putting the above quotation into context, Michael Bratton seems to agree on the problematic nature of CSOs. He argues that:

By 1980, there was no political party in Zambia that could contain and express mass discontent with the rising cost and declining standard of living. Alarmed, UNIP’s leaders responded by banning debate within the party and state organs and taking control of the print and broadcast media, including the country’s only two daily newspapers, the Times of Zambia and the Daily Mail. Dissidents, forced out of political society, took refuge in civil society, and civic organizations became thoroughly politicized[...]The business community became a heaven for officials dropped in Kaunda’s cabinet shuffles and for exponents of private enterprise disillusioned with UNIP’s dirigiste economic approach. The Christian churches also provided a convenient cover for political dissent (Bratton 1992:84).

Other scholars described the above phenomenon that civil society was serving as a *de facto* opposition party (Ihonvbere 1996:74; Bartlett 2000:435). It should be noted that what happened in Zambia was simply an “Elite Power Game” where conflicts of interests informed the transition process. Reaffirming this view Bacharach (1962:440) maintains that power within a political system resides primarily with the intervening structure of elites – with those person who hold leading positions in the giant corporations, trade unions, churches, political parties, and in professional and veteran organisations. In contrast to the elites, the masses of ordinary people are powerless since they cannot act except through organization and in response to the initiative of small number of leaders. Thus the stability of the system, indeed, its very survival, depends upon the elites. In other words, elite fragmentation is likely to shake the entire foundation of the system and vice versa. When the interests of elites are bound together institutionally the ruling party will survive in power and the failure of which leads into the

regime collapse (Higley and Moore 1981:581-585; Heinz et al. 1990:356-357; Higley et al. 1991:36; Brownlee 2007:3; Rakner and Svåsand 2005). Even the MMD itself before the 1991 was about to split, especially when Arthur Wina lost the party presidency to Frederick Chiluba. This would have otherwise made UNIP remain on power (Tembo 1996:26). This fragmentation however became a reality after MMD formed the government. Other observers came to argue that MMD was simply a collection of elites with competing interests formerly serving very well UNIP (Ihonvbere 1996:107; Tordoff and Young 2005:414). Thus it is important to revisit the strategies and their effectiveness employed by UNIP and its government to ensure elites' interests are bound together.

The second reason for the downfall of UNIP is the economic crisis. It is maintained that the crisis was caused purely by UNIP's monopoly of power, the personal rule of Kenneth Kaunda, internal mismanagement and irresponsible economic policies as well as a deteriorating price of copper on which the entire economy was dependant (Good 1989:306; Ihonvbere 1996:94; Henriot 1997:41). This situation led to legitimacy crisis and ultimately massive demonstrations demanding for a multiparty system. This argument can provide only a partial explanation. It must be noted that economic crisis is not a precondition for democratic transition but rather it must be viewed only as a catalyst to facilitate the process once it began.

The third factor is related to international pressure and developments. These developments include the collapse of the USSR and the fall of Berlin Wall. Joseph (1997:363) thus submits that "The upheavals in much of Africa after the Berlin Wall was opened in November 1989 have been referred to as a second independence". But importantly following these developments, was the role played by IMF, World Bank and the donor community (and especially the USA and Western countries) to pressure African countries to adopt multiparty systems. Through development assistance, these actors attached conditions with regard to the liberalization of economy and politics to the extent that African countries could not escape them but rather had to bow down (Plattner 2009; Pangle 2009; Seligson et al. 2009). Authoritarian regimes were forced to devalue their currencies, to cut down subsidies and the size of the public sector all of which made these regimes unpopular. This situation made them unpopular and subjected them to massive demonstration demanding for democracy. But it should be acknowledged

that the impact of these conditions varied from country to country depending on the level of the crisis as well as the skills of the regime in power to accommodate them. Zambia was much affected by the SAPs (Joseph 1997; Olukoshi 1998). The next sections focus on four parameters of state-party relations, namely, the rules of the game, nature of bureaucracy, oversight institutions and elite factionalism.

### **Rules of the Game**

The key rules of the game that guided the 1991 elections were the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 1991, Societies Act. Cap. 119 and the Election Act. No. 2 of 1991. The constitution which is the mother-law of the land had up to 1991 undergone three major developments: The Zambia constitution of 1964, the constitution of 1973 and the constitution of 1991. With the exception of the constitution of 1973 which made Zambia a one party state, the other two were tailored around a multiparty democracy. One important feature of the constitutional development in Zambia is that the Bill of Rights existed since independence, though with some limitations. With a relatively liberal legal framework, the position and status of UNIP in the state constitution were always put at minimum. For example, apart from Article 4(1 and 2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 1973 which established UNIP as the sole political party; and Articles 42(1)(2)(3) and 43(1)(2) which provided that if the office of the president became vacant by reason of death, resignation, illness, removal due to incapacity, violation of constitution, or gross misconduct, the Secretary-General of the Party or, if there was no Secretary-General, then one member of the Central Committee of the Party elected by the Central Committee assumed the power of the president until a person elected as a president took the office; no other clause seemed to strictly fuse the power of the party and the state. Besides, the party supremacy clause in Zambia was only found in the party constitution. It simply meant: "Work, high productivity, discipline and self-reliance" (RZ, 1975).

At the eve of a multiparty democracy, the president appointed a constitutional review commission, popularly known as Mvunga Commission after its chairman, Professor Patrick Mvunga, with a view to pay particular attention on the followings: Examine and determine a system of political pluralism that would ensure a government which would be strong enough to rule the Zambian nation and ensure the personal liberties of the people; to



examine and determine a system of government that would ensure the separation of the powers of legislature, the executive and the judiciary so as to enhance the roles of these organs; to examine and determine the status in relation to the government of the ruling party which has won an election; and to look into the composition and functions of the various organs of the state and recommend their modality of operation. A close examination of this report shows that most of its recommendations were in line with a multiparty system. It can be observed that the commission made 155 recommendations of which the government accepted 147 (94.84%) and rejected 8(5.16%) (RZ, 1991). However, the emerging opposition forces, particularly the MMD did not accept the draft constitution appended to the Commission's report on two grounds: Firstly, the commission was predominated by UNIP members; and secondly, the proposed constitutional draft was not publicly discussed. This situation forced Kenneth Kaunda to accept a compromise constitutional text agreed to at an Inter-Party dialogue between the ruling party UNIP and the MMD as was brokered by the "mother churches" under the Chairmanship of the Anglican Church's Bishop Stephen Mumba. The impact of the dialogue was to liberalise further the rules of the game in which 68 alterations were made on the proposed new constitution. A new constitution was finally passed by the parliament on 24 August 1991. Arguably, the rules of the game were significantly transformed, implying that UNIP and its government were weakened. It should be recalled that the 1991 elections were held two years before Kaunda's five year term in office lapsed.

Yet, the status and position of UNIP in the state constitution were intensely undermined. In concrete terms, the Mvunga Commission stated that in a plural democracy a constitution cannot set out party programmes, be they social, economic, political or otherwise. The constitution must accommodate all lawful political parties. In this diversity, the constitution must not be too rigid but not too flexible either to make it susceptible to political manipulation to the advantage of any political party in power. The commission therefore recommended that the party that has won an election should detach itself from the government, its functions, operations, material and human resources. Before the elections, UNIP attempted to "de-link" the party from the state institutions. For example, cabinet directives were issued to UNIP employees and demanded them to vacate government houses; return of all government property on loan to UNIP such as vehicles and

stationery; and above all the directives ordered the resignation of government employees who desired to work for the ruling party. But separating the personnel, finances, assets and operating procedures of the party and government, after 17 years of union, proved to be difficult. The government did not however ever make any allocations on any basis to opposition parties (NDI, 1992). It is beyond doubt that the observation made by the Mvunga commission (1990:45) that a separate law was already settled to assess the assets acquired by the ruling party during the one party era through tax payers' money did not work. At the end of September 1991, Michael Sata of MMD filed a petition with the Lusaka High Court, seeking UNIP's immediate vacation of central or local government premises, including parastatal and residential premises and requesting UNIP to account for or surrender all properties of the government including vehicles. The court granted the order and ruled that former leaders hand over the property by 31 November 1991. Some affected leaders resisted the handover (Andreassen et al.1992:20). Until 1992, UNIP was still contesting for 35 vehicles which were under government verification.

As the case with many African countries, much of the presidential power in Zambia was retained. The president appointed the election commissioners at his discretion and would dismiss them whenever it pleased him (Article 76 of the Constitution of Zambia 1991). Yet, the Local Administration Act. No. 15 of 1980 fused the party and state organs at the local level. One of the principal objectives of the 1980 Act was to combine together the primary organs of the party and other organs of local administration within a single, unified framework provided by the district council. The president appointed a District Governor to administer each district. The Governor was the chairman of both the District Political and District Development Committees. He or she was required to cultivate co-operation between the Central government agencies, traditional rulers, and the people themselves. While the president might have used the discretion to ensure the electoral commission worked in his favour, that was not successful. This does not want to suggest that UNIP did not completely benefit from this fused structure in the 1991 elections. For example, in the Western Province, UNIP candidates used the district council's vehicle to campaign in the area. However, the electoral commission and election officials throughout the country demonstrated their dedication and professionalism and conducted successful, credible elections (NDI, 1992). This fact was disputed by President

Kaunda who maintained that the election was rigged in favour of the opposition party the MMD.<sup>1</sup> This would mean that Kaunda had by then lost control of the usual rigging machinery in the African context.

Besides, the 1991 elections were conducted under the state of emergency, a condition which is against democracy. Historically, the state of emergency was inherited at independence in 1964 because of the external destabilization and insecurity Zambia had faced for her support of liberation movements in the Southern Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The Eastern Province was, for example, a target by attacks from the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The emergency was therefore renewed after every sixth months. However from 1969 following the Constitutional (Amendment) No. 5, Act. No. 33, the state of emergency was extended indefinitely. With the emergency powers, the president was empowered discretionally to make regulations related to detention without trial, restrict movement of people within and without Zambia if in his opinion he thought that such movements were harmful to the interests of Zambia, and to permit the holding of a rally or a large meeting. As it can be seen, the emergency powers affected the Bill of Rights. For one thing, individuals' rights were violated through police brutality; freedom of movement and expression were also curtailed. In 1991, the Mvunga Commission recommended for the emergency powers to continue subject to its sixth month renewal something which was unsuccessfully opposed by opposition parties.

During the 1991 elections, the MMD and election monitors argued that the emergency powers was anti-democracy and could affect the election. Despite such an outcry, the emergency was not lifted. Instead, President Kaunda pledged not to use the emergency powers to constrain democracy. By and large, he observed his promise throughout the election period (Andreassen, et al. 1992:34). There were of course some problems which are common even to those countries in Africa without the emergency powers. For example in Zimbabwe, Zanzibar and Kenya, the rigging and police harassments are common during elections. In Zambia, the state of emergency resulted into intimidation and harassment of the opposition supporters by the police and paramilitary units. For example, in Kitwe the paramilitary officers were accused of stirring up civil unrest and chaos by indiscriminately carrying out corporal punishments, and by stopping taxis and beating passengers, after ordering the taxi driver to leave his passengers behind. It was common for

residents in most townships to be arrested and beaten up without being charged with any offence. One Kalingalinga resident, B. Mwansongo, died at a paramilitary post in Kalingalinga after he was picked up one night by the forces. To worsen things, Kaunda was reported publicly announcing that he would deal with opposition members after elections (Andreassen, et al. 1992:35-9). By any standards, the emergency powers did have some impact on the elections. Indeed, it enabled Kaunda to impede the movements and campaign meetings of his opponents (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:204).

The stronghold of UNIP could also be seen in relation to the registration of political parties. Article 21(2)(d) of the Constitution states “nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law in question makes provision (d) for the registration of political parties or trade unions in a register established by or under any law”. The sub-clause further provided for reasonable conditions related to the procedure for entry on such a register. Such procedures should be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. It should be understood that political parties in Zambia are registered through the Registrar of Societies and regulated by the Societies Act. Generally the conditions for registering a party were not cumbersome. However, one of those conditions was that a new party was strictly prohibited to identify itself with the past names of political parties prior to 1973 when the one party state came into being. These parties were ANC, UP and UPP to mention the most vibrant ones against UNIP. The ruling party feared that the use of such names could revive stiff opposition of the past.

The above backdrop indicates that the timing of registration of new parties worked in favour of UNIP. As already stated, on 4 December 1990, the government repealed Article 4 of the Constitution of 1973 which made Zambia a one party state. On 17 December 1990, the Act. No. 20 of that year was signed by the president. It replaced Article 4 of the constitution by a new Article 4A which stated:

Notwithstanding the repeal of Article 4: (a) The institutions and the organs of the Party recognized under this Constitution shall continue to exist until the next dissolution of Parliament; and (b) Any party formed as a consequence of the repeal of Article 4 shall only

participate in an election to the National Assembly after the next dissolution of Parliament.

These constitutional clauses were clearly interpreted by the Supreme Court of Zambia in *Joshua Lumina v. Bennie Mwiinga* (1991) S.J. (S.C.). In that case, Mr. Mwanawasa, on behalf of the appellants, argued that Articles 4A, 67(c) and 71(2)(b) were discriminatory in themselves and in their effect because, by depriving non-members of UNIP the right to contest Parliamentary elections and the right to remain members of the National Assembly, these provisions conferred upon members of UNIP privileges and advantages which were denied to non-members of that Party. Further, it was argued that the said provisions subjected non-UNIP members to disabilities or restrictions to which UNIP members were not made subject. Mr. Mwanawasa prayed to the Court that it could not have been the intention of Parliament to give the rights under Article 13, 22, 23, and 25, only to have them taken away by Articles 67(c) and 71(2)(b) were either null and void or ineffectual. The Court ruled in favour of the appellants and declared Articles 4A, 67(c) and 71(2)(b) were in conflict with those rights and freedoms guaranteed by Articles 13, 22, 23 and 25. But one fact to be learnt from this case is that UNIP remained the only single party until the dissolution of the Parliament on 24 August 1991 (just two months before the October 1991 general election). It implied that UNIP continued to benefit from the constitution status and state resources. This was made strategically to strengthen the party ahead of the election against MMD.

However, the above strategy did not prove to be fruitful since opposition parties of the past could still operate on an underground basis to the extent that their inclusion in or exclusion from UNIP by the one-party clause in the constitution was not an issue. During the one party era, opposition parties were by and large a *de facto* category. The members of the defunct opposition parties were found in the trade unions and later at the eve of a multiparty system in 1991 they resurfaced in opposition parties. Most members who broke from UNIP, and those who were detained, joined the opposition forces particularly the MMD. For example, many UPP supporters took up local positions in the MMD: Stanley Sinkamba became MMD constituency chairman in Kamnfinza, Kitwe while Josiah Chisala formed a local branch in Kabwata, Lusaka. Daniel Kapapa, MMD member of parliament for Kasama and a key Chiluba loyalist, was Deputy Minister for North Province in the

1990s. Boniface Kawimbe, the only significant UPP figure reached the senior office as Minister of Health from 1999 to 2001; and later on Mr. Kawimbe served as MMD national chairman after Chiluba left office until 2005 (Larmer, 2008:123). While UNIP was able to use its past history as an independent party, and the like, it failed to outcompete the opposition parties using such resources.

Yet, the chieftainship system was another way through which the party and state were fused. Historically, the chieftainship system was basically inherited by the Zambian government from the outgoing British colonial state. During the colonial days, the indirect rule (divide and rule) system was applied to almost all British colonies. The system was useful in three respects: Firstly, it helped to make the state machinery run cheaply despite its few European officials; secondly, it helped to reduce confrontation with the colonized subjects since they thought that they were ruled by their local chiefs; and thirdly, it was a strategy to divide colonial subjects along ethnics and hence weaken them to fight the colonial master. For ease of reference, Section 14 of the Zambia Independence Order, 1964 stated:

Any person who, immediately before the commencement of this Order, was recognized by the Governor to be of Chiefly status in Barotseland or was recognized under any law as the Litunga of Barotseland or a Paramount Chief, Senior Chief, Chief or sub-Chief shall, until that recognition is withdrawn by the President, be deemed, from the commencement of this Order, to have received equivalent recognition by the President (RZ, 1964).

Chapter five of the constitution of Zambia 1964 established the House of Chiefs in which each province was represented. The Chiefs therefore reflected the ethnic-regionalism divide of the Zambian population. During the single party era, the Chiefs and their House were made an appendage of UNIP. Article 104(1) of the Zambian Constitution 1973 empowered the president, the Secretary-General of the party or the prime minister, at any time, to attend and address the House of Chiefs. The party further co-opted the Chiefs and as UNIP functionaries, or appointed local government officials; chiefs were entitled to benefits such as salaries, allowances, vehicles, and housing. In some instances, chiefs were appointed or elected to political positions. For example, eight chiefs were elected to parliament, four of whom

appointed as ministers of state. Others were elected to UNIP central committee, and served as permanent secretaries and diplomats (Andreassen et al.1992:16-17). On the return of the multiparty system in 1991, the institution of Chiefs was preserved as recommended by the Mvunga commission, and it still exists to date. During the 1991 elections, UNIP maintained its close ties with almost all Zambia's 280 hereditary Chiefs. In May 1991, President Kaunda appointed the Senior Chief Mukumi from Southern Province as governor of Kalomo because of his unwavering commitment to UNIP. Yet, in August 1991 the UNIP Congress re-elected two chiefs to the central committee. Moreover, UNIP fielded originally 12 chiefs as parliamentary candidates for the October 1991 elections. While Kaunda pledged to support the continuity of chieftainship, the delegation of chiefs in turn expressed their eagerness to support UNIP (Andreassen et al.1992:17-18). But the chiefs were not homogeneous. At the eve of a multiparty system, some strived to be neutral while others joined MMD.

#### **Nature of Bureaucracy**

UNIP lost control of both the security and civil bureaucracy. To understand how this happened, one needs to revisit the history of Zambia. During the First Republic, UNIP had always struggled to co-opt the civil servants into its hegemony. The party initiated various strategies towards that goal. For example, President Kaunda frequently made statements that all civil servants must belong to UNIP. Employment opportunities, promotion, demotion and dismissal were used to ensure the servants comply with the Party's order. After the 1968 elections, Kaunda retaliated:

I cannot see how I can continue to pay a police officer or a civil servant who works for Nkumbula [...] How dare they bite the hand that feeds them? They must learn that it pays to belong to UNIP. Those who want to form a civil service of the opposition must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry Nkumbula.<sup>2</sup>

To make his statement real, Kaunda insisted that a civil servant must work for a party which was interested in him as a person and that it was for UNIP, the party which formed the government. He therefore ordered the Secretary-General and all permanent secretaries to work out in order to establish party-workers' committees in the civil service. This move intended to teach them the party's philosophy of Humanism. Mr Kaunda emphasized "Because of

our sensitive geo-political situation we cannot afford neutrals; you are either with us or you are against us (RZ, 1970).” It was not until 1972 when the civil servants were officially allowed to stand for parliamentary elections and were free to belong to the Party. It is said that in most cases, party membership-card was used during the recruitment of servants.

On the eve of multipartism, civil servants were supposed to be impartial. The normal argument advanced was that the servant being supported by tax payers’ money was required to serve all individuals or political parties impartially. Although UNIP had not significantly de-linked itself from the state, the civil bureaucracy seemed to have acted against UNIP and Kaunda. Bratton and van de Walle (1997:101;199) note that from 1985 onward, administrative and parastatal employees, later joined by doctors and nurses, embarked on a wave of wildcat strikes in the public sector. They further that, apart from being a coalition of interest groups (trade union, business, professional, student, and church groups), MMD skilfully used the far-flung teachers’ and civil servants’ unions to mobilize support in the countryside, and through its own multi-ethnic leadership (diverse tribal, linguistic, and regional identities). It is estimated that by 1980 UNIP’s paid-up members were barely 5% of the population equivalent to less than half of the membership of the trade union movement (Chiluba 1995:26). Arguably, Kaunda had lost control over the civil servants. Indeed, they turned against him for the quest for change. The underlying force of the 1991 elections was “change”. This was not only due to the devastated economy but also owing to the fact that President Kaunda had already overstayed and the party resisted to undertake reforms.<sup>3</sup>

Related to this, Kaunda used to appoint and re-appoint senior servants depending on the degree of loyalty to him. This practice undermined his legitimacy to the servants. For one thing, he created factionalism amongst the servants, “them” and “us”. As I noted at the beginning of this article, Kaunda had 40,000 patronage positions in Lusaka alone during the 1980s. In his speech to the members of the parliament, Mr. Chiluba said “Civil servants are not politicians; they should refrain from usurping the political role. Be reminded that there is now a clear division between Party and State, between politics and administration (RZ, 1991).” Two things stand out in relation to this statement: Firstly, Chiluba was certain of how politicized was the civil servants; implying that he also managed to politicize them and mobilised



their support. His argument was that all civil servants were supposed to implement the policies of the democratically elected government, which meant the MMD. Secondly, it is about dichotomising administration from politics. This subject has been under debate for decades admitting the difficulty both in theory and practice. Arguably, one should emphasize on impartiality of the civil servants as opposed to the politics-administration dichotomy.

Constituting the election commission team at the grassroots, where the actual voting took place, the civil bureaucrats were against UNIP and Kaunda. Kaunda admitted that the government printer, for example, that was responsible for designing and printing the ballot papers was one of the key actors who tampered with the papers against UNIP.<sup>4</sup> However, Chiluba argued that MMD was able to mobilise workers especially from the government to add muscles to its campaign countrywide. Being affected adversely by the economic crisis, this mobilisation could be relatively easy.<sup>5</sup> That is to say, the servants wanted change and improvement of their conditions. The Economic Report<sup>6</sup> of 1991 in Zambia describes well the workers conditions. It states that the slowdown in the Zambian economy led to massive retrenchments in most sectors. Through cost-saving measures, most firms forced their employees to redundancies and early retirements without compensation. The situation exacerbated by brain-drain whereby doctors, engineers, academic staff and other professionals left outside the country to seek for employment. As a result, total formal sector employment declined from 23.03% in 1980 to 9.0% in 1991. Against that backdrop, the Mvunga commission, made specific observations about Zambians and the pressing call for change. The commission noted a mood of anxiety, impatience and depression among some petitioners; some submissions reflected a resentment of the one-party rule of the past 17 years which was directly extended to the leadership of UNIP; and above all there appeared to be some mistrust between the rulers and the ruled, particularly in rural areas. Arguably, the civil servants looked indifferent to support UNIP.

On the other hand, the relation between the Party and security forces was made official for the first time on the eve of a one-party state in Zambia. In October 1972, the Chona report<sup>7</sup> recommended that the members of the security forces should be free to belong to the Party; and be free to stand for parliamentary elections. These proposals were accepted by the government

(RZ, 1972). The heads of the armed forces and the police became ex-officio high-ranking party members. In efforts to politicize and integrate the security forces into the Party, President Kaunda argued that there must be a deliberate effort to analyse the situation so much so that the young officers would know their philosophy of Humanism. He remarked "We must adopt a new attitude towards the police force and law enforcement authorities. They are part of the UNIP machinery for strengthening discipline in the Nation (RZ, 1972: 15)." As it can be seen, there were no strict strategies that fused the security forces to the Party. However, the President was the Commander-in-chief of all armed forces. He had the power to determine the operational use of the forces. Besides, he was vested with powers to appoint on promotion and dismiss any member of the armed forces. No wonder, the orders of the Commander-in-chief must be obeyed without questioning, implying that practically all the armed forces were serving the interests of the Party.

To survive, the Second Republic strategically divided the military. The government designed separate Command of the Army and Air Force. Chiluba (1995:47) posits that the government with the army of around 15,000 men, a small air-force, police mobile units, police paramilitary units and the national service were kept separately, the factor which minimised a well coordinated military coup. The commanding officers and senior army officers were frequently reshuffled and brought into the government posts at cabinet level while others served in foreign missions as diplomats. Despite these efforts, Zambia experienced three attempted coups in 1980, 1988, and 1990. Interestingly, Kaunda managed to retain enough support from the army (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:104). However, Kaunda asked himself whether the law was soft to deal with such an offence (Mwanakatwe 1994:176). By all indication, the coups sent a sufficient message to the president; indeed it challenged his power as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This partly explains why Kaunda failed to use the security forces to resist the handing over of power to the MMD and Chiluba after the 1991 elections. In his own words, Kaunda put:

When the results began to [...] pour in, I could see clearly there was something wrong somewhere [...] I said to myself, yes, these results are disappointing. Obviously MMD is winning [...] What does this mean? [...] I am Commander-in-Chief. I have the Armed Forces at my

command. I am doubtful about the results. I will do one of the two things. One, resist change and say no, we go to the polls again because there has been some rigging [...] or be sensible about it and accept change and then examine closely what to take place. The idea would be not...going back to power but...avoiding them happening again" (Kabwe 1997:126-7).

It should be noted that in most African countries, losing election is one thing, and handing over power to the winner is something else. Normally, the party in government will use state apparatuses to prevent the winner from assuming power. In Zimbabwe, for example, with the help of state coercive forces, President Robert Mugabe, has always resisted change. In the 2008 elections, he openly used such forces against the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Indeed, the Zimbabwe state is a typical case of state-party (Bratton and Masunungure 2008:44-45). The same phenomenon happened in the last general election of 2007 in Kenya. It was said that Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) won and the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) lost. With the help of state apparatuses and resources, Kibaki managed to resist power change (Elischer 2008). The experiences of Zimbabwe and Kenya have developed a new political formula in Africa whereby the "loser" becomes the president and the "winner" a prime minister. Although the security forces favoured UNIP during the 1991 elections, as I noted elsewhere in this work, it seems that Kaunda had by then lost a solid base with the security forces.

### **Oversight Institutions**

Two institutions are examined under this parameter, namely, the media and parliament. The history of media in Zambia has ups-and-downs. During the one party era, the media was a powerful tool of party propaganda. Both print and electronic media were fused to UNIP in terms of ownership and issues to be covered. In 1975, the party strengthened its position over media by streamlining them to one party state. For example, the Times of Zambia and Sunday Times of Zambia were taken over by the party one hundred percent. The party also took over 60% of the shares in the commercial side of both papers. The Zambia Daily Mail, Times of Zambia, Zana, radio and television were supposed to reflect the official thinking of the party and the government. UNIP went further to take control of cinemas (RZ, 1975: 35).


Editors to the newspapers were appointed and removed from office by presidential decree especially when they went against the party's interests. With the advent of a multiparty system, media was supposed to be impartial, particularly the state-owned ones. This is because media is funded by tax payers' money and is the most important source of information. For example, the 1993 survey shows that more than 50% of Zambians claimed to own a radio, and more than 60% said that they listened to news bulletin, about 30% listened everyday while only 8% claimed to read newspaper every day. 70% of those claimed to read newspapers mentioned that they read the Times of Zambia and Daily Mail (Svåsand, et al. 1995). From these figures, it is beyond doubt that whoever controlled the media was able to campaign widely. For one thing, electoral campaigns in most contemporary democracies are predominated by national television, radio and press coverage.

On the eve of multipartism, the media did not work impartially. Most of the time it favoured UNIP. The MMD criticized Zambian media as being directly or indirectly controlled by the party and state (Wina quoted in Moore 1992:72). In December 1990, Kenneth Kaunda removed the editors of the two daily papers (the Mail and Times) from their posts for allegedly allowing coverage of the activities of the opposition in their publications. The new editors were appointed on the strength of their UNIP allegiance and were warned against covering MMD news items or accepting its advertisements (Andreassen et al.1992:41-42). In January 1991, President Kaunda issued a directive to the editors of the Times of Zambia and of the Zambia Daily Mail instructing them not to cover the opposition parties. This obstruction was lifted up on October 1991 following the court injunction order obtained by the Press Association of Zambia. The order considered such an act as illegal, unconstitutional and discriminatory. Specifically, it barred Mr. Stephen Moyo (the Director-General of the Zambia National Broadcast Company-ZNBC) and Bwenondo Mulenga, the editor of the Times from supervising news reporting until after election on the ground that they acted in favour of UNIP. However, on 29 October, only two days before the election, the Supreme Court reversed the injunction and reinstated Moyo and Mulenga to their respective positions (NDI, 1992). On its part, the MMD complained that state television and radio engaged in biased reporting in favour of Kaunda and UNIP. In July 1991, the MMD prepared 14 radio and television spots for advertisement. The party submitted them to the ZNBC for broadcasting. The authority refused them on the reason that they violated advertising ethics for

they attacked UNIP and government. The MMD challenged the ZNBC in the High Court. On 14 August the Court issued an injunction requiring the television to air the commercials.

Despite the court's rulings in favour of MMD, the party continued to claim that the media was biased. This claim called in for further investigation by election observers. Between 30 September and 27 October 1991 an independent research<sup>8</sup> was conducted to provide the reality over the matter. The report revealed generally that although most of the time UNIP and Kaunda were ahead of MMD in terms of coverage, the gap was not so significant. For example, on the placement of television news between the mentioned period, UNIP had 61 minutes, 6 seconds compared to MMD's 34 minutes, 18 seconds, a difference of 26 minutes, 48 seconds. Figure 7 below provides specific time allocation to Kaunda and all political parties in seconds:

Figure 1: Time allocated to Political Parties in Zambia, 1991 General Election, 30 September – 27 October 1991.



Source: Adapted from “Fairness in the Media? Election in Zambia: Independent Research Report for Z-Vote” (Summary Report 30 September – 27 October 1991).

From the figure above, the following observations can be made: One, UNIP together with Kaunda maintained a visibility across nearly all the news items. They received especially longer durations of coverage with the more important news items of 1, 2, and 3; second, MMD’s visibility appeared consistent across the news items as well, but with less than half the duration given to UNIP and Kaunda collectively; and three, other parties were almost eclipsed in terms of coverage, featuring only in the rather less important news items such as 6 towards 12; and even then, at very short periods as is

shown. These parties included the Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS), Social Democratic Process (SDP), Democratic Debating Party (DDP), National Democratic Party (NDP), Movement for Democratic Process (MDP), Christian Alliance for the Kingdom of Africa (CHAKA), National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). Arguably, the opposition's struggle to access the media was by and large a successful story. Such success was made possible by the judiciary which adjudicated impartially as well as the efforts by the election monitors. Most of the time, the monitors voiced against the biased media. Indeed, as the election days were approaching, the opposition parties' coverage increased.

It is interesting to note that after a decade of multipartism in Zambia, Kaunda remarked "The public media which is supposed to facilitate this debate has become an instrument of party propaganda. The example of Ben Kangwa has been a lesson to all journalists. Kangwa was suspended and shunted to the side lines just because he aired a paid UNIP advertisement." He furthered that:

In the democratic Zambia of today you will never see any opposition party leader being interviewed for an hour on public radio or Television. Interviewing opposition figures is common practice in all democracies so that citizens can be informed about policy alternatives that are being posed by various political parties.<sup>9</sup>

These statements are important with regard to the behaviour of ruling parties in most of African countries. During the 1991 elections, it was Kaunda who used state apparatuses and resources against the furtherance of opposition parties and democracy in general. Dispossessed with the state instruments, he is now complaining about the access to media by opposition parties. He appears to think more democratically now than before. No wonder, state is the life blood of ruling parties. This may partly explain why most ruling parties, especially those which struggled for independence in Africa, when defeated in election; they never come back to power as was the case with UNIP and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), to mention but a few cases.

### **Elite Factionalism**

Before the 1991 elections, Zambia's population was about 7.8 mn and kept on growing at over 3.5% a year. With about one half of its population living in urban areas, Zambia is the most urbanised country in sub-Saharan Africa. This population reflects the 73 ethnic groups with officially seven language groups: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi (Barotse), Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. In religious terms, the majority of Zambians are Christians. The elites in Zambia reflect this population characteristic. Between 1950s and 1964, elite conflicts informed struggles for independence and signified clear divisions among the population. After independence the conflicts persisted and indeed, the ruling party UNIP failed to bind together and safeguard the interests of elites. And therefore, throughout its existence, UNIP experienced severe elite fragmentation.

Intra-party and inter-party opposition to UNIP were common. For example, UNIP was initially formed in 1959 as a splinter group from the African National Congress (ANC, 1951-1972). As noted elsewhere in this chapter, UNIP formed the first government in 1964 having won the landslide victory. With barely ten seats, ANC became an official opposition during the First Republic. Later in 1966, UNIP split to give the United Party (UP, 1966-1968), and further split occurred in 1971 culminating to the birth of another opposition party, the United Progressive Party (UPP, 1971-1972). One distinctive feature about all these political parties was their foundation on ethnic-regionalism. Erdmann (2007:12-14) provides an interesting observation of ethno-regional cleavages that informed party politics during the First Republic. According to him, UNIP was reconstituted by a loose elite coalition of various ethnic groups. The most dominant ones included the Bemba-speakers of Northern-Luapula- and Copperbelt Province, and Nyanja-speakers of Eastern Province which included Tonga and Lozi speakers as well. However, UNIP was better identified with the Bemba speakers, implying that it acquired a Bemba ethnic-label. On the other hand, opposition parties such as ANC had its stronghold among the Tonga speakers in the Southern Province; while UP was predominant among the Lozi of Western Province; and UPP was dominant among the Bemba speakers of Northern Province.

It is interesting to note that all the splits were done by the most senior party and government officials. For example, UPP was formed by Simon Kapwewe



who resigned from his post of Vice-President to defend his ethnic interests. Following the tension within and without UNIP, President Kaunda once remarked:

We have canvassed to strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a spate of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, colour, and religion, which is the negation of all that we stand for in this Party and Government. I do not think that we can blame the common man for this. The fault is ours fellow leaders-we, the people here assembled (RZ, 1967).

The above quoted paragraph is instructive in understanding the nature of intra-and inter-party tensions among elites. It implies that it is elites who construct ethnic cleavages in order to renegotiate their interests. But most importantly, it indicates clearly that UNIP was weak to address such conflicts. Although Kaunda and UNIP did not want to bring the one-party state by legislation in 1972, they were certain that it was impossible. The only solution, Kaunda thought, was to eliminate opposition using legislation (Olawa 1979:53). On 25 February 1972 Kaunda announced:

You know that since Independence there has been a constant demand for the establishment of a One-Party State in Zambia. The demands have become more and more widespread in all corners of Zambia. In recent months I have received hundreds of messages and letters from organisations and individuals appealing to me to take concrete steps to bring about a One-Party system of Government.<sup>10</sup>

Kaunda's statement would suggest that the people and not UNIP and himself wanted the one-party system. As I noted earlier, Kaunda thought the one-party state would come through the ballot box something which became a nightmare. One-party state, thus, came as a tool to deal with intra-and-inter-party problems. On 13 December 1972, Zambia was proclaimed to be a one-party state. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the underground intra-party opposition continued in the party and government, especially in the parliament, leading to the signing of the Choma Declaration.<sup>11</sup> between UNIP

and ANC in 1973. At the eve of multiparty system, the old, strong social cleavages reappeared and defections were normal. For instance, twenty MMD candidates for seats in the National Assembly previously sat there as UNIP's MPs, including twelve who had served either in the cabinet or on the party's Central Committee. Yet, other members of UNIP joined parties such as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Democratic Party (DP). Similarly, the Garden House Conference was significantly sponsored and attended by the former UNIP senior members like Vernon J. Mwaanga (Foreign Minister 1973-1975, and a member of the UNIP Central Committee up to 1976); Arthur Wina (Finance and then Education Minister in UNIP government 1964-1968); and Humphrey Mulemba-Secretary-General of UNIP in 1981-1985 (Chiluba, 1995).

Another elite group constituted the trade unionists. This group participated fully during the struggle for independence in Zambia. Although trade unions supported UNIP during the struggle for independence and thereafter, the unions resisted to be controlled by UNIP. During the pre-independence period, the unionists under the umbrella of the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), later changed to be the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) made resolution which stated that labour movement would remain neutral in politics but reserved the right to support any party with progressive politics. It was not uncommon at this time to find individual members of trade unionism to be at the same time members of UNIP. During the First Republic, trade unions maintained their autonomous status from the party. The multiparty framework associated with its Bill of Right provided enabling environment for the unions to operate effectively. This is not to say that UNIP did not attempt to co-opt the unions under its control. Certainly, of all strategies it used, UNIP was unsuccessful to control trade unions.

In 1971, UNIP government decided to legislate for a labour law that could bring its control over the unions. Thus it came the Industrial Relations Act. No. 36 of 1971 which put in place the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). This law was enforced in 1974, indeed after the introduction of a one-party state in 1972. The Act introduced among other things UNIP-party committees at workplaces as forum for workers' participation under the one party system. The popular UNIP motto: "One Zambia One Nation" was turned to reflect the industrial settings and hence "One Union One Industry." Section 15 of the Act obliged all trade unions to be affiliates of the

ZCTU. Although UNIP managed to reduce the strength and autonomy of the unions, the party could not completely weaken and gain total control over them. With the coming of Chiluba into power as the new Chairman-General of ZCTU in 1974, trade unions regained much of its autonomy. As it can be seen, ZCTU opposed the Industrial Act of 1971 as well as the one-party state. These political developments had far reaching negative consequences to the unions particularly in relation to their autonomy.

When the tension between ZCTU and UNIP reached to a climax, ZCTU declared that they were not and would never become a political party. They recognised that under the one-party system only UNIP was the sole political party by law, and that all unionists' leaders were still faithful in it (Rakner 1992:108). However, Mr. Chiluba, the Chairman-General of ZCTU presents how the unions resisted UNIP's co-optation, and it is worth quoting him in extenso:

From 1974 onwards, when I became ZCTU Chairman-General (being also Chairman of the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers), the leadership consistently sought to defend the organisation's autonomy, spoke out against the infringement of workers' bargaining rights and against the corruption associated with the one-party state. By the end of 1970s, and particularly in view of the stance it took against the 1980 Local Administration Bill, organised labour in the shape of ZCTU came to be seen as the unofficial opposition to UNIP, with the leadership frequently making statements on a range of public policy matters that affected the economy as well as the autonomy of trade union movement (Chiluba 1995:70).

The above paragraph shows that ZCTU managed to oppose UNIP's move to curtail its autonomy and the one-party state in general. Throughout, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions issued radical statements which were against UNIP and its government. For example, in relation to the 1980 Local Administration Bill, the Congress sent a petition to the Secretary-General of UNIP and stated that the Bill intended to undermine the rights of citizens. Besides, it intended to merge the party and government structures at the local levels, and finally the Bill would have increased the cost of managing the local government and hence ruining further the economy. UNIP

attempted as much as it could to co-opt the workers but that could not work effectively. Arguably, ZCTU became an unofficial opposition where dissents from UNIP sought refuge and accommodation.

The relationship between ZCTU and UNIP deteriorated further with the economic crisis in the 1980s. Zambia, which depends entirely on copper for its economy was by 1988 badly hit by copper crisis. During that time inflation was high, the country experienced shortage of foreign exchanges, and the debt crisis deepened. President Kaunda admitted the crisis. He attributed it to four major factors which were beyond the capacity of the party and government. These were high production costs, low prices in the world market, protectionist policies of developed countries, high cost of importation on goods and services from developed countries and unprecedented droughts (RZ, 1988). Addressing the problem, through the IMF-World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes, the situation especially for workers worsened. The Minister of Finance and National Commission for Development Planning, Hon. Chigaga presented well the negative consequences of the crisis to workers. He said "Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the civil service has suffered as a result of a decline in real earnings over the years. The Party and its Government are determined to restore the morale and efficiency of the public service". He furthered that "Employment in areas of lower priority will be reduced and savings realised from the exercise will be used to restore the morale and enhance the efficiency of the civil service RZ, 1990)."

In contrast, ZCTU argued that the problem of economy in Zambia was caused by the one party state and the failure by UNIP to handle the situation. From that juncture, ZCTU started to publicly campaign for change of the political system, particularly the restoration of the multiparty system. Indeed with the coming of multipartism in 1991, ZCTU broke its long alliance with UNIP and declared to support MMD. In fact, Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman-General of ZCTU became the presidential candidate for MMD, the fact which made it easier for the party to mobilise the support of workers countrywide.

Three more elite groups played an important role in relation to the defeat of UNIP. These included the churches, business elites and intellectuals. As already pointed out, most Zambians are Christians. Throughout, the First

and Second Republics, religious groups and individual leaders were accorded high respects. In some instances, individual leaders were involved in UNIP and national affairs. For example, Rev. Jalabafwa Chipeso of the United Church of Zambia became Lusaka Rural District Governor; Rev. Merfyn Temple from the same church worked in the Land Resettlement Office, while his colleague, Rev. Mwape, sat on the National Commission on One-Party state in 1972; Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo (member of Cultural and Social Sub-Committee of the UNIP's Central Committee and of the Mufulira Disaster Fund Committee of 1973); Archbishop Mutale (member of the Rural Development Sub-Committee of the UNIP's Central Committee and of the National Sub-Commission on the One-Party State in 1972); Fr. C.I. Riordan (member of the Electoral Commission in the first one-party elections in 1973); Fr. S. Mwansa (District Governor of Kaputa District); Fr. Protea Mwela (MP, Kawambwa). Many more clergymen were involved in the party and government in several posts at local levels (Hinfelaar 2008:131). Although individual leaders saved in the party and the government, the church remained autonomous part of the community that state and the party could not control. For example, the church opposed the UNIP government to introduce the teaching of scientific socialism into the school curriculum in the 1970s (Chiluba 1995:66). However, Christian churches played a significant role at the eve of multipartism. Apart from playing the mediating role when MMD and UNIP met to negotiate for reforms prior to the 1991 elections as already pointed out in the previous sections, the church went openly to oppose the one party state and in some occasions UNIP itself.

On the other hand, business elites were the most victims of the one-party state and Humanism. With almost total control of the economy by the state, the business community was weakened and could not benefit out of their business. This elite group stood for multiparty system and the liberalisation of the economy so that they could participate fully in the ownership of the economy. This group too supported MMD which seemed to bring the change they wanted. The last but not least group was the intellectuals. These included students and lecturers especially from the University of Zambia. Throughout its existence in power, UNIP attempted to control this group but it could not. When multiparty system came, they supported MMD. As it can be noted, UNIP failed to safeguard the interests of these groups and hence they struggled to find out a new organisation that could replace it, that was MMD.

### **Conclusion**

This article raises two important issues in relation to UNIP's defeat. The first one is that by 1991 UNIP ceased to be a political party as an organisation but rather turned to be a one-man organisation of President Kaunda.<sup>12</sup> The second issue is that UNIP was weak to bind together the interests of elites. This made elite fragmentation and intra-and inter-party conflicts to be common. The introduction of one party state to address fragmentation did not seem to work effectively. New opposition parties such as UP and UPP were formed out of dissents from UNIP. The situation was worsened by the trade unions which constantly opposed the one party state and UNIP ineffectiveness to address the economic crisis. All these dynamics worked against the state-party and must have therefore weakened it. During the 1991 elections, UNIP was reduced to almost a conventional party. Without state apparatuses and resources, the party suffered a humiliating defeat in that election.

### **Notes**

1. Interview with the former president of the Republic of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda 7 April 2009, Lusaka, Zambia.
2. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Volume 17(1968-9), p. 23321.
3. Interview with Mr. Donald Chanda, Economic Advisor to President Fredrick Chiluba during the Third Republic; and Lecturer University of Zambia. Mr. Chanda was an active participant during the transition to multiparty democracy in 1990/1. He was the one who coined the popular slogan of MMD "The Hour Has Come and that Hour is Now". This slogan was translated into five languages, namely, Nyanja, Bemba, Tonga, Lozi and Kaonde. Interview on 2 April 2009, Lusaka, Zambia. Also interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Executive Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue, Lusaka, Zambia, 30 March 2009. Also interview with the President of Zambia, Third Republic, Mr. Fredrick Chiluba, Lusaka, Zambia, 7 April 2009.
4. Interview with the former president of the Republic of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda 7 April 2009, Lusaka, Zambia.

5. Interview with the former president of the Republic of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba 7 April 2009, Lusaka, Zambia.
6. See the Republic of Zambia, Economic Report 1991, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, January, 1992, Printed by the Government Printer, Lusaka, Zambia, p.27.
7. See the Republic of Zambia .1972. Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party Participatory Democracy in Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia (This report is commonly referred to as the "Chona" Report after its chairman, Mainza Chona, then the Vice-President of the Republic of Zambia), p. 30-31.
8. Fairness in the Media? Election in Zambia: Independent Research Report for Z-Vote (Summary Report 30 September - 27 October 1991).
9. See UNIP President, Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Speech to the United National Independence Party Extra Ordinary Congress, Held on 9 May and 13 May 2000 at the Zambia International Trade Fair-Ndola, Zambia, p. 7.
10. See the Republic of Zambia, Report of the Working Party Appointed to Review the System of Decentralized Administration, Lusaka, Cabinet Office, May, 1972, Appendix I, p. 67. See also the United National Independence Party (UNIP), National Policies for the Next Decade 1974-1984, Freedom House, Lusaka, Zambia, Published by Zambia Information Services and Printed by Government Printer, Lusaka, Zambia.
11. The Declaration was signed at Choma in the Southern Province between President Kaunda for UNIP and Harry Nkumbula for the ANC in June 1973. It was a declaration to dissolve officially the ANC and ask all its members to join UNIP. See Kaunda, Kenneth .2006. "The Choma Declaration: A Government of National Unity" Sunday Post Newspaper, 10 September.
12. Dr. Neo Simutanyi opined that the personification of UNIP by Kaunda created misunderstandings with his colleagues and

consequently led to the decay of party structures; Interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Executive Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue, Lusaka, Zambia, 30 March 2009; Also Tiyaonse Kabwe said that the problem was critical since the president used to fill all the elective posts in the party without holding elections contrary to the constitution. He went further to argue that UNIP lost legitimacy and the citizens wanted change. Interview with Tiyaonse Kabwe, former Member of the Central Committee of UNIP and Lecturer, University of Zambia; Interview on 4 April 2009, Lusaka, Zambia.

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