When "Populists" become "Unpopular": The Case of Three Presidents in Africa

Alexander B. Makulilo[∗]

Abstract

No leader in the world would like to be called populist. This is partly owing to the fact that the term connotes radicalism and anti-establishment. Notwithstanding this extremism, some leaders employ populist strategies to mobilise support for votes during elections thereby exhibiting the rhetoric of "a man of the people". Unlike other regions of the "Third World" and more specifically Latin America where populism is common, populist encounters were rare in Africa. However, with the third wave of democratisation, the phenomenon is becoming more apparent. This article compares populist strategies of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete of the United Republic of Tanzania, the former President Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba of Zambia and President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma of South Africa. Contrary to their campaigns on effecting radical transformations for the betterment of the people, populist leaders have been by and large a failure. Paradoxically, the same factors that seem to give rise to populism in the region such as economic and leadership crises are the same ones that have facilitated its downfall.

Introduction

As Africa enters the third decade of democratisation after the third wave, the use of populist strategies during elections is more evident. This, in turn, suggests that populism as a political project is not necessarily inimical to liberal democracy (Mathekga, 2008). Yet, populism as a field of study on the continent has received little scholarly attention. Hence, the term "populism" is hardly encountered in African literature. There are two main reasons for this academic lacuna. One is anchored on the politics of demobilisation. Nearly thirty years after independence in the 1960s, political strategies by most African governments intended to demobilise the masses from

∗Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, E-mail: makulilo76@yahoo.co.uk

participating in politics (Carbone, 2005). As a result, African "citizens"[1] progressively disassociated themselves from states. This state of affairs came to popularly be known in the political economy discourse as "uncaptured peasants" (Hyden, 1980). The situation was not different in those states where the single-party system was the political order. In such polities, competition was absent and therefore making populism as a strategy of mobilising support less important. Two, post-independent political discourse focused much on conceptual constructs such as "authoritarianism", "neo-patrimonialism" or "personal rule" (Carbone, 2005; Clapham, 1985; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).

The goal of this article is to revisit populist strategies in Africa and how they are implemented. Three political leaders are compared for the purpose of this study. They include Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the chairman of the ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM); Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, the President of South Africa and the President of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC); and Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba, the former President of Zambia (1991-2001) and the leader of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Though the selection of these cases is by no means random, they remain interesting for a study like this.[2] To be sure, Zambia is the first Anglophone country in Africa to complete democratic transition peacefully. President Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) transferred power to Frederick Chiluba and the MMD in 1991. For that reason, Zambia is important because it provides a model of political reform that would resonate among ruling elites and popular movements across Africa. Indeed, the Zambian case raises the general question about the intriguing dynamics of transitions away from authoritarian rule to a more open competitive political system (Tordoff and Young, 2005). Tanzania, on the other hand, introduced a multiparty system in 1992 but it has just ended up being a *de facto* one party state (Makulilo, 2008; 2010). Hence, Tanzania has emerged as a country to watch in Africa. While it has not reached the level of democratisation, it is clearly one of the better performers in Africa with respect to democratic governance. Its transition to democracy has been neither rapid nor dramatic in which the ruling party CCM has not lost power to opposition (Hyden, 1999). Importantly, Tanzania's transition, unlike elsewhere in Africa, has not been marred with upheavals. South Africa is also unique. Rising out of the apartheid setting in 1994, the ANC has remained a dominant party. Yet, internal politics in the ANC is factionist culminating to a populist leader even before the general election was set in 2008.

Understandably, CCM[3] and the ANC have remained the ruling parties since independence in their respective countries. In contrast, MMD ousted the UNIP in the founding election under multipartism in 1991. Besides, institutionally the founding fathers of the three countries were friends. These included Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania, Nelson Mandela of South Africa and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Their friendship was cemented through the Front-Line States (FLS). Nyerere and Kaunda were among the most active founders of the FLS in 1975 which aimed at establishing the majority rule in Southern Africa (Cilliers, 1999). As part of the broader liberation struggles, the two countries, with the help of China, constructed the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Still, Tanzania and Zambia provided training bases for freedom fighters from South Africa. In order to accomplish this endeavour, the article is divided into five main parts: introduction, theoretical framework, historical evolution of populism in Africa, selected populist leaders, and conclusion.

Conceptual Framework

Populism is an elusive concept. However, its core message across definitions is simply in defence of the "common people" who are often regarded as marginalised. Hence, as a movement, it claims to seek for "inclusion". In this regard, the underpinning assumption of populism is just doing away with elites and establish a more direct (and doubtful a more homogeneous) democracy thereby reducing inequality and exclusion (Lucardie, 2009). As such, populism is "anti-party, anti-elites, anti-establishment, anti-political." Yet, its egalitarianism is questionable since populism mobilises support based on a specific constituency. Given that lines of cleavage vary from polity to polity, it is not uncommon therefore to find that populism manifests itself in different forms. It can be civilian or military, progressive or regressive, left or right, rural or urban, ethno-religious or secular, indigenous or foreigners, youths or elders, bourgeois-proletariat or peasant based, electoral or insurrectional (Schmitter, 2006).

The definition by Giovanni Carbone is exhaustive for the purpose of this study. He lists five main indicators that are typical to a populist leader:-

> ...a strongly personalistic leadership style; outsiderism, or the claim that the new leader does not originate from among the existing political class; an anti-system, anti-institutions and anti-organisations rhetoric, often targeting political parties and political corruption; a call for restoring 'the power of the people' by refounding democracy (where a

notion of 'the people' as an organic whole does not allow for the representation of particularistic interests); a two-fold mass mobilisation strategy, aimed at both legitimising and implementing the above political project, based on: (a) a leader that *appeals directly to the masses* for legitimacy. This, in turn, implies: (i) a kind of leadership that relies on, or is easily adapted to, an electoral environment; (ii) a possible key role for the media; and (iii) the likely emergence of demagogic policies, notably xenophobic calls or irresponsible economic policies; (b) *mechanisms for direct democracy*, such as local participatory structures or referenda, meant to whip up and mobilise the population (Carbone, 2005:1).

The above paragraph indicates that an individual leader becomes the centre of politics in a polity thereby undermining political institutions. This, in turn, suggests "decisionism" and lack of predictability of the political system. As such, a populist leader tends to free himself/herself from any kind of institutional control hence promoting institutional decay. Yet, the notion of "the power of the people" in Africa and beyond is problematic. It implies homogeneity and unanimity. Practically, however, societies are heterogeneous. In Africa where the colonial strategy of divide and rule remained an institution of ruling since 1880s and possibly inherited by post-independent leaders, societies are highly fragile. The problems of ethnicity, abject poverty, corruption, regionalism to mention just a few are common on the continent. And therefore the "people" can be "some people". As can be noted, populism is not always a natural phenomenon like "charisma". It is a deliberate project created to symbolise someone as unique in leading the population. Normally, it is achieved through the use of media as a tool of propaganda. Indeed, in times of misfortune such as economic crises, poverty and conflicts, media tend to portray populists as saviours of a country. Though they enjoy legitimacy, the same is not founded on organic values between the ruler and the ruled. Consequently, such legitimacy is only short-termism. In some cases and especially in poor societies, populism is attained by the use of corruption and patronage. As I will show in due course, the populism of President Kikwete was made possible by the "*mtandao" (i.e. network)* phenomenon which apart from relying heavily on media to create populism, it at the same time used corruption and intimidation. Therefore, the bottom-line of "creating" populism is central to elitist politics and struggles to get power. In that way, minority elites mobilise the rest of a society against other elites who are in power.

In Africa's context, populists would specify time to solve what it may be considered as chronic problems. Normally, they would say, for example, "within 100 days after being elected I will make sure that poverty is history". Since elites are not typical of the masses, and that they serve the interests of their fellow elites, it is less likely that they succeed in addressing such problems. As a result, when it comes to elections for their second terms, it is difficult for them to sail through the ballot box. This is due to the crisis of underperformance on overambitious projects that were used to solicit votes. It should be understood that in some instances, populists tend to attack foreigners to camouflage their underperformance. For example, in 1972, Idi Amin of Uganda expelled Asians on the ground that they were exploiting Ugandans. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe has constantly used the land issue to label Britain and the United States of America as enemies of Zimbabweans. While, I share concerns on the domination of Western countries over the less developed parts of the world particularly Africa, I find that the issue of land has been misused to legitimise Mugabe's regime.

Yet, foreigners are sometimes used to legitimise populists in Africa. This is not because foreign nations like populism but due to the fact that some populists are used to protect imperialist interests. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the British interest over land has greeted and backed Morgan Tsvangirai, the Prime Minister to oust Mugabe. Similarly, in South Africa, President Jacob Zuma had to assure Western countries that no radical changes would be effected once he got into power. This kind of assurance was also the case for President Jakaya Kikwete. However, there is a high risk for a populist to solely identify and appeal to the West. This is because Africa was historically subjected to all forms of exploitation and de-humanisation of the slave and colonial eras. Under the current globalisation, which some analysts would view it as a global jungle, (e.g. Wangwe, 2000) and even the perception of the general public is negative as it continues to subject Africa to the same historical status, it is even more risk for populists to approve the West. In the above scenarios, the West has been both a facilitator and a speed governor to populism. Usually, populists in the continent would tend to disapprove the West during electoral campaigns but suddenly bow down for the assistance to run their respective countries once in power. Notwithstanding its strategies, populism worldwide has its virtues and vices. The schema of virtues and vices provided by Philippe Schmitter (2006) is relevant in understanding the consequences of populism in Africa. Figure 1 below is self-explanatory:-

Figure 1: Populisms: Virtues and Vices

Virtues	Vices
Consolidation of sclerotic partisan loyalties and dissolving of collusive party systems thereby opening them up for the entry of new political formations.	Undermine existing party loyalties and stable choices between competing partisan programs without replacing them with alternative ones.
Recruitment and mobilisation of persons who were previously apathetic and passive citizens to participate in the electoral process.	Recruitment of ill-informed persons who do not have consistent preferences and who seek "emotional" rather than programmatic satisfactions from politics.
By raising and combining disparate and/or ignored political issues, populisms encourage the articulation of suppressed cleavages and expectations.	Raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled and pursue policies that are incompatible, both of which produce negative externalities for everyone.
Challenges "accepted" external constraints and call into questioning existing and often exploitative dependencies upon foreign powers.	Usage of foreigners and foreign powers as scapegoats for their own failings and weaken external linkages necessary for national welfare and security.
Replacement of out-moded and formulastic party programs and ideologies with personality of leaders.	Shifts attention from issues and policies to persons and personalities thereby introducing an erratic and opportunistic element into politics.
Exercises "decisionism" and replaces it with policy immobilism and expansionism of "politically possible" solutions to collective problems.	Populisms may be more decisive, but their decisions tend to be ill-conceived and disrespectful of long-term effected that are passed on later generations.
Populisms need continuous popular ratification and are eventually defeated at the polls, leaving in their place a reinvigorated party system.	Populisms may be capable of altering the rules and/ or of gaining the support of military and security forces such that they cannot be peacefully removed from power.

Source: Philippe Schmitter (2006)

It has to be noted that every political system is potentially subject to populism. However, in most developed democracies, where institutions are relatively stable, populists are limited. In contrast, in the underdeveloped societies, where institutions are usually weak, populists have adequate power to play their politics. In Africa, institutions are still weak thereby creating potential environment for populism.

Historical Evolution of Populism in Africa

Africa is a continent arising from colonial setting. Around 1880s, it was subjected to colonialism mostly by the Western European imperialism (Callinicos, 2009). Since then, the continent was appended to the metropolitan capitalism. It is not surprising to find out that all policies and politics taking place in Africa are by and large Western imposition. This is made possible due to the fact that states in Africa were created through the historical past such as slave trade, colonialism as well as neo-colonialism (Clapham, 1985). Admittedly, the colonial state which was given powers to manage colonies was purely an imposed state. It had no roots in the colonized lands (Tordoff, 1997). In other words, it used force to grab power since it lacked consent of the ruled. This problem was compounded by the primary purpose of colonialism which was the exploitation of resources from the colonized people. This simply means that colonialism was not designed to deliver goods and services to the colonized subjects (Rodney, 1972). Hence, there were no recourse of the labour and taxes extracted from the subjects by the colonial state. This kept the colonial powers even further away from the subjects. For sure, the colonial state survived in a permanent legitimacy crisis throughout its life.

It has to be acknowledged that Africans have all the times been resistant to any form of domination. The colonial state therefore experienced resistances since its introduction on the African soil. It was especially after the World War II in 1945 that the scale and scope of such resistances went beyond to demand for independence. In a way, the struggle was against foreign domination which for centuries played significantly the politics of demobilisation. For the first time, it was at this juncture that Africa witnessed the rise of populist leaders who tried to mobilise the masses against the colonial state. By then, it was easier for political parties to identify the colonial masters as the source of all troubles on Africa hence being anti-colonial regime. Notwithstanding this development, there were some politicians who advocated for policies that favoured colonial masters. These

were parties which were deliberately founded by colonialists to manipulate the struggle for independence.

During the struggle for independence, therefore, some leaders were perceived as "anti-colonial, anti-political and anti-elites". In Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere was so popular and charisma. His political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) for example, won all seats during the pre-independence elections. Although Tanganyika attained its independence in 1961 based on a multiparty system, Nyerere turned it to single party order in 1965. In fact, Nyerere was so popular than his party. It was due to his populism that Nyerere remained head of the state/government from 1961 to 1985 when he decided himself to resign from active politics. It is said that one of the reasons to explain this phenomenon was the economic crisis of the 1970s which needed him to appeal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for assistance. Nyerere believed in *Ujamaa*, a form of socialism which is a pro-people ideology. Under *Ujamaa* and particularly through the Arusha Declaration of 1967, Tanzania nationalised all major means of life hence state owned economy. As such, Nyerere was totally against the introduction of privatisation of the economy as this would have horrific consequences to the poor who are the majority in the country. Mwalimu Nyerere is regarded until to date as the father of the nation and he is respected in the continent as a "man of the people". It is interesting to note that the Roman Catholic Church has initiated a process for his beatification as a Saint. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah was a populist leader while in the case of Zambia it was Kenneth Kaunda popularly known as (KK). These leaders mobilised masses against colonialism and finally won "flag independence".

Contrary to the seemingly populism demonstrated by those cited leaders, one observer contends that, they had a shared deal with the outgoing colonial masters. Most of them were trained in Europe and hence induced with their values and obedience. He raises one interesting question: What exactly happened at independence? He responds to this question by saying that there were only celebrations (Clapham, 1985). As can be noted, it is here where the independence was questioned. For that matter Western countries have continued to dominate all spheres of life including politics, economy and social-cultural aspects (Amin, 1972).

From the above backdrop, whoever wants to contest for leadership particularly as head of the state/government, he or she should get the

approval of Western powers. This is indirectly, though. The intention is normally to make sure that a prospective leader should work within the framework of protecting their interests. Much as they would not want a populist leader in Europe, Western powers are inimical to populists in the rest of the world. This is because populists are unpredictable and hence would disturb their exploitative projects. As already stated, President Robert Mugabe, for example, is regarded as populist simply because he is anti-Western policies.

Yet, after independence, most African leaders opted for strong centralised states (Wunsch, 1990). It was believed that such states would fasten development. Hence, under the justification of unity and developmentalism, most states introduced single party systems. Further to that they opted for state owned economies. The dual impact for this was simply concentration and centralisation of power into a single hand. This was the essence of politics of demobilisation which was against populism. However, the outcome of centralisation was a failure in 1980s. National governments tried to restructure economies but it did not work out. This led them to appeal to Western powers for some help. The package of this assistance is commonly known as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). SAPs were given by the IMF and the World Bank. Associated with SAPs were the mandatory requirements by recipient countries to introduce economic as well as political liberalisation (Schraeder, 2000). African countries had no choice. However, instead of providing relief, SAPs deepened crises (Shivji, 2009). Arguably, SAPs created fertile grounds for the emergence of populism. In Zambia, for example, the situation was so critical to the extent that riots on basic needs like foods were phenomena. Thus, with the third wave of democratisation, avenues for mobilisation were created.

"Populist" Leaders
Populist leaders usually distinguish themselves as typical of the masses in a political system. In most cases, this is achieved through a combination of strategies such as demagogic policies and eye-catching slogans that seem to reflect wishes and needs of the people. In some other instances, populists become even more well-known through the use of media and opinion polls. This is more critical especially in countries where ignorance and poverty hamper most people to the extent that they take media and polls as givens. Yet, neopatrimonialism and corruption have been used to back up populism. This section examines populist strategies of three leaders, namely Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the president of the United Republic of Tanzania; Jacob

Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, the president of South Africa as well as Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba, the former president of Zambia. It starts by providing their short biography. This is followed by presentation of their populist strategies.

Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete

Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete alias (JK) was born on 7 October, 1950 in Bagamoyo, Tanzania. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of Dar es Salaam. He also got trained in the military and has vast experience in it. His involvement in politics since the first phase government (1961-1985) is quite evident. Kikwete acted as a party functionary of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and later Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) after the merger of TANU and Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP), then the only parties in Tanganyika and Zanzibar respectively, on 5 July, 1977. As an active officer of the party, Kikwete managed to climb the ladder of party levels and was elected a member of the National Executive Committee (NEC), the top most decision-making authority of the party in 1982. He also got elected as a member of the Central Committee of the party in 1997 and still is he to date. Kikwete's active participation in politics did not end in the party. He held several positions in the government as well. During the second phase government (1985-1995) the then president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi appointed him a member of parliament and the deputy minister for Energy and Minerals in 1988. He was then promoted to a full minister of Water, Energy and Minerals in 1990. In 1994 Kikwete was appointed the first youngest minister of Finance. Likewise in the third phase government (1995-2005), the then president, Benjamin William Mkapa appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, a position he held until he became the fourth president of the United Republic of Tanzania in 2005. This profile shows that JK is an insider both in the party and government. Indeed, he is elite.

It should be pointed from the beginning that unlike Zambia and South Africa, Tanzania's political system is typically described as state-party (Makulilo, 2008). This simply means that the state and the ruling party are fused to the extent that the political playing field is significantly tilted in favour of the ruling party. The party uses state resources and coercive apparatuses to outcompete opposition parties. This fusion is so acute that the state appears to be in the pocket of CCM (Hyden and Mmuya, 2008). Thus, in the first place, CCM's victory is guaranteed ahead of election day. It should be noted that stiff competition during election season takes place within the

ruling party rather than without it. It is only in the recent past that opposition parties have slightly gained momentum. In the 2010 elections, for example, the total share of opposition parties' popular votes went up to about 40%. So, there is no way one can get into power outside party structures. This fact is also a requirement of a law that any candidate should be a member of a political party and be sponsored by it (Makulilo, 2011). Hence, the populism of Kikwete should be understood within this context and more importantly the fact that it was boosted by state-party structures especially during the interparty competition.

The populism of Kikwete has no long history. In 1995, Kikwete unsuccessfully aspired for the presidential post within his party. It is said that Mwalimu Julius Nyerere[4] had Benjamin Mkapa as his favourite candidate. It was towards the end of the second term of Mkapa in 2005 that Kikwete started to rebuild himself as a "man of the people." To achieve that he and his colleagues in the party initiated a working network of support popularly known as "*mtandao*".[5] Acting like a tsunami, the "*mtandao"* used every means to portray JK as people's choice. It used a lot of money to mobilise support from all walks of life particularly the youths. In the first place JK was symbolised as a "youth candidate". This campaign went hand in hand with excessive use of media and overambitious promises. Yet, unlike other populisms, JK's was backed by the state-party structures. This was the time in the history of the country where under the multiparty system, the president was able to get elected by 80.28% of popular votes (NEC, 2006). Yet, as a state-party system, the use of intimidation as well as corruption was part and parcel of the game (TEMCO, 2006).

Towards 2005, Kikwete's populism gained momentum as media and polls described him as the most trusted leader in the government. During the 2005 campaigns, Kikwete distinguished himself as a man of the people and identified himself with the youth, a factor which had impact on his subsequent elections. It should be noted that CCM has for a long time enjoyed mostly the support of elders and women (TEMCO, 1997; 2001; 2006; 2011). His slogan of "*Maisha Bora kwa kila Mtanzania*" literally meaning "Better life for every Tanzanian" and "*Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya na Kasi Mpya*" literally meaning "New Zeal, New Vigour and New Speed" (see Nyang'oro, 2011)) was among other aspects that made his populism real. With a lion's share of media[6] coverage, CCM managed to popularize this slogan from towns to villages, adult to children and countrywide. Taking the fact that since the adoption of the SAPs in 1980s the gap between the rich and the

poor is glaring, this slogan seemed to be too romantic and it was easily bought by the electorates. While this does not mean that the landslide victory[7] of CCM was singly attributed to this factor, it simply acknowledges the impact of the said slogan to CCM's victory. From its face value, no wonder the slogan advocated for a new hope and beginning where the gap between the rich and the poor could be narrowed. This slogan attracted support from all corners of the country, urban and in rural; from all classes of people with different faith and ethnic inclinations. Kikwete became the choice for those who lost hope. Indeed, he was seen as a true man for change.

To be sure, one of his overambitious plans was on agriculture and employment of the youths. With regards to promises and policies, Kikwete used agriculture, which is regarded as the backbone of Tanzania's economy. This is because about 80% of the population live in the rural villages and about 90% of them depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Yet, agriculture contributes about 30% of the total GDP of Tanzania's economy.[8] Therefore, in the 2005 elections, Kikwete and his party pledged that for the economy to grow to 10% it requires the agricultural sector to grow to least 20% by the year 2010.[9] Thus, by reading carefully the CCM manifesto, it seems that agriculture is its main preoccupation. It should be noted that since independence, the agricultural sector has never grown up to 7%. Hence, Kikwete came up with his innovation of the "Green Revolution". Associated with this, he also promised to create 1 million new jobs especially for the youths. The USAID report on democracy and governance assessment of Tanzania provides an insightful observation about Kikwete's populism:

> Kikwete's victory was due first and foremost to his personal charisma, youthful looks, and charm. A second important factor was his superior campaign organization (network, or *mtandao*) as it has come to be known. He started organizing soon after he lost the CCM presidential nomination to Benjamin Mkapa in 1995. Over a 10-year period, he amassed many friends and allies, money, and political capital, all of which came to his aid in 2005. Third, he also developed very clear messages captured by his lead slogan "New Zeal, New Vigor, New Speed" (which sounds much better in Swahili) and (ii) "Better Life for All is Possible." He promised everything to everybody — a fact which has come to haunt him in recent years (USAID/Tanzania, 2010).

Contrary to the above hopes, the 2008 Afrobarometer survey has shown increasing citizens' discontents on the management of economy and

particularly in addressing the problem of poverty. From that survey 78% of the respondents were dissatisfied with government's efforts in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor. This dissatisfaction was at 54% in 2005. Similarly the same survey reveals that 82% of the respondents were dissatisfied with government's management of keeping prices down and thus doubling that figure from 42% in 2005. Moreover 64% of respondents were dissatisfied with government's efforts to create jobs. The dissatisfaction level was at 53% in 2005. The survey further reveals that 61% of the respondents were dissatisfied with government's efforts in providing reliable supply of electricity. The above survey indicates the public outcry that the government has failed to implement its promises as translated by its slogan. Today the slogan is unpopular and utopian.

Yet, another strategy used to create this populism is money politics. Most Tanzanians especially in rural areas are poor. This makes it easier for them to exchange money with their votes. In the aftermath of the 2005 general elections, President Kikwete was quoted saying to CCM members in Dar es Salaam that "We must start to think of effective strategies to support the party in terms of resources, strategies that will not bring shame to the party" (Makulilo, 2008). It is because of this that Mwesiga Baregu would argue that poverty is used as political capital (Raphael, 2011). Towards the 2010 elections, the use of corruption by CCM was visible and indeed magnified (UDSM, 2010). It was on that basis that the government introduced the Election Expenses Act No. 6 of 2010 to regulate money during elections. However, it has unintended consequences by exacerbating corruption (TEMCO, 2011). It should be noted that Kikwete's government has experienced series of corruption scandals that hampers his performance and populism. The scandal of External Payment Arrears (EPA) and the Richmond Development Company are good cases in point. The latter led to the resignation of the Prime Minister Edward Lowassa in 2007. The phenomenon was popularly referred to as "*ufisadi*" (i.e. grand corruption involving government officials). In between 2008 and 2010 Kikwete's popularity fell drastically and a chain of demonstrations and riots emerged complaining the government to be irresponsible and unaccountable. The REDET's poll notes that Kikwete's popularity was in sharp decline among those citizens who seemed to be very much satisfied by his performance. To be sure, his popularity dropped from 67.4% in 2007 to 44.4% in 2006 and ultimately reached to 39.5% in 2008 (REDET, 2009). This trend was also reflected in the 2010 general election. Results indicate drastic drop of votes from 80.28% in

2005 to 61% in 2010 (NEC, 2011). This is despite the use of opinion polls in favour of the ruling party and Kikwete (REDET, 2010; Makulilo, 2011; 2012).

Similarly, under Kikwete's leadership, the image of CCM to the general public is further declining. Whereas in the past the party was considered relatively unified and having ethical leaders, in recent years it is perceived as corrupt and divided. CCM is experiencing critical factions which are founded on the struggle for power rather than ideological differences. To be sure, the Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) conducted opinion polls and found that the general public level of satisfaction by CCM's performance is in decline: in October 2006 the level of satisfaction stood at 60.1%; in October 2007 it dropped to 40.7% and it finally reached to 32.6% in November 2008 (REDET, 2009). The major three reasons for this state of decline included: one, 22.4% of respondents said that the party had not fulfilled it manifesto; two, 18.7% posited that CCM has bad leaders and three, 13.9% opined that the party has corrupt leaders. In his speech on 11 November, 2012, the CCM Chairperson and the President of the United Republic of Tanzania Mr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete once remarked that however much CCM implements its election manifesto to 100%, if it is widely perceived as corrupt, the party is over. Similarly, he contended that unity is the only strength for members to uphold. By now, the Chairperson sees that about 75% of internal factions are based on parochial struggle for leadership positions in the party and the state (Kikwete, 2012).

Mwesiga Baregu provides an interesting analysis of these divisions (see in Makulilo, 2010). He notes three main groups: The first group is CCM-*mtandao* (original) with its architects like Rostam Aziz, Edward Lowassa and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete. This is the group in power and that enjoys resources and privileges associated with being in power. With immense resources and power (within the party and the state), it has a voice to cajole the rest groups. However, the group has recently undergone some shifts as Lowassa resigned in 2008 as the Prime Minister and it is said that he is re-building his own *mtandao* for presidential race in 2015; and Aziz resigned his party position and the post of Member of Parliament for Igunga in 2011. The second group is called CCM-*mpasuko* (originally it was part of *mtandao* but after the *mtandao* is in power, this group was forgotten; it also includes those who were not part of *mtandao* but would like now to be included). This is a group of hungry politicians. In struggling to get into the *mtandao*, they identify themselves as fighters for the national resources. The group is represented by "vocal" CCM's members of parliament (like Anne Kilango, Dr. Harrison

Mwakyembe, Lucas Selelii, James Lembeli, Fred Mpendazoe, Christopher Ole Sendeka, and Aloyce Kimaro) including the former Speaker of the parliament, Samuel Sitta. There are again some dynamics within this group. For example, Mpendazoe joined *Chama Cha Democrasia na Maendeleo* (CHADEMA) before the 2010 elections; while Selelii and Kimaro were not selected to contest as Members of Parliament in the 2010 elections. The third group is called CCM-*Asilia* and is represented by people like Joseph Butiku and Joseph Warioba. This is a group that claims to uphold the original ethics of the party as they were descended from Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Institutionally they lead the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. It is important to note that all key figures of the Foundation were appointed in 2012 as members to the Presidential Commission on the Constitution Review Process. While Warioba is the Chairman of the Commission, Butiku and Salim Ahmed Salim are ordinary members to the Commission. This means that this group is relatively powerful and influential. While Baregu's categorization of actors and interests within CCM is impressive, I find the three groups mean two, that is, CCM-*Mtandao* and CCM-*Mpasuko*. This is because CCM-*Asilia* developed as a result of the defeat during the presidential nomination process within the party in 2005. This group supported Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim (the former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU which became the African Union or AU later). Besides, most of the time this group joins hand with CCM-*Mpasuko* to challenge the CCM-*Mtandao*.[10] Overall, the general and dominant view on Kikwete's performance is by and large a failure.

Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba

Frederick Chiluba was born in Kitwe, Zambia on 30 April, 1943 and died on 18 June, 2011 in Lusaka. He held a Master's Degree from Warwick University. Chiluba was the second President of Zambia from 1991 to 2002. Unlike Kikwete and Zuma who were really political insiders within the ruling parties and their respective governments, Chiluba was essentially a trade unionist. His highest rank in the unionism was obtained in 1974 as the Chairman-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). This was a national body which coordinated nineteen major unions. It should be noted that the ZCTU was established in 1964 by the ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), as a means to communicate with the labour force. For that case, it is not surprising that historically the ZCTU supported UNIP. It should be emphasized however that the ZCTU managed to maintain its autonomy from the party which always tried to co-opt it. In 1990, Chiluba entered officially political activities at the national level. With

the return of multiparty democracy in 1991, he and his colleagues founded the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) which terribly defeated the long-time President Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991). Results show that MMD secured a landslide victory of 972,212 votes (equivalent to 75.76%) of the vote cast for the presidential vote and 125 of 150 parliamentary seats. In contrast UNIP managed to mobilize up to 311,022 votes (equivalent to 24.24%) for the presidential vote and 25 parliamentary seats.[11] Ideologically, Chiluba pretended to stand for socialism and hence he was anti-IMF and World Bank sponsored SAPs. When he got into power, he implemented the very same reforms with diverstating outcome to Zambia's economy.

Zambia's context was always potential for populists to emerge. This is owing to the fact that the country is highly urbanized and poor. It is further complicated by its ethnic-regionalism setting. It should be understood that before the 1991 elections, Zambia's population was about 7.8 million and kept on growing at over 3.5% a year. With about one half of its population living in urban areas, Zambia is the most urbanised country in sub-Saharan Africa (RZ, 1991). This population reflects the 73 ethnic groups with officially seven language groups: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi (Barotse), Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. In religious terms, the majority of Zambians are Christians. The elites in Zambia reflect this population characteristic. Between 1950s and 1964, elite conflicts informed struggles for independence and signified clear divisions among the population. After independence conflicts persisted and indeed, the ruling party UNIP failed to bind together and safeguard the interests of elites. And therefore, throughout its existence, UNIP experienced severe elite fragmentation.

Intra-party and inter-party opposition to UNIP were common. For example, UNIP was initially formed in 1959 as a splinter group from the African National Congress (ANC, 1951-1972). As noted elsewhere in this article, UNIP formed the first government in 1964 having won the landslide victory. With barely ten seats, ANC became an official opposition during the First Republic. Later in 1966, UNIP split to give the United Party (UP, 1966-1968), and further split occurred in 1971 culminating to the birth of another opposition party, the United Progressive Party (UPP, 1971-1972). One distinctive feature about all these political parties was their foundation on ethnic-regionalism. Erdmann (2007) provides an interesting observation of ethno-regional cleavages that informed party politics during the First Republic. According to him, UNIP was reconstituted by a loose elite coalition of various ethnic groups. The most dominant ones included the Bemba-

speakers of Northern-Luapula- and Copperbelt Province, and Nyanja-speakers of Eastern Province which included Tonga and Lozi speakers as well. However, UNIP was better identified with the Bemba speakers, implying that it acquired a Bemba ethnic-label. On the other hand, opposition parties such as ANC had its stronghold among the Tonga speakers in the Southern Province; while UP was predominant among the Lozi of Western Province; and UPP was dominant among the Bemba speakers of Northern Province.

It is interesting to note that all the splits were done by the most senior party and government officials. For example, UPP was formed by Simon Kapwewe who resigned from his post of Vice-President to defend his ethnic interests. Following the tension within and without UNIP, President Kaunda once remarked:

> We have canvassed to strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a spate of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, colour, and religion, which is the negation of all that we stand for in this Party and Government. I do not think that we can blame the common man for this. The fault is ours fellow leaders-we, the people here assembled (RZ, 1967).

The above quoted paragraph is instructive in understanding the nature of intra-and inter-party tensions among elites. It implies that it is elites who construct ethnic cleavages in order to renegotiate their interests. But most importantly, it indicates clearly that UNIP was weak to address such conflicts. Although Kaunda and UNIP did not want to bring the one-party state by legislation in 1972, they were certain that it was impossible. The only solution, Kaunda thought, was to eliminate opposition using legislation (Olawa, 1976). On 25 February, 1972 Kaunda announced:

> You know that since Independence there has been a constant demand for the establishment of a One-Party State in Zambia. The demands have become more and more widespread in all corners of Zambia. In recent months I have received hundreds of messages and letters from organisations and individuals appealing to me to take concrete steps to bring about a One-Party system of Government (RZ, 1972).

Kaunda's statement would suggest that the people and not UNIP and himself wanted the one-party system. As I noted earlier, Kaunda thought the one-party state would come through the ballot box something which became a nightmare. One-party state, thus, came as a tool to deal with intra-and-inter-party problems. On 13 December 1972, Zambia was proclaimed to be a one-party state. As noted elsewhere in this article, the underground intra-party opposition continued in the party and government, especially in the parliament, leading to the signing of the Choma Declaration between UNIP and ANC in 1973. On the eve of multiparty system, the old, strong social cleavages reappeared and defections were normal. For instance, twenty MMD candidates for seats in the National Assembly previously sat there as UNIP's MPs, including twelve who had served either in the cabinet or on the party's Central Committee. Yet, other members of UNIP joined parties such as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Democratic Party (DP). Similarly, the Garden House Conference was significantly sponsored and attended by the former UNIP senior members like Vernon J. Mwaanga (Foreign Minister 1973-1975, and a member of the UNIP Central Committee up to 1976); Arthur Wina (Finance and then Education Minister in UNIP government 1964-1968); and Humphrey Mulemba (Secretary-General of UNIP in 1981-1985).

It has to be emphasised that the populism of Chiluba was essentially built as an opposition to the economic crises that Zambia experienced as well as the leadership crisis by the single party system. Being the leader of the ZCTU, Chiluba had a social base to start his populist strategy. After founding the MMD, Chiluba resigned and became the presidential candidate. But his links with unionism were stable. Chiluba argued that MMD was able to mobilise workers especially from the government to add muscles to its campaign countrywide. Being affected adversely by the economic crisis, this mobilisation could be relatively easy (Makulilo, 2010). That is to say, the servants wanted change and improvement of their conditions. The Economic Report (RZ, 1991) in Zambia describes well workers' conditions. It states that the slowdown in the Zambian economy led to massive retrenchments in most sectors. Through cost-saving measures, most firms forced their employees to redundancies and early retirements without compensation. The situation exacerbated by brain-drain whereby doctors, engineers, academic staff and other professionals left outside the country to seek for employment. As a result, total formal sector employment declined from 23.03% in 1980 to 9.0% in 1991. Against that backdrop, the Mvunga commission (RZ, 1990) made specific observations about Zambians and the pressing call for change.

The commission noted a mood of anxiety, impatience and depression among some petitioners; some submissions reflected a resentment of the one-party rule of the past 17 years which was directly extended to the leadership of UNIP; and above all there appeared to be some mistrust between the rulers and the ruled, particularly in rural areas. Arguably, the civil servants looked indifferent to support UNIP.

The role of trade unionism needs to be overemphasised since it was mainly the support of this group that Chiluba's populism got foundation. This group participated fully during the struggle for independence in Zambia. Although trade unions supported UNIP during the struggle for independence and thereafter, the unions resisted to be controlled by UNIP. During the pre-independence period, the unionists under the umbrella of the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) later changed to be the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) made resolution which stated that labour movement would remain neutral in politics but reserved the right to support any party with progressive politics. It was not uncommon at this time to find individual members of trade unionism to be at the same time members of UNIP. During the First Republic, trade unions maintained their autonomous status from the party. The multiparty framework associated with its Bill of Right provided enabling environment for the unions to operate effectively. This is not to say that UNIP did not attempt to co-opt the unions under its control. Certainly, of all strategies it used, UNIP was unsuccessful to control trade unions.

In 1971, UNIP government decided to legislate for a labour law that could bring its control over the unions. Thus, it came the Industrial Relations Act. No. 36 of 1971 which put in place the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). This law was enforced in 1974, indeed after the introduction of a one-party state in 1972. The Act introduced among other things UNIP-party committees at workplaces as forum for workers' participation under the one party system. The popular UNIP motto: "One Zambia One Nation" was turned to reflect the industrial settings and hence "One Union One Industry". Section 15 of the Act obliged all trade unions to be affiliates of the ZCTU. Although UNIP managed to reduce the strength and autonomy of the unions, the party could not completely weaken and gain total control over them. With the coming of Chiluba into power as the new Chairman-General of ZCTU in 1974, trade unions regained much of its autonomy. As it can be seen, ZCTU opposed the Industrial Act of 1971 as well as the one-party state. These political developments had far reaching negative consequences to the unions particularly in relation to their autonomy.

When the tension between ZCTU and UNIP reached to a climax, ZCTU declared that they were not and would never become a political party. They recognised that under the one-party system only UNIP was the sole political party by law, and that all unionists' leaders were still faithful in it (Rakner, 1992). However, Chiluba, the Chairman-General of ZCTU presents how the unions resisted UNIP's co-optation, and it is worth quoting him in extenso:

> From 1974 onwards, when I became ZCTU Chairman-General (being also Chairman of the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers), the leadership consistently sought to defend the organisation's autonomy, spoke out against the infringement of workers' bargaining rights and against the corruption associated with the one-party state. By the end of 1970s, and particularly in view of the stance it took against the 1980 Local Administration Bill, organised labour in the shape of ZCTU came to be seen as the unofficial opposition to UNIP, with the leadership frequently making statements on a range of public policy matters that affected the economy as well as the autonomy of trade union movement (Chiluba, 1995).

The above paragraph shows that ZCTU managed to oppose UNIP's move to curtail its autonomy and the one-party state in general. Throughout, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions issued radical statements which were against UNIP and its government. For example, in relation to the 1980 Local Administration Bill, the Congress sent a petition to the Secretary-General of UNIP and stated that the Bill intended to undermine the rights of citizens. Besides, it intended to merge the party and government structures at the local levels, and finally the Bill would have increased the cost of managing the local government and hence ruining further the economy (ZCTU, 1980). UNIP attempted as much as it could to co-opt the workers but that could not work effectively. Arguably, ZCTU became an unofficial opposition where dissents from UNIP sought refuge and accommodation.

The relationship between ZCTU and UNIP deteriorated further with the economic crisis in the 1980s. Zambia, which depends entirely on copper for its economy was by 1988 badly hit by copper crisis. During that time inflation was high, the country experienced shortage of foreign exchanges, and the debt crisis deepened. President Kaunda admitted the crisis. He attributed it to four major factors which were beyond the capacity of the party and government. These were high production costs, low prices in the world

market, protectionist policies of developed countries, high cost of importation on goods and services from developed countries and unprecedented droughts (RZ, 1988). Addressing the problem, through the IMF-World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes, the situation especially for workers worsened. The Minister of Finance and National Commission for Development Planning, Chigaga presented well the negative consequences of the crisis to workers. He said "Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the civil service has suffered as a result of a decline in real earnings over the years. The Party and its Government are determined to restore the morale and efficiency of the public service". He furthered that "Employment in areas of lower priority will be reduced and savings realised from the exercise will be used to restore the morale and enhance the efficiency of the civil service" (RZ, 1990).

In contrast, ZCTU argued that the problem of economy in Zambia was caused by the one party state and the failure by UNIP to handle the situation. From that juncture, ZCTU started to publicly campaign for change of the political system, particularly the restoration of the multiparty system. Indeed with the coming of multipartism in 1991, ZCTU broke its long alliance with UNIP and declared to support MMD. In fact, Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman-General of ZCTU became the presidential candidate for MMD, the fact which made it easier for the party to mobilise the support of workers countrywide.

Three more elite groups played an important role in relation to the defeat of UNIP. These included the churches, business elites and intellectuals. As already pointed out, most Zambians are Christians. Throughout, the First and Second Republics, religious groups and individual leaders were accorded high respects. In some instances, individual leaders were involved in UNIP and national affairs. For example, Rev. Jalabafwa Chipeso of the United Church of Zambia became Lusaka Rural District Governor; Rev. Merfyn Temple from the same church worked in the Land Resettlement Office, while his colleague, Rev. Mwape, sat on the National Commission on One-Party state in 1972; Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo (member of Cultural and Social Sub-Committee of the UNIP's Central Committee and of the Mufulira Disaster Fund Committee of 1973); Archbishop Mutale (member of the Rural Development Sub-Committee of the UNIP's Central Committee and of the National Sub-Commission on the One-Party State in 1972); Fr. C.I. Riordan (member of the Electoral Commission in the first one-party elections in 1973); Fr. S. Mwansa (District Governor of Kaputa District); Fr. Protea

Mwela (MP, Kawambwa). Many more clergymen were involved in the party and government in several posts at local levels (Marja, 2008). Although individual leaders saved in the party and the government, the church remained autonomous part of the community that state and the party could not control. For example, the church opposed the UNIP government to introduce the teaching of scientific socialism into the school curriculum in the 1970s (Chiluba, 1995). However, Christian churches played a significant role on the eve of multipartism. Apart from playing the mediating role when MMD and UNIP met to negotiate for reforms prior to the 1991 elections as already pointed out in the previous sections, the church went openly to oppose the one party state and in some occasions UNIP itself.

On the other hand, business elites were the most victims of the one-party state and Humanism. With almost total control of the economy by the state, the business community was weakened and could not benefit out of their business. This elite group stood for multiparty system and the liberalisation of the economy so that they could participate fully in the ownership of the economy. This group too supported MMD which seemed to bring the change they wanted. The last but not least group was the intellectuals. These included students and lecturers especially from the University of Zambia. Throughout its existence in power, UNIP attempted to control this group but it could not. When multiparty system came, they supported MMD. As it can be noted, UNIP failed to safeguard the interests of these groups and hence they struggled to find out a new organisation that could replace it, that was MMD.

Bratton and van de Walle (1997) note that from 1985 onward, administrative and parastatal employees, later joined by doctors and nurses, embarked on a wave of wildcat strikes in the public sector. They further that, apart from being a coalition of interest groups (trade union, business, professional, student, and church groups), MMD skilfully used the far-flung teachers' and civil servants' unions to mobilize support in the countryside, and through its own multi-ethnic leadership (diverse tribal, linguistic, and regional identities). It is estimated that by 1980 UNIP's paid-up members were barely 5% of the population equivalent to less than half of the membership of the trade union movement (Chiluba, 1995). Arguably, Kaunda had lost control over civil servants. Indeed, they turned against him for the quest for change. The underlying force of the 1991 elections was "change". This was not only due to the devastated economy but also owing to the fact that President Kaunda had already overstayed and the party resisted to undertake reforms.

So Chiluba used this slogan "The Hour of Change has come, and that Hour is Now". It is interesting to note that the slogan was translated in five local languages of Zambians: Nyanja, Bemba, Tonga, Lozi and Kaonde. It became a popular slogan that MMD used to campaign against UNIP in the 1991 elections. However in the 1996 elections, Chiluba's popular support dropped to 68.96% of all cast votes which was equivalent to 40.30% against all registered voters.[12] This was due to the crisis of his performance. It is interesting to note that towards the end of his second term, Chiluba started underground move to change the Zambia's constitution so as to allow him stand for the third term. He did not manage since all forces starting from his own party to outsiders were totally against him. His populism ended then. His successor, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa who served one term as Chiluba's Vice-president implicated Chiluba in corruption scandals until he was acquitted in 2009.

Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma

Jacob Zuma was born on 12 April, 1942 in the Zululand South Africa. Unlike Kikwete and Chiluba, Zuma did not acquire formal schooling. However, he involved in politics when he was still very young. In 1959 he joined the ANC. Following its ban in 1961, Zuma became a member of the South African Communist Party in 1963. In the same year he was arrested and convicted of conspiring to overthrow the Apartheid government. He saved 10 years' imprisonment. After his release he continued to do the political work for the ANC, though underground. He served several posts within the ANC. After the waiver of the ban on the ANC in 1990, Zuma served in the party as Deputy Secretary General and later as the Deputy President of the ANC. It should be noted that his highest rank in the government was the deputy president of South Africa from 1999 to 2005. He served this post under Thabo Mbeki who was the president of South Africa and at the same time the president of the ANC. In 2007 Zuma became the President of the ANC after defeating Thabo Mbeki. He finally became the President of South Africa in 2009.

The populism of Zuma should be understood in a broad setting. That is to say, South Africa is a complex multi-racial society made up of Blacks, Whites, Asians and Coloureds. More importantly, the country is set on the legacy of the Apartheid regime. This regime exploited and de-humanised Africans. Until to date, the country is dominated by minority whites who own the major share of wealth. Throughout, the ANC managed to identify itself as the party of struggle and hence pro-people. Its historical past is real. Indeed,

the party enjoys popular support partly due to the fact that it managed to bring the majority rule in 1994 under Nelson Mandela.

Admittedly, Zuma has not all the time been a populist leader in the politics of South Africa. His populism therefore should be understood in line with the politics of presidential succession in the ANC as well as South Africa. It was Zuma's long ambition to one day become the president of South Africa and the ANC. Hence, he always tried to play his cards right towards this goal. Yet, Mbeki was quite aware of Zuma's plans of succeeding him. Unlike in the most developed democracies where an incumbent president has no much control in determining his or her successor, in Africa, most incumbent presidents would work to impose their successors so as to protect their interests particularly wealth accumulation. And therefore it is not uncommon to find that prospective presidents are groomed by those in power. This has been the major source of political tension in the continent. In some cases, where the chances of getting someone to undertake the presidency in a fashion similar to those in power are less likely, a third term agenda has been an alternative.

After working together with Mbeki for some time, it seems that Zuma was not considered as Mbeki's successor. In that regard, President Mbeki worked hard to make sure that Zuma's power goals are not realized. As Mbeki's second serving term approached to the end, he dismissed Zuma from both posts in the party and government in June, 2005 on allegations of his involvement in corruption. This was further complicated by another case with regard to raping a woman. Without going to the merits of the allegations and cases against him, it appears that such allegations would have painted him unfit as a presidential material. Nonetheless, they did not as I shall show in due course. At this stage, it seems that Zuma set out to play this power game and possibly wage revenge against president Mbeki for the sake of his presidential goals. As a result, Zuma mobilised popular support among different ANC structures and within trade unions. This underlies the reactive nature of populism. It can therefore be argued that the timing of Zuma's populism in the politics of South Africa came out clearly following his dismissal as the ANC deputy president as well as deputy president of South Africa.

As is well known, Mbeki was a true follower of the neo-liberal policies. These policies have had negative impact not only in South Africa, but also in Africa as a whole. Though South Africa had already practised some elements of

neo-liberalism, it was Mbeki who accelerated its pace and scope. One distinctive element of neo-liberalism has been the widening gap between the rich and the poor. It is for that reasons that Mbeki was perceived to perpetuate the interests of the whites and capitalists. This would mean that about 80% of the population, who are Africans, are the ones that experience the problem of poverty (Leibbrandt *et al*, 2010). The interpretation here might be that the ruling party, the ANC has not done enough to liberate Africans. The whole essence of independence is therefore put at question.

Similarly, leadership crisis provided faultiness for populism. Mbeki's style of leadership was mostly centralisation. His two terms saw the office of the President with immense powers. While this approach made Mbeki to be relatively stronger, it at the same time weakened the party. This caused a rift between the ANC and Mbeki's administration (Mathekga, 2008). It was a miscalculation of Mbeki to leave the party. It is interesting to note that Zuma used this weakness to consolidate himself within the party. Since he grew in the party, he knew very well that it is finally the party which determines the government of the day.

As can be seen, the centre of struggle was the party and the state. While Zuma became a dominant figure within the party, Mbeki remained in the state. It was against that backdrop that Zuma capitalised on two critical issues that is economic and leadership crises against Mbeki. It was too late for Mbeki to control the party in order to deal with Zuma. As such he contested for the presidency of the party in 2007 and suffered a terrible defeat from Zuma. The immediate use of the party against Mbeki came in response to Zuma's charges over corruption in the court of law. It is said that Mbeki interfered with the court processes and thereby could have influenced the judgement against Zuma. It was due to this fact that the ANC under Zuma recalled Mbeki in 2008. Further to that, all Mbeki's followers were removed from the National Executive Committee, which is the party's main decision making organ. In response to this, these followers left ANC to form the Congress of the People (COPE). The next section summarises the strategies that were used by Zuma to build his populism:-

- He identified with the commonest people. He always referred to himself as an uneducated. This was a strategy to deal with Mbeki and his colleagues who portrayed Zuma as ignorant. So, the widespread perception of the majority poor and particularly those who did not have the opportunity to schooling like Zuma, was simply that he was

like them. As such his "ignorance" was turned to be a political capital.

- He identified himself as and indeed he is a traditionalist. As is widely known Zuma is polygamy. Besides, he capitalised on the use of traditional songs and dances to attract the masses.

- He used politics of memory. In this, he identified himself as a man of struggle (Carton, 2010). Indeed he capitalised on his historical past in relation to the wars of liberation against the Apartheid regime. He also focused on the essence of such struggles that is true liberation of the African people from the enclaves of imperialism. One of his celebrated songs associated with wars of liberation struggles is "Bring Me My Machine Gun". During his campaigns, Zuma sang this song and attracted the poor and marginalised people. The song implied "second liberation" which his predecessor Mbeki was a failure.

- He portrayed as anti-neoliberalism of which Mbeki seemed to be fascinated with. In this, he all the time identified as a leftist and nationalist. In fact, Whites in South Africa were afraid of him. Nonetheless, they were assured that no fundamental changes would be effected. As Daryl Glaser notes, the Zuma coalition is multiclass. It composes of not only the unionized proletariats but also a range of subalterns – shack dwellers, hostel dwellers, semi-educated urban youth, peasants, farm workers – as well as local and provincial party cadre, Zulus, traditionalists and pro-Zuma businessmen. The coalition was mobilized, not against capitalists, but against a range of 'insider' elites, first and foremost the leadership cadre and businessmen around Thabo Mbeki but encompassing, if often only subliminally, liberal judges and journalists, intellectuals, gender activists and urban sophisticates. Against these forces the 'Zunami' represented an anti-establishment revolt.[13]

- He used the Zulu heritage. Hence he identified himself as "100% Zulu Boy" to symbolise respect, firmness, and capability to move forward (Carton, 2010). In fact, his notion seemed to provide a clear distinction between the strength of the Blacks as opposed to the Whites. Indeed, during his campaigns, he used t-shirts with the wordings "100% Zulu Boy" to show closeness he has with the

> common people as against elites. He often threw some Zulu phrases into his speech to attract support. This unlike in the previous elections made the ANC to win Kwa-Zulu Natal by 64%.[14]

> - He also visited several places, especially the marginalised population and listened to their critical problems. He made overambitious promises to address them thereby gaining appeals of the common people (Resnick, 2010).

Though it is too early to thoroughly assess Zuma's performance in line with his populist strategies, it is important to comment on the state of politics and economy in the country at this juncture. First and foremost is the fact that Zuma identified himself with the common people and pretended to be anti-elites. This could mean that he stood for radical and fundamental changes of the exploitative system for the benefit of the majority. Notwithstanding, so far he has not come up with any policy or programme which seems to question the existing capitalist and racial system of life. As a result, the poor have continued to suffer at their own cost. Consequently, between 2008 and 2012, South Africa witnessed a series of demonstrations demanding for good services, employment, improvement of workers' welfare and working conditions. Vincent (2011:10) correctly posits that Zuma's regime is becoming harsh. He contends that "In some instances police have fired rubber bullets and teargas on protesters demanding better services and jobs and scores have been arrested." Yet, the Marikana incident which led to the killings of 34 miners in 2012 is still a fresh case to test Zuma's regime.

Conclusion

This article has shown that much as populists claim to be anti-political, institutions, and elite, they finally use the very same institutions to solicit support for power. In Tanzania and South Africa, Kikwete and Zuma respectively had to use institutions such as factions within parties to propagate their agenda. In Zambia, Chiluba relied much on trade unionism to apply his populism. As such populism is socially constructed to react to certain social phenomena. Yet, it has been observed that Africa is potential to populism. The region is always on economic and leadership crises. Populists employ a number of strategies such as symbols, culture, slogans, propaganda, overambitious promises, corruption and patrimonial politics to solicit support across a society. In some instances they make use of intimidation. There are two broad implications for populism in Africa. One is that it has led to legitimacy crisis of populist leaders as well as their

respective regimes. This happens owing to the fact that such leaders fail to deliver to the expectations of the masses. In some extreme cases such failures have amounted to mass demonstrations to seek for regime change. Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia, have recently become potential sites for demonstrations by frustrated masses. Two is that populism may turn into authoritarianism especially when populist leaders resort to use force to resist change. In any case, the situation exacerbates due to the problem of ethnicity. Populists tend to use their respective ethnic identities to protect their interests culminating to civil wars.

Notes

1. During this period, most Africans exhibited parochial or subject political culture. According to Almond and Verba, such culture reflects incompetence in participating in political processes. See Gabriel Almond A. and Sydney Verba, *The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations,* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

2. According to the Freedom House's Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties of 2011, Tanzania and Zambia belong to the partly free countries while South Africa is regarded as free http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=594 (accessed January 15, 2013).

3. CCM was born out of the merger between the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) on 5 February 1977.

4. He was the first president of the United Republic of Tanzania and the father of the nations. He held CCM Membership card No. 1.

5. The actors of the "m*tandao*" were Rostam Aziz, Edward Lowassa and Jakaya Mrisho.

6. See the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) report (2005).

7.   CCM won 80.28% of all presidential votes and 206 Parliamentary seats of the total 232 parliamentary seats. See the National Election Commission 2006.

8.   See the National Budget 2011/12.

9.   In 2010 the targets were not met since the sector declined to about 6%. Interestingly, towards the elections, Kikwete and his government, while fearing to be put at task for failing to achieve the promised targets, they initiated another slogan "*Kilimo Kwanza*" i.e. "agriculture first" to mask that underperformance. Indeed, they were successful to do away with questions about this sector.

10. See Raia Mwema, "Mwalimu Nyerere wamlipua Kikwete" Disemba 2, 2009.

11. Electoral Commission of Zambia 1991.

12. Electoral Commission of Zambia 1996.

13. Daryl Glaser "South Africa: Toward Authoritarian Populism?" University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, http://www.jwtc.org.za/ (accessed December, 10, 2012).

14. See election results from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa 2009.

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