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Civil society and generation of trust in Zimbabwe

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Abstract

This article discusses the extent to which religious civil society organisations generate trust that can enhance post-violence transition and reconciliation. Locating the discussion within the Zimbabwean context, it argues that civic associations are sites within and from which trust can be generated. Trust is one of the prerequisites for effective post-violence transition[1] and reconciliation. The latter are characterized by institutional and attitudinal reforms which reinforce each other in the transitional and reconciliation processes. Institutional reforms restore trust and confidence in the political systems. To implement political reforms, actors require some level of trust between and amongst themselves. In the end, attitudinal reforms become prerequisites for a holistic and sustainable reconciliation process to take place. Attitudinal reforms can only take place when trust between and among the actors is built and subsequently transported to grease structural and institutional reforms.

Introduction

A political process built on social trust is stronger and effective than one which lacks it. Newton (2001:212) posits that "a good stock of social capital is a prerequisite for an effective political system, which is then able to build up political capital..." Stevens (2004:134) states that political institutions can only operate where there are relationships of trust. Social capital has elective affinity with social trust. Trust is a virtue and as Putnam (1993: 88-9) puts it, "virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful and trustful towards one another, even when they differ on matters of substance." If voluntary associations are understood as sites to create conditions for community relations in a way that generates trust and cooperation between citizens, leading to a high level of engagement even with former protagonists and participation in political processes, it is in order to argue that they are conceptually and strategically positioned to facilitate post-violence transition and reconciliation. The article

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begins with a brief conceptual and theoretical framework on trust, and its elective affinity with social capital. The latter can be both a cause and an effect of associational life. In this article, associational life is understood as civil society, defined as "a public realm of associations or groups formed by members of society to pursue or protect their interests, values or interests" (Bratton, 1994:57). Thereafter it turns to the contextual framework, which is the Zimbabwean political conflict and how it has engendered the emergence of civil society as associational life. One religio-political movement, understood as 'organisations which interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, organising and mobilising social groups on the basis of faith identities, but in pursuit of political objectives, or alternatively promote faith as a socio-cultural construct, as a means of uniting disparate groups on the basis of faith-based cultural identities' (Benthall, 2006:3) is presented to concretise the discussion.

Trust and Social Capital Revisited

Trust has various definitions determined by the disciplinary backgrounds. This article deploys the social capital approach, since it deals with the link between trust and associational life which is the nexus of this article.[2] Social trust is the belief in the goodness or good intentions of others that they will not willingly or unwillingly do any harm to the other. Embedded in this conception is confidence in the good intentions of the other during interaction. Political trust is belief in the good intentions and functions of a political system. Confidence in other people or in the political system enables one, without fear or reservations, to engage the other and participate freely. This implies on one hand the expectation that one's views or actions will be objectively considered and on the other hand do the same in return - reciprocity in short. Two types of trust can be identified, namely primary (taken-for-granted and unquestioned trust) and reflective or calculating trust. The former does not search for evidence of trustworthiness, while the latter is conceptualised and rationalised, and progressively transformed into strategic and calculated forms (Markova, Linell and Gillespie, 2007:3-27). The article is interested in the latter type, in which trust is understood as confidence in human qualities in role expectation and not faith, which is divinely, sanctioned confidence (Herbert 2003:87). This means it can be thought about, is symbolically communicable, is implicitly or explicitly present in interactions, relationships and communication (Markova, Linell and Gillespie, ibid). It grows gradually mediated by patience and time (Stevens, 2004: 135). In this respect it goes beyond the Christian notion of trust, where trust is based on the grace of

God and no evidence is required. Hence Kaase (2007:3) notes that "trust must be understood as something which is by necessity relational and therefore in process of growing, stabilising and/or declining….the chance to develop trust in some other actor obviously depends on interactions over time and with satisfactory outcomes for all sides involved." Connection, interaction and communication are therefore vital for creation of social capital and social trust. Questions, however, have to be asked as to with whom and about what and on what values are the connections made.

Putnam's theory of social capital[3] can be resorted to, to explain the importance of interaction in building trust around issues of a political nature. As Rowland (2008) puts it, arguably at the core of social capital is social trust. Putman (2000:18-19) defined social capital as 'connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity[4] and trustworthiness that arise from them.' While Putnam (2001: 7) embedded trust in the definition, he has agreed to Michael Woolcock's (2000) critic that social trust is not part of the definition of social capital but it is a close consequence which can easily be thought as a proxy. I assert that social capital is instrumental in the generation of trust. It has elective affinity with social trust. Locating interaction within voluntary associations, assumes the following logic: 'social capital is embodied in relations among persons… a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparative group lacking trustworthiness and trust (Coleman, 1990: 304). Voluntary associations are therefore instrumental in generation of social capital which can generate trust, because they are "intentional participatory organisations that facilitate social connections and cooperation, and by virtue of repeated interactions engender trust among members" (Anheier und Kendall, 2000:11).

In trying to deal with the objection that not all social capital produces positive results, Putnam (2000: 22-4) distinguished between "bonding and bridging" social capital. Bridging social capital brings together people of different sorts and are associated with positive results ahead of "bonding groups" which bring together people of a similar sort and are likely to produce negative externalities. Woolcock (2000: 11) adds "linking social capital" which refers to connections between people at different levels of power or social status. These classifications should however not be seen as hermetically sealed but a continuum, as groups can be all, but not at the same time and not under the same respects (see Norris, 2003:4). The particularistic nature of associational life, understood to mean being based upon certain

principles to which members must abide, makes it generate bonding capital, while its voluntary nature allows people of diverse backgrounds to come together, thereby generating bridging capital. Linking social capital can be found in both bonding and bridging groups. Bonding and bridging social capital result in in-group and out-group trust respectively, hence the theory of social capital suggests societal consequences for people in associational life and for society at large (Norris, 2003:3).

Social capital and subsequent social trust should not be conceived as always having good consequences. Sometimes they can be built for destructive ends (ibid.). The extent of trust can even be different between the insiders and outsiders to the organisations. This results in categories of thick and thin trust. Thick trust is embedded in the relationships of the members that are strong and frequent, while thin trust is one that extends to those outside the group, but are influenced by the activities of the group (Rowland, 2008).That the classifications of social capital and trust should be viewed as a continuum and the extent of trust differs between insiders and outsiders signal the problem of measurement of social capital and trust. Consequently, to evaluate associational life in terms of social capital and trust requires laying out the benchmarks against which to undertake the task.

In situations where social capital is accessed by all members of a society or community, it is referred to as a public good. When access to it is controlled by other individuals it may be called a "club good" hence a force for exclusion. This exposes the downside of social capital (Bacon, 2001:5). This means that attention must be paid to the type of civility created (particularistic or democratic)[5] and this can be established by investigating the ideological content and substantive messages of a group (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001:841- 2). This goes to say that social capital has its downside as well (Portes and Landolt, 1996).

Civil Society, Trust and Reconciliation

Civil society organisations are founded on interaction and participation of actors, hence are poised to embody and generate social capital and trust ahead of the state, particularly undemocratic states in which freedoms such as association and expression are not guaranteed. Despite adopting many variations over time, some contradictory, civil society is today generally agreed to refer to a plethora of institutions outside the state. Crocker's (2000:109-10) associational model[6] of civil society is instructive with regards to the potential of civil society to be a site to generate social capital and trust

within a post-violent conflict transitional period. The associational model conceives civil society as a third sector between state and market[7] with the capacity to generate civically valuable by-products (social trust, civic capacities) as well as civically noxious attitudes. This dovetails with the functional definition of civil society proffered by Chris Hann (1996:20) that civil society should be defined in the context of ideas and practices through which co-operation and trust are established in social life. This will enable community and political society to form and function. For Tocqueville (1805-1859) civil society plays the role of cultivating, reproducing and reinforcing[8] virtues through voluntary associations. It can be described as an incubator of civic virtue.

Rowland (2008:3) presents three critical elements for building trust which resonate with associational life. He notes that "repeat exposures to others tend to lead to a greater confidence that others can be trusted, if the parties are honest in their communication and the parties follow through on the commitments they make". Parlevliet (2001:2) notes four dimensions of civil society that make it a good place for generation of trust. Firstly it addresses structural and relational issues. In this dimension it addresses relationships which are vital to unlock positions of fear and suspicion which block systemic changes. Secondly its processes enhance participation and ownership by bringing communities together to reflect on the way forward and formulate proposals for action. Thirdly it facilitates process than delivering products, such as an accord or ceasefire agreement, through their power in the relationships they have with parties to a conflict, the broader population and their ability to raise awareness on certain issues. Intra-state conflicts are replete with psycho-political dynamics which can be transformed through a process than a prescription. Lastly it builds local capacity through "peace building from below" strategies which draws on local human and cultural resources.

While this article concentrates on the ideal type of good civil society, it must not be overlooked, as already mentioned, that the contest regarding the concept is based on the fact that it is not automatically granted that civil society will produce positive results. There are instances when civil society has been a site of conflict and a place to socialise people into competing and oppositional blocks (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Ganiel, 2008: 14). Furthermore, positive lessons learnt in associational life do not always have a spillover effect into in the political realm. Members of a hate group learn cooperation and trust amongst themselves but this does not mean that they

become cooperative and trusting democratic citizens, though this is not to negate the democratic effects of participation (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001:855).

Contextual Framework

Political instability in Zimbabwe gathered momentum in the late 1990s when the economy, due to bad governance and corruption began to collapse. Financial institutions, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which would shore Zimbabwe up, responded by calling for structural adjustment programmes which *inter alia*, meant reducing public service wage bill and privatising lots of services. The net effect of these adjustment programmes was intense suffering of the Zimbabwean citizenry. Instead of saving the country from degeneration the political elites responded by accumulating the available wealth using their position of influence. In other words corruption increased, not only among the political elites but also cascaded down to the general populace, particularly among the public service institutions. To receive a service which is rightfully one's, one had to pay a bribe, if not; it depended on who one knew in the ranks. Rights transformed into privileges.

The free falling economy and the exclusivist work ethic led to disenchantment of the citizens who began to put pressure on the government to address issues of bad governance. Civil society organisations (CSOs) emerged to put a stop to the rot. Subsequent to the emergence of CSOs was the birth of a new political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to give the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) an unprecedented electoral challenge. The crisis was traced back to bad governance premised on a faulty constitution. Hence the first port of call for the CSOs under an umbrella body the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was the creation of a new people driven constitution. The government responded by forming its own constitutional commission, which went around the country gathering people's views for the contents of the constitution. It is argued that the government sponsored draft constitution did not fully consider the real issues the Zimbabweans had raised. A case in point is the retention of the unbridled powers of the Executive which the majority of the people had spoken against. This was confirmed by the rejection of the draft constitution by the population in an unprecedented government defeat. This development brought a radical awakening to ZANU PF. The rejection of the draft following extensive

lobbying against by the CSOs demonstrated their strength and transformative potential. As a result more CSOs were formed.

While Mugabe accepted the rejection, he realised that support for his party was dwindling. To mobilise support, he resorted to the land reform programme. There is generally no contest concerning the necessity of land redistribution in Zimbabwe. It was necessary to correct the colonial land imbalances. Debate centres on how it was undertaken. The exercise was violent and chaotic. It saw white commercial farmers and their workers mostly of Malawian origin being violently driven off their farmers. It witnessed the acquisition of more than one farm by the political elites and taking of rich and productive land by people with no knowledge of farming. The net result was the transformation of Zimbabwe from a bread basket of Africa to a basket case. From this time onwards violence increased. State institutions became partisan hence violence got institutionalised. The economy suffered greatly from this instability due to low agricultural production and exports, and low investor confidence.

Zimbabweans dealt with the crisis by either challenging the government through civil society organisations or joining political parties either MDC or ZANU PF depending on what would bring food to their tables both in the short term and in the long run or by being acquiescent to the situation. Others responded by leaving the country for both economic and political reasons (Tevera and Zinyama, 2002). Economically they searched for greener pastures and politically they escaped violent targeted attacks due to their political activism. Response through CSOs or political parties was met with harsh reaction from the ZANU PF government. In general post-colonial Zimbabwe has witnessed some of the following harsh reaction from the ZANU PF led government: *Gukurahundi* massacres;[9] political violence not just from 2008 elections but stretching back to pre-independence 1980; institutionalisation of violence through political institutions such as security sector, the judiciary, economic sector, land reform programme; Operation Restore Oder, commonly known as *Murambatsvina* (a Shona language word which means get rid of the filth) where alleged illegal houses of ordinary people mostly in urban areas were demolished by the government in a case of a state turning against its citizens. The violent and disputed presidential elections of June 2008 proved that the conflict was now untenable. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) facilitated the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) as the only viable solution to the political crisis. A Global Political Agreement (GPA) which ushered in an

inclusive government was reached. It comprised the main political parties that had significantly participated in the 2008 presidential elections, namely ZANU PF led by Robert Mugabe, the MDC formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), and the other faction previously led by Arthur Mutambara and now by Welshman Ncube[10].

The GPA has to be commended for reducing violence or restoring the country to a relatively working form compared to pre-GPA period. It has to be commended for what it was- a transitional mechanism and not a permanent settlement. It acted as a bridge between the old and the new order. It has to be viewed as a realization of the flexibility required in the true art of politics as an art of the possible. So what came out from the 15 September agreement was a step in the right direction. The first step in dealing with a problem is to acknowledge that there is one. At least all parties agreed that there was a problem and were able to point out that political violence was one of the problems. Problems of attitude and behaviour emanated with reference to Article 20, the executive governmental structure, which is fundamental aspect of the deal. In this article came the implementation of the deal. It is the stage at which we meet human beings and their political and economic interests. It is the point where the actual sharing of power was played out. It is also the realm within which the dark side of power sharing agreements emerges.

The GPA seemed the best option at the time. In terms of policy it was good but it suffered in terms of attitude to the process. As a result it has suffered from underrealisation understood as limited implementation of the provisions of the agreement among parties at state level and interventions at the community level. Cutting across these is the crises of undervisioning, meaning lack of a shared vision of the future as well as of a shared future among parties and communities (Parlevliet, 2009). It is my assertion that this has been among other reasons due to underestimation of the reconciliation process as necessary in creating the required trust for the transformation of the political process. This aspect remains underestimated and unless it is pursued the political process will be directed by mechanical processes bent on estimating what will keep actors in power than what will move the nation forward.

The Role of Churches

The call for reconciliation in Zimbabwe has also been placed at the door of churches, because national healing and reconciliation are viewed as issues of

moral obligation, to which churches can claim "moral authority" and "legitimacy" to lead ahead of political actors which fare very low on the index of trust (Machakanja, 2010:8). Unfortunately the churches did not provide sufficient theoretical and practical guidance in dealing with the legacies of the past. As a result people lost trust in them, and also accused them of legitimizing the status quo, that is, the political crises[11]. The historic mainline churches and their apex bodies, that is, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference (ZCBC), Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) – attempted to facilitate talks between the main political parties, ZANU PF and the MDC. But ZANU-PF tried to co-opt these organisations and other prominent Christian leaders who failed to rise above political patronage. The Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Reintegration (Organ) created through the GPA did nothing significant other than hold high profile consultations at the expense of engaging the grassroots people. A transitional justice survey conducted by Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum (2011) found out that 74 % of the respondents stated that they had heard never of it.

Some analysts (Chitando and Manyonganise, 2011:83-6) have argued the churches have been very critical of the regime's oppressive tendencies as evidenced by the critical and strong pastoral letters they have published. Unfortunately pastoral letters regardless of how intellectually sharp and thorny they may be, make the church so distant from the people. They alienate people who end up feeling that the leadership is detached from the real world experiences. They do not provide appropriate space for interaction that builds trust amongst people since there is no dialogical communication. So are the statements that were published by the Organ from time to time. Trust is engendered mostly readily through personal proximity. Vertical relationship through pastoral letters does not provide the opportunity for the relevant interaction that generates social capital and subsequently trust. Horizontal relationships instead provide such an opportunity. They involve dialogue and interaction. Issues of healing and reconciliation need direct interaction to resolve them and not a general approach. Brewer, Higgins and Teeney (2010: 1032) call this, restriction to negative peace[12], characterised as 'the provision of pastoral care to the affected communities, criticisms of violence, calls for restraint, formulaic statements after each tragedy and the promotion of national dialogue between protagonists'.[13]

Case study of Zimbabwe Christian Alliance

Given the perceived ineffectiveness of groups like ZCBC, ZCC and EFZ, as well as the state Organ, it is not surprising that new groups and movements including those of Christian origin have been formed. This article shall focus on Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) as an exemplar of alternatives to the mainline churches and state sponsored mechanisms to political transition and reconciliation. If trust is to be understood as something which is by necessity relational and which grows in spaces provided for interaction, the interrogation of this organisation must focus on i) the extent to which it has provided spaces or platforms for interactional life, ii) the type of social capital it has generated, and iii) the extent to which its benefits go beyond the organisation, that is how it positively bridges and links with other institutions.

ZCA defines itself as a Christian faith-based organisation whose mission is to bring about social transformation, social justice, reconciliation and national healing in Zimbabwe through prophetic and biblical proclamation, advocacy and action. Its formation was prompted by Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore order in May 2005 when the government demolished houses under the guise of cleaning mostly urban areas of illegal structures and subsequent activities. Over 700 000 people lost their housing and livelihoods through the operation (Tibaijuka, 2005: 7). After providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the operation, some religious actors engaged in a process of reflection and concluded that Operation *Murambatsvina* was just one among many other governance problems. One interviewee said that:

> During that reflective process, people began to say maybe we need to deal with issues of bad governance which are the root causes of this crisis. We began to see a new theology among these people. We began to question a lot of things we had previously believed in, to look at biblical texts as part of the struggle to actually bring democracy to Zimbabwe in a fresh way. All this is leading to a new way of practicing Christianity and a new way for the leadership to be very reflective in their approach (*Harare,* 22.2.12).

ZCA justifies its involvement into socio-economic and political affairs on the basis of making their faith relevant in their daily life. A member of ZCA said:

> We came about at a time when we were forced to a very embarrassing question in Zimbabwe at that time after 2000 when the crisis was escalating and visitors were asking: 'We read a lot about the crises in Zimbabwe, but what is the church doing, what are Christians doing. At that time there was no tangible evidence of the voice of the church on issues of human rights abuses, there were no actions that were coordinated by the church seeking to address human rights abuses in the country, and therefore it was a challenge that needed a response but we could not make that response within our traditional church institutions because they were very slow to respond so we started the Christian Alliance (*Harare,* 24.1.12).

ZCA believes in visible and active prophetic action through expressing solidarity with suffering Zimbabweans. Its approaches compel the state to address the problems of bad governance and economic mismanagement that have been the root causes of the Zimbabwean crisis. It believes that the older generation of church organisations did not succeed in pressurising the state to stop instigating and condoning widespread electoral violence because it protested (through pastoral statements) against acts of violence without seeking to change the environment that allowed this violence to occur. ZCA aims to end the systematic violence that has characterised Zimbabwe's post-colonial political landscape by seeking a change in this environment, although it does not intend to contest political power (Zimudzi, 2006:202).

To realize its goals, ZCA has been involved in the transitional process through public prayer meetings, workshops to empower volunteer activists and create awareness on topical challenges. It has conducted workshops and seminars on national healing, reconciliation, and healing memories. It involves itself in counselling communities, writing workshops aimed at responsible journalism in the face of state controlled journalism that breeds hatred and tension, issuing out position papers, publishing a newsletter to share its reflections. It has also engaged political elites. For some of its activities it has been subjected to police brutality and arrests.

Strategic Social Spaces in Civil Society

Stevens (2004:136) asserts that for generation of trust connections must be made between people and social (and political) institutions that involve understanding, familiarity, respect and relationship with the "other", acceptance, empathy and co-operation. In this light I venture to deploy Brewer, Higgins and Teeney's (2011: 133 -48) conceptual framework on how

civil society mediates dealing with violent politics and its legacies, and in my view in the process generate trust. They identify four "strategic social spaces in civil society", namely intellectual, institutional, market and political spaces, where they see religious actors playing a special role:

Firstly are *intellectual spaces,* "in which alternative ideas are envisaged and peace envisioned, and in which the private troubles of people are reflected upon intellectually as emerging policy questions that are relevant to them as civil society groups. Civil society groups can help to rethink the terms of the conflict so that it becomes easier to intellectually contemplate its transcendence or ending, and through their championing of alternative visions come to identify the range of issues that need to be articulated". Through workshops, national dialogue meetings, seminars and publication of compendiums and position papers, ZCA is a site for intellectual contemplation to advance issues of transition and reconciliation. It provides space to reflect on concepts and strategies that maybe helpful for post-violence transition and reconciliation process. Not only are intellectual spaces for reflection but also for interaction, participation and dialogue, key processes important for generation of trust. The mainline churches have shared this space with religio-political movements, but unlike them, ZCA has viewed intellectual engagement not as an agonistic arena for display of excellence, but reasoned exchange on the basis of social existence. Hence ZCA brings communities together to reflect on the way forward and formulate proposals for action (see Parlevliet, 2001:13). The mainline churches' intellectual spaces produce elitist statements couched in agonistic theological language, and inaccessible to the ordinary persons.

Secondly are *institutional spaces,* "in which these alternatives are enacted and practised by the civil society groups themselves, on local and global stages, making the groups role models and drivers of the process of transformation. Civil society thus lives out the vision of peace and transgresses, in its own practice, the borders that usually keep people apart – being institutions that practise, say, non-racialism or non-sectarianism well in advance of the general citizenry". This space provides the organization with the opportunity to go beyond intellectual publications and compendiums to practising what they "preach". Intellectual space is put into practice lest it risks remaining passive peacemaking (ibid: 141). ZCA has deployed this space by being open to everyone interested in being a member regardless of ethnicity, language, doctrinal background, political party affiliation, according everyone the opportunity to contribute to and participate in the activities, and in a united

front advocate for values and virtues theoretically and practically that contribute to post-violence transition and reconciliation. This institutional space is a learning field in which what is believed is put into practice first within the confines and remit of the organisation and practiced from places connected to it , allowing practitioners to remain within familiar territory (ibid: 142). In this way it is a "bridging group" understood as those that bring together people of different sorts and are associated with positive results ahead of bonding groups" which bring together people of a similar sort and are likely to produce negative externalities. ZCA brings people of different backgrounds who are in agreement on the particularistic "habits of the heart" such as tolerance, cooperation and reciprocity thereby being both bridging and bonding groups. Their "bond" has been important not only in developing trust amongst themselves but also in attracting outsiders. A dualistic conception of trust is generated from institutional spaces. The movement generates trust amongst its participants (in-group trust) and increases its credibility (trustworthiness) as an actor in the reconciliation process to the wider society (out-group trust). Mainline churches have also fared well in this space. However they remained focussed more on religious capital, understood as making use of connections for religious advancement, thereby not implementing the social gospel, than spiritual capital where religious connections are capitalised on for social impact and influence.

Thirdly are *market spaces,* "in which cultural, social and material resources are devoted by the civil society groups, drawn from local and global civic networks, to mobilize and articulate these alternatives, rendering them as policy issues in the public sphere, nationally or internationally". This is the converse of the institutional spaces as market spaces depict an explicitly outward practice of peace-making. ZCA has gone out to work amongst the poor, marginalised and victims of violence through interactional and trust-generating activities such as workshops, seminars, and meetings inter alia. Resources are required and allocated for this kind of work. Fundraising is one of the challenging tasks of civil society organisations. It involves writing detailed funding proposals, paying keen attention to detail so as to develop meaningful logical frameworks required by funding agencies. The tenacity to do this speaks of the commitment to the task at hand[14]. Resources are not restricted to financial resources but also include human resources of which the members are, as well as ideological resources of which religious values are part. More important for the argument of this article, religious values offer cohesive rallying points around which the critical masses for social movements coalesce. Religion offers the social infrastructure for movements

(Beckford, 2001: 238). Culturally or ideologically religion constructs and maintains identities, defines social problems and supplies symbolic repertoires that justify collective action (Kniss and Burns, 2004:696) In a shared religious community, people become empowered, they develop the capacity to *act* in concert (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993:9-10). Since religion provides identity, identity-based social capital and trust is generated by virtue of subscribing to the same religious values. Lastly, being involved in such politically sensitive work for which the members have been arrested increases people's trust in them as genuine ambassadors of political transition and reconciliation. Through market spaces negative peace is transformed into positive peace and religion transforms from pastoral focus to political engagement (Brewer, Higgins and Teeney, op.cit:142). Religion faces the real, uncomfortable and risky world. This, like the political space below, is the space that the mainline churches have shunned away from because it is uncomfortable and risky, hence they try to desensitise political issues for the sake of negative peace but unfortunately without change (see ibid:2003).

Lastly are *political spaces,* "in which civil society groups engage with the political process as back channels of communication and assisting in negotiation of the peace settlement, either directly by taking a seat at the negotiating table or indirectly by articulating the policy dilemmas that the peace negotiators have to try to settle or balance. These political spaces can be domestic and international". In 2006, ZCA mooted the Save Zimbabwe Campaign which brought all stakeholders from civil society and political parties to resolve the country's socio-economic and political crisis. At the end of its launch which involved speeches, presentations of papers and group discussions civil society and political leaders stood together on the podium, shook hands, embraced and vowed to work together for peaceful change in the country[15] (Wakatama, 2006). ZANU PF, though invited, did not come. In acts of advocacy for peaceful transition in Zimbabwe, ZCA has engaged political elites such as the Prime Minister to raise its concerns with regards to violence, slow implementation of the GPA, detention of civil society human rights activists, the need for non-partisan media and security reforms inter alia, (see Christian Alliance Newsletter April-May 2009). Instilling in participants norms and values such as collaboration and shared responsibilities through the market space is linked to the political space, since that allows members to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions including violence. In so doing tensions and negative repertoires are clarified, lessened and this increases public confidence and political trust.

Trust cannot exist where there is no accountability and transparency. Mainline churches have participated in this space through backchannel communication channels with politicians. Unfortunately those were elitist efforts which did not provide space for interaction for generation of trust, since they are guided by confidentiality and secrecy with the latter compromising transparency and making the religious leaders susceptible to co-option.

ZCA however has to take caution not to create negative bonding capital among the victims of political violence. As noted earlier on, bonding capital brings together people of the same kind who share the same fate, in this case victimhood of the political violence. Political violence represents not only a case of victims of violence but also a socially, economically and politically excluded society (political opponents), to which social inclusion is the answer. While it is argued that to be able to be part of a shared society, people need to be confident with themselves first before engaging with the other communities, thereby making a case for single-identity bonding work, this should be viewed as a process and not an end in itself. Bonding work can limit the victims' healing journey because of lack of cross-community relationship (Graham, 2012). Bonding capital tends to essentialise differences thereby not contributing positively to social inclusion and socially cohesive or shared society. ZCA therefore has to note that protagonists need each other and the process of engagement must bring perpetrators on board without belittling the suffering of the victims.

Conclusion

This article has advanced the point that civil society organisations are a site to generate interpersonal and social trust which can be transported to influence political trust in pursuit of political transition and reconciliation. It has referred to government and mainline churches' low satisfaction on the index of trust to argue that civil society movements remain strategically positioned to generate the needed trust for post-violence transition and reconciliation. It unearthed the characteristics of civil society organisations and how that influences their satisfaction on the index of trust. A practical example of one religious movement in the pursuit of social justice, national healing and reconciliation has been used to concretise the argument. In conclusion it emerges that conceptually and structurally, in spite of their limitations, good civil society organisations stand not only better positioned to generate the needed trust and for post-violence transition and reconciliation but also to facilitate the process.

Notes

1. A number of terms have been employed to refer to a situation after a violent conflict. Some of the terms used are post-conflict, post-settlement, post-violent, post-conflict transition among others. These terms technically do not mean the same thing. Post-violent does not mean post-conflict or post-settlement. In situations where violence has been brought to an end through political agreements, it is suitable to refer to it as post-settlement or post-violence because conflict will still be in existence in a different form. Since this article is interested in dealing with the legacies of a violent conflict less than 5 years 'after' the violence, the term post-violence shall be used (see Parlevliet, 2009: 257-8).

2. In Economics, trust is defined as an efficient mechanism to economise on transaction costs. In sociology it is defined as taken-for-granted, socially constructed reliability; a priori assumption of trust (Anheier, H.K, and J. Kendall. (2000).

3. Theories of social capital have their genesis in the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1986).The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (New York, Greenwood), 241-258, and James Coleman (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. In American Journal of Sociology, Vol 94. (pp. 95-120)

4. The aspect of reciprocity features prominently in John Rawls' (1997) notion of the use of public reason. He notes the principle of reciprocity as key for civility.

5. Particularistic civility contains all the goods associated with participation (trust, public spiritedness, self-sacrifice) but only between members of a particular group, and democratic civic civility extends the goods learned in participation to all citizens regardless of group membership (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001:841).

6. The other two models are firstly the anti-governmental model which presents civil society as a body of non-state actors that can be a bulwark against the state's oppressive tendencies. In this model civil

society fights for people's freedom to associate and express themselves. The other model is the public sphere model which focuses on how civil society can nourish the kind of informed public opinion that makes viable democratic government possible.

7. Whether to include the market as part of civil society remains contested as some authors think some civil society organisations resemble entrepreneurial organisations(Parlevliet, 2001:3).

8. Understanding civil society including the religio-political movements as sites for moderation and educating people on virtues and morals, to facilitate political processes such as democracy, transition and reconciliation is an aspect of cultural determinism in its positive sense of enabling or capacitating to do what they want or confirm that they have a choice. In the negative sense cultural determinism is viewed as conditioning people towards some desired goals, and human behaviour, as behaviourism asserts, beyond their capacity, thereby taking away their freedom.

9. *Gukurahundi* was an attack on the people of Midlands and Matebeleland provinces in Zimbabwe, predominantly Ndebele speaking, which began when mistrust grew between ZANU PF and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) from the time of integrating the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU PF, Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of ZAPU and the Rhodesian army into one national army.

10. At the time of writing the struggle for power between Mutambara and Ncube seemed to have ended, with Mutambara having withdrawn his court petition to be the rightful leader of the smaller MDC political party.

11. While churches are normatively in the best position to generate social capital, which is important for political consequences as Putnam had it that has not been the case with the mainline churches in Zimbabwe in response to violence.

12. The distinction between negative and positive peace is often traced to Galtung (1996:3ff). The former refers to the absence of violence, while

the latter refers to achievement of fairness, justice and social redistribution.

13. Despite numerous pastoral letters that were issued violence persisted on the political field (Zimudzi, 2006:201).

14. This is however not to overlook that for some it is simply becoming a job.

15. It should be noted however that real peace goes beyond such simple gestures but such gestures have an impact on the larger society when broadcast to the nation. They mark the beginning of processes.

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