

Electoral Violence in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Tanzania

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Abstract

Electoral violence is one of the pernicious vices that afflict Africa. It has led to massive deaths, injuries, destruction of property and above all political instability in the continent. This article revisits elections in Kenya and Tanzania in order to explain this state of affairs. It observes that although Kenya has experienced relatively more incidents of electoral violence, Tanzania is still regarded as an "island of peace". Yet, Zanzibar as a distinct part of the United Republic of Tanzania has remained highly fragile. This article asserts that such violence is a function of unfair electoral rules, social cleavages, and economic disparities amongst the people.

Introduction

Electoral violence has become a common phenomenon in Africa. Admittedly, there is no any single election held in the continent without notable cases of violence and with devastating impact. Kanyinga *et al.* (2010: 2) maintain that "elections-induced conflicts have threatened the very survival of nation-states. Even where the nation-state remains 'together', conflicts around elections tend to leave behind indelible marks as a reference pointer to a society in an ending tension, as has been demonstrated in Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe in the last decade". Yet, Zimbabwe's case is critical where the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU) (PF) continues its rule through violent means. Its common strategies of organised violence and of intimidating its political opponents by characterising them as illegitimate, British Sponsored, anti-democratic and subversive recurred in every general election (Kriger, 2005). In March 1983 for example, a four day cordon around Bulawayo led to 1000 detentions.

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Similarly, between 1982 and 1987 human rights violations in Matabeleland and Midlands totalled 1437 deaths, 354 missing, 680 property loss, 366 tortured, 1537 assaults, 2713 detentions, and 159 rapes (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, 1999). Although violence has been part of electoral processes since the return of multiparty politics in Kenya and Tanzania, the magnitude and intensity of such violence has varied from one election to the other. In their analysis of frequency of violence in African elections, Straus and Taylor (2009) observe the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections in Kenya appeared to have cases of high electoral violence. In 1992 the number of deaths reached 779 people and 654 injuries. Moreover, the 2007 elections were the most deadly ones that the country has ever experienced causing 1133 deaths, 3561 injuries, and numerous destructions of both government and private properties (Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, 2008).

Tanzania represents some isolated incidents of violence which differ from election to election but are more pronounced in Zanzibar. The violent nature of Zanzibar elections owes to the nature and form of regime transition from the Arab domination to independence. For instance, the June 1961 elections witnessed a stiff competition between the Arab dominated party of Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), the Shiraz Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) and the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) an African dominated party. Both ASP and ZNP won 10 seats each and ZPPP 3 seats. Although ASP had the majority votes, the coalition between ZNP/ZPPP won. The ASP complained that its victory was sabotaged. Violence was reported to have erupted in Unguja during these elections leading to 8 deaths, 400 injuries and 1000 arrests (Mpangala, 2006). In the election leading to independence in July, 1963, the ZNP/ZPPP coalition won 18 seats and ASP 13. Again ASP with majority of votes could not form the government hence the coalition of ZNP/ZPPP formed the independence government. Tensions aroused and led to 68 deaths and hundreds injuries (Mpangala, 2006). As a result of all this, the revolution was waged on 12 January, 1964 to overthrow the Arab Sultanate in Zanzibar. Tensions continued to characterise elections in Zanzibar after the re-introduction of multiparty system in 1992. The 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections saw the competition between Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)¹ and the Civic United Front (CUF)-allegedly representing ZNP/ZPPP parties.

All these elections were said to have been marred by violence as a result of irregularities, rigging and mismanagement (Common Wealth Observer

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Group, 1995, 2000; TEMCO, 1997; 2001; 2006). The 2000 elections were the most violent and highly mismanaged in Zanzibar. TEMCO (2001) certified them as abortive while the Common Wealth Observer Group simply called them as a sham. The CUF did not, in all elections, recognise the government formed by CCM as it believed its victory was illegal. It boycotted the meetings of the Zanzibar House of Representatives in 1995 and 2000 elections. Following the 2000 mismanaged elections, violent clashes occurred between CUF demonstrators and the police in Pemba on 26 and 27 January, 2001. The police killed dozens of peaceful demonstrators. Because of lack of exact official figures of deaths and injuries, different reports have different figures. Nyirabu (2003:8) states at least 22 people were shot dead on Pemba Island in conditions suggesting unlawful use of force. In what it called preliminary findings, CUF (2001) recorded 67 deaths and 787, 510 refugees and 1149 missing. Human Rights Watch (2002) estimates 35 deaths and over 600 injuries and some 2000 refugees fled to Kenya.

However, elections in Tanzania mainland proved to be relatively more peaceful with the exception of the 2010 general elections in which dozens of angry voters protested against the delay of result declarations. The police in many centres deployed massive force like teargas canisters to disperse them [Tanganyika Law Society (TLS, 2010)]. This led to injuries and destruction of properties (CASS, 2011, Sulley, 2012). Against that backdrop, this article examines the main causes of electoral violence in Africa by comparing the Kenya and Tanzania's democratic experiences. It asserts that elections in these countries have proven to be violent because of irregularities, mismanagement and unfair electoral laws. Additionally, entrenched economic problems and social cleavages based on ethnicity, race, regional politics and religion play a significant role.

Revisiting Political Contexts

Kenya and Tanzania² are two of the East African countries which are similar and different in many aspects. The two countries were under the British colonial rule from 1920's to 1960's. Their administrative and political systems reflect to a greater extent that of their British colonial power. Hence, Tanzania and Kenya got their independence in 1961 and 1963 based on a multiparty politics respectively.

A note should however be taken that the struggle for independence in the two countries differed substantially. This owes to the nature of the British colonial system in the two countries. While Kenya was a settler economy,

Tanzania was a Trusteeship colony under the League of Nations in which the role of the British colonial power was to help Tanganyika get its independence. In contrast, Kenya had to wage a guerrilla warfare known as *Mau Mau* in the 1950's to remove the white settlers in the country.

Immediately after independence, Kenya and Tanzania designed development projects popularly known as the nation-building projects. The policies took more or less similar paths. One of the policies was to adopt socialism and self-reliance as development ideology. This was followed by immense centralisation of powers and the adoption of one-party systems as means to implement the projects. All these were done in the name of development and national unity. Some scholars are critical of this ground and argue that development and unity is possible through consensus and discussion (Shivji, 1991) and what was more evident was "a move of defensive radicalism to mobilise mass support and legitimise a regime under the threat of economic purpose (Ake, 1976: 198-211). To him, Arusha Declaration institutionalised state capitalism and made the ruling class more secure politically and economically (Ake, 1979: 125).

Despite designing similar policies, their implementation politics differed in some respects between the two countries. One of such differences was that, while the first president of Tanganyika, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere was more into socialism and self-reliance by establishing *Ujamaa* villages, forming one strong political party, nothing of the equivalent was done in Kenya at least during the first regime. Kenya witnessed disagreements as to which path was to be taken as a national ideology. There were those who wanted capitalism and others socialism. The first president, Jomo Kenyatta was vehemently against the ideas of socialism and preferred a more capitalist way of organising the society which he called "African Socialism".

The African Socialism ideas are summarised in his "*Suffering Without Bitterness*" presenting the foreword to the 1965 Session Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and its Application to Kenya. Kenyatta stated: "Our entire approach has been dominated by a desire to ensure Africanisation of the economy and the public service. Our task remains to try to achieve these two goals without doing harm to the economy itself and within the declared aims of our society" (Kenyatta, 1968: 273). His political opponent, Oginga Odinga expressed his ideological difference with Kenyatta in *His Not Yet Uhuru* (1967) where he presented the propaganda from the white settler press when he said "I was branded because of visits to socialist countries to see the

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difference between their ways and those of western imperialism and to determine how to benefit from their socialist experience". Finally, Kenya adopted a more capitalist western oriented ideology. In practice however, Kenya implemented a mixture of capitalism and socialism in contrast to Tanzania which had clearly implemented *Ujamaa* (a form of socialism) and self-reliance in the 1970's and 1980's.

In order to achieve its development agenda, Tanzania started by changing its constitution in 1962 by centralising state power to the president. Sooner than late, the country started the move to adopt one party system in 1963 when the chairman of the ruling party then Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), J. K. Nyerere announced to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party that the country should adopt one party system. The presidential commission was formed in that year whose recommendations led to the formation of one-party in 1965 with the adoption of the One-Party Constitution.

Earlier in 1964 the unity was forged between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This then enabled the formation of one party state in which TANU and ASP were the sole parties in Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar respectively. Two years after the adoption of one-party system, Tanzania adopted the Villagisation and rural development program as part of the implementation of *Ujamaa* and Self-reliance ideology. This was well enshrined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.

The one-party system was solidified after the merger of TANU and ASP to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as the sole political party in the United Republic in 1977. The party was made the strongest institution that controlled all other institutions. All activities of the state were to be done by or under the auspices of the party. It abolished all organised groups like trade unions, women, youth groups and cooperative unions. If any of such groups existed, then they were nothing more than party's departments. Similarly, the Local Government Authorities were abolished in 1972. After the formation of CCM in 1977, the Constitution of the United Republic was adopted in the same year. This constitution was by all measures a one party constitution. The culture of one party system, unity, and fraternity was well indoctrinated to Tanzanian citizens. The subject culture was what defined the Tanzanian citizenry. During the one-party system, democracy was highly limited. Freedom of speech, information, and assembly were curtailed.

On its part, Kenya started the implementation of its unclear capitalist ideology which came to be known as “African Socialism”. What was clearer in Kenya was the implementation of state capitalism in which the state had an upper hand in most social, political and economic issues. In contrast to Tanzania, Kenya did not adopt one party system until 1969 when Kenya became a de-facto one-party state after the informal merger of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Since Kenya’s strategy was more of capitalist, some level of associational life and critics were tolerated. Hence, KANU was not strengthened as was TANU in Tanzania. Kenyan elites chose a more conservative, in-egalitarian, pro-Western and authoritarian path (Hornsby, 2012: 789). This went hand in hand with the adoption of the independent constitution which was severally amended to benefit the political class and gave enormous powers to the executive, particularly the president (Lumumba, 2011).

Kenyan politics is incomplete without understanding its ethnic configuration. This owes to its history. During British colonial rule political parties were formed on ethnic lines. KANU and KADU; the first parties to be formed in Kenya in 1960 reflected ethnic identities. As (Hornsby, 2012:2) correctly notes “Ethnic identities have shaped the political system, and in turn has been shaped by Kenya’s politicians and the institutions they inhabit”. The first regime under Mzee Jomo Kenyatta saw the domination of the Kikuyu group in which country’s economic and political performance was undermined. However, Kenyatta allowed some level of dissident views within his party. The presence of ethnic based associations like the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) in early 1970’s provided formidable challenge to KANU as a sole party (Oloo, 2007).

In 1978, Kenyatta passed on while in office. His vice president then Daniel Arap Moi assumed the presidency as per the Kenya’s constitution of the time. During his tenure, Moi followed Kenyatta’s footsteps but took some steps further by amending the constitution and made Kenya a de-jure one party state in 1982. KANU was recognised as the only party in the country though more loosely organised throughout Moi’s era. There was an attempted coup in the same year. This was followed by long period of Kalenjin-(president Moi’s tribe) domination in Kenya. The politics of exclusion was strengthened during this period. Kenya’s politics was characterised by more violence in Moi’s regime than during Kenyatta’s time. Governance was deteriorating, economy was going down. Kenyans were

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heavily marginalised and tortured, many went to exile and yet others were detained without trials. Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia were for instance detained without trial after leading a call for multiparty politics in 1990. All these strategies were directed to those indifferent to the regime in power. Ethnic politics became even more entrenched during the multiparty politics in Kenya.

After the period of about three decades of one party rule, Tanzania and Kenya re-established multiparty politics in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Due to their political contexts during the one party rule, the transition politics differed in the two countries. While the Tanzania's transition was more of a top-down nature and smooth, mostly spearheaded by the ruling party and its government (Hyden, 1999; Baregu, 2003; USAID, 2003; Nyang'oro, 2006), Kenya's transition was rather influenced by internal disagreements mostly based on ethnic marginalisation, government mal-performance characterised by grave corruption, economic underperformance, limited political participation among others. These challenges led to the formation of Civil Society Organisations whose role on democratic transition together with external pressures was vital (Nasong'o, 2007). The internal disagreements can be exemplified by "*Saba Saba*" riots and students-led protests in 1991 and 1990 respectively. The role of external actors featured well with the internal dissidents. Hence Moi accepted to amend Section 2A of the Constitution of Kenya to allow multiparty politics.

Although the countries adopted multiparty politics, the participation was still limited since the playing field was not fully opened up and was substantially skewed to the ruling party's advantages. In Tanzania for example, the ruling party and the state are one and the same thing. There is a close relationship between the party and the media, civil service, the executive, security forces, the national assembly, state-party ideologies and the election management bodies (Makulilo, 2008; Hoffman and Robinson, 2008; Sulley, 2012). In the same vein, KANU and the Kenyan state were highly entwined (Widner, 1993).

Against the above context, it does suffice to note at this stage that, the nature and form of politics in the two countries has had implications on elections that were relatively peaceful and the ones which were violent. The suffocation of the political playing field, economic mismanagement, and identity politics have contributed to a large extent to electoral violence in the two countries.

Theoretical and Conceptual Review

A starting point to understand electoral violence is to begin with a review of theories of violence. This is due to the fact that the prevailing reality of world history is violence (Collins, 1974:416) and violence is omnipresent in the world around us (Sen, 2008:5). Since violence is of various kinds, no single theory will suffice to explain them all. Collins (2009:1) posits "There are a large number of kinds of violence, and no simple theory will explain all of them." She proceeds that "No theory of individual motives for violence will explain much of what actually happens, not only because motivations for violence are diverse, but because most attempts at violence are abortive and most violent actors are incompetent". In the same vein (Biegon, 2009) asserts "At the very least, general explanations may lead to over-simplification of the issues that have led to electoral violence in a particular society". This section therefore reviews some theoretical underpinnings on violence to see which one can better explain electoral violence in Africa generally and in Kenya and Tanzania specifically. Three broad categories of theories are discussed. These are metaphysical, structural, and cultural explanations to violence.

The metaphysical approach³ sees violence as intrinsic to human kind. That is certain human beings are so bad and that they are inherently violent. In this situation the only means to do away with violence is getting rid of "bad" human beings. This line of reasoning is hard to sustain since it is almost impossible for a person to be violent without being triggered by certain factors. This brings us to another approach that rivals metaphysical explanations and put emphasis on structural factors. This school of thought points to the fact that violence is a result of the environment that surrounds an individual. Collins (2009:16-7) holds that:

Situational conditions can launch otherwise un-violent individuals in to violence. Such conditions include not only war but also states breakdowns fostering violent crowds and paramilitary activities... Even if on the face of it most of them have not shown violent and anti social patterns from an early stage but acquired their techniques of violence as the unfolding historical situation presented the opportunities.

Structural violence as explained by Galtung (1969:170-2) is a situation whereby "violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances." He proceeds that "resources are

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unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy unevenly distributed, medical services exist in some districts and for some groups only. Above all, the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed". This condition of structural violence is also referred to by Galtung as "*social injustice*" and asserts that the general formula against structural violence is inequality in the distribution of power (See also Muller, 1985).

Related to Galtung's discussion on social injustice and inequality is what Sen (2008) calls political economy view of violence. This approach sees poverty and inequality as the root cause of violence. He argues: "It is not hard to see that the injustice of inequality can generate intolerance and that the suffering of poverty can provoke anger and fury" (Sen, 2008: 7). Similarly, the political economy approach sees that poverty can certainly make a person outraged and desperate, and a sense of injustice, related particularly to gross inequality, can be a good ground for rebellion- even bloody rebellion. In a similar way, Stremmler and Price (2009: 5) hold that election-related violence is typically systemic and is often an indicator of challenges faced in terms of economic development, nation building and consolidation of political power. The structural theory of violence helps to delineate the inequalities in different aspects of life. Uneven playing field and the increasing gap between the rich and the poor can be some of the examples of inequalities in the electoral politics and can lead to violence. This line of reasoning is also plausible for in many countries that experience adverse levels of economic underdevelopment, poverty and violence have coexisted. Good examples can be Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya and Tanzania to mention some. While the political economy view of violence remains plausible, it is not without shortcomings. This relates to a situation where a society is poor and hampered with gross inequality but no violence. In this regard, as pointed out at the outset, no single theory will suffice to explain violence in all situations. Thus, Sen (2008: 12) concludes "Poverty and inequality are importantly linked with violence and lack of peace, but they have to be seen together with divisions in which other factors, such as nationality, culture, religion, community, language and literature, play their part".

Another view under structural approaches to violence is held by Honderich (2003: 168-9) in his "*Democratic Terrorism*" thesis. He sees violence as a means to end the inequalities and social injustices discussed by Galtung and Sen above. He posits that "At the same time it is entirely relevant that violence by

another comparison may be an attempt to secure *equality* of influence, or an approximation of it. Some violence, argues Honderich, is an attempt to approximate more closely to an equality of influence. Terrorism can be directed, to speak differently, to ends that make for progress toward well-being for those who are deprived of it. This is what he calls terrorism for humanity (Honderich, 2003:193-5). He cites South African's Apartheid movements to prove his case. He argues that there was a clear end in the case of Black terrorists in South Africa to end Apartheid and pretence of democracy. Equally, Dunning (2011) states that:

While war does not simply continue politics by other means, warfare can also reflect the underlying distribution of power revealed by pre-war elections, and the logic of violence can be shaped by pre-war electoral configurations. Moreover, the choice is not always between fighting and violence: sometimes, elections and violence act as complements, with elected politicians or their militias using violent actions to shape electoral outcomes.

Theorists under structural approaches to violence tend to believe that violence can be avoided if the environment within which it takes place will be changed. The structural explanation on violence is important in this analysis insofar as it puts emphasis on the context within which violence occurs. Within the context of a political system for example, the crumble of political and social systems are likely to cause violence. It is within this framework that the dominance of one party against others over state institutions notably the electoral management bodies, the army, the judiciary and the executive, skewed political fields, economic marginalisation, the politics of exclusion fall. The party and by extension the state becomes absolute hence authoritarian tendencies are inevitable. This fact is also proved by Collins (2009:21) when she comes up with an explanation that state can also be the major source of violence. She states that "A major area of macro violence involves the state. The state itself in Weber's famous definition is an organisation which claims monopoly of legitimate violence over a territory. The rise of the modern state, with its violence monopolising tax collecting, society-penetrating propensities, is itself the framework in which other phenomena of conflict and violence arise". In line with its coercive powers, violence can also occur in fragile states. A fragile state is one with weak political, economic and social systems and institutions which fail to meet people's needs (Mitchell, 1979; Biegon, 2009; Muller, 2011). This kind of state reduces its legitimacy and is more prone to violence.

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The last approach to violence in this article is based on the culture of the society. Sen (2008) states that cultural theories relate to conflict and violence as they point to modes of living as well as religious beliefs and social customs. The most commonly cited explanation under this approach is Huntington's clash of civilisations which sees global violence as a result of clash of civilisations primarily religious and contrast what is called the Islam world, Christian world, the West and so on. The division among these civilisations make them prone to clash with one another thereby leading to violence. The major drawback of this reasoning as Sen (2008:6) points is to reduce the analysis of human identities to be only on religious basis. Sen posits and should be quoted in extenso:

What is perhaps the most limiting feature of civilisational approach-even more limiting than missing out a great deal of world history-is the mind-boggling short-cut it takes in trying to understand our sense of identity. Ignoring the immense richness of the multiple identities that human beings have, given their diversity of affiliations, attachments and affinities, the civilisational approach attempts to put each one of us into a little box of single sense of belonging, to wit, our alleged perception of oneness with our respective civilisation.

Additionally, Sen argues that "the civilisational approach of global violence is firmly moored on a particular 'solitarist' approach to human identity, which sees human beings as members of exactly one group defined by their native civilisations, defined mainly in terms of religion". Despite its immense critics, the civilization explanation is useful in our analysis since the culture of a certain society has a bearing on whether that society will be peaceful or violent. It also affects the behaviour of the people within a society. Hence, Galtung (1990) gives a more broad definition of cultural violence to include any aspect of culture that can be used to legitimise violence. These aspects can be religion and ideology, art and language. As can be seen, there is no a single theory that can explain much of violent situations. To avoid the simplicities of using a single approach to violence, this article takes a more eclectic approach that will emphasise on the interconnectedness of the explanations depending on the context, nature, form, character and motive behind politics of violence.

Explaining Electoral Violence in Kenya and Tanzania

Kenya and Tanzania have experienced a certain form and level of violence during elections. This state of affairs is not exceptional to these two countries

but rather is a general reflection of the nature and form of politics in Africa. Countries such as Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Togo, Zanzibar to cite some, have experienced violence of some kind in elections. However, it is important to note from the outset that Kenya's elections have been relatively more violent than those in Tanzania. Most specifically, the Kenya's 2008 post election led to enormous incidents of deadly violence. This is partly because of the ethnic cleansings in Kenya which have historically been manifested in the struggle for power and resource distribution. The relative peace in Tanzania can be attributed to its legacy of socialism and self-reliance and relative absence of ethnic politics in the country.

Apart from electoral disputes recorded on the part of Zanzibar, elections in Tanzania mainland have been relatively peaceful with the exception of the 2010 general elections which featured some isolated cases of violence. Analysis of electoral violence in Tanzania will make reference to both the Union elections and those in Zanzibar. Drawing from the theoretical framework on violence reviewed above, two broad categories of explanations can be identified with regard to electoral violence in Kenya and Tanzania. The first relates to structural factors manifested in the inequality on the distribution of power and resources. Inequality can be seen in the form of political repression for instance uneven playfield in the electoral race as a result of disagreement in the rules of the game and the resultant elections; impartial Election Management Bodies (EMBs); one party dominance; and the increasing gap between the rich and the poor. The second category is cultural factors. This can be in the form of identity politics based on ethnic cleavages, religious beliefs, and regional politics. The two set of factors are analysed in historical perspectives in the two countries.

Kenya

Kenya experienced varied levels of electoral violence since it got independence. As seen in its political context, the country has been under authoritarian regime for more than three decades. However, the first two regimes under Kenyatta and Moi were characterised as more undemocratic, repressive and unresponsive. To be sure, there was indeed inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth in the two regimes. Wanyande et al (2007) correctly note the distribution of resources and socioeconomic prosperity as central determinant of societal harmony or conflict. After getting hold of power from colonial government, the first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta controlled the state power. According to Nasong'o (2007) Kenyatta controlled

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the associational space, dismantled the *Majimbo*⁴ system, adopted the colonial administrative system which was by all measures repressive. He amended the law to make sure that he controlled the state. The Constitutional amendment Act No. 16 of 1969 for example empowered the president to control the civil service. He centralised Trade Unions under the Central Organisation of Trade Unions and co-opted the only opposition party KADU into KANU in 1964. Above all, the opposition dissents were marginalised from power. Notable examples are Oginga Odinga with his Kenya People's Union (KPU) whose main agenda was state reconstruction. This was banned in 1969. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment No. 2) Act No. 17 of 1966 gave the president powers to constitute and abolish offices of public servants. This affected the independence, impartiality and political neutrality of civil service (Lumumba, 2011). Individuals who opposed the regime were assassinated and detained (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). Good examples are Pio Gama Pinto in 1965; Argwings Kodhek in 1966; Tom Mboya in 1969 and Josiah Mwangi Kariuki in 1975 and some of the detained individuals were Martin Shikuku, Ngugi wa Thiong'o and George Anyona (Nansog'o, 2007: 32). As can be seen, the inequality in the distribution of power in Kenyatta time led to violence done by the state to individuals opposed to the regime and who supported a more transformed Kenya.

Moi on his part marginalised some groups in his administration. He exacerbated the politics of marginalisation thereby creating a source of resistance in his regime. To do that he reformed the legal, political and administrative regimes. A good example is the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 7 of 1982 which made Kenya officially a one-party state by adding Section 2A. The constitutional Amendment Act No. 14 of 1986 removed the security of tenure of the Attorney General, Controller and Auditor General, as well as High Court Judges. All of this enabled him to have a total control of power and used these institutions to maintain his power and marginalised the opponents. The state power was therefore highly personalised under Moi. Since the state controlled everything, the underground social movements started to oppose the regime through violent means and Moi regime turned the state into a police state. The state was highly repressive during this time. The notable conflicts in Kenya were therefore with regard to the constitution which was believed to have failed to tackle many problems of the Kenyan citizens such as power and resource distribution (Mwagiru and Mutie, 2007).

Although the struggle for multiparty system succeeded through the repeal of the Section 2A of the constitution which made Kenya a constitutional one-party state, other repressive laws were in operation. The political space was still suffocated and human rights abused. To be specific, Kanyinga et al (2010: 2) hold "The rising number of failed elections and the resultant conflicts is a manifestation of acute institutional failure and the inability of political forces on the continent to reform the state through democratic constitutions". Because of the skewed laws, some groups started to push for new rules of the game. The state was highly ambivalent with these groups and contained them. The good example of the groups' reaction was the *Sabasaba* (July 7, 1990) riots whose agenda was the call for multiparty politics. Its slogan was "Multiparty Now". It involved political figures like Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba who were detained before the meeting took place. However, the public turned up for the meeting and the police deployed force to disperse people. This led to violence and killings.

As a reaction to the discontents, mechanisms were designed by the regime in power to protect its position. There were ethnic cleansing operations organised and sponsored by KANU party officials (Brown, 2004; Mutahi, 2005). For instance, two mechanisms were designed during Moi regime in 1992. These were Youth for KANU in 1992 known as YK92 and Operation Moi Win (OMW). Both of these meant that winning is a must and will be achieved by all means possible. Similarly, in the 1997 elections, the Moi regime is reported to have established informal militia popularly known as *Jeshi la Mzee* (*Old man's army*) (Laakso, 2007). This was responsible to make sure that all against Moi were dealt with perpendicularly. The opposition reacted against it, hence some incidents of violence in the 1992 and 1997 elections. The opposition's motto was "Moi must go" coined in their famous statement "Operation Moi Out" (OMO).

The *Jeshi la Mzee* and OMO clearly show the tension between the incumbent supporters and the opposition supporters which led to incidents of violence in the country. Clashes between these groups were common during electioneering. The agenda on constitutional and electoral reforms was central in the run up to the 2002 elections. This explained in part the success of an opposition via the National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) which took over power by promising the making of a new constitution in 100 days of its rule. Contrary to that, NARC's government abandoned the agenda for new constitution, it marginalised the parties to NARC- by breaching the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) among parties to the

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alliance promising the power sharing deal; tribalism dominated appointments in the public sector (Kanyinga, et al. 2010). This led to tensions among the marginalised groups and entered the 2007 elections as individuals with grievances to acquire power. The results of the 2007 were highly contested and led to massive violence which led to the brokerage of power sharing deal in 2008.

It is important to note that the Kenyatta and Moi regimes were essentially of one party (Widner, 1993). This system was in itself unequal. It failed to solve people's problems and led to legal, social, political and economic problems (Mwagiru and Mutie, 2007). The struggle for multiparty politics in Kenya is therefore the struggle against the one party dominated centralised and repressive regime. The dominance of the ruling party over the rules of electoral game has been a source of violence during elections. Political opposition has been against the management of elections in Kenya. This is because the ruling party enjoys incumbency advantages. To be exact:

Violence ensues in situations where there is a strong possibility of changing existing power relations and the incumbents are unwilling to cede power. This has been the case in Africa, as elections are often associated with tension and the eruption of social antagonism over the capture and control of the state. Much can be attributed to the dominance of one party and an intolerant political culture relating to the opposition. In the context of authoritarian regimes the strategic intent and practical consequences of violent acts are designed, in many ways, either to vitiate the elections altogether or to influence voting behaviour through threat or intimidation (Motsamai, 2010: 4).

Kenya's 2007 elections prove this fact when electoral results were contested as a result of lack of confidence on the EMB, the Electoral Commission of Kenya. In their study, Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2010) note that 42% of respondents said that violence was triggered mainly by the perception that the election had been rigged pointing out election irregularities and a weak electoral commission. This led to post election disputes in 2008 which resulted to massive deaths, destruction of properties and displacements of thousands of people from Kenya to other countries (Commission of Inquiry into Post-Elections Violence, 2008).

The second set of factors relate to identity politics. Analysts note amongst themes of political conflict in Kenya, to be not only the legal and institutional

regime that govern elections, but also the historical ethnic identity (Lebas, 2011; Kanyinga et al, 2010; Oloo, 2010; Erdmann, 2007; Jonyo, 2002; Carey 2002). As was shown earlier, identity politics in Kenya is historical. It started during colonialism whereby the Black race was excluded in all spheres of life. Their land was taken and did not hold positions in the administrative structures. The colonial administration included some groups and excluded others. The politics of inclusion and exclusion was inherited by the post colonial African administration. Consequently, ethnic divisions were institutionalised during the first and second regimes, and have become the common way of organising politics in the country to date.

Historically, the struggle for power and resources manifested itself in three way cleavage that is Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin. The first two decades of independence saw the incorporation of the Kalenjin into Kenyatta's Kikuyu centred alliance and gradual marginalisation of the Luo (Hornsby, 2012: 10). In the same vein, the class conflict that characterised the early KANU-KPU split and was at the core of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki assassination. The conflict began as an ideological one but turned into ethnic conflict (Wanyama, et al. 2007). The preoccupation of the post independent regimes was how to distribute the benefits of independence among the people. Since benefits were fewer, the preoccupation of the regime in power was to design criteria for distribution. Among the criteria were ethnicity and nepotism (Wanyama, et al. 2007). Hence, Presidents Kenyatta's Kikuyu and Moi's Kalenjin enjoyed during the first two regimes respectively. As can be seen, rivalry for the control of state power and resources is a persistent source of conflict in Kenya.

The restoration of multiparty politics saw a reinforcement of ethnic politics by consolidating political support along ethnic lines (Throup and Hornsby, 1998; Wanyande, 2002, Jonyo, 2002; Ludeki, 2002, Oyugi, et al. 2003; Wanyande, 2006; Kanyainga and Okelo, 2010; Hornsby, 2012). Tribes which supported the opposition were highly intimidated by KANU politicians. Similarly, Moi advocated *Majimbo* (provincial administration) and argued that Rift Valley belonged to the Maasai and Kalenjin from which he got more support. In this context, the opposition were tactically not allowed to go there. If found, then it was fought by KANU militia and the opposition fought back hence violence⁵. Similarly, in the 1997 elections there were ethnic cleansing in the Coast Province-Liken and Kuani. More than 100 people were killed (Laakso, 2007). The reason for the conflict was the 25% threshold of votes which KANU initiated. In the 1997 elections, the candidate from the

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Social Democratic Party (SDP) Charity Ngilu seemed competitive and Moi worried he would not get the 25% threshold and hence he devised the ethnic cleansing mechanisms and ethnic clashes led to violence. Actually, the Moi era between 1978-2002 is reported to be “notorious for the detentions and tortures of the prodemocracy activists at the former Nyayo House Torture Chambers, Turkoman Carpet House, Nyati House, Kamiti and Naivasha Maximum prisons among other security operation centres. The key victims were the 1982 Airforce mutineers, the Mwakenya members (1982-1995), the February Eighteenth Movement (FEM from 1995), the Pro-democracy activists under the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) and the Release Political Prisoners (RPP) lobby groups (1992-2002)” (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011).

The last factor responsible for electoral violence in Kenya is the economy. It was evident that there is a close relationship between good living standards of people and peace. When people are in economic hardship, there is a big gap between the rich and the poor, there is exclusion of some groups as far as the distribution of national resources is concerned, the likelihood of conflict becomes more evident. Conflict on resource distribution has been at the centre of political confrontation in Kenya’s history. Indeed, the question of land and its related advantages has been the source of misunderstandings and has not been resolved since independence (Ludeki, 2007).

The people of Kenya started to witness the seeds of inequality during the British colonial administration. The change of administration to Kenyan nationalist leaders did not alter things. The Kenyatta’s regime paradoxically became a ruthless capitalist state which allocated land to the selected, politically correct or well-connected few, leaving the masses under abject poverty. The second regime under Moi saw the propagation of poverty as his years of rule elapsed (Oucho, 2010). The third regime under coalition NARC and president Kibaki did not implement the change it promised Kenyans when removing KANU from power and changed its position after achieving its goals through the coalition (Wanyande and Asingo, 2004). The incumbent Kibaki entered the 2007 election with a new party and allegedly stole the results after Kenyans seemingly decided to elect the Orange Democratic Movement of Raila Odinga in the hope of implementing the promised change in 2002 (Oucho, 2010).

The economic inequality in Kenya is a reality than a fabrication. There is increasing gap between the haves and have not’s thus making Kenya the

third most unequal society in the world (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011). Despite continued positive five year growth of its economy between 2002 and 2007, poverty remains a challenge among Kenyans (Stein, 2010). As discussed earlier, the use of youth to instigate violence in elections was common in both Kenya and Tanzania. A study on the relationship between youth and violence indicated that abject poverty and great socioeconomic disparities have impacted on the youth to participate in violent action. It indicates that about 50% of Kenyans live below the poverty line which means that a majority of youth (over 60% of Kenyans are persons below 35 years) have inadequate access to basic needs and services namely, food, water, shelter and clothing as well as educational and health facilities (Korongo, 2012). In Nairobi, the capital city, 60% of the population live in slums and levels of inequality are dangerously high, with negative implications for both human security and economic development (Oxfam Great Britain, 2009).

In their study, Kristjanson *et al*, (2010) show that “Among the 4773 households studied, 42 per cent were poor 15 years ago and 50 per cent are poor at the present time” that is when the study was conducted. According to the Republic of Kenya Poverty Eradication Commission (PEC) (2009), nearly half of the Kenyan population is below the poverty threshold. In 1992, 44.8% of population were poor and rose to 52.3% and 56% in 1997 and 2000. This reduced to 46% in 2005/2006 (PEC, 2009). Human Development Index 2003 place Kenya at 146th out of 175 countries (Human Development Report, 2003). Kenya was ranked 137 out of 174 in 1998 (Kenya Human Development Report, 1999). In 2010 Kenya ranked 128 out of 169 (HDR, 2010). Although these reports indicate at times a positive change, the trend is not stable and has not manifested in ordinary people’s lives.

Tanzania

Electoral violence in Tanzania differs relatively from that of Kenya in terms of magnitude and intensity as discussed earlier. Tanzania has historically been branded as an island of peace and harmony. Hence, research tended to shy away from analysing the evidence against or for this long standing claim. However, research has shown that one part of the Union that is Zanzibar has been hampered by political and electoral violence for long time (Bakari, 2001; Mpangala, 2006; Killian, 2008). If anything, the expectation among political observers is that Zanzibar will continue to be a trouble spot given its political history, which relates to the configuration of ethnicity, race and class, and the consequences of the 1964 revolution on the islands that overthrew the sultanate (Nyang’oro, 2006). On the other hand, Tanzania Mainland has

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enjoyed some relative peace during its elections with some exception particularly in the 2010 elections.

Just as its counterpart Kenya, Tanzania's electoral violence can be explained in terms of both structural and cultural factors as identified at the outset of this part. During the first regime under Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Tanzania saw the unification of the nation through socialism and self-reliance policies that emphasised on communism, fraternity and brotherhood but did not cure differences that were present since colonial time over the Union question between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This was relatively silent during his reign but erupted afterwards. Hence, the return of multiparty politics witnessed cases of electoral violence based on ideological factors on the Union question and in the inequalities in the distribution of and struggle for power. This state of affairs is partly because of the more opening up of the political space which was curtailed during the one party state in the name of national unity and development. This is not to suggest nonetheless that pluralist politics always correlates to instability and violence.

With regards to structural factors, the inequalities in the distribution of and struggle for power manifest in the rules governing electoral politics in Tanzania. This has been the major source of tensions and conflicts during electioneering in the Republic. A starting point to the problem of inequality in the rules of the game is the analysis of the transition politics in the country. It was noted that Tanzania was a one party state for about three decades. The transition from this system to multiparty system was problematic. The then sole party CCM dominated and controlled it to ensure that it retained its dominance in the new system. To do this, CCM and its government established a commission⁶ in 1991 to investigate whether or not Tanzania should go multiparty politics. In its report, the commission stated that Tanzania should go multiparty but with substantial reforms on the existing laws, rules, regulations and institutions which by all measures were designed to support the old system. Thus, the making of a new constitution, conducting national wide civic education, extensive reforms of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), and the repeal of the 40 draconian laws were the commission's major recommendations for the working of the new system. Unfortunately, the CCM and its government did not agree with any of these recommendations. It only amended Article 3(1) of the 1977 constitution which stipulated CCM as the sole political party in the United Republic of Tanzania, and Article 3(2) which made CCM the final authority in respect of all matters in the United Republic Tanzania.

After the re-establishment of multipartism, Article 3(1) reads “the United Republic is a democratic and socialist state which adheres to multi-party democracy”. Nonetheless, most laws and provisions remained intact. Indeed, some amendments added even more powers to the state-party and the president. As a result, CCM had control over all state institutions and laws which favoured it in the new system (Raphael, 2011; Makulilo, 2008; Nyirabu, 2003; Rupiya, et al. 2006). The newly formed opposition parties were highly marginalised and tensions and disagreements on the rules of the game have been common in the multiparty era. The most contentious element of the skewed rules has been the form and structure of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC). These are the institutions responsible for the supervision and management of the Union and Zanzibar elections respectively. These institutions are said to be partial and not independent. The partiality of NEC and ZEC is seen in terms of the appointment of its commissioners by the president, lack of security of tenure of the same and independent budget (TEMCO, 2001, 2006, 2011; LHRC, 2010; Makulilo, 2009; 2011; Therkildsen, 2009). Although after the *Muafaka* II peace accord in Zanzibar, ZEC’s composition included some members of the opposition parties, its independence was still under severe criticism. To be sure, the 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections were marred with violence and conflicts to a greater extent because of the disagreement on the rules governing them and the manner in which they were managed.

As a result, the 2000 Union elections were declared by TEMCO free but not fair because of the state being in favour of the ruling party and the use of massive force by the police during opposition rallies. In contrast, elections in Zanzibar were declared by both the local and international election observers as mismanaged. Specifically, TEMCO (2001) certified them as aborted while the Common Wealth Observer Group (2000) characterised them as a sham. In the 2000 general elections, demonstrators against the electoral mismanagement were crushed by state security and led to the deadliest violence on the Island (Dagne, 2010). Votes were cancelled in 16 constituencies because of irregularities, and although new voting was conducted in November 2000, CUF boycotted the exercise. Similarly, in January 2001, after these elections, the police and security forces used excessive force against civilians and CUF leadership in Dar es Salaam—considered the worst riots in the country’s history and culminating in a number of deaths and refugees fleeing to Kenya (USAID, 2003).

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It is important to note that the 2010 general elections reversed the history of violence in election in the United Republic. While the elections in Zanzibar were relatively peaceful, the Union elections were marred with more violence. In an attempt to investigate why this was the case, the College of Arts and Social Sciences (CASS) of the University of Dar es Salaam undertook a study in 2012. CASS (2011) observed among other factors for the violence to be election mismanagement which sparked off feelings among opposition parties and their supporters that there could be vote rigging. This was caused by the NEC system of electronic tallying which was unusually slow and boring (CASS, 2012; Sulley, 2012). The reason for the relative peaceful elections in Zanzibar can be partly attributed to the power sharing deal between the rivalry parties CUF and CCM prior to the 2010 elections. After these elections, Zanzibar formed the Government of National Unity (GNU) which has been arguably source of “peace” in the Island.

As is in Kenya, identity politics plays a role in Tanzania. Although Tanzania’s politics is not affected by ethnicity as in Kenya, there is a growing tendency of regional and religions identities whose role in politics has been instrumental. Analysts demonstrate that there is a number of identity groups that have served as the basis for political organisation at one point or another (Heilman and Kaise,r 2002; Mpangala, 2006; Vittori and Bremer, 2009). However, by the 1990’s religion emerged as a deeply held identity, raising the question of whether Tanzanian society might polarise along sectarian lines. Forster et al (in Heilman and Kaiser, 2002: 694) hold that “In Tanzania there has been numerous problems rising from religious pluralism, and these have been more overt than ethnic issues”.

Several incidents of violence occurred as a result of tension either between religions and or religions and government. The 1993 conflicts between Christians and Muslims over the destruction of pork butcheries in Mwembechai, Dar es Salaam, the 1994 conflict on whether Zanzibar could join the Organisation of Islamic Community (OIC), and the 2001 Mwembechai demonstrations after the arrest of a Muslim preacher in August 2001 for allegedly insulting the Christian religion are cases in point. However, to date mainstream political leaders in both the ruling and opposition parties have shunned systematic, large scale mobilisation strategies based on religious affiliation (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). But the analysis of the 2005 elections shows that CCM did use religion as a mobilisation strategy when it tactfully promised the establishment of the Kadhi’s Court (CCM 2005 Manifesto; Sulley 2012). The tension between the

Muslim and the government comes after a historical feeling that Muslims were discriminated during British colonial and post independent state under a Christian leader, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. The imbalance between Christianity and Islam was seen in terms of education and leadership opportunities.

Notwithstanding some trends of identity politics based on religion, the fact still remains that violence is greatly a result of democratic deficits in Tanzania. As Bakari notes violence in Zanzibar has to be understood not in terms of ethnic or racial politics, which are now being carried out by the CCM government in Zanzibar, but rather the political discontent on the islands is based on an incomplete democratisation process that has politically oppressed the opposition in Pemba by the ruling party CCM (Bakari, 2001).

Apart from the problems related to legal and institutional framework, economic factors play role in electoral violence in Tanzania. This is evidenced in the continued mistrust in the government performance. Although CCM and its government received highest percentage scores in acceptability of its candidates since the multiparty politics, this has been deteriorating overtime. In the run up to the 2005 elections, 74.8% of interviewed people by the Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) 2005 Poll indicated that they would vote CCM's candidates if elections would be conducted in march 2005. With its famous 2005 campaign slogan of *"better life for every Tanzanian with new vigour, new zeal, and new speed"*, CCM attracted people from all walks of life (CCM Manifesto, 2005). The results of the election attest to this. Its presidential candidate Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete won by 80.28% and obtained 206 out of 232 parliamentary seats (NEC, 2006). This level of acceptability did not however last long before it started declining. People's hope for better life turned to be an illusion. REDET's three consecutive polls in 2006, 2007, and 2008 show this decline at least for the presidents of both the United Republic of Tanzania and of Zanzibar. Tables 1&2 are indicative.

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Table 1: Opinion on performance of President of the United Republic of Tanzania Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete in 2006, 2007, and 2008

Satisfaction Level	October 2006	October 2007	November 2008
Very Satisfied	67.4 (873)	44.4 (574)	39.5 (510)
Fairly Satisfied	22.7 (294)	35.0 (452)	39.0 (504)
Not Satisfied	7.8 (101)	18.6 (241)	19.3 (250)
Don't Know	2.1 (27)	2.0 (26)	2.2 (28)
Total	100 (1295)	100 (1293)	100 (1292)

Source: Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) Opinion Poll of November, 2008, Published on 24th April, 2009.

Table 2: Opinion on performance of President of Zanzibar Aman Abed Karume in 2006, 2007, and 2008

Satisfaction Level	October 2006	October 2007	November 2008
Very Satisfied	47.8 (119)	35.5 (88)	44.0 (110)
Fairly satisfied	23.3 (58)	30.6 (76)	24.0 (60)
Not Satisfied	27.3 (68)	31.5 (78)	26.4 (66)
Don't Know	1.6 (4)	2.4 (6)	5.6 (14)
Total	100 (249)	100 (248)	100 (250)

Source: Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) Opinion Poll of November, 2008, Published on 24th April, 2009.

As indicated in the two tables above, clearly people were not happy with the performance of the presidents and by extension their governments. Amongst the reasons for government performance dissatisfaction, failure to improve living condition topped the list by 30.4% and 31% in 2007 and 2009 respectively. This is followed by failure to implement promises by 21% in 2007 and 24% in 2009 (REDET 2007; 2009). Since the most notable promise was better life for every Tanzania, the two reasons seem to be one although REDET put them as different reasons.

The decline and mistrust in government performance reached its climax in 2010 when Tanzanians went to the fourth poll since the advent of multipartism. In that election, CCM's performance in the Union elections dropped drastically. It obtained 61.16% for presidential votes and 186 out of 239 seats in parliament (NEC, 2010). In the run up to the 2010 election, the opposition particularly Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) managed to mobilise voters against the CCM and government mal-performance and corruption. As seen earlier, these elections were the most violent in the Mainland part of the Union. CASS (2011) observed "Widespread poverty, lack of opportunities for youth, and a growing awareness that some in society particularly those in positions of power were economically doing well fuelled frustration on the part of the youth, many of whom took a strong anti-status quo stance". CASS findings resemble that of Korongo (2012) which indicated unemployment to youth as the main factor for their participation in violence. The opposition parties mobilized these youth to protect their campaign rallies not trusting the police. They did that in the name of protecting their votes from being rigged. The state employed massive force to disperse the awaiting voters hence the clashes between the police and the supporters of the opposition groups (TEMCO, 2011; CASS, 2011; Sulley, 2012). The United Republic of Tanzania Poverty Eradication Strategy, 1998 estimated more than 50% of population in Tanzania lives below poverty line. Human development Report (HDR) 2003 ranked Tanzania 160 out of 175 countries as far as Human Development Index is concerned; and 148 out of 169 countries in 2010 (HDR, 2010). The rankings from these reports prove the fact that peace, security, and development are still a major challenge in Tanzania.

Conclusion

The preoccupation of this article was to explain the causes of electoral violence in Africa by comparing Kenya's and Tanzania's experiences. It was evident that African elections have been characterised by violence of one form or the other. Nonetheless, the magnitude and intensity have differed from country to country and from election to election. This is also true to Kenya and Tanzania. It was noted that Kenya's elections have been more violent than those in Tanzania mainly due to the ethnic configuration of its politics. Tanzania on its part showed differences between the Union elections and those in Zanzibar. While the latter have been historically more violent, the former have not with the exception of the 2010 elections. Three major factors have been advanced as causes of electoral violence in the two countries. These are structural factors defined by inequalities in the struggle

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for and distribution of power and resources. These inequalities are seen in the rules governing elections and in the gap between the rich and the poor. It was noted that poverty can make otherwise less violent individuals to be violent. The third explanation was identity politics. It became evident that both countries are affected by politics of identity in elections.

While Kenya's negative ethnicity is more overt and strong in its politics, Tanzania is challenged by the emerging religious polarisation. Although this is said to have not been openly and substantially used as mobilisation strategy, its instrumentality in political violence cannot be understated. The challenge of democratisation in Africa and in Kenya and Tanzania in particular is therefore to establish the democratic principles of fairness. Kenya has made a commendable stride in constitutional reforms although it is too early to comment on its success in building the culture of democracy that will reduce the negative use of ethnicity in its politics. The 2013 elections have proven paradoxically that ethnicity is more intense in Kenyan politics. Tanzania is in the process of making a new constitution but the process receives severe critics from opposition parties, academics and the civil society as being controlled by the ruling party, CCM and its government.

Notes

1. This party was formed on 5 February 1977 after the merger of ASP and TANU.
2. Tanzania is a United Republic after the merger of the two independent states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Island on 26 April, 1964.
3. See Political and Electoral Violence in East Africa, Working Papers on Conflict Management No. 2 (2001: 7).
4. Provincial Administration. This system was abolished in 1965 by the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 1965 in favour of a more centralised system of administration.
5. See the parliamentary select committee on the Rift Valley Clashes 1992/97 and the Tribal Clashes Judicial Commission to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya 2002.

6. See the Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty System in Tanzania: Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Democratic System in Tanzania, (Volume I, 1991), Dar es Salaam University Press.

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