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Sino-Africa Relations: The Dynamics of Seized and Squandered Opportunities[1]

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Abstract

China's fast growing economy and its global political influence seem to provide an impetus for unprecedented development opportunities for Africa. The opportunities on the horizon would range from new and the expanding markets for African goods and services with trade preferences, investment opportunities with the potential for skills and technology transfers as well as development cooperation resources without conditionalities. This article juxtaposes the potential opportunities engendered by the current Sino-Africa cooperation against the challenges that African countries are facing in dealing with the rising superpower. It is argued that Chinese engagement in Africa is essentially driven by its national interests and that the skewed benefits in favour of the Asian power is largely a result of unequal distribution of wealth, power and influence between it and African countries. Caution is expressed to the effect that if clumsily managed, the much trumpeted "Chinese Dream" could easily degenerate into "African Nightmare."

Introduction

In the last two decades, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as the second largest economy in the world, overtaking Japan. With an accumulation of large reserves of foreign exchange, an abundant skilled workforce and shrewd diplomacy, China has pursued a global economic strategy via various strategies to invest and trade globally. It has, furthermore, aggressively participated in the extraction of key resources from global sources, moved goods and services around the world, built a complex transport infrastructure and undertaken showcase development projects in most African countries. As a result, China has signed a string of multi-billion dollar deals with various African governments for bilateral aid, trade,

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tourism, peacekeeping operations, debt relief, and investment by emphasizing principles of political equality, mutual trust, and economic win-win cooperation for both parties. These developments have further consolidated China's global power status reflected in its being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a nuclear power nation.

China's fast growing economy and its global influence, together with the influence other emerging market economies of India, Brazil and Russia, seem to provide an impetus for unprecedented and unique potential development opportunities for Africa. The opportunities on the horizon would range from new and the expanding markets for African goods and services with trade preferences, investment opportunities with the potential for skills and technology transfers as well as development cooperation resources without major conditionalities. Above all, the unfolding windows of opportunity are likely to reduce Africa's economic and intellectual dependence on the West and, possibly, change forever Africa's marginal place in the global political and economic arena. The possibility of Africa making the turn around and beginning to assert itself economically would seem to be already on the horizon. According to the 2012 United Nations Commission of Africa Report, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Africa witnessed a substantial improvement in its economic performance: its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average of 5-6 percent in 2002-2008, making it the second fastest-growing continent in the world, behind Asia. Above all, of the world's 15 fastest-growing economies in 2010, 10 were African.[2]

The arguments and analysis of this article juxtapose the potential opportunities engendered by the current Sino-Africa cooperation against the challenges that African countries are facing in dealing with the rising superpower. The article is divided into five sections, with this introduction being its first section. In section two, it discusses the organizing argument that informs the whole article. It is argued that Chinese engagement in Africa is driven by its national interests and that the skewed benefits in favour of the Asian power is largely the result of the unequal distribution of power between it and African countries. In order to seize the potential opportunities, Africa will be required to address the unequal distribution of power by articulating its long-term strategic objectives, interests and plans and use these as the core basis for negotiations with China. Furthermore, caution is expressed to the effect that if clumsily harnessed and managed, the much trumpeted 'Chinese Dream' could easily degenerate into an 'African Nightmare'. In section three, the paper discusses existing Sino-Africa's cooperation mechanisms by highlighting the limitations of current institutions, systems and processes of the Forum for Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAS). The fourth section presents what is perceived as seized unique windows of opportunity as well as what is viewed as squandered opportunities, highlighting why the FOCAC process has remained heavily tilted against Africa's long-term development interests. The fifth and final section is a conclusion with recommendations.

Sino-Africa Cooperation: The Context

The end of the Cold War, the collapse and dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the rapid development of a global market economy and relative decline of the US have combined to usher in the current era. The new era is broadly defined by an altered global balance of power, which has shifted away from the bipolarity of the US-Soviet mode to a multi-polarity mode constituted by linked power centres around the US, European Union, Japan and South Asia. Secondly and equally importantly, the post-World War II global governance structures and alliances are gradually being challenged by the emergence of new economic and political actors from the global South, namely, China, India and Brazil. The trio, together with a new Russia and, recently, South Africa (BRICS), has emerged as the biggest and the fastest growing economic and political power centres. They have become significant alternative sources of foreign direct investment, markets and suppliers of official development assistance for fellow developing countries.[3] Not surprisingly, the BRICS are presently calling for the establishment of a new global order which would be equitable, democratic and multi-polar and are scaling-up elaborate institutions, systems and processes to promote South-South cooperation! (Kaplinsky and Farroki, 2009). More specifically, China's rise to a superpower status has become an inspiration to other developing countries and their development thinkers (Tylor, 2012).

China's foreign policy rhetoric notwithstanding, its unstated self-interests in Africa are quite apparent: natural resources, market access, investment opportunities and political allies. Its interest in Africa is largely influenced by its political economy dynamics and the realities of globalization. It is against this backdrop that the Chinese state has increasingly adopted a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy befitting its rapid socioeconomic development and rising power status as the world second largest economy. As it will become increasingly clear, its national interests in Africa have been methodically pursued through its dedicated FOCAC Secretariat and other branches of government in Beijing (Brown and Chun, 2010). As Joshua

Kurlantzick, a respected sinologist has succinctly concluded…"in a short time, China appears to have created a systematic, coherent soft power strategy and a set of power tools to implement that strategy" (Kurlantzick, 2007). In the same vein, the Economist wrote that China's state-owned corporations have gone "on a shopping spree in the global market and that everybody stays open for their business."[4] At least for now, the paper claims, China's charm offensive seems irresistible and its soft power diplomacy has assumed a gigantic effect on a global scale!

China's more recent engagement with Africa has evolved over the years.[5] It can be traced to the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia. At this conference, newly independent Asian and African countries came together and resolved to promote close cooperation among them and reduce dependence on the West. The participating countries further committed themselves to promoting economic and cultural cooperation and bringing an end to remnants of colonialism. The conference, arguably, marked the beginning of what has become popularly known as South-South Cooperation. Relatedly, the first era of China-Africa relations was inaugurated by the establishment of the Sino-Egypt diplomatic relations in 1956. Until the mid-1990s, not only did PRC support liberation movements materially and diplomatically, it also bankrolled well over 800 projects throughout Africa in farming, fisheries, textiles, energy, transportation, hydropower, machinery, construction, health and food processing. It is also during this initial period of cooperation that China built the famous 1,860 kilometre-long Tanzania-Zambia Railway which helped to free Zambia from its dependence on trade routes to the sea that were dominated by then white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa.[6] In return, African countries unwaveringly stood by China as the Beijing government attempted to seek international recognition and enter the United Nations.

Until the beginning of its "Global Opening" diplomacy after the Cold War, China's foreign policy was heavily influenced by the then Cold War politics and ideological contestations with the former Soviet Union. However, after the infamous Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, China began to look for ideological allies in Africa and tried to export its own version of socialism, depicting itself as a leader of the Non-aligned Movement. It profiled itself on the forefront of the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the Third World. China further accused the pro-Soviet Communist Parties in various African countries of "revisionism", regarding them as ideological rivals.[7] Above all, following its adoption of economic reform in 1978, there was more focus on domestic issues and relatively less emphasis on Africa.

Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been a renewed effort to strengthen Sino-Africa cooperation. Beijing's foreign policy would seem to have rhetorically abandoned its anti-colonial and anti-US capitalist hegemony ideological strategy of the Mao Zedong era and embraced broader economic and geo-strategic interests and objectives. Its bilateral relations have hence grown steadily in every respect.[8] By 2013, more than 2000 Chinese companies had established businesses in different African countries. This, it would reasonably seem, is a novel strategic partnership.[9] China's steady rise as the world-wide economic powerhouse and its growing international respectability has predictably eroded the influence of the industrial nations of the West among African nations, triggering particularly strong negative reactions from the United States, Europe and Japan.[10] What has been dubbed as the "Beijing Consensus" based on the respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefits is widely appealing to Africa's current leadership as an alternative to Washington's version of spreading democracy and free markets through what some may view as harsh and unfair political and economic interferences. To make matters worse, both China's and Africa's current political leaderships rhetorically claim that their relationships signify the dawn of a new international political economic order based on mutual respect, equality, non-interference and mutual benefit. China's relations with Africa could, arguably, help diversify Africa's export base, strengthen its domestic production capacity and irreversibly reshape Africa's asymmetrical relations with the rest of the world. The importance of China to Africa's potential development is hard to overstate. It has often been willing to make strategic investments in the much neglected infrastructure sector of many African countries, from the construction of dams to major transport and telecommunication projects. By 2013, for example, China had established diplomatic relations with fifty countries in Africa.[11]

According Harvard University political scientist Joseph Nye, in its search for global power status, China has developed and accumulated various instruments of both hard and soft power in order to conduct its global foreign policy. Its defence spending was estimated at $132 billion in 2013, the second highest defence budget behind the US which spent $600.4 billion the same year. Similarly, Chinese military capabilities are said to have expanded steadily by growing the size and reach of its naval fleet, advancing its air force and testing a host of new missiles. Such military build-ups have become one of the sources of concern for paranoid Western experts even though the US military budgets are several times larger![12]

The soft power resources include such tools as around the clock Chinese media and broadcasting, global education exchanges and Chinese language training as well as establishment of Confucius cultural learning centres, high-level diplomatic and business visits, and finally the deployment of its pro-South-South solidarity rhetoric. The arsenal of this rhetoric ranges from vaguely defined and understood slogans such "peaceful rise" "virtues of Chinese civilization" "peaceful ascendance" "scientific development" "Chinese Dream", "African Dream" "win-win diplomacy" to "harmonious world". Nye further claims that China has skilfully deployed its soft power to cajole client states into accepting Chinese contracts by using unconditional aid, low interest loans and technical cooperation agreements to cement business deals on oil supplies, engineering contracts and trade agreements.[13] To dampen criticisms from the West, PRC bolstered its pledge for the UN Peace keeping missions. Between 1990 and 2008, it had deployed more than 10,000 troops –more than any other permanent five members of the Security Council. Above all, and more recently, the Sino-Africa cooperation policy instruments have expanded its scope to include people-to-people exchanges, the environment and exchanges between think-tanks.[14]

Regarding China's national interests, Le Pere neatly groups Beijing's foreign policy strategic interests into five categories. First, China seeks to nurture and expand its geopolitical influence on the basis of several instrumental imperatives that underpins its future economic growth and advances its national interests. Second, it seeks to sustain access to the African continent's rich natural resources. Driven by tremendous domestic growth demands and backed up by its huge foreign exchange reserves, China hunts for oil gas, timber, platinum, copper and other energy and natural resources globally. Third, it seeks to make inroads into an African market of over one billion people, which, furthermore, is expanding rapidly for its export-driven economy. Fourth, the China seeks to enhance its own political legitimacy and standing in Africa on the basis of its slogan of "One China Policy," whose purpose is to diplomatically isolate and marginalize Taiwan. Fifth, it seeks to craft a new axis for South-South cooperation with Africa as one of the key pillars of a new global order operating under Chinese championship (Le Pere, 2007). Samantha Blum has added yet another unstated foreign policy goal of Beijing constituted by a desire to overhaul the current unfair and undemocratic global order and opposing the perceived US global hegemony.

Through political and economic cooperation with Africa, China seeks to secure support for its own larger political objectives in the international arena. To be sure, by virtue of the sheer size of numbers, African countries exert a significant influence on voting in the United Nations for a (Blum, 2003). As it will become increasingly apparent, China's stated and unstated national interests and Africa's interests need not always converge. In the following section, the paper discusses how China leverages its enormous power to promote its national interests.

Institutions, Systems and Processes

China has stepped up its effort to make the go-out policy successful. The China-Africa Policy was released in 2006.[15] It embodies a comprehensive and long-term plan for enhanced cooperation in the Sino-Africa relations. The policy is guided by five principles of coexistence, namely: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in domestic affairs of others; equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful coexistence. These principles seek to publicly portray China and its people as a trade partner, an investor, a technology supplier, provider of credits and development assistance and a political friend based on the principle of non-interference. At the same time, the rhetoric of mutual respect and cooperation of equals has struck a chord with the current African leadership as has the lack of conditionality, which is in stark contrast to the aid and investment regimes of traditional Western institutions. In her work, *The Dragon Gift,* Brautigam (2009) explains that the Chinese offer Africa economic relations that trade natural resources for capital improvement, roads, bridges, telecommunications, ports and various other infrastructural improvements. This is exactly the same model of development China used in the 1970s and 1980s when it traded coal and oil with Japan for advanced technology and capital resources. Viewed retrospectively, as Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi have insightfully cautioned, while China knew what it wanted, Africa has yet to develop a common framework on how to negotiate with China from a stronger and better informed platform.[16] This is one of the underlying structural weaknesses of the Sino-Africa cooperation.

Following the exponential growth in the China-Africa linkages, the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation was established in 2000 by the PRC in collaboration with African governments for collective consultations, implementation and feedback processes. The FOCAC is an inter-governmental platform for comprehensive cooperation on political, economic, diplomatic and social cooperation. Ministerial Conferences take place every three years, alternatively, in China and then Africa, and they seek to address issues of common interest. Equality and mutual benefit are the hallmarks of the envisaged Sino-Africa cooperation. The first conference was launched in October 10-12, 2000, in Beijing. Subsequent conferences were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2003; Beijing in 2006; Sharm El- Sheikh, in Egypt 2009 and in Beijing in 2012. At each conference encounter, new cooperation programs and plans for the next three years are announced. Following the first FOCAC meeting, parties to the cooperation broadly agreed on three-year action plans whose main goals were: boosting Sino-Africa aid, trade and investment; cancelling African debts owed to China by thirty-one countries to the tune of $1.2 billion; increasing development aid to Africa; and encouraging Chinese companies to invest in Africa.

The second FOCAC conference focused on political cooperation and social economic development. China agreed to apply tax exemptions to some products exported by African countries to China. The aftermath of the second FOCAC witnessed a phenomenal expansion of Sino-Africa trade and investment. At the third FOCAS conference, China unveiled an ambitious politico-diplomatic program including the provision of $5 billion in loans and credits, doubling of development assistance by 2009; establishment of a $5 billion China-Africa Development Fund to promote Chinese investment in Africa; setting the goal of increasing the two-way trade to over $100 billion by 2010; and setting an infrastructural development pledge of $20 billion in three years. Moreover China agreed to build hospitals in rural Africa, cancel debts to thirty-one countries; double aid to reach $1 billion by 2009; establish China-Africa Development Fund; provide $3 billion preferential loans and $2 billion preferential buyer credits.[17] The following section discusses the opportunities that were simply squandered and those that were profitably seized and possible explanations for both outcomes.

The fourth and fifth conferences witnessed more and more of similar pledges by the PRC. Moreover, at both conferences, the PRC brought on board innovative policy instruments for the widening and deepening the FOCAC including mechanisms facilitating the incorporation of new issues such as a FOCAC Think Tanks Forum, a China-Africa People's Forum and finally a China-Africa Young Leaders Forum.[18] Not surprisingly, in a race for Africa's natural resources, various other emerging economies have institutionalized their respective cooperation platforms with African on essentially Chinese lines. They include South Korea-African Summit, South America-African Summit, India-Africa Summit and the Turkey-Africa Summit.[19] The following section discusses the opportunities that were profitably seized and those that were simply squandered and the possible reasons for both outcomes.

Seized Opportunities

According to official Chinese statistics,[20] China-Africa bilateral trade volume was only $12.14 million in 1950. It rose to $100 million in 1960 and exceeded $1 billion in 1980. After reaching a $10 billion mark in 2000, China-Africa trade has maintained a steady momentum of rapid growth ever since. In 2008, according to the above sources, China-Africa bilateral trade has in volume been estimated to exceed $100 billion, of which $50.8 billion was China's exports to Africa and $56 billion were imports by China from Africa. The average growth rate of Africa-China trade in monetary value rose between 2000 and 2008 to reach 33.5 percent. Although China-Africa trade volume dropped to $91.07 billion in 2009 as a result of the international financial crisis, China became Africa's biggest trade partner that year for the first time. As the global economy recovered, China-Africa trade also maintained a favourable recovery and development momentum. By the end of 2011, China-Africa trade volume reached a $160 billion mark.[21] Secondly, since 2000 China export products to Africa have diversified from low-cost textiles and garments imports to machinery, automobiles and electronic items. Similarly, in addition to oil, gas, and minerals, Africa's major export products to China have increased to include steel, processed copper and chemical fertilizers. Thirdly, and again from the same authoritative source, China has signed bilateral trade agreements with 45 African countries, and enhanced cooperation in customs, taxation, inspection and quarantine so as to create favourable conditions for Africa-China trade development. Additionally, China has offered the Least Developed Countries of Africa zero-tariff treatment on most of their exports to China since 2005. By July 2011, African products enjoying zero-tariff treatment increased to 4,700 taxable items, representing 97 percent of the tariff exports from the Least Developed countries with diplomatic ties with China.[22]

As it is in the trade regime, so it is in investment sector.[23] By the end of 2003, China's FDI in Africa had reached $490 million, rocketing to $10 billion by the end of 2011. More than 2,000 Chinese enterprises were operating in different African countries, also ranging in ownership structure from state-owned large and medium-sized enterprises, large scale stock exchange-listed private-owned enterprises to small and medium-sized private enterprises. Chinese FDI is distributed to 49 African countries, and most of it targets countries that are natural resources-rich economies such as Angola, Zambia, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt. Moreover, China's FDI covers a wide range sectors, including mining, finance, construction, tourism, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries.[24]

Unlike traditional EU-Africa investment relations, some African FDI has been facilitated by the Chinese government to invest in the China market. By the end of 2009, African countries' accumulated FDI in China is estimated at $9.9 billion, covering petrochemical engineering, machinery and electronics, transportation and telecommunication, light industries, household appliances, garments and textiles, entertainment and catering as well as real estate. Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles, Nigeria and Tunisia are the major African countries that have so far invested in China. Well over a dozen companies with roots in South Africa had invested in China by 2010. SABMiller, South African drinks giant, operates nearly 70 breweries in China. The Sasol Company of South Africa, the world's largest producer of oil from coal has been involved in several coal-to-liquid joint ventures in China. Similarly, a chemical fertilizer joint venture established by Tunisian and Chinese enterprises is one of the leading chemical compounds producers in China.[25] These few examples are but some of the unique windows of opportunity that would seem to have been seized and profitably utilized by African firms with a global reach.[26]

Although the gains from and impact on African FDI to China and the Chinese FDI to Africa and the mutually beneficial increase in China-Africa trade relations as a whole deserves to be guardedly celebrated, not all countries and communities in Africa have benefited from each and every economic encounter with China. Some researchers have noted discomforting patches in the Africa-China relations.[27] Such tensions range from opaque business deals, state support of undemocratic African regimes, alleged Chinese firms' wanton disregard for environmentally sustainable forms of resource extraction, failure to transfer relevant skills and technology, grotesque labour practices to pervasive dumping of cheap manufactures and displacements of local businesses. Much of the blame is chiefly attributed to the parasitic and unaccountable African elites. In the words of Fantu Cheru, "Chinese companies have been able to thrive in African countries where the legal and regulatory frameworks are either very weak or simply poorly enforced".[28] In the following section, squandered windows of opportunity are discussed.

Squandered Opportunities: Ambivalent Cooperation Strategies

One of Kenya's dailies, *The Nation*, succinctly hit the nail on the head when it editorialized right before the third FOCAC Conference that "China has an African Policy. Africa doesn't have a China Policy, only a Beijing-controlled forum in which Mandarins figure out which country to take a sweet shot at. A China talk of mutual trust…the danger is that China will politely rip off Africa just as the West did."[29] Similarly, Adam Gaye's work had earlier offered a similar perceptive counsel in the title of his book: *China-Africa: Dragon and the Ostrich* (Gaye, 2006). At almost the same time, the London-based *Economist Magazine* joined the chorus of free advice by counselling that: "African leaders could also play their hand rather better. They should talk to each other as well as their hosts in Beijing. If they negotiate as a bloc, they could drive a harder bargain. Just as China insists that foreigners enter joint ventures with its companies, so Africans could equally insist that they get China's knowhow, not just its money".[30] Whereas Beijing has a structured long-term strategy of engaging Africa in every domain of the partnership, with FOCAC, Ministry of Commerce, Chinese Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank as institutional mechanisms for executing its strategy, Africa is yet to develop a unified, coherent and countervailing multilateral response strategy and an institutional framework for harnessing and managing the partnership for its own development interests.[31] This strategy vacuum is, arguably, a glaring asymmetry of interdependence. As already pointed out, the PRC's geostrategic national interests and goals in the Sino-Africa relations are clearly defined and articulated in Beijing's African Policy Paper.[32]

In the absence of a structured continental or even sub-regional African strategy and institutional mechanisms to undertake negotiations, coordination and follow-up activities with FOCAC, Beijing possesses, by default, a *carte blanche* to drive and manage the entire partnership process: from setting the FOCAC agenda, defining who does what in the FOCAC process to ultimately deciding on who gets what, when and why according to Chinese national interests and its merit criteria. One of the comprehensive studies on Sino-African cooperation undertaken by the Centre for African Studies at Peking University summed up Africa's near total inaction in the FOCAC's process as: "….At present, the Chinese government dominates the Forum with limited initiatives of the African countries which is due to the great number of African countries, regional differences among them and difficulties in intra-African coordination."[33]

Again by default, Beijing conducts its international cooperation business largely on a bilateral basis. Each African country prepares its own shopping aid and investment list to be presented at the FOCAS Conferences (Brautigam, 2011). Ultimately, one could safely argue that it is Beijing that almost unilaterally decides which investment projects or programs are supported and with what resources. Tragically enough, virtually all bilateral projects dotted over the African continent are said to possess no links between them or between them and regional or continental development priorities.[34] Many students of Sino-African relations have expressed concerns that the 50-plus African countries seem to be both unable and unwilling to define and articulate any continental or even sub-regional strategic goals and policies for engaging China within the FOCAC.[35] These squandered opportunities are witnessed in spite of the African Union Summit Decision of 2007 which mandated the African Union Commission to coordinate Africa's preparations, conduct and follow-up of the implementation of the decisions made at all FOCAC Summits. This is one of the central power asymmetries in the Africa-China partnership, reflecting African countries' inability to formulate a coherent system of ideas which sets the agenda for FOCAC negotiations. In the absence of a continental strategy and program, or at least, those collectively formulated by various African regional economic communities, the Sino-Africa cooperation has invariably tended to assume the quintessential donor-recipient relationship model of engagement, leaving each and every African country to negotiate with China on a country-by-country basis.[36] Under such inauspicious circumstances, the PRC has had a preeminent position vis-à-vis African countries' delegations. The latter tend to be merely passive and reactive to pressures from well-prepared Chinese state bureaucrats, individual Chinese entrepreneurs, state banks and state-owned corporations as well as provincial agencies, province-owned companies and even individual entrepreneurs. Arguably, no single African country possesses adequate political, economic or technical power to engage China on anything near equal terms!

Fully embedded in asymmetrical relations, the mutual cooperation and win-win principles enshrined in official Sino-Africa relations policy documents have seldom been fully practiced. This is not only because of the asymmetry between the two sides as to resources, power and capabilities, but also precisely because of the dominant donor-recipient pattern of behaviour, according to which China considers its contributions to the relationship as a form of one-way benevolence instead of a two-way mutually beneficial cooperation. The asymmetrical Chinese one-way mindset is quietly felt by

African policy makers and civil society associations. They feel they are not in the driver's seat in determining which recipient country's wish list projects would be simply dropped or selected to be to be funded by the ever gregarious donor! Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi's study concluded with a very stern but well calculated warning that the Sino-African cooperation can become an opportunity of positive force only when African states are prepared to negotiate from a stronger and more informed platform. Given the relatively smaller sizes of most African national economies, a sub-regional problem-solving approach is suggested as an economic imperative for improving gains and minimizing transaction costs. Sub-regional strategies may include common sub-regional frameworks on industrialization and trade; natural resource exploitation; and, finally, a common sub-regional regulation regime on FDI. As for the latter strategy, each sub-region would be required to put in place policy instruments demanding the use of local inputs in every Chinese venture; encouraging the creation of dynamic forward and backward linkages to existing and newly stimulated local companies; and promoting effective technology and skills transfers as well as common regulations regarding environmental and social standards. Arguably, in the absence of such deliberate and proactive sub-regional strategic stances, clumsily structured and implemented engagements with China could turn out to be neo-colonialism by invitation (Cheru and Obi, 2010).

Space to Rethink Development

As noted earlier, China offers Africa a new approach to development that is similar to its own economic model of growth. It has achieved remarkable success in lifting hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty and transformed the structure of its economy. Africa, by most accounts, continues to struggle for mere survival. The second important window of opportunity squandered in the Sino-Africa partnership is the failure of African governments to exploit the policy space engendered by the on-going crisis in the capitalist system and to rethink alternatives to the much discredited neo-liberalism. The new space would have provided the opportunity for research, reflection and policy-making in Africa based on a long term vision of structural transformation and sustainable development rooted in a comprehensive understanding of Africa's history, political economy, institutions, challenges and social needs with respect to of economic development, equity, and environmental sustainability.[37] Indeed, long gone are the days when the *End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama was a must-be read text on international development studies (Fukuyama, 1992). In short, the Chinese experience would seem to reject the position taken by Fukuyama – who would seem to argue that capitalism and liberal democracy were the only viable systemic choices after the collapse of communism. By the 1990s, neoliberal globalization was universally proclaimed as the "only way". Proponents claimed that the paradigm engendered all parameters of development policy. The paradigm and resulting policy praxes were paraded as panaceas for a broad range of social ills, from internal and international violence to poverty, famine, corruption and even environmental destruction. Not surprisingly, for poor and dependent developing countries, neo-liberalism was taken as a given, no longer a subject for debate, rethinking or resolution. We quote Larry Diamond on the subject *in extenso*:

> The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with each other. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgence. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run, they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes much more difficult to secretly breach agreements. Precisely because they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law within their borders, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built (Diamond, 1995 :6).

However, the recent global financial crises have completely and irreversibly changed all this. The crises have swept into oblivion all fantasies of free-market infallibility. The first one, 1997-98, was directly associated with one extreme form of globalization, namely, capital account liberalization. It was politically decisive in discrediting the entire ideological edifice of capitalism. The episode served to embolden the intellectual and political critics of the hegemonic orthodoxy as the world continued to witness a gradual but discernible shift in global wealth, power and influence. The second financial crisis, 2008-09, began in the US with the housing market and particularly the subprime mortgage market, and this brought about the most serious recession in the US since the Depression, and dragged the rest of the global economy down with it. This second crisis further called into question the free-market model of development. Washington rescued financial and industrial institutions rather than imposing the harsh medicine it advocated and forced on others. Instead, it lowered interest rates and bailed out those responsible for the crisis (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011). Once again, it became patently obvious to every development specialist that, indeed, all policy choices are political choices. They are essentially not objective, technically neutral or even strictly economic in criteria. As Martin Wolf writes, "…Not for long time will people listen to US officials lecture on the virtues of free financial markets with the straight face" (Wolf, 2008).

The unauthordox BRIC-type economies emerged from the global financial crisis as new global growth poles barely scratched. They have large pools of physical and human resources and rapidly increasing their share in the global GDP growth with a potential to replace the declining US as an engine of growth. It is estimated that they contributed about 30 percent of the global GDP between 2000 and 2008. Their contribution to global growth has increased even further since 2007 to roughly 45 percent. It is now widely believed that one of them, PRC will surpass US as the largest economy of the world by 2020; BRIC would become as big as the G7 by 2032 and that India will become the second largest economy after China by the halfway mark of this century (World Bank, 2012). Similarly, Chinese strategists predict that, all other things being equal, China will surpass the US by 2020 as the world's largest economy and evolve into a mature and responsible superpower, help create a world order marked by mutual interests and collective challenges.[38]

Those two global recessions would have provided Africa a unique policy space to rethink development strategies and to reflect on how to achieve sustained and inclusive growth, to reduce poverty and to increase reliance in a globalized economy. Indeed, there is greater autonomy in policy making and greater space for own diagnosis and prescription than before. Similarly, alternative models of development are growing in importance – models that promise high growth rates without periodic collapse or implosion, which seems to be an unfortunate hallmark of the free market model. The capitalist crisis has opened up invaluable autonomous spaces and opportunity for development policy alternatives for the global South to restructure their economies away from the prying restraints of hegemonic powers. Already

Joshua Ramo in 2004 penned the extended essay calling for the "Beijing Consensus"[39] or what political scientist-cum journalist Fareed Zakaria dubbed in his *Post-America World,* the "rise of the rest" (Zakaria, 2008). Sadly, most states in Africa have failed to borrow a leaf from the on-going successful Chinese development experience.

China has already shown the way. It has amply demystified the phenomenon of development, showing it to be a profoundly political process involving new ways in which all manner of resources are mobilized, directed and deployed in new ways to promote welfare and growth. Like the development experiences of almost all late industrializes of Europe, the United States and recently of Asia, the role of the state in development has been and continues to be central to China's development endeavours. After WW II, economist Alexander Greschenkron popularized the need for a state with developmental functions in the context of the late developers, a belief that became an article of faith among economic planners and development economists (Greschenkron, 1962). The Chinese development-oriented state has steered, pushed, cajoled, persuaded, enticed, coordinated and at times instructed the wide range of economic and political agents to act in particular ways. In sum, the role of the state in development throughout history has been about managing the markets. In this sense, China's pragmatic approach in engaging capitalist rules of the game and her insistence on the pre-eminence role of the state in promoting development offers huge lessons for Africa. As Giovanni Arrighi concluded, rather than swallowing the doctrinaire neo-liberalism, Chinese policies seem to adopt a pragmatic approach to problems of governance, namely: a model that is ecologically aware, labour-friendly, and egalitarian, a model of accumulation without dispossession (Arrighi, 2007).

Following the classic works on late industrializing countries of Germany and the United States, Greschenkron, and more recently, Ha-Joon Chang (2002) insist that the economics of catching-up was anything but linear. The late-industrializes, he argued, needed to study the paths traversed by others in order to determine how to manage their respective structural transformation and sustainable development. More than anything else, he called for the construction and development of a 'developmental state' and a selective utilization of the world economy. He further proposed policy intervention strategies to include increasing labour productivity through rising capital accumulation, accelerating technological acquisition, accumulation and innovations, by introducing new economic activities, increasing economic linkages, development of markets and division of labour as well as increasing the formalization of informal economic activities.[40] In purely economic terms, China's developmental state model envisaged a strong role of the state in the economy and society anchored on five major elements: high household savings; high corporate debt-to-equity ratios; collaboration between banks, firms and the state; a national industrial strategy and investment incentives to enhance international competitiveness. Western hypocrisy against state intervention in the economy is out for everyone to see. Surprisingly, since 2008, the US government has spent billions of dollars rescuing banks and major corporations. These interventions were the exact opposites of what the IMF and World Bank had been preaching to others *ad nausium* for decades.

Africa seems to have performed dismally on this critical developmental front. The construction of democratic developmental states requires Africa to confront and address several sets of challenges and opportunities. At a domestic level, there is need to revitalize the nationalist project of reconstructing the state, rebuilding citizenship, renewing the social contract, reconstructing society and rejuvenating integrated and inclusive economies. At a regional level, the challenge is to promote more broad-based integrated projects that encompass dense political, economic and cultural exchanges and networks and incorporate both elite and ordinary people in addition to productively including Africa's historic Diaspora.

Resources for Technology Swaps

At the fourth Ministerial Meeting of the FOCAC 2009, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that the Ministry of Science and Technology of China was to launch the China-Africa Science and Technology partnership Program. In the new partnership, China was to establish a new type of practical, efficient and robust science and technology partnership with African countries aimed at sharing experiences, tapping cooperation potential, taking full advantage of science and technology's pivotal role in providing socio-economic development. As a developing country, China's rich experience in successfully implementing science and technology policies, rapidly enhancing its science and technology capacity and bringing science and technology into the service of people's livelihood and national development should have served as an important reference to African countries. This announcement opened yet another development opportunity for Africa to leverage its abundant natural resources and markets for technology transfer swaps. The potential mechanism for technology transfer would include government-to-government technology transfers, privatelymanaged transfers through FDI, joint ventures, direct technology purchase or co-production agreements that facilitate borrowing, learning and imitation, as well as technology management skills formation at firm levels.[41] The verdict on the natural resource exploitation for technology transfer deals in Africa is not yet out.

Viewed retrospectively, however, South-South technology cooperation has many merits in its own right. In rural development and intermediate technology issue areas, for example, Sino-Africa cooperation has obviously a lot to offer to African countries. China has structurally transformed itself from an agrarian to an industrial economy that produces manufactured goods and services. Given available evidence, this potential window of opportunity seems to be equally being largely missed, considering the existing power asymmetries that define the FOCAC negotiations and low levels of institutional and technological capabilities in most African countries. As one United Nations study documents, Africa's per capita agricultural output and productivity are still low compared to the global average, with dire consequences for food security and social stability.[42] The African Development Bank estimates that Africa's per capita agricultural output is only 56 percent of the global average.[43] If prudently negotiated, appropriate technologies prioritized and domestic capacities adequately improved, Sino-Africa agricultural cooperation arrangements would go a long way toward transferring appropriate technologies for sustainable agricultural transformation in Africa. To be sure, the Chinese agricultural transformation experiences receive very good grades from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the Chinese are portrayed as ready and willing to partner with African countries to genuinely support development. China's stellar achievements in food self-sufficiency lie, in part, in integrating its agricultural sector with other sectors as part of its state-led, market-driven farm-based agrarian transformation model. FAO further observes that:

> Chinese science and agriculture have much to offer to other developing countries, since the intensive small-scale agriculture has been practiced for centuries… China repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to helping other developing countries to improve their food security in contribution toward the achievement of the World Food Summit targets and the Millennium Development Goals to half the number of hungry people by 2015…and by reaching out quickly to a large number at a relatively low cost with appropriate technology.[44]

Why are African countries squandering this window of opportunity of reproducing the Chinese miracle in the agriculture sector? Although answers to this puzzle may differ from one African country to the other, it is hereby submitted that several attributes that define the Sino-Africa cooperation go a long way towards providing relevant explanations of the puzzle. Africa's weak institutional and bureaucratic capacity to define and pursue own interests combine to strike not only weak bargains but also to accept inappropriate technology transfer packages. At the same time, Chinese FDI have repeatedly failed the quality test – marked by weak linkages to domestic firms but linked to low productivity and low-wage employment creation. Moreover, African countries have repeatedly failed to submit at FOCAC meetings the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program of NEPAD or the 2009 African Mining Vision[45] to serve as continental frameworks for negotiation and cooperation. As already pointed out, most African governments have yet to design sectoral policies or capacitate institutions to facilitate the transfer, adapt and use of Chinese technologies. Michael Bell and K. Pavitt, technology policy experts, do identify several concrete transfer technology difficulties in developing countries. These include, among others, institutional, political, technological, economic, information, financial and cultural barriers. They further advise that the most effective role of governments is to seek to overcome some of these barriers by creating economic, legal, and regulatory mechanisms that promote and strengthen public-private partnerships. The argument in defence of this strategy is straightforwardly obvious: private sector firms generally have a more appropriate understanding of technology markets and commercialization processes. If provided with the right incentives and requisite institutional arrangements, private sector actors have the appropriate capacity to select, transfer, adapt and, even over time, build and accumulate the relevant technological capabilities for embarking on aggressive industrialization of African economies (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Cheru and Obi, 2010).

Surprisingly, Lila Buckley seems to suggest that Africa does not understand China and China does not understand Africa, in terms of language, culture, history, politics, and that both do not seems to even understand each other's interests. It is claimed that what constitutes appropriate technologies for Africa's agriculture remains a quintessential problem. As a result, actors on both sides are left guessing as to what technologies to transfer, where to transfer them and how to build local firm capabilities to use, adapt and later to innovate new products, processes and organize relevant systems in respective countries, firms and farms (Buckley, 2013). Claims of ignorance apart, it is high time FOCAC quickly moved away from its predominantly government-to-government contacts between the PRC and Africa and sought to involve other key stakeholders in the FOCAC process. These should include, but not be limited to parliaments, the private sector and relevant civil society organizations. Whereas the participation of parliaments and civil society organizations would credibly address issues of transparency and ownership as well as labour and environmental concerns of the cooperation, the participation of the private sector would leverage both sides' appropriate understanding of the market place for technology, commercialization processes and co-production arrangements with Chinese firms particularly in Africa's special economic zones (SEZs).[46]

The Chinese government wants to share some aspects of the country's development model by facilitating the establishment of the SEZs in several African countries. For China, SEZs were a successful Herculean task constituting a public-private initiative of leveraging FDI and enhancing its manufacturing sector competitiveness. This strategy played one of the defining roles in its early economic reforms, by helping to transform the economy from a peasant-based agriculture into a high value-adding economy (Davies, 2008). By mid-2012, six SEZs were either under construction or at early stages of operation in Mauritius, Zambia, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Egypt. As a development strategy, SEZs were expected to attract local and foreign investment, add value to exports, transfer technology and skills, create well-paying employment, promote exports, elevate Africa's industrial competitiveness, and, above all, if wages rise in China, and according to the "flying geese" economic principle, labour-intensive industrial activities would arguably relocate to the Africa's special economic zones. At the same time, the SEZ program was perceived as a mechanism for diffusing wide-spread claims about the Chinese engagement being allegedly largely driven by the exploitation of natural resources, markets for its cheap manufactures, and employment opportunities for Chinese construction workers and small-scale traders and vendors. As noted already, the promotion and export of SEZs to Africa was also seen as falling within the Chinese grand strategy of its own industrial restructuring – by gradually but systematically allowing labour-intensive mature industries such as textiles, leather goods and building materials to move off-shore (Brautigam, 2008).

Like other windows of opportunity discussed above, the SEZs, will only have far-reaching development implications if African countries put their acts together individually and collectively. Africa should move away from inter-governmental negotiations and protocols and seek the participation of other actors.[47] In this case, we have argued that African governments, the private sector, civil society organizations and research networks should collectively participate in FOCAC decision-making in order to ensure the identification of what types of firms are selected to participate in SEZ investment ventures in Africa. Equally importantly, African leaders should always be reminded that at the centre of China's recent stellar development lies a strong technological foundation. Nowhere is this more evident than China's emphasis on technical training and the role of engineering sciences in solving economic problems. Future rounds of Chinese investment initiatives in Africa should seek to negotiate better and smarter terms with the Chinese government and investors, including the diversification of economies from supplying unprocessed natural resources, quality control and better linkages with local economies, to improved preferential market access for African manufactured goods and services overseas in World Trade Organization negotiations. In the same vein, China should consider putting in place public policy initiatives to support the capacity of African producers to take advantage of newly created market access.

Conclusion

The article has demonstrated that the Sino-Africa cooperation holds various strategic windows of development opportunity which Africa can ill-afford to squander under the current global power alignments. Along with other BRICS members, China strongly believes that the existing global rules and norms favour the West and that the distribution of decision-making power in global institutions and the costs and benefits of globalization are biased against the developing world. In the same vein, the evolving Sino-Africa cooperation arrangement should endeavour to address the existing power imbalances that are entrenching and perpetuating colonial-style structures of trade, aid and investment between China and its African partners. In order for the latter countries to diversify and dynamize their respective national economies, it is suggested that programs like the SEZs should not only be expanded to all participating African countries but should be designed to address current bottlenecks including weak national and regional institutions, loose SEZs linkages with national and regional economic priorities, poorly developed firm and national technological capabilities, and to engage China in a dialogue to reform the global governance institutions and make use of its bargaining power and influence in the World Trade Organization. The Chinese government would seem to have repeatedly counsel its African partners that the SEZs will serve African economies as business incubators that should help host countries attract FDI, create jobs, and improve local infrastructure and investment climate.

It was further revealed that while China has a well-defined strategy for engaging the continent, Africa has yet to articulate a coherent regional approach to harnessing and managing partnerships in trade, investment and finance for its benefits. It is proposed that relevant partners revisit the rules of engagement guiding the FOCAC process. It is pertinent that adequate deliberations should be undertaken on the principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures that should govern the FOCAC process instead of the process being exclusively focused on the transfer of resources in the Sino-Africa relations. Similarly, the African Union Commission and Africa's Regional Economic Communities should be elevated to positions above those of member states. They should reclaim their rightful role of setting the African agenda as well as influencing the structure and substance of relations with PRC. It should also be remembered that the 2007 AU Summit of African leaders mandated the African Union Commission to coordinate Africa's preparations and to negotiate cooperation initiatives with China as well as undertake follow-ups of the implementation of the decisions made at all FOCAC Summits. Such an enhanced role of the continental organization will obviously allow the NEPAD development priorities to form the basis of any future cooperation initiatives with China, including engaging China in a dialogue to reform global governance institutions and the global trading system.

Finally, it was noted that whereas China is represented by major national economic and political actors and institutions in the FOCAC process, African partners are represented largely by disparate government officials and diplomats. This was considered a gross under-representation on the Africa side and the fundamental basis for the power asymmetry and inertia. It is therefore suggested that the rules of engagement for Africa should radically change, to reflect the participation of key decision-making actors in the entire process as is presently the case with the Chinese side. The inclusion of, and alliance with, national parliaments would buy-in the voice of the popular masses. The participation of relevant civil society organizations would increase ownership, transparency and accountability of government's dealings with oil, minerals and gas firms as well as not giving environmental and labour issues a short shrift in project negotiations, implementation and evaluation. The effective involvement of civil society organizations would ensure that all participating business firms and relevant decision-making institutions are held accountable to its South-South rhetoric and the principle of "mutual benefit." Above all, the participation of the private sector actors would promote public-private partnerships, facilitate the choice of appropriate technologies, and transfer of skills and knowledge as well as encourage Sino-Africa co-production and co-marketing initiatives that encourage diversified economies. It bears remembering that China is neither a philanthropic development partner nor are its interests always similar to those of Africa.

Notes

1. This article was presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting scheduled for November 21-November 24, 2013 in Baltimore, Maryland, USA.

2. According to this report, the economic revival of the continent is mainly attributed to improved economic and political governance, reduction in armed conflicts, increased foreign capital flows and improvements in the business climate as well as rising commodity prices. For more details see, United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA). Economic Report on Africa 2012: Unleashing Africa's Potential as a Pole of Global Growth. UNECA: Addis Ababa, 2012: xiii-xiv.

3. Jim O'Neal, Goldman Sachs economist coined the acronym BRIC from the initials of Brazil, Russia, India and China to describe their role in the emerging global economy. See his later work, The Growth Map: Economic Opportunity in the BRICs and Beyond, London: Penguin Books, 2011; and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnerships. UN Publication Sale No.E.10.11.D.13. UN: New York and Geneva, 2010:1-12.

4. The Economist. "China buys up the world: And the World should stay open for business" November 11, 2010. Found at http://www.economist.com/nodel/17463473. (accessed: February 12, 2013).

5. On China's recent engagement with Africa see Anshan, L. "China and Africa: Policies and Challenges," China Security 3 (3) 2007:69-93; Brautigam, D. China in Africa: What Can Western Donors Learn?: A Report of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries. Oslo, August, 2011; and, Tull, D. "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences," Journal of Modern African Studies 44 (4) 2012:301-312.

6. Brautigam, D. China in Africa: What can the Western Donors Learn? Op. cit.

7. On China and Cold War politics see Thompson, A. An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge, 2004.

8. In its 2010 report, White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, the PRC noted that: An increase in the value of China-Africa trade to US$114.1 billion, from US$10 billion in 200; An increase of Chinese investment to US$9.3 billion in 2009, from US$490 million in 2003; Removal of tariff levying for African exports (with US$1.3 billion between 2005 and 2010); Completion of 500 infrastructural projects by 2009; Provision of US$5 billion preferential loans and export buyer's credit (2007-2009); Cancellation of 312 debts for 35 countries (2000-2009); Training of 30,000 Africans in different disciplines; 18,000 medical workers sent to treat 200 million Africans since 1963; and, Built 56 hospitals (by 2009).

9. Renard, F.M. China's Trade and FDI in Africa. Working Paper, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin.uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/working%2012.pdf. (accessed: August 3, 2014).

10. "In Africa: China Expansion Begins to Stir Resentment" Wall Street Journal. February 2, 2007: p. A1.

11. The four African countries without diplomatic relations with China include Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe, Burkina Faso and the Gambia. However, they attend the FOCAC meetings as observers only.

12. See Ramo, J. "The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power." Unpublished Manuscript, Foreign Policy Centre, May 2004; Roy, D. "China's Reaction to America's Predominance,"

Survival Autumn, 2003; Nye, J. Power in the Global Information Age. New York: Routledge, 2006 and Ybarra, M. "Rising Red Tide", The Washington Time, June 5, 2014.

13. Nye, J. Op. cit.

14. On the structure, systems and functions of FOCAC see Li Anshan, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: From a Sustainable Perspective. Peking University, Centre for African Studies, 2012.

15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. China's Africa Policy. Beijing, January 2006.

16. For a particularly helpful and nuanced discussion on Sino-African relations see essays edited by Cheru, F. and C. Obi. The Rise of India and China in Africa. London: Zed Books, 2010; and Cheru, F. and C. Obi. "Decoding the Evolving China-Africa Relations: Partnership for Development or Neo-Colonialism by Invitation?" http//www.worldannualreview/ (accessed: August 17, 2014).

17. For increasing dollar value of Chinese overtures to Africa see Daniel Bach. "The European Union and China in Africa" in Ampiah, K and S. Naidu (Eds). Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China. Scottsville: Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008: 278-293.

18. There are several African ad-hoc Committees in the FACAC process including the African Diplomatic Corps in China, Senior Officials of African countries Committee, African Foreign Ministers Committee, the African Union, African Ambassadors in China, Follow-Up Committees in African countries and Sub-Regional Economic Communities. It is our considered opinion that either together or individually, their respective interventions would hardly add up to a coherent African strategy to effectively engage China. For more details see Li Anshan et al. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: From a Sustainable Perspective. Op. cit.: 15-18.

19. On the scope and dimensions of South-South Cooperation initiatives see UNCTAD. South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Development Partnerships. Sales No.E.10.11.D.B. UN: Geneva, 2010.

20. Fang Yang. China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. Beijing Information Office of the State/China's Cabinet, Beijing, 2012.

21. ibid. pp: 3-6.

22. ibid. pp: 6-8.

23. ibid. pp:8-12

24. ibid. pp:12-13

25. Broker, R. "Investments between China and South Africa," Financial Business News, July 25, 2008.

26. It is interesting to note that 57 companies listed on the Johannesburg's Securities Exchange in 2004 also had a listing in at least other foreign exchange market. 27 of them were listed on the London Stock Exchange, including such major South African companies as Billiton, Anglo-America, Old Mutual, South African Breweries and Dimension Data. For details see UNCTAD. Case Study on outward Foreign Direct Investment by South African Enterprises. Geneva: UNCTAD. Td/b/com.3/em.26/2/AD.5 November 7, 2005.

27. Holslag, J. "Friendly Giant? China's Evolving African Policy", Asian Paper 2 (5) 2007.

28. Cheru, F. "Decoding the Evolving China-Africa Relations". http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/073Cheru/. For insightful discussion on the inability of African states to regulate predatory investment activities of transnational corporation see Rugumamu, S. "State Regulation of Foreign Investments in Tanzania: An Assessment," Africa Development 13 (4) 1988:5-28; Wang, L. and J. Zheng. "China's Rise and a New Paradigm in the World Economy: Preliminaries", Journal of Chinese Economics and Business Studies 10(4) 2012: 301-312; Tull, D. "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences," Journal of Modern African Studies 44 (3) 2006:459-479.

29. The Nation (Nairobi, Kenya). June 12, 2006.

30. The Economist (London) October 26, 2006.

31. The institutional and management role of African partners is much more limited versus the ACP-EU cooperation strategy that has a full-fledged African Secretariat in Brussels, the ACP-EU Joint Strategy, and joint mechanisms for implementing the EU-Africa strategic partnership.

32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. China's African Policy. January 2006.

33. Centre for African Studies. China-Africa Cooperation and Sustainable Development: The Role and Functions of the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation. Beijing, 2012:30.

34. See UNCTAD. South-South Cooperation.2010:op. cit.: 35.

35. See a collection of chapters in Ampiah and Naidu (Eds) op. cit.

36. See, for example, Sarali, P. and A. Stahl. "Europe Development Policy toward sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges of the Growing China Presence", Emulations # 7 2010; Taylor, I. "From Santa Claus to Serious Business: Where Should FOCAS go next?" East Asia Review July 2012 and Kaplinsky, R. et al. "The Impact of China on sub-Saharan Africa." IDS Working Paper 291: 2007.

37. On the imperative of structural transformation and sustainable development see UNCTAD. Economic Development: Structural Transformation and Sustainable Development in Africa. United Nations: The UNCTAD, 2012.

38. Angang, H. "China in 2020: Building a Well-Off Society," Asia-Pacific Economic Literature 26(1)2012:97-98 and Xiao Geng, Xiuke Yang and Anna Junus. State Owned Enterprises in China: Reform and Impact, Beijing, 2009, www: //global centers.columbia.edu/ (accessed: August 13, 2014).

39. Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former TIME Magazine editor coined the term, claiming that China's economic marvel offers the developing world a blueprint for success. The model is defined by pragmatic

development based on the country's own characteristics, emphasizing a national interest in stability, willingness to innovate, policy experimentation and gradually integrating with the global system while keeping foreign interference at bay.

40. Greschenkron, A. Op. cit.

41. On the different technology transfer vehicles see Enos, J., s. Lall and H. Yun. "Transfer of Technology: An Update", Asian Pacific Economic Literature 11 (1) 1977: 56-66; and Rugumamu, S. "Technical Cooperation as an Instrument of Technology Transfer: Some Evidence from Tanzania," European Journal of Development Research 4 (1) 1992:81- 96.

42. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Industrial Development Report 2009. New York: UNIDO, 2009. and World Bank. Knowledge, Technology and Cluster-based Growth in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010.

43. Africa Development Bank. Africa Economic Outlook. AfDB: Tunis, 2010.

44. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). "South-South Cooperation: FAO Representation China, 2012". Unpublished article, http://coin.fao.org/Cms/world/china/SSC.html. (accessed: August 13, 2013).

45. The African Mining Vision focuses on balancing the requirements of transparency and accountability with the need to integrate mining into Africa's long-term development at the local, national and regional level. Ideally, this means transforming natural resource capital and transient wealth into lasting forms of capital and industrial growth with the ultimate objective of reducing dependence on primary resources exports. On the need for a common negotiation see, Competing World Visions? China's and EU's African Policies, http://www.sideshare.net/GlobusHamburg/chinese-and-the-eus-africanpolicies (accessed: August 2, 2013).

46. On the role of the Special Economic zones in Chinese industrial transformation see Geng, X, X Yang and A. Junus. State-Owned Enterprises in China: Reforms and Impact. Op. cit.

47. In order to reduce knowledge and information asymmetries in the FOCAC processes the UNECA proposes the participation of more actors besides government delegations. See UNECA. Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation. UNECA: Addis Ababa, 2013.

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