

Citizenship without Integration: The Case of 1972 Burundian Refugees in Tanzania

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Abstract

This paper reviews the process of naturalization of 1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania. It draws from the literature on refugees and citizenship which provides a critique to the argument that integration of refugees begins at the time of their arrival and the neoliberal assumption of "flexible citizenship." It shows how after 40 years of living in the country and having to meet the requirements for naturalization the refugees still struggled to negotiate for citizenship and are yet to be integrated. The empirical data to support the argument is drawn from observations made by the author in different years between 2003 and 2012 and review of secondary materials such as policies, plans and strategies for naturalization and integration of the 1972 Burundian Refugees in Tanzania. The paper calls for examination of everyday practices which are geared towards access to citizenship in determining local integration.

Introduction

This paper examines the process of granting naturalization to 162,256 Burundian refugees who came in 1972. It refers to the 1972 Burundian refugees who are in three settlements, Katumba in Rukwa region; Mishamo in Katavi and Ulyankulu in Tabora region. In 2010 these refugees were accepted for naturalization (UNHCR, 2007) and required to relocate and settled in 16 regions and 55 districts in the country. Although the process of relocation was contested by both the refugees and

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the local it was justified by the government and the UNHCR. In 2012 however, the process of relocation was halted and in 2014 the government granted citizenship certificates to the naturalized refugees while in their settlement.

The paper draws from observation of the process of naturalization in the settlements and planned relocation from 2008-2012 and reviews policy and practices applied in the naturalization process. It applies discourse analysis to the 1995 Tanzania Citizenship Act, the 2003 Tanzania Refugee Policy, 2010 National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NASCIP); relocation Joint Action Plan (JAP) and the relocation support initiatives from UN organizations (UNHCR and UNDP). The paper argues that it is in the understanding of the changing role of the state in the neoliberal era and increasing role of non-state actors that we can understand why the Burundian refugees despite living in Tanzania for more than 40 years had to negotiate for citizenship and are yet to be integrated.

The paper is divided into nine parts. These are; the refugee laws and policies which identify their rights; the literature review section; the context; the complicated naturalization process; the contested relocation process; the plans for integration through relocation, the waiting for integration and the conclusion.

Policies and Laws on Refugee Rights

Globally refugee rights are described in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. In Africa, the 1967 AU (then OAU) Convention governing Specific Aspects of Refugees is used. Tanzania is also a signatory the two instruments. In Tanzania, the 1998 Refugees Act and the 2003 Refugee Policy guide the refugee rights. Despite the fact that Tanzania has been hosting refugees since 1950s there was no any written down policy; issues of refugees were integrated under the development policy. The practices of refugees before were geared towards integration while the 2003 policy promotes repatriation. The Policy therefore restricts access to local education, health and land contrary to the previous practice. The process of granting naturalization to the refugees is therefore not supported by existing national policies and laws on refugees in Tanzania which talk about repatriation. While the practice has been to exclude refugees from integration, the process of naturalization requires integration to have taken place.

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The process of access to citizenship by refugees as defined here refers to the process of naturalization as it is outlined in the 1995 Citizenship Act. The Act has complicated access to citizenship and increase the amount of time one has to spend in the country before he/she qualifies to apply for citizenship. It has outlined that the condition for accessing Tanzania citizenship for non-citizens is only by naturalization. In the Policy, the First Schedule Section 9(3) allows those who are 18 years and above and “full capacity” to apply to the Minister for Home Affairs, who has the authority to grant or revoke citizenship. The Act also outlines that those seeking naturalization must “denounce the citizenship of the country of origin; taking the oath of allegiance; and declaring intent to reside in the country; they must have: a) “resided in the United Republic (of Tanzania) throughout the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of application; b) and that during the time immediately preceding the said period of twelve months, the applicant must have resided in the United Republic (*of Tanzania*) for periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than seven years; c) have knowledge of Kiswahili or the English language; d) be of a good character; c) (*sic*) and show that they have the potential to contribute to the nation.”

Looking at the requirements for naturalization as outlined in the Act, one can argue that local integration is a prerequisite for naturalization. Refugee rights are provided for by both states and non- state actors. In this paper the non state actors are the international and local humanitarian organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme, United Nations Children Education Fund, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and implementing partners such as the Tanzania Christian Refugee Services (TCRS) and Relief for Development Society (REDESO). The granting of citizenship is the role of the state but local integration requires collaborative efforts between the refugees, the local communities, the state and non state actors.

Exclusion for Citizenship and Local Integration in the Neoliberal Era

In understanding naturalization of the refugees one need to draw from the literature on local integration and citizenship. Kibreab (1984) outlined three steps for local integration namely social, economic and political integration. Strang and Ager (2010) have identified several factors for integration. These factors range from

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access to social services, social capital, language and agency of the refugees. The process of naturalization can be related to the process of local integration which is one of the three durable solutions for refugees (the other two are repatriation and resettlement to a third country).

Although globalization and neoliberalism promotes “flexible citizenship” it also requires integration in more than one locality. The flexible citizenship is limited to a certain class (Hyndman, 1997); and only benefits a few (Bloemraad, 2004). As Hyndman noted refugees find it difficult to cross border compared to people with capital. Besides, the process limits access to certain rights by certain individuals because it is dominated by capitalist practices commoditization. As Marshall (2006) note there exist a tension between access to social rights and capitalism. As such, less and less number of refugees are naturalized or integrated in Africa as compared to the post-independent period or resettled in third countries of asylum (which are usually rich western developed countries) despite globalization. Flexible citizenship therefore allows one to be in one place at a time and it requires integration in more than one locality. Neoliberalism also preaches less state intervention in the economy which has increased the role of non- state actors in provision of services and rights and has implication in access to citizenship by refugees. The declining role of the state in controlling the economy is followed by a decline in the redistributive role of the state, which no longer ensures access to different rights by its citizens. The declining redistributive role of the state is accompanied by increasing role of the state in creating policies and laws that are geared towards promotion of market forces and exclusion of certain group in accessing certain rights. An increase role of non -state actors in providing social rights has implication on dependency to non- state actors, who guarantees refugees support but has implication in access to formal citizenship which is granted by the state.

This paper examines how Burundian refugees access citizenship in the light of all these changes which are geared towards exclusion of the poor. Despite the claim of “flexible citizenship”, in Africa and in many places, globalization has led to claims of autochthony (Geschiere, 2009). Claims of citizenship and belonging are also guided by meanings and values people attach to places and land in particular instead of civic and political rights. Local integration is also associated with

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meanings and values attached to a place. Places of birth or places where the ancestors were buried are valued despite freedom of movement and flexible citizenship. However, the assumption behind the claims of autochthony by Geschiere (2009) is that the claim of belonging to land can only be used by those who are citizens and indigenous to a place. On the contrary this paper shows how claims of autochthony are also used by the 1972 Burundian refugees who have access to land in the settlements. The refugees claimed to have been attached to the settlement and have “no where to go” (IRRI and CSFM, 2009) when the government was planning their relocation. Access to citizenship has become a condition to access social and economic citizenship, in particular ownership of land. If access to political right (i.e. right to vote) jeopardize access to land it will lead to uprooting rather than integration.

Although the 1995 Citizenship Act is clear that access to citizenship is only by naturalization, the available laws and policies are subject to multiple interpretations, making it difficult for some groups to access citizenship. Even when these laws and rules are observed, new conditions can be put in place to restrict access to citizenship making it difficult for non citizens to access. As Manby (2009) observed there are a lot of conditions tied to the naturalization laws. She pointed out that most countries require long stay from 5 years and above, and employ conditions such as investigations, interviews and police inquiries. This paper argues that these interpretations are not just discursive in nature but have material implications to those involved. Although the 1972 Burundian refugees had fulfilled all the conditions for accessing Tanzania’s citizenship, the interpretation of the law that “relocation is best for integration” led to promotion of relocation for citizenship. However, when this was contested by the refugees and the locals for fear of land insecurities, suddenly the granting of citizenship was done without relocation. Such acts can be explained Aminzade’s (2013) observation that the meaning of citizenship in Tanzania has changed over time, and is constructed in everyday practices to include or exclude certain groups. Therefore a different construction of meaning of citizenship has allowed for granting of citizenship certificates without relocation.

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The Context

In Tanzania, the change in the role of the state brought by change from development policies that are guided by the Ujamaa doctrine to structural adjustment programmes guided by neoliberal policies have implication on access to different rights by refugees (Chaulia, 2003; Daley,1992; Kweka, 2007). First the refugee policy changed to be a “closed door policy” which promotes the keeping of refugees in camps and repatriation rather than local integration and naturalization (Felleson 2003). Therefore the change in the role of the state has implication on access to citizenship (right) and integration of refugees. The neoliberal Tanzania state played a minimal role towards integration of the refugees and promoted integration.

Tanzania’s exceptional policy of local integration has been commended by many scholars. The generous policy has enabled granting of citizenship to a number of Rwandan refugees, and the recent granting of citizenship to Somali refugees. The treatment of refugees in Tanzania, however, has not been homogenous. As the case of Burundian refugee shows, despite the fact that they have lived in the country for more than 40 years now, their access to citizenship was not a smooth process. Even after they were naturalized they are required to go through integration.

In 1950s and 1960 refugees from Rwanda were naturalized; in 2005 those from Somalia were naturalized; and in 2014, the 1972 Burundian refugees. The context under which the three groups were naturalized differs. The Rwandan refugees were naturalized in the context of PanAfricanism and African Socialism in which the then President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere played an exceptional role in putting his inclusionary thinking into practice as far as refugees from Africa are concerned. The Somali refugees in Chogo, Handeni in Tanga region were naturalized on the basis that their ancestors had formally moved from the place as slaves to Somalia. They belonged to the Zigua tribe of Tanga. They therefore have an ancestral relationship to the Zigua in Tanga. It is also a fact that the number of naturalized Rwandese and Somali refugees was small.

It is also important to distinguish the Burundian refugees in Tanzania. Burundian refugees who moved to Tanzania were in two major groups. There were those who came in 1972, and those who came in 1990s. These refugees were treated differently

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due to the change from socialism to neoliberalism. Using the policies of Ujamaa and Self Reliance coupled with Pan Africanism ideology, the state gave the 1972 refugees land for cultivation, allowed them access to Tanzania's system of education, provided free social services, as was the case for Tanzanians. The refugees were said to have received economic integration. The change in the refugee policy and practices as a result of socio-economic changes led to keeping of the second group of Burundian refugees in camps for humanitarian aid and subsequent adoption of the 2003 Refugees policy which promotes repatriation. These refugees were not economically integrated as they had no land for cultivation and were required to follow the Burundian system of education. They depended on humanitarian agencies for their support and were given only the option of repatriation while those in the settlement were given two options, repatriation or naturalization.

Besides the largest number of naturalized 1972 Burundian refugees, the process is also happening in the neoliberal era and it is neither supported by the Refugees Act nor the Policy. The 2003 Refugee Policy which promotes repatriation over integration and clearly stated that refugees will not be allowed to access land, education and other social system initially they had access to. Speaking during the granting of citizenship certificates to the Choggo Somalis the then Minister for Home Affairs Omari Mapuri said they government will not grant citizenship to the Burundian refugees in the settlement (Kweka 2007). It is not surprising to see that the process of naturalization of the 1972 Burundian refugees was complicated leading to some refugees changing their option from naturalization to repatriation (CSFM, IRRI and SSRIC, 2008). A total of 80 % of those refugees in the settlements chose naturalization and only 20% wanted to repatriate (SA3ltd). Scholars have questioned the reasons for these refugees to stay for a long time without applying for citizenship. A study by UNHCR (2000) showed that most of them did not want to be granted citizenship. Malkki (1995) argues that the Hutus refugees (Burundian refugees in Tanzania were mainly the Hutus) wanted to return and revenge was one of the reasons. Burundian refugees in the settlement claimed that the land in the settlement is their ancestral land and because that is where their parents were buried, therefore they are entitled to stay there (Kweka, 2007). It is also true from the point of view of migration studies, that when migrants receive all their needs (i.e. have access to the civic and social rights of citizenship) they do not see the need

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to ask for formal citizenship from the hosting state. The government of Tanzania was also not keen to naturalize these refugees (Minister Omari Mapuri as quoted in Kweka, 2007) following the experience with naturalized Rwandan refugees, when most of them left without renouncing their Tanzanian citizenship when the RPF took over. Many refugees also pointed out that they did not apply for citizenship before because acquiring citizenship was expensive and they could not afford it, but now they received support from the UNHCR after the government waived the fee from \$800 to \$50 per person (CSFM and IRRI, 2009).

Turner (1990) has written about the reasons for refugees changing their minds are because of changes argues changes in regional policies and generational differences. The generational differences refer to large number of youths born in the country of asylum who were eager to take up new opportunities in new places. Burundi is now part of the East Africa Community and there is an East Africa Common Market Protocol, which explains why the large number of refugees changed their mind and chose naturalization. Refugees thought that they will be allowed to move freely in the region, and thus have access to Burundi and Tanzania simultaneously through the East African Protocol. The free movement protocol, however, has remained silent about the refugees in East Africa (Kweka, 2012).

Complicated naturalization process

The process of naturalization of the 1972 Burundians was not conducted smoothly. A study by CSFM, IRRI and SSRC (2008) showed that the 1972 Burundian refugees who chose naturalization qualified to become citizens. Therefore refugees expected to be granted “mass naturalization” as it was done with the Rwandese after independence which is to simply declare them citizens and only require formalizing their citizenship individually. However, the refugees found out that they were required to go through individual interviews with immigration officers, have witnesses and sponsors and also have their finger prints taken (CSFM, IRRI and SSRC, 2008). After these procedures were completed, their names were scrutinized by the regional and district security and defense committees, and those with criminal records were disqualified and asked to repatriate (ibid). Through these processes some were recommended for naturalization and some were not and required to repatriate although they had chosen naturalization and some wanted to be considered for resettlement in a third country of asylum (CSFM & IRRI, 2009).

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A review of existing reports showed that the state's retreat from naturalization was observed earlier in the process of naturalization when refugees struggled to prove that they qualified for Tanzanian citizenship (CSFM, IIRI, SSRC, 2008; CSFM and IIRI 2009). The refugees claimed to be socially and economically integrated in the areas where they were living (settlements and the districts and the regions) because they had access to land and refused to be relocated for fear of losing their land. They also did not want to repatriate because they were not sure of getting land in Burundi (IIRI, 2013). The refugees tried to show that they were born in Tanzania or arrived when they were young, are educated in Tanzania, they speak Swahili, and the majority did not know Burundi (CSFM, IIRI and SSRC, 2008) yet they were reluctant to relocate and mix with the Tanzanians in other districts and regions. They attached different meanings and values to the settlements and said they belonged to the settlements and have no relatives in Burundi and their parents died and were buried in the settlements (Kweka, 2007). They therefore felt that they belong to Tanzania and not Burundi and Tanzania is their home (CSFM, IIRI, SSRC, 2008) but only wanted to be integrated in areas they had lived, the settlements. They saw themselves as citizens of a place that would assure them access to land, housing, and other services, including peace and security, and that place is in the settlements. Unlike neoliberal assumption of "flexible citizenship" refugees insisted that they belong to Tanzania and in the settlements. This confines their citizenship to their localities. They rejected the idea of being Burundian and Tanzanian at the same time and embraced the idea of being Tanzanians or Burundians from the settlements.

Contested relocation process

A year after they had chosen naturalization, the refugees learned that they would be required to relocate to 16 regions and 55 districts inside Tanzania. Several reasons were given to justify their relocation by the government. One of the reasons given by the state was "security". The fear of creation of a Burundian enclave led to a desire to disperse the refugees in different regions and districts. However, it was then revealed that plans were underway to give Mishamo and Katumba land to an American foreign investor, Agrisol (Oakland Institute, 2011). This raises the concerns that the naturalization was done to allow for them to be relocated and access the land for investors. Other questions that can see the granting of citizenship as having political or economic motives rather than the humanitarian are the timing

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of granting citizenship after many years of governmental refusal. The complicated process of naturalization also arises the questions as to why granting the option of naturalization which is not in line with existing laws and policies and resulting in complicated or failed implementation strategies.

The promotion of access to land for investors over other groups in the country is seen not only with the refugee land but also with respect to land that belongs to local citizens. This is one feature of neoliberal capitalism, which privileges property rights over citizenship rights. While the state is ready to grant access to land for investors and is engaging in a discussion of dual citizenship for migrants in the diaspora (Kweka, 2009), it is not ready to do the same for refugees, who had once been formally integrated into the national economy under the ideology of socialism and Pan-Africanism.

Following the plan for relocation, a debate emerged in the Parliament and in the media on the decision to grant naturalization to this group and its associated plan for relocation. Members of the Parliament expressed their concerns about not being involved in the decision making process. Some local communities also thought that because the refugees are already naturalized, they should be given their certificates and allowed to move freely to look for land anywhere in the country. Local communities were therefore surprised that the state decided to relocate naturalized refugees and saw relocation as a process of monitoring "its own citizens" instead of letting them choose their own place for residency within the country. Some questioned the involvement of the non-state actors such as the UNHCR in providing for this group who are no longer refugees. In fact, some local community members pointed out that involvement of the UNHCR during relocation would lead to their stigmatization as refugees and local integration will thus not be successful. Some members of these local communities questioned the decision of state to grant naturalization while they fear of "insecurity." As such, local communities rejected the relocation on the same grounds of insecurity, lack of land, and lack of support from non state actors. It was later realized that the process had by- passed the ministerial cabinet stage of decision making and was halted and taken back to the cabinet.

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In addition to the fact that the process did not follow the proper channels of decision making, the government of Tanzania expected massive support from non state actors given also the large number of those who requested for naturalization. Getting support from non - state actors for relocation then became a condition for granting of citizenship certificates. However, in 2011, the process of relocation was halted and the then Minister for Home Affairs, Shamsi Nahodha, was quoted saying that the lack of support and commitment from donors was among the major factors that led to halting of the plans for relocation (Guardian Correspondent, 2011 and Meena, 2011). Other factors such as contestation of the process of relocation by both the refugees and the local communities also added to the reasons for halting it. The next section explores the strategy for relocation and the planned support for relocation.

Plan for Integration through Relocation

UNHCR embraced the idea of relocation on the grounds that it would allow for “local integration” while the refugees complained that relocation was leading to their displacement, loss of livelihood and social insecurities (IRRI, CSFM and SSRC, 2008). A total of 52 districts and 16 regions were chosen for the relocation of the refugees on the basis of availability of land and low population density. The plans for relocation were written under the NASCIP - National Strategy for Local Community Integration Programme 2010-2014 (URT, 2010). In addition to NASCIP, there were plans for supporting the process of relocation to be provided jointly by non state actors and the state called Joint Action plan 2010-2014 (UNDP, 2010) and the Transitional Solution (UNDP & UNHCR, 2011). The plans quoted a total of US\$144 billion, which was required for relocation and local integration. However, on the side of the refugees they protested relocation on claims that it would lead to their displacement, loss of livelihood and social insecurities (IRRI, CSFM and SSRC, 2008).

Although refugees were naturalized, the fund to support relocation and local integration was expected to be raised by the UNHCR, which took the main control of the process, and the local government was involved as an implementing partner. It should be noted that the state activities outlined above only involved the central state, with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the President of Tanzania playing a key role in the process of naturalization. In the case of relocation and local

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integration, local government was going to be responsible for implementing the program. Despite the key role by the local governments, the UNHCR led the process and established five relocation offices called LISO - Local Integration Support Offices parallel to regional offices and recruited only focal persons from the Local Government and Regional Authorities (RALG) in five regions, Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Iringa, Mwanza and Mtwara. The LISO offices were composed of UNHCR and two of its implementing partners, the Tanganyika Christian Refugees Services (TCRS) and the Relief for Development Societies (REDESSO). The UNHCR and its implementing partner became the key institution spearheading the local integration but this was mainly due to the fact that though the refugees had lived in the country for 40 years their relocation was taken as if they are new refugees arriving to the designed localities.

According to the plans, former refugees were going to leave their land and houses, without compensation except for what UNHCR called a repatriation package, basically a transportation allowance. In the Strategy and in the Plan, refugees were divided into three groups: group A, those who were already living outside the settlements who were said to be in need of minimal assistance in their relocation, about 25,000; group B, those who knew the places they could move to, approximately 60,000; group C, those who did not know where to go and had never been outside the settlements, more than 70,000. There was no any compensation planned for the relocation to the refugees, only the UNHCR's relocation package which planned to give US \$100 for each refugee in group A, US \$ 200 for group B, and US \$ 300 for group C. Although, NASCIP talks about the need to avoid the "newly naturalized Tanzanians" becoming a burden on the local communities, the planned relocation package was not enough even for the NNTs to transport their belongings. There were no plans to build houses or pay for the land on behalf of the NNTs, and refugees wanted to be able to take some of the building materials. The refugees complained that the process was going to uproot them rather than integrating them. The local communities also saw the NNT as a burden on their side as they were not sure of how much support was to be given to them directly and specifically to those who would give land to the refugees. At the end of the process it was only a total of 744 from group A who were successfully granted with citizenship. This succeeded because they were already locally integrated or what is called self settled refugees.

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The Strategy and the Plan concentrated more on how the refugees would be monitored during the movement and their settlement rather than on support for assisting them with integration, despite the fact that they were accepted for naturalization. Even though the refugees feared that the process of relocation might lead to displacement, loss of livelihood and finally loss of social protection, the Joint Action Plan referred to the process as simply “moving house” (JAP, 2010:7).

The plan of support was not concrete on issues of access to land and housing for the NNTs, and the relocation package (according to the refugees) was not even enough to transport all of their belongings (IRRI, 2013). However, both the state and the non-state actors did not have good information on the challenges of the process, and no prior study had been conducted to determine the feasibility of the plan for relocation and integration. The process entailed moving from one region to another and to a completely different environment and culture in some cases. Hence, the refugees concern and doubt regarding integration were genuine and were going to have serious costs on their livelihoods.

NASCIP pointed out that “appropriate support packages” (2010:7) would be put in place and negotiation for public land would be conducted. The Strategy indicated that “the community-based support approach” would be used where host communities could be involved, but a year after the program started not a single local community had been involved. Local integration offices (LISOs) were opened, and mass information campaigns were done at the district level. The local government authorities and land committee had gone to different villages to simply look for land for relocation without much preparation of the local communities on integration. NASCIP clearly documented that the success of the program depended very much on the engagement of the international community. The UN and the government were expected to work together in soliciting the resources. Despite commitment of the UN agencies to support the process, the lack of evidence of adequate compensation was also a challenge.

Although JAP’s main aim was to support NASCIP, there was no concrete evidence on the availability of funds to support the process. Instead, JAP outlined plans to work with different government Ministries, such as health, education, infrastructure, finance, and the President’s Office Planning Commission under the

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broad umbrella of the Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Strategy II (commonly referred to as MKUKUTA II) in which the UN is also a development partner. In 2011, the UNHCR and UNDP prepared another plan for supporting NASCIP called Transitional Solution Initiatives (TSI). The new support plan had three components: support movement, the local governments and local integration. TSI also prepared a new budget of US \$ 88,500,000 instead of US \$ 144 million that was quoted before in the NASCIP and JAP. Massive support was also expected from other non-state actors, such as the World Bank, but the regional and district authorities were left waiting for funds from the UNHCR to start implementing the program. There was no any commitment from donors mentioned except from JICA's plan to bring water to all major districts after relocation (JAP, 2010-2014) and NASCIP requires local villagers to identify land from their village for settlements and farms for the refugees (URT, 2010).

The Waiting for Integration

While the halting of the process of relocation allowed the process to be decided at different levels or decision making such as the ministerial cabinet, the length of time it is had taken lead to anxiety, fear, and insecurities on the side of the state, UNHCR, refugees and the local hosting community. On the side of the non state actors, there were fears that the state was going to revoke the decision of naturalization and may implement permanent residence, or force the refugees to repatriate, or force them move to the planned local host communities unprepared. On side of local communities, there were worries that the integration of refugees into local communities would disrupt peace if resources were not enough especially land. Refugees were also worried that if they are integrated they may not have access to land and the livelihood that they enjoy now in the settlement. The process which was meant for providing them with voting right and freedom of movement had in turn increased fear in both sides.

After three years of living in the insecurity and anxiety (2011-2014) and not knowing whether they will be granted citizenship or not, the government of Tanzania in 2014 suddenly announced its intention to grants citizenship certificates to the naturalized refugees. The Ceremony was then held on the 14th of October which is commemorates day of the death of Mwalimu Julius Kabarage Nyerere the founding father of the nation. Although this practice was commended as it had

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ended one of the most protracted refugees case in Africa, it also has a political implication.

The granting of the citizenship to the refugees in 2014 since 2007 when the decision was made had to do with the fact that Mr. Kikwete, the fourth president completing his tenure, therefore wanted to finish what he had started. Secondly, the process was also use to pave way for CCM to get many voters. It is therefore not surprising that the refugees who were given citizenship had promised to select CCM during campaign (Fabian, 2015). Speaking with the refugees Mr. John Kadutu who is contesting for a parliamentary seat in Ulyankulu promised the refugees to be patient as the government is preparing to register their villages and wards. However, CCM lost the Kaliua (where Ulyankulu is part of) district to Civic United front (CUF). The unregistered new refugee wards in Kaliua include Mirambo, Igombe Mkuru and Karundo. The completion of the process of accessing citizenship will depend on when they would get their villages registered and that means ownership of land and access to all the services as Tanzanians.

Conclusion

This paper argues that the process of granting of citizenship to the 1972 Burundian refugees has not completed the process of integration but it is just the beginning. The refugees who were assumed to have been integrated because of the length of their stay proved to be wrong when they realized that they have been isolated in the settlements. Globalization and neoliberal assumption of “flexible citizenship” does not work as many locals fear of insecurity while refugees fear losing their land. The paper concludes that the length of stay is one factor for integration but the practices are more important and that the location of refugees matters in ensuring local integration.

Changing socio-economic and political situation in Tanzania has led to change in the refugee policy and restriction on local integration. However, political changes and specifically the intense competition that CCM had received from opposition led to suddenly granting of citizenship in anticipation that former refugees will vote for them. However, CCM won two (Katavi and Mpanda) out of three constituencies were the refugees reside. The Kaliua constituency was won by a Civic United Front (CUF).

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Politicization of decisions in the refugee governance regime is common and sometimes has negative consequences to the refugees. In the first place refugees were naturalized without knowing that there is a plan for relocation that can lead to losing of their land. In the second place they were granted citizenship without the “relocation for integration” and were expected to vote for the party that had given them citizenship to have their wards registered and recognized. The processes and practices of access to citizenship by refugee shows that is not a smooth process and the refugees have to negotiate it in their day today activities and practices. In the neoliberal era citizenship is not only commoditized but also politicized.

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