The Political Economy of Insurge-terrorism and "Covart" in Kenya and Juba Borderlands

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Abstract
Kenya's efforts in containing Al Shabaab at source in Somalia are increasingly constrained by the former's resolve to expand and consolidate control over alternative geographies of contention. Examining these efforts in spatial and temporal terms, this paper concedes the centrality of the challenges of the distance decay as an animator. It grapples with two related questions: how should a state experiencing differentiated dynamics of distance decay insulate itself from subversion to the extent of prevailing over the insurgency? What variables can animate and mediate such a defeat? Notably, any anticipated defeat has to revolve around the conception of converse counter insurgency efforts. These have to suppose distance decay reduction to effect administration through ideas and organizational frameworks on the affected state's triage of territory, human and material capital of the state. Here, the net assessment process executed by the State actors has to be anchored around the mobilization and arraying of Clausewitze's trinity of the people, the army and government to prevail over insurgent resolve. Given both regional and state-centric dynamics that include increasing distance decay, counter insurgency has to evolve taking into consideration the morphing geographies and discourses that frame terror-insurgency and Insurge-terrorism dual wings of Al Shabaab's war strategy with state and regional state viability as the end -state.

Keywords: Kenya, Juba-borderland, Al Shabaab, Terror-insurgency, Distance decay

Introduction
Kenya's military engagements in Somalia are literally enjoined by inverse mirror activities executed by Al Shabaab enabled networks. Of interest, are operations occurring largely in what this article conceives as "Juba borderland" that converges frontier geographies of the two states. Their intensity and consequent geo-economic threats despite "operation *linda Boni"* initiated in

2015 as a counter measure, underpins the interest of this article. Some explanations for these are rooted in an actor's innovative ability to maximize on the quartets of time, space, force to space ratios, and cause to expand distance decay constitute the base upon which insurgency is built. Consolidation of the emergent out-administered (Fall, 1999:55) realms engenders favourable military spaces critical for the realization of an insurgency end state. The converse counter insurgency efforts have to revolve around distance decay reduction to effect administration through ideas and organizational frameworks on the affected state's trilogy of territory, human and material capital of the state. The net assessment process, executed by actors on both sides of the contention is anchored around the mobilization and arraying of Clausewitz's trinity of the people, army and government to prevail over the opponent's resolve. This manifests itself in his project desire and armed resistance. Of in interest, is the complexity of counter insurgency rooted in the challenge of nation state crisis, regional state collapse or weaknesses. Here, counter-insurgency has to evolve, taking into consideration the geographies and discourses that frame terror-insurgency and Insurge-terrorism dual wings of *Al Shabaab's* war strategy with state and regional state viability as the end-state. We recapitulate on the foregoing with the evolving Caliphate project and globalized regional spaces of Juba-land in mind.

Dilemmas of Distance Decay as a Crisis of State Consolidation
Security, *raison d'être* for the existence of the state, revolves around efforts to positively build up its trilogy of ideas, institutions and its physical base. Positive investment in these components animates the state consolidation process. Underlying this is the fact that policy frameworks rooted in the proper conception of national interest and its securitization have their source here. Security here as a development mission of the state manifests in concerted efforts geared towards vulnerability reduction and enhanced resilience. The consequent reduction of threats to acquired interests engenders security in an objective sense. Success in elimination of fear that values will be attacked, affirms security at a subjective level (Wolfers, 1962:149). This has to be seen in the broad perspective of securing as a process of emancipating people, as individuals and groups from human constraints to pursuit of choice from poverty, lack of education, political oppression (Booth, 1991:313-26) and poor health and environment.

Success here leads to reduction of fragility and increased viability, while the converse animates state weakness and eventual collapse consequent to

sustained crisis. Three issues stand out when using the concept of fragility; the first is that state fragility implicitly sets out what to expect out of a state while pointing out the reality of its inabilities. Secondly, it anticipates the resultant consequences of this inability to the state's own essence as an entity. Thirdly, it thrusts analysis towards the anticipation of the next stage of state change and the resultant consequences.

For analytical purposes, fragility should be conceived in terms of both state and government. It should be seen in terms of the extent of threats with respect to the vulnerabilities the two are exposed to. A state will be said to be fragile to the extent that what Buzan (1991) calls ideas, physical base and institutions around which it is constructed are easily exposed to a phenomenon that threatens its survival as an entity. While the evolution of the state has a role in influencing its survival, it is how the mission of state building is carried out that informs its fragility or the converse, its strength. An entity is defined as a state to the extent to which it has a populated territory that is organized and managed by a government that exercises sovereignty.

Sovereignty is derived out of a government's ability to mobilize its resource potential to evolve capacity to provide for its population. This helps to enhance its level of legitimacy and as a result, maximize on its power potential to effect control over its territory. The resultant protection of citizens from insecurity threats at economic, political, military, environmental and societal levels helps the state reinforce its legitimacy and control while building a collective identity. The extent to which an entity is in a position to demonstrate sovereignty increasingly qualifies it to be a consolidating state on the rails of viability. This is demonstrated by the ability of the state to exhibit three characteristics; sovereign authority - serves as an accepted source of identity and an arena of politics (Zartman, 1995:1-11). State refers to an institution and thus tangible institution of organization and of decision making, and an intangible symbol of identity; State is a security guarantor for a populated territory (Dawisha and Zartman, 1988:7). The assumption here is that if the ability to provide the foregoing demonstrates stateness, decreased inability diminishes state capacity and produces a condition that is referred to as State fragility. The higher the level of fragility, the higher is the propensity towards unviability.

In reality, this is caused by actions or inactions of a government especially inadequacies in policy-making and implementation. Fragility as a condition should be conceived as that continuous inability of the government to

undertake activities that help to advance stateness at one level and the extent to which exposure to a threat produces immediate negative consequences that the state can hardly absorb. This in turn mutates into the phenomenon of weak state. Conditions in which the states' triage of ideas, physical base and institutions (Buzan, 1991) are weak-or strong, produce either low or high levels of socio-political and economic cohesion respectively.

The weak-state strong-state nexus finds rational here. An examination of the extent of cohesion in these three realms not only points to the extent and levels of threats to the state's security but also differentiations among states. Weak states are a consequence of the failure to create domestic, political and social consensus sufficient enough to guard against the option of resorting to violence. The converse notion of strong state on the other hand is about the capacity or ability of the state leaders to use the agencies of state to attain compliance (Migdal, 1988). It also has to do with how society and groups within it tolerate, permit or resist development of state. States are considered to be weak to the extent that they cannot provide basic functions for citizens. They are characterized by weak economies, weak health provisioning capacity, infrastructural break down and escalation of criminalization of state tendencies.

The function of governance is to enhance the extent of voluntary compliance. Part of this is inherent in the ability to sustain an inclusive state building mission. Success here allows the state to manage existing and subsequent diversities. Whether they emerge consequent to constructed and narrativized characteristics or of differentiated politics of resource distribution, diversities can morph to constitute identity-based fault-lines of state insecurity. As part of the physical base, management of diversity calls for virtuous leadership with a requisite instrumental knowledge and institutions to channel mobilization and value allocations. Where a state manages diversities, it is able to evolve strength. This is characterized by its instrumental capacity that includes firstly, institutional ability to evolve policy and provision values; secondly, development of coercive capabilities that anchor ability to effect legitimate deployment of force when authority is under challenge; and thirdly, the demonstration of national identity.

Diversities become an issue when they are made a basis for which access to or denial of resources is made. It is at this point that hardens group and individual perceptions into politicized identities. In Kenya, identities have roots in the frankensteinian experiment that midwifed the post-colonial State. Managers of

the colonial State had concentrated on compartmentalizing groups to create frozen ethnic identities. The task of forging an overarching common identity as a basis for creating a citizenship remains undermined by differentiated treatment and access to resources practices of successive regimes. The failed process of state forming especially constricted the bio-power development (see Foucault, 1978:208-9). This has engendered the transformation of what were essentially politicized ethnic identities into ethno nationalities aspiring exclusive control over what they conceive as native spaces.

A trifurcation of spaces can be conceived here. First is the space of the imagined nation-state. Here discourses on citizen equality before the law are espoused despite the fact that they stand in contra-distinction to the apparent inability to guarantee various forms security to secure the vote, property and identity. Second, is the space of contested predation where youth violence is exchanged as a commodity for the ethnic gerontocracy capital: in the process reproducing mirror images of order and political power? Third are spaces of indigeneity. Here ethnic belonging determines right to citizenship while its past is re-invented as an objective of security to be protected from "others" through production of "ethnic militias" in mirror images of the military. The common denominator in this case is the increasing desire to solidify group power to the exclusion of others and in the process adding up the process of incapacitating the state especially its ability to dominate instruments of violence.

The state's own differentiated use of violence, in abide to extract resources to the benefit of the few, have had the net effect of engendering extractive integration into the metropolis at the expense the economy. Underlying this are limited efforts at building horizontal infrastructure geared towards facilitating internal integration compared to vertical infrastructure engendering the latter. Over time this has created economic, political, social and security distance decay dynamics that now hounds the state elite as Kaplan's revenge of geography (Kaplan, 2012).

Of interest is the evolving security schizophrenia spawned by variegated forms of distance decay in trifurcated spaces (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2014). The first is the administrative distance decay manifested by crisis of rule imposition and control in large parts of the state a factor that has underpinned the emergence of predatory activities and the increasing shift from state service provision to gangs. Second is economic decay undergirded by extent of exclusion and inability of state to create value addition in space a process that has spawned

predation? Third is an apparent decay in regulatory frameworks a process that animates the consolidation of predatory spheres. Fourth, is security distance decay mediated by inability to operationalize security institutions along established principles of Mass and Economy of Force and Force to Space ratios.

Distance decay in turn has underpinned organic and organized militias- gang logic whose growth is related to the process of absence or abstinence of internal security infrastructure and actors. This dynamic in turn compounds Force to Space ratios thus making it impossible for the state to dominate instruments of violence and thus guarantee security while evolving a veritable Tillian security racket (Tilly, 1987:171) whose dominant form is the prevalence of shifting symbiotic and parasitic relationships between organized and organic bandit groups and communities, state elite and the structures of violence. This in turn continues to spawn the inflation of violent groups and the calculus of violence. The net effect is the emergence of what deWaal calls a political market place (de Waal, 2015: 17-27). Here dynamics of power, violence and corruption converge animated by the desire to access political power. Core here, is the ability of an actor to bring his entrepreneurial skills to bear on others through the fiat of capital, violence and instrumentalization of ethnicity.

Of interest is the mutation of this challenge for the state from that of consolidation to one of its very viability. This is apparent given the convergence of corruption, crisis of identity and governance and the localizing of regional and global terror-insurgency groups. Most challenging are those that seek to mobilize groups and individuals on the basis of politicized identities and material conditions while maximizing on distance decay economic and social sanctuaries. The convergence of these state pathologies with similar ones at the regional level undergirds the anarchic regional insecurity structure. Characterizing this are, security and insecurity dilemmas, and regional fragility cascades. Besides conflicts, under-development and human insecurity, there is the transformation of borderlands into a warm-hole that sustains regionalized local insurgencies or local insurgencies and criminal groups enabled by extra state and regional actors. The Boni forest in Lamu that straddles the Jubaland corridor is a point of reference.

The foregoing is what Kenya is experiencing. Unlike traditional terror groups that differentiate themselves from conventional insurgency groups by their logic of hibernating in cell structures while deploying terror to force political concessions, Kenya is grappling with nascent groups that transit from or retreat

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into cell structure over time in space with the objective of deconstructing the state as it has been known over the last 54 years. Two characteristics are discernible here. The first is what can best be referred to as terror-insurgency. The second is what can be referred to as Insurge-terrorism. Both strategies seek to protract the resistance against the state with the aim of effecting its out-administration maximizing on asymmetrical warfare. In effect, they seek to converge two strategies of insurgency and terrorism privileging ether of the two depending on the dictates of geography to animate the achievements of their end state.

It is the inability to conceive the foregoing as a strategy of war that continues to blur responses. Beyond moral trepidation, what we conceive here, as terror-insurgency strategic practice- is an apparent discernible logic of war to the extent that it seeks to continue politics with an end in mind. That end, is the military destabilization and/or conquest of Kenya and subsequently Eastern Africa as geographical space mythically constructed as Habasha by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) to the establishment of the caliphate. The strategic logic is inherent in what Howard, terms as the use of available resources to achieve ends (objectives)(Howard, 1983:36). The privileging of terror violence as a lead strategic or tactical weapon in urban spaces to animate contradictions that support insurgency explains the conception of terror insurgency. The converse is the case when insurgency leads the way complemented by terrorism in rural geographies. Violence here is used as broad strategy, whose aim is to compel compliance, consequent to the breaking of their enemy's resolve. Under terror-insurgency, the actor seeks to promote a certain type of reaction that engenders friction and misdirected violence that saps moral rectitude of the force and society. Success here is conceived in terms of the extent to which society becomes reality of the monster the state has constructed of the terror actors.

It is the foregoing that provides it with a goal orientation for engagement. Violence here as Neumann notes is used to deliberately create a sense of fear usually by use/ threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence to influence political and psychological behaviour (Neumann, 2003: 56-7) at one level. At another, real and imagined fear provides the justification for consent that anchors restriction to a free society. The long-term consequences animate the desired collapse, which is finalized by an insurgency sustained by the incorporation of local and external elements. The converse Insurge-terrorism emphasizes the building of infrastructure for out administering the state. The

main drive is to facilitate the implantation of a Foco (the initiating self sustaining complement) in the Foci(a selected geographical space hard to assail but able to nourish, implant networks in the community in the process creating time). This time consuming, resource intensive process has to be conceived in terms of decades, hence the logic of protraction to enable out-administration and subversion rather than out fighting of the state in the nascent stages. A sustained survival of a *Foco* in Foci animate its survival and consolidation in the state through existing distance decay contradictions. The desire is to engender conditions within which consolidation process sharpens contradictions that weakens the state over time in space.

It has to be seen as a war given its structure and its recognized form, which mediates decision making between opponents. Each side initiates decision. A notable fact is the means it provides the actor as an instrument of policy with two elements: force as instrument and war as an analytical frame leading to an outcome. Hence logic of language (force as mediator) engenders communication between two actors (speaker and listener). In it we presuppose Strategy (ways) that lead to ends (objectives).It is also notable that actors use it to communicate political intention and thus continua to execute a political intercourse by other means. Critical here are the use of this form of war as speech or text that find expression in multiple media sites such as social media, internet, mass media (radio, television), and other elements such as pictures, deaths, forms targets and extent of destruction as an unspoken statement.

Equally, important is the ability of actors to evolve military lines of operations out of media realms and vice versa. The foregoing convergence is always apparent when incidents are affected and instrumentalized through media to operationalize their narratives. These tend to link strategy with objectives. It is this that gives meaning to quality and nature of violence especially its strategic and symbolic character. The ability to effect both terror insurgency and Insurge-terrorism has the objective of not only converging distanced geographies in time and space but also to create strategic confusion to effect a sense of invincibility. This creates public despondency while engendering flexibility in time across space. Here narrative construction and fabrication of spaces are continuous engagements that can be distanciated or expanded as time is narrowed.

A notable characteristic is the exploitation of the market state especially the free movement of goods and service, weakening state provisioning capacity, and criminal tendencies to set up its enablers. Indeed, its operational

capabilities are building around the ability to innovate and adopt their plans to existing technology, blending in society to effect their attacks. In addition, their ability to effect attacks and deploy them to sharpen contradictions in a bid to engender dilemmas for the state brings out their strategic logic. The core aim here is to effect a conceptual paralysis, dilemmas and unpreparedness of state institutions to set out plans to fight the enemy.

Contrary to conventional thinking that conceives them as mere irrational violence without a clear strategy, their focus is on dialectics of the opposites. Here, the aim is to sharpen social contradictions while maximizing on simplicity and complexities consequent to their ability to adapt and quickly innovate. An examination of their operations in Kenya ranging from Westgate to Mpeketoni, and against Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in El Adde and Kolbio in Somalia points to a clear grasping, adaptation and convergence of Clausewitz (1984), Jomini (1992) and Hart's (1967:75) constructs in an asymmetrical reverse logic to compel their enemy to abide by their will. They are able to locate and focus their efforts on what they consider as their enemy's Center of Gravity (CoG) and decisive points. However, unlike conventional forces, their project is structured to protract in a bid to align it with their capacity, relative to their enemy's material strength and sustaining will.

Their leadership's appreciation of dynamics of material conditions and technology, more so, their ability to isolate elements to which they subject Clausewitz's triage of fog, friction and chance, has enabled them to effect attacks while engendering contradictions within state realms. It is around material conditions that the leadership has been able to construct cause while exploiting the variables of time and space to exploit resultant Force to Space ratios. Of interest is the apparent ability to nurture their nascent cells in their evolution, development and adaptation to a point of maturity. The main effort here is spent on exploitation of human and physical terrain to effect mutations. Time progression is direct inversely to time spent in space by the state to reverse debilitating dynamics such as regime insecurity, violence and corruption in favour of inclusive state building activities or what is referred to elsewhere in this paper as Distance Decay Reduction (DDR).

Terror-Insurgency Actors and Their Strategic Imperatives
Rational conceptualizers of the twin strategies of terror-insurgency and insurge-terrorism spend time to read their milieu to identify opportunities it offers them to achieve their ends. They are able to pick out what is possible in relation to

what is probable. Here, the ability to subject the mind to what seems determined before subsequently subjecting it to technology enhances their element of surprise. Of salience is the prevailing geographical space and the opportunities it offers to all actors, though relative to its exploitation at one level, or gaps it offers consequent to acts of commission and omission at another.

Kenya's North Eastern and Coastal counties, point to favourable or military spaces. They become *foci*, consequent to a rationalized process that sets them out as suitable for nurturing resistance cells, its *foco* and new areas of operation. Underlying this is the presence of a set of elements such as obstacles, sanctuaries, information, communication and transport. The existence of these and how actors dialectically opposed to each other, exploit them differently in space over time. Underlying this is the perspective adopted by actors to either perceive opportunities that are exploitable or obstacle that are a constraint. Herein lies the strategic exploitation and dialectics of resistance. Obstacles can range from physical (high grounds, raised features, vegetation cover and drainage system) to economic; From demographic (sociological) to climatic (rain, flood, winds, heat) characteristics. Sanctuaries can be economic, social, and political. Ideally, a developing state leadership has the option of reducing the negative impacts of constraints in what is best referred to as the process of increasing state viability through state building efforts. Engagement in this process engenders distance decay reduction. In essence the presence of obstacles, (sanctuaries, minus communication and transport infrastructure) conforms to distance decay conceived as the existing distanciation of related elements in a given space that are ideally supposed to be close. The net effect is that, the greater the distance decay is, the higher the favourability of a space for anti-state activities. The implications here are that, the cost of containment for the state increases as opportunities to operate expand for non-state actors. What they are left to grapple with are rationalities of choice.

Insurgents and terrorist tend to act to maximise utility by choosing preferred alternatives by assigning numerical values to each possible alternative geographical space available relative to action sought. Hence, favourable Space (FS) = *f (Cost, Utility)*. A favourable geographical space for terror and insurgency activity is subject to total costs (C) that a terrorist will incur and the utility (U) he derives from the attack. Total Cost = Mileage^2 + ICT − Obstacles (obstacles created for state) + Sanctuary. Therefore, the equation FS = f(C, U) can be stated

as FS = f {(Mileage^2 +Obstacles + Sanctuary –ICT), Utility} FS= f {(M$_1^2$ + OB+ San –ICT), U}(See Katzenbach and Hanrahan, 1962:134-35; Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2014).[1] The said space will also retain the enabling networks to sustain the convergence of previous and current organized crime capital to fund resistance activities. These groups effect through their innovative ability to exploit existing information and communication technology. This acts as force multipliers for these groups and dividers for the state actors given the constraints imposed by its vulnerabilities such as corruption, political instability and dependency to external support.

Apart from bandit or criminal capital, utility variable is undergirded by the presence of valuable assets (objects of security) that can be targets capable of producing desired economic, political, social, geo-political and economic effects across multiples fields all at once from a single act. Underlying this is the prevailing vulnerabilities consequent to distance decay. To the extent that vulnerabilities are high consequent to fragility enhancing underdevelopment, the cost factor is reduced making an action worth effecting in a given geography as an ideal space.

Actors will tend to examine all options (ideal places) to determine the preferred geography. The totality of calculation or compilation of preferences facilitates the ranking process. This in turn allows the ranking of preference of all geographical spaces to determine favourability. It is the foregoing that allows them to engender the transitivity logic. If geographical space (i_1) is preferred to (i_2), and ($i_{2)}$ is preferred to (*i_3)*, then (*i_1)* is preferred to (i_3) (Katumanga and Miguta, 2013; Katumanga, 2014).

Geographies currently reeling from insurge-terrorism in Kenya are consequent victims of colonial and postcolonial state policies of exclusion, marginalization and violence. Notwithstanding constitutionally desired security redesign, little efforts toward this have been undertaken. The net effect is the closing of spaces of production at economic, political and social levels, and their transformation into contested spaces, characterized by increased vulnerabilities, bandit economies that underpin organized crime, corruption, violence, and the crisis of command and control.   Given the foregoing, whereas distance decay offers non-state actors alternative multiple opportunities, the state is confronted with obstacles and contradictions that engender dilemmas. The former has an easier task of increasing distance decay while embedding itself to create further cost sapping challenges. The state has to grapple with multiplicity of security

threats. This can be summed up as follows; distance decay/military space/ favourable space = Square mileage plus sanctuaries plus obstacles minus information, communication and transport (DD/MS/FS= MI^2 + OB + SAN-ICT). To this should be added organized crime. Organized crime (OK) is a function of distance decay plus financial capital (current capital plus previous capital) OK= f [DD + FK (Kt + Pk)]. Countering these groups demands a leadership with instrumental competence to maximize on the dead capital inherent in the distance decay to engender state building. This is the process we conceive as distance decay reduction (DDR) and which we deem critical to counter insurgency. [DDR =f (M_1^2 – Ob - San + ICT)]; Containment of OK = F (DDR-FK). Core here is the containment of organized crime capital, upholding of the rule of law and the commitment to the realization of the new constitutional order as an ideal vision.

The challenge for the state lies in the ability of non-state actors to deploy the strategy of asymmetry to offset disadvantages they have relative to the state in a decayed milieu. It is this ability that transforms asymmetry into strength in their favour. Here, variables such as culture and identity are transformed by ideology to become instrument of out-administering the state on human and physical terrains increasing the potential for its strategic defeat.

The processes of out-administration and/or weakening of the state are animated by the adaptation and deployment of the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) whereas the state remains locked in a state-centric manoeuvre warfare. The aim here is to influence the decision making loop, maximizing on political, economic, social, and military networks to convince the rational actors that aims of their war will be defeated notwithstanding their preponderance in effort. The desired option, given the costs of effort for the state actors is to abandon their cause of action and by inference, interest. It is driven by the conviction that application of superior political warfare can prevail over economic and military power. Here, timelines are protracted while gained time is spent on recruitment, political education and training of new recruits.   Actors maximize social media especially cyberspace for recruitment, training, messaging and transmission of images in real time. Tactical (exploitation of images, message, media) allows them to deploy it as a realm of operations and contestations at transnational, regional, state and local levels.

Kenya's Drift into Somalia and the Habasha Project
Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) entry into Somalia in 2011 under operation *linda nchi* was constructed as a punitive measure geared towards degrading Al Shabaab following its multiple attacks that threatened Kenya's geo-economic and security interests. The objective was the expulsion of the group from Jubaland area and its replacement with operational regional governance under Sheikh Ahmed Madobe of the Ras Kamboni brigade, the military's preferred candidate. However, a contextualization of the group's evolution and growth points to long *durée* planning for the establishment of a caliphate initiated by Osama Bin laden in the late 1980s. For Al Qaeda, the setting up of what ISIS would later call the province of Habasha was tenable to the extent that Kenya is disorganized and plunged into a crisis. This was as a precursor to the disruption of the entire region. Entry into Somalia seemed to animate this to the extent that, it would suffer a strategic defeat leading to withdrawal while animating internal instability and loss of control over certain regions. Disruption and consolidation would help the setting up of a caliphate through the logic of protracted war arrayed on the trilogy of state through strategies such as what Naji (2006) calls the management of savagery. This is structured around Mao's three stages of protracted struggle. The first is Nikayah. Here, irregular forces wage unconventional war that encompasses terror tactics in a bid to compel collapse of local authority or occupying forces to withdraw from certain spaces. The second stage, which he refers to as Tawahhush, is a combination of unconventional and conventional tactics. These are deployed to animate civil strive, and tensions along sectarian lines to engender destabilization in vacated zones. This is essentially meant to terrorize certain groups. The value of chaos here is to animate the desire for order, which is operationalized in the third stage he calls Tamkin. Here, militants move in to establish their form of order and structures before eventually consolidating their power. Al Shabaab seems bent on operationalizing this in Kenya, whether in Mpeketoni or over the last four years in its Somalia inhabited counties.

Al Qaeda's leading elements in Africa such as Ali Godane, Abdulla Fazul were sent to Afghanistan to train as an advance foco before being reinserted into the Somalia Foci and the Kenya's Indian Ocean island of Siyu respectively (Katumanga, 2013). Godane and others evolved as Al Itihad Al Islami *(*IAIA) to become part of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) before subsequently morphing into Al Shabaab. As a bridgehead in East Africa, Al Shabaab provided critical foci for hosting local elements from Kenya and the greater East Africa. Of importance was the training infrastructure in *Ras Kiamboni* close to the Kenyan

border. These would subsequently play a critical role as a new training ground, recruitment spaces and evolution of networks under the supervision of Fazul. These existed parallel to others networks in Nairobi such as Muslim Youth Centre used to supplying AI AI/ICU. These morphed into Al Hijra, which currently operates in the Counties of the former North Eastern Province (Katumanga 2014:25).

Al Qaeda sought to use Al Shabaab and its subsequent mutations with largely local, national and regional elements such as Al Hijra and Jaysh Aymanto to operationalize and mature a geographical area encompassing Juba-land sections of Somalia and Kenyan counties in the former provinces of North-Eastern, Coast and Nairobi. Core here is a strategy that mediates tactical attacks on economic and human assets against Kenya security forces in Somalia and Kenya. Herein lies the origins of terror insurgency in Nairobi and parts of Coastal Kenya targeting the state's physical base (human and material base, and the territory). Parallel to this, is the insurge-terrorism strategy that sought to create and gain control over a geographical space in Counties of the Coast and North Eastern region. The attacks had strategic objectives; the dislocation of KDF from Somalia through the strategy of manoeuvre and surprise to engender the dispersal of KDF through exploitation of the expansive stretching from Somali Jubaland all the way to Nairobi.

Unlike the traditional insurgencies that waged wars against colonial and other occupiers, or for that matter repressive regimes with support from neighbouring states, Kenya is experiencing a new dynamic that points to a total mutation. Here, the insurgency is structured around existing felt sense oppression, whose meta-explanation is rooted within the prism of a certain version of religion. An equally interesting dynamic is the fact that, the broad end state is not the collapse of the regime in place and its replacement, but rather total deconstruction of state order within a wider continental setting to impact on world order as it is currently constructed. A third characteristic revolves around multiple layers of realms and levels within which this war is grasped and fought. This factor underpins its local, regional and global specificities. These converge as they diverge bringing together differentiated actors as individuals or networks to fight on both sides of the contest. The main actor though non-state, retains the capacity to sustain war due to his strategic flexibility. This is structured around his ability to cascade activities across virtual, physical and mental geographies. His ability to replicate ideas and transmit them across social contexts is assisted by virtual networks. These enhance his network inter-

operability and survivability in a hostile environment. The net effect is that he is able to prosecute a war that in effect assumes a global dynamic without losing its regionalized local logic.

In their calculation, if KDF's strength is dependent on stability, that equilibrium of control, morale and supply, its dislocation through psychological and physical imbalance can be achieved through a collection of actions and activities that converge as an indirect approach strategy. These can cumulate to engender firstly its withdrawal from Somalia. The protracted nature of these activities can also engender internal contradictions at economic, political, social and geostrategic levels to animate consolidation of insurgency in Kenya. Its indirect approach is an adaptation of Hart and Sun Tsu's tenets that emphasize deception, speed and manoeuvre. The main effort is geared towards attacking the will of its opponents to fight (Hart, 1967) in the process wining with less exhaustive campaigns. Its focus has been on investing in and exploiting intelligence to know Kenyan security challenges and to exploit internal friction, elements of chance and fog to effect casualties that seek to erode the political will to sustain the war. At the core of military strategy is an apparent mastery of the operational art of distribution and allocation of its means to achieve the ends of its objectives. At the core of military strategy is the battle of resolve between two protagonists. For Liddell Hart, the chief incalculable is the human mind, which manifests itself in resistance. The aim of its strategy is to diminish this resistance. For Al Shabaab, this has to be done over a protracted action focusing on Kenya's Centre of Gravity (COG). Al Shabaab has sought to play on the variable of time and exploitation of vulnerabilities in space in a bid to gain initiative. To engender dislocation, and its subsequent exploitation, it continues to maximize on manoeuvre and surprise by adjusting its means from conventional engagements to terror acts while adopting its plans to circumstances.

Al Shabaab reacted to the fall of Kismayu by retreating in space to gain time, subsequent to reorganization. It soon launched relentless attacks on the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) forces before mounting terror attacks in Kenya. These tactical incidents soon evolved a discernible logic when operations like Westgate were launched. It soon becomes apparent that Al Shabaab sought to target economic, security and social realms to broadly weaken the state. To this end, it evolved terror-insurgency wings of its broad strategy. The coordination of operations initiated in North Eastern and Coastal counties with

attacks in Somalia revealed the commencement of its insurge-terrorism dual wings.

It soon become apparent to Kenyan security forces that exploitation of this expansive geography engulfing parts of Somalia and Kenya, would engender a strategic dilemma. They would have to either disperse their forces in the process loosing tactical dominance or consolidate them at the expanse of abandoning territorial control. To effect this dilemma, Al Shabaab created three operational theatres in the former North Eastern province, one in Lamu with several active cells in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kwale. Complementing these, were offensive actions in Somalia. Most of these were successful due to their ability of engendering diversionary actions on the Kenyan side of the Juba borderlands. El Adde attack was for instance preceded by diversionary attacks along the Garissa , Mandera and Wajir corridor.

Al Shabaab conceived KDF's strength as Hart (1967), would have argued to be a function of stability or equilibrium of control, morale and supplies. Its overthrow would have to be a function of dislocation of its psychological and physical balance. In Al Shabaab's planning appreciations, physical and psychological dislocation could be produced by a combination of political, economic, social and military means. In physical logistical sphere, this could be achieved through actions that compelled change of front, while disrupting the distribution and organization of forces (Hart, 1967). Success in engendering separation of forces as Liddell Hart notes would endanger supplies and communications, while threatening retreat lines that could be used for re-establishment. An examination of Jaysh Ayman's attacks in Lamu is apparently geared towards achieving this. Attacks in North-Eastern counties and the Boni forest forced reactions from the Government that ranged from considerations to construct a wall, to the closing down of refugee camps. There were operations in Nairobi to expel refugees followed by operation in Boni forest and a linear deployment of Security units along the border and town/markets. The attacks engendered an apparent overstretch that has militated extended stays in areas of operation, exhaustion and additional recruitments of police at an average rate of 10,000 per year (see Ombati C: The Police to recruit 10,000 more officers on May 10, 2017 (The Standard, 25, April 2017).

Equally apparent are geo-political and economic consequences. Kenya lost its argument for Hoima to Lamu pipeline deal to Tanzania's Hoima to Tanga proposition. It in turn, has created fears of unavailability for Lamu Pipeline for

South Sudan and Ethiopia Transport (LAPPSSET) project. These are compounded by attacks from *Al Shabaab* and the opting out possibility of South Sudan. This explains Kenya's increased sensitivity to its geo-political and economic infrastructure and resources. The need to secure LAPSSET will engender either additional recruitment or dispersion of its security assets. In Boni forest areas, sustained attacks along roads have forced the government into organizing convoys. The inability of the Police to secure population and market towns has seen KDF being drafted into road clearing forest-combing tasks. With the Police seeming to retreat into a defensive mode, KDF is finding itself stretched. Continued attacks have engendered the destruction of social infrastructure such as schools, health facilities and communication assets. Education, economic and social services have all been disrupted as thousands have been turned into Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Attacks have not only frayed social relations among communities but also affected tourism and oil and gas prospection activities at the Kenyan Coast.

The main desire for Al Shabaab seems geared towards engendering a dislocation in the psychological sphere by effecting surprise and speedy attacks that impose threatening circumstances. A spread out sense of being trapped, if extended on economic assets, and population is expected to force the State to rush to protect these. Such a rush it is assumed will engender a physical dislocation of main elements and its eventual weakening. At the tactical level, attacks have been mounted on some least expected targets with the strategic objective value animating community polarization and psychological exhaustion. It should not be surprising if assassinations and further attacks on schools, dams, installations, fuel tankers, and oil installations next to malls are also effected. Neither should recruitment of, nor use of elements within security institutions to mount debilitating attacks on installations or use weaponized bacteriological and chemical agents become a surprise. The aim here will be the exploitation of lines of least resistance. Moves against such strategic economic targets that are also a source of supply (material and will) are geared towards undermining the will of the strategic leadership hopefully inducing its collapse and dislocation.

Kenya remains enjoined in an external expedition against Al Shabaab. Internally, Kenya is grappling with an insurge-terrorism mediated by youth recruited mainly from the affected areas. Al Hijra for instance, is made up of youth from mainly counties of the former North eastern province. Jaysh Ayman whose main operational spaces are in Lamu's Boni forest is made up youth from coastal counties, other regions of Kenya, larger Eastern Africa and the world at large.

Local, regional and international alliances are morphing and embedding with local grievances, rising potential for further metastasis as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) loses territory in Syria and Iraq. One of its new areas of operation will be in emerging contested spaces like Kenya. Al Shabaab's luck lies in the fact that its twin strategy of terrorism and insurgency is known to only a few elements in security that unfortunately are unwilling to confront the rational actor and his National Security Council (NSC) with this reality check to incline their focus beyond mere terrorism. This has allowed the group to dissimulate its main effort in classical insurgency logic; the option to evolve a *foci* in a distance decayed borderland setting with a spatial flexibility that allows retreat into space to gain time, attack and retreat on both sides of the frontier. The aim here is to engender frustration, morale and resource depreciation over time, until the point at which it will be in a position to consolidate control over the *foci* while transforming the *foco* into a viable self-sustaining fighting entity. The fact of not acknowledging this *a priori* to shape the main effort through mobilization underpins the strategic paralysis and tactical blunders so far experienced.

This is apparent in the Government's frequent declarations to the effect that it is gaining the upper hand, a factor derived not from its ability to impose its will power to motivate change of behaviour among its adversaries but rather from the reduced terror incidents and where they occur in geography. For Al Shabaab and its franchises, the first advantage has been in the National Security Council inability to conceive this as an existential threat demanding extensive mobilization of the entire triage of the Kenyan State and by inference a shift in political and economic behaviour to in favour of state building. Second, is the ability to craft objectives with multiple options engendering successful dissimulation of ends through tactics.

Al Shabaab seems to have established a stalemate that can only be shifted with a revaluation of strategies and resources. In Kenya, it has intensified actions in the North Eastern counties with a broader objective of gaining "influence on the ground" while undermining Kenya's national power. Its actions are mediated by logic of utility of its actions. The concentration of its actions has been in rural towns and spaces in the borderland areas with probing actions effected in the coastal city of Mombasa and towns such as Malindi and Kwale. The net effect has been an extraction enabling logic that sees the campaign in terms of physical numbers deployed and the body count of enemy elements.

Kenya's efforts include linear deployments of an average 10,000 troops, in the Juba borderlands of Kenya and Somalia. There is an addition 4000 demoralized paramilitary personnel in these border counties. The government tactics have included attempts at population control through curfews, declarations of emergencies, border controls including a wall. It has also begun a resettlement program for refuges back in Somalia. In addition it has stepped up on military operations in Somalia in addition to intelligence-led paramilitary actions that include arrest, detention and what some human rights organizations and communities have called executions (Kenya Events of 2016 - Human Rights Watch 2017). It has deployed drones to enhance information gathering critical for the disruption of insurgence activities. Unfortunately, its psychological operations have remained wanting, as has been its inability to address grievances, corruption, impunity and the felt sense of exclusion contrary to the spirit of the Kenya Constitution of 2010.

Covart: The Counter Insurgency Distance Decay Reduction Project
Kenya is at a culminating point of contending visions. Critical however is the variable of organized violence as a strategy applied by elements like Al Shabaab. Whether external or not, the fact that they are able to recruit followers and sustain their activities within the State affirms the crisis of legitimacy deficit that the Agenda 4 of 2008 (Kanyinga and Okello, 2010) and the 2010 Constitution of Kenya sought to cure. We can talk of three contending visions on the table around which the will that drives these contentions is increasingly predicated. The first is the old status quo order mediated by the pre-2010 Constitution. This was characterized by economic and political marginalization, institutional violence, exclusion, corruption, historical injustices and election rigging. State functionaries through the fiat of their actions apparently float this. This is unattractive to the evolving and growing community of rebels. The second is the vision 2010 Kenya Constitution. Caliphate adherents advance the third vision, which is denigrated by the State functionaries as an extremist dystopia. The success of either of the actors enjoined in the current war will be determined by whoever is able to structure a believable cause in addition to leadership and organization in the broad strategy of insurgency or counter insurgency.

If insurgency can be defined as a protracted process borne out of a conceived theory of organized resistance, whose end state is the defeat and eventual collapse of the existing order and its replacement with an alternative, counter insurgency war seeks the converse defeat of this desire. However, for it to prevent recidivism, a counter insurgency strategy has to be mediated by the

desire for the transformation of the quotidian social order. In the case of Kenya's strategy, counter insurgency has to build its cause around realization of 2010 Constitution as a start but go beyond it through the realization of a federated East African region.

Just as their own weapon of theory relative to their geographies mediates insurgency wars, counter insurgency theories are differentiated by dynamics borne out of the given space they seek to transform. The leadership at the grand strategic level has to define objectives, which mediate both strategy, and tactics adopted. Notably, counter insurgency wars will tend to be constrained and indeed fail to the extent that they do not address the factors that underpin the uprising. In this dialectical contest, insurgents win as long as their cause is legitimate, have a well-organized leadership, and are organic to the *foci* in the process drawing the government into their strategy that seeks to animate the degeneration of State security civil military relations. Clausewitz captures this aptly with respect to a conventional actor. For him, the overcoming of an enemy is a function of matching ones efforts against his power of resistance expressed as a sum total product of two inseparable factors; total means at the enemy's disposal and strength of his will (Clausewitz, 1984:77). The problem is that while means at one's disposal matter and are easy to calculate, the same cannot be said of the strength of his will neither is it easy to determine it. This is even more complex with respect to insurgents deploying terror in an attempt to build a motive/cause within local communities by way of appropriating existing grievances animated by the nature of the state. What Clausewitz calls motive, which animates the will of the enemy to resist, is crafted from these.

The implications here are that, the state leadership has to build a calculus of its estimates of what its efforts geared towards defeating the insurgency must consist of while also crushing its will through realization of a better alternative. The assumption here is that if a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy's power of resistance, is arrived at, it is possible for one to adjust efforts accordingly. For instance, the state can either increase them until they surpass Al Shabaab's. The foregoing points to the challenge underpin the process of waging a counter insurgency war. That is the ability of the state leadership to admit strategic errors, and seek to fix them as part of the broad puzzle to defeat insurgents. In effect, the process of defeating Al Shabaab will stem from the acknowledgement of the existential threat it poses to the survival of Kenya and East African states as viable entities. Any national security campaign has to evolve with the appreciation that framing a counter insurgency strategy will

have to factor in the logic of a protracted struggle. Sustainability here has to be a function of value derived in terms of building a viable state inverse to the current status quo.

Counter Insurgency (coin) is about the reinsertion of state in the society through penetration engendered by Distance Decay Reduction (DDR). This has to engender development parallel to enhanced capacity. The net result of these efforts is the ability of the state to take, clear, hold, build and protect its triage of ideas, institutions and physical base. As a strategy, Coin is the art of deploying, arraying elements of power to engender DDR to achieve a viable state in time and space. It has to manifest itself as a protracted art of engendering DDR through deployment of State variables over time in space. Critical here are the variables of the grand strategy, and national security policy coordination. It is best conceived as a process of a protracted Civil Operations in Vulnerable Areas, Re-integration and Transformation (COVART) in a contracting time in space.

Covart is underpinned by the need to mobilize and transform the underutilized insecurity engendering potential inherent in military, human and material resources capital into a state building security enhancing capital. In its current form, it remains essentially what De Soto H (2000) characterized as dead capital. It is a process that engenders a systematized strategy informed surge in capacity through distance decay reduction to force a strategic culmination on the part of an enemy. It has to seek to maximize on an alternative vision, tactics, techniques and procedures including the rebuilding of civil military relations through use of opportunities engendered by logistical enablers to the military. Military/security assets are inserted in community as construction workers, educators, protectors together with under-utilized youth, academics and community workers to create new society / person. Coin has to set out to revise sharpened dimensions of economic warfare while increasing the same on the insurgents through the elimination of their enabling infrastructure. Counter insurgency success is rooted in conception and consolidation of ideas, and institutions to the extent of adding value to the physical base of the state and indeed its *raison d'etre*. The argument here is for the enhancement of the interdependence of strong political, economic and military/security institutions of the state. These have to be driven by imperatives of value provision without which the basis for conflict continues to morph.

At the strategic level, the National Security Council has to build a clear strategic narrative that can support strategic and tactical actions just as its instruments of power have to help evolve defence and intelligence in depth through state building inclusive activities. The operational strategy has to respond to Kenya's National Security Policy formulation and implementation to ensure that a wide range of organic and organized parasitic and symbiotic extractions are brought to an end in addition to responding to policy failures. The broad aim here is the focus on population, and Force to space ratios. Underlying success of insurge-terrorism is the ability to organize supply networks through mobilization of a cause that transforms actors into liberators compared to the state functionaries that are inversely seen as enemies. Where this is successful, their offensive activities acquire an enduring logic due to reduced supply lines. This process essentially transforms the state functioning supply lines into insecure spaces over stretched insecurity enhancing traps unsustainable for effective offensive actions. The purpose of Coin is to reverse this situation through positive Civil Military relations and value proposition efforts. This has to engender evolution of legitimacy, unity of efforts, political building, environment, intelligence (capture of population), leading to transformation of state and isolation of insurgents.

A counter insurgent has to grapple with the battle of wills which as Hart, (1967) notes manifests itself as resistance. It is this that makes the process dialectical. A counter insurgency strategy is incumbent upon the evolution of a comprehensive tool kit woven around a mobilized centre of gravity and intangible Centre of gravity (CSO, academics) to engender social re-engineering. It is imperative that leadership revisits its operational concepts to understand what it is they are dealing with. The issue here is whether it conceives the current engagements as a security question underpinned by a flawed logic of the State's foundation (a factor that is beyond law and order issue) and thus demanding a lead agency that may be military but with a well coordinated expanded multiple lines of operations. The converse is refusal to see what is evolving as war and instead opts to engage more in a discourse of war, thus setting up a basis for bandit resource extractions. The latter is wont to impact on the reality engendering extreme realities that will drain the state making it unviable.

In Kenya's case, counter insurgency has to stem from the acknowledgement of the fact that the state is facing a protracted process of its out-administration, structured around the maximization of asymmetrical warfare by a determined

actor who dissimulates himself as weaker opponent by seeking to maximize on what is considered to be weakness of the State to attain his political ends. The presence of variables of leadership and organization and ability to exploit time, space, cause, Force to Space ratios in relation to constraints they place on State security should in conceptual terms make state actors acknowledge their comparative disadvantages. Here, the main efforts of State actors should be the ability to evolve and develop abilities that can engender adaptation, and mutation of behaviour. This should anchor strategic flexibility critical for them to operate on physical, human and virtual terrains that shape the triage of the State.

Beyond moral trepidation towards, terrorism that accompanies insurgency as a strategy, Kenya's counter insurgency strategy has to see it in terms of a dual strategic practice underpinning a broader war. As Clausewitz (1984:47) would proffer, a continuation of politics by other means and purposed to achieve ends. If understood to be a war, it has to be seen as an act of force to compel an enemy to do one's will. Hence, the need to disarm him by a multiple sets of weapons that collapse his will to resist. Achieving military goals leads to the political goal in conventional logic. As Howard (1983:36) notes, it is strategic to the extent that the actor is deploying available resources to achieve ends (objectives). Grasped better, it has to be interrogated as a study in the use of violence as broad strategy whose aim is to compel compliance through the breaking of a strong actor's resolve by way of applied selective terror. Notably, it is critical that making the ground unfavourable neutralizes this. Core here are socio-economic, military and intelligence variables. It is thus a goal-oriented engagement. At one level the logic of insurgency is planted through use of Kenyan youth maximizing on language, identity and material conditions. Tactics that deliberately seek creation of a sense of fear usually by use/ threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence to influence political behaviour magnifies it.

Critical is the capacity to transmit meaning of an action or incident, hence the use of a multiple triages of cycle realms such as private and Government media and with these, the interpretation by human agents. Success or failure is going to be a function of collective interpretation of an action as text/speech. It is important that Coin is supported at the national security level to engender a shared interpretation. This is a function of and the ability to construct interpretive structures to give shared meaning. Here, identification of interests and security objectives of Kenya National Security Policy is imperative. These have to be in line with the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Without evolving a

stable interpretation critical for evolving a shared and desired meaning, the State will continue to be challenged by multiple interpretations from given incidents including what it defines as victory, who it labels as a terrorist to whom, how they should be confronted and why. It thus goes without saying, that the readjustment of doctrine and with it, behaviour (rule of law) is a given.

For the military and other security institutions, the process has to begin with the rationale for their existence – the object of security. Even though this is clear in Article 1 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, many actors in security institutions are yet to internalize it to the extent of treating and respecting the human rights of Kenyan citizens (The Constitution of Kenya 2010). Chapter 14 of the Constitution is at the core of the rationale for restructuring, and transforming security provisioning. In anchoring Coin under the National Security Council, it helps define the principles and values that need to underpin command appointments and the entire gamut of recruitment, training, armament – employment, development and deployment. How vices of corruption, bribes, favouritism, and ethnic consideration that underpin friction while forging these institutions into fiefdoms for elite cronyism are contained is, critical to any attempts to increase institutional competence and probity. In counter insurgency, a paradigm shift of institutions from their orientation of seeing themselves as vanguards of the elite predators to a people's security is imperative. The former has roots in the old colonial training geared towards the logic of disciplining and controlling the native to deter him from resisting oppression. It also has the net effect of engendering a force made of people who largely put their self- interest first. In Police service, it begins with efforts to recover amounts paid. It is followed by situations where actors work for themselves and their bosses who receive prepend collections down up including the capitalization of promotions, postings to lucrative fields of extraction and deployments.

A counter insurgency effort has to revisit the basis for posting police officers to these areas of operations. Currently, these regions are conceived to be reserved for hells' rejects or disciplinary cases for those who do not have a voice or resources to bribe their way out. Those who do, quickly exit in the process contributing to weakening of the morale of the unit. Police here are entitled to hardship allowances. When on escort duties, they are supposed to be paid at a rate of ksh 6000 per day, and ksh 4900 when in Garrissa from their stations. Some constables contend that much of the time, some of their seniors appropriate these monies. Compared to their colleagues elsewhere, average

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take home for some officers in Nairobi assigned on escort duties (especially banks, which pay between ksh 1000 and ksh 1200) officers end up with more than ksh 100,000 per month compared to an average ksh 30,000 per month made by those in North eastern counties. In addition to this is the crisis of housing and poor medical services. This ends up sapping morale in the processes undermining operational fitness. Abuse of morale here is worsened by the fact that when officers suffer injuries, most are transported by road back to Nairobi despite airlift capabilities existing within the service and which tend to be expropriated and diverted for personal use by the leadership.

Corruption within other state security institutions merely compounds the evolving security situation. Former Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Julius Karangi pointed to crooked registration, Police and Administration officers who aided entry of more than 100,000 foreigners, some of them criminals through issuance of Kenyan ID cards, passports, work permits in exchange for bribes. Between 2014 and July 2015 when KDF was allowed to man road blocks through which more than 100,000 foreigners were arrested" (Julius Karangi: Graft fuelling terror, Daily Nation, Thursday, August 13, 2015). The net consequence is the apparent shift of critical resources to roadblock manning without addressing the critical issue of corruption in the Police Force.

In these border counties, most police officers are not only outsiders with little local knowledge but that they have been accused of purveying violence when effecting curfews and other operations. This engenders hostility from a populous that state agents need to seduce on their side as part of counter insurgency agenda (Galula 1964). In any case the insurgency/counter-insurgency is a struggle over the population and the host geography. The two operationalize and make real the elements of government and sovereignty that make up a state. Without a strong civilian police force with the ability to penetrate the society, proactive intelligence and quick reaction is constrained. Currently, the Police lack investigative capacity, assets and requisite funding. In March 2014 counter terrorism police was operating on a budgetary allocation of US$735 per month. This was in addition to poor salaries, existential conditions of officers that have generally affected morale. In operational areas, Police and other paramilitary elements are challenged logistical terms. Units like the GSU go for long durations of operation without relief, a factor that continues to engender fatigue, post combat stress disorder as has been manifested by suicides and violence on colleagues and members of the public. The foregoing has also begun to affect military officers who now complain of poor allowances

and little recuperation times. What is likely to affect morale even further is the extent of corruption in Kenya and the general misalignment of instruments of power. The political and military instruments are all predating on the economic instruments. While Police lack housing and other critical services, an average Member of Parliament (MP) earns US$ 15,000 including allowances. While part of the police housing and indeed insecurity problem could be resolved through a simple aspect of respecting what policing is all about, it has to be a local issue not about regime consolidation imperatives. The former underpins the inclination to sustain the colonial logic of barracking the police.

As is the case across the state, most Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service encampments are within the same geographical setting sometimes separated by a road, and generally hostile to each other. The implications are apparent in the logic of Force to Space ratios. Large spaces that suffer from limited penetration, crisis of transport when they have to be sent in to respond to threats. Coin calls for restructuring of the service and the creation of well motivated trained and led local defense units with a task of protecting populations and immediate local infrastructure. These have to coordinate security provision with a unified national police service embedded in the society but assigned general policing duties including protection of select strategic assets in local spaces. These have to be supported by disciplined paramilitary with a quick reaction capability. The broad outer ring would then be secured by the military.

Insurge-terrorism leadership maximizes extensively on technology and communications. For instance, they do convert used / unexploded ordinances by the fiat of innovation into explosive devices with which they use to increase distance decay. Their ability to adjust and infuse technology in their doctrine with limited disruption enables to enhance their operational capacity. Coin has to grapple with disruptions on the part of the state. These could be a result of external driven imperatives to infuse systems whose quality is in doubt but whose capital returns benefit bandit actors. This in turn sharpens friction increases element of chance on the side of the insurgents. Failed infusion of technology merely animates the revenge of geography and exploitation of friction, chance and uncertainty, maximum of external and effort for internal networks, organization through flexible phases.

A critical objective is the architectural redesign of state security to enhance dimensions of Government as desired by the Constitution 2010. In this, it has to

borrow deep from Dean in reshaping forms of visibility especially how objects of security are not only pictured but also constituted (Dean, 1999:16).   Dean also points to the *Techne* of government, which has to do with means, mechanisms, tactics, and technologies for constituting authority and accomplishing rule. Core in these efforts is the investment in the episteme of government especially forms of thought, knowledge, expertise and the gamut of calculations employed in governing, and development of form that has to be eventually given to what is governable. The state has to be innovative and seek to appropriate existing traditional networks of identification. These have to be integrated into existing technology platforms to engender negotiated inclusion through value provision to communities within affected areas to allow for less violent forms of identification, which include forming of subjects, agents, actors, production of governable subject.

Success in the foregoing underpins the victory indicators. These should be conceived in terms of viability of state as ideas, institutions and physical base, especially the penetration of human geography through the fulfilling of his desires to make him turn against the outsider. This is about exclusion of insurgent as a collective effort of both state security and the local population (Galula, 1964) rather than the current efforts undertaken by the security forces for the population. The latter process transforms them into a collateral terrain of contestation. The operational organizing question is not about the whereabouts of the enemy and his organizational framework but rather that of where we are and why the enemy is there in the first place. In effect, it is about what elements engendered the cause and one's relationship with it, either as an animating or a positive cause-reducing actor. It is notable that the ability of a Foco, in this case the small elements of Al Shabaab, to survive in their Foci in North Eastern and Coastal counties is a function of the extent of and nature of the support available in the *F*oci as a favourable space and the ability of the Foco to maximize on it.

This ranges from material support, to intelligence or denial of the same to the enemy. In Lamu, Jaysh Ayman maximizes on the contiguity of the Boni forest across the Kenya-Somalia borderland to bring in sustaining elements (ratios, arms). What exists here is an apparent warm-hole connecting the Al Shabaab bases in Somalia and the evolving foci in Boni forest on the Kenyan side. These supplies are subsequently buried at select points for easy access. This decision is strategic. It seeks to avoid antagonizing the population in the early stages through demands for sustaining logistics, a factor that would also attract

government reprisals. The foregoing is facilitated by the prevailing distance decay characterized by the absence or abstinence of security assets in the community. The broad aim is to appropriate local grievances against the Government such as the decision to expel the communities from the forest spaces on which they are organically dependent.

By forcing the Boni people out, the government has affirmed its inability to secure community in favour of controlling a geographical space. The net consequence is the creation of an IDP situation that has also compromised on community-based intelligence sources. In the meantime, it is allowing itself to be constructed as siding with settler communities, a process that is exacerbating community tensions. The logic of starting small is a mark of insurgency leadership's appreciation of challenges including consequences of starting big without requisite resources and support as opposed to initiating and an organic dynamic with the populations. At the nascent stage, the aim of the insurgency seems to be that of engendering support for their activities or at least indifference towards both the Foco and the State. It is imperative that counter insurgents build quick support from local allies at this early stage. The questions "where are we?", "why are the insurgents here?" have to be innovatively addressed by the design of a mutual security interest in which the locals are provisioned in return for their intelligence and hostility towards the enemy. The focus here has to be on distance decay reduction and the use of the military assets given its ability to reach deep into spaces inaccessible to other state agencies.

Like insurgencies, the government's counter insurgency elements must be versatile to wage a transformative combat. Such combat is a weapon of social liberation, struggle against the existing order, which belongs to the past. The soldier here has to be seen and to act as an engineer, medic, teacher or a nurse, in short a social reformer, seeking to build a new social order. KDF has an opportunity to do this if it maximizes on the 2010 constitution. It can effectively use it to deny Al Shabaab its moral arguments by casting counter insurgency as part of the broad process of human, societal and state reform. The advantage Kenya has here is the fact that it seats on a huge mass of dead capital at one level while the state is weighed down with a wide range of social economic, political and institutional vulnerabilities. The fundamental question is whether paucity of a critical leadership can be mobilized to animate and transform the current challenge into an opportunity for state building. This would imply maximizing on the counter insurgency efforts to engender the burial of the old

order. This dynamic is not strange – just as states make war, they too are also forged by it.   The absence of strategic focus to derive maximum positive energies underpins the converse negative reality. Wars also collapse states by sapping it dry of its human and material resources while sharpening contradictions within it. This is true where the absence of requisite leadership instrumentalizes war for self-serving extractions and elite/ethnic regime conservationism. The basic argument here is that trying to win a counter insurgency war implies a regard at the nature of state, a broad net assessment of its vulnerabilities, a commitment to reducing them and transforming this process into positive mass and economy of force to direct at the enemy's Centre of Gravity (E-COG).

Countering efforts have to be holistic. They have to be mutually reinforcing in synergy, be they military or political. FM 3-24 provides a broad schema - Clear, Hold, and Build operations (United States Government, US Army Field Manual FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. June 2014) Clear here entails finding, through intelligence and eliminating by way of military actions. Holding, presupposes actions rooted in presence of governmental assets that allow protection of the population. The third component build, is about construction of infrastructure where these have been absent engendering legitimacy for local governance structures and the rule of law.   In Kenya's case, the state has to go beyond the foregoing to recognize and correct historical injustices, assure the future through broad frameworks that seek to economically and socially uplift while ensuring that communities are not short-changed in the emerging geo-strategic and economic infrastructure and resources.   The fact that spaces are within borderlands implies that, while emphasis is on the Kenyan territory, effecting a difference and consolidation implies that the state has to push for regional policies that favour what is referred to as borderland corridors and triangles. These have to seek security for individuals, communities, states and the global setting. This has the potential of evolving and anchoring new regionalism, while helping to consolidate global goodwill through resource access. Short of this region centric appreciation, the borderland security threats and insecurity dynamics will continue to constrict counter insurgency efforts in effect animating the broad strategic objective of Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab's caliphate project. This project seeks to rally and converge local but regionalized identities with religious identities and Meta explanation of poverty and exclusion. Here, the Caliphate is constructed as the anchorage of solutions worth aspiring for.

The net result of transformation in the borderlands should lead to the elimination of the cause while preventing recruitment through actions that allow for penetration of state into society and individual. These should have the converse effect of denying the enemy both population and space contraction over reduced time. This engenders the transformation of unfavourable spaces or distance decay DD/MS/FS= MI^2 + OB + SAN-ICT, which favours bandit crimes and violence in unfavourable spaces; reduced time, hostile population and denied space. The net effect is [DDR =f (M_1^2 – Ob - San + ICT)] which contains organized banditry. Unfavourable spaces are characterized by increases in cost for bandit elements as a result of reduction of space, time, cause and maximization on population. Success affects a credible real shift in mass and economy of force in favour of the state while making it viable.

It is notable that just as rentier tendencies and effects of a political market place model (Waal, 2015:17-27) especially the war economies such as corruption animate insurgency and eventual state unviability, they can provide a realm for critical opportunity for reversing state fragility. This is apparent to the extent that they are confronted. Their value for the insurgency lies in the fact that they engender a material realm through which new lines of rendering the state fragile such as poor management of wartime economy, and corruption affect the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth while animating further intra-elite friction at one level and state-societal tensions at another. Protection of institutions, human and economic resources from friction of war is in itself a component of Coin. Management of economics of war has to be immediate and sustained over a *long durée* at local, national, regional and global levels.

Failure to respond to the foregoing has the net effect of surrendering management of strategic intent, narrative and tactical actions to state opponents. This becomes apparent; more so as elite enrich themselves in the course of war, while soldiers and the population turn against each other. Animation of friction at these levels and the construction of the resistance as a counter poise to geo-economic exploitation attracts local support and alienation towards the state.

The purpose of counter insurgency (Coin) is to operationalize security as that territorializing of government thought through the re-ordering of social spaces for sovereignty to be felt. To secure Deans (1999) notes, calls for new practices of state - to shape human conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, beliefs, for definite but shifting ends. In the end governmentality is

rendered distinct by specific forms in which the population and the economy are administered. Where state is successful, Coin will succeed due to the fact that it is able to locate, isolate and eliminate negative elements. This calls for the decrease of time and occupation of space, hence, need to maximize on a mobilized population. Mobilization on the other hand engenders early warning, through enhanced HUMINT. Critical however is the enhancement of Civil Military relations. This is underpinned by economic value provision, rule of law, identification and respect of genuine dissent, consolidation and development to win legitimacy and enhance prevention of embedding.

For effective degradation of insurgents, Kenya has to invest in the Juba-land project and with it sanitize the frontier areas through similar social economic construction works that seek to build state from below. Core here is the construction of political legitimacy through micro and macro social economic infrastructure within the greater Juba-land (North eastern-Lamu-Jubaland Corridor). The idea here should be the evolution of this corridor into a growth zone with airports, free ports, and industrial parks structured around a triple ownership of individual, community and state capital. It is imperative that the State maximizes on the initial border wall construction capital and the broader LAPSSET project design to reframe this. The option of seeing and issuing dual citizenship, in addition to a special identification document that facilities free movement should be on the table. This should allow state idea to penetrate in citizens shielding and inoculating them from insurgent messages. Messages symbolically sent out are critical and indeed different from a mere process of surging in a given space deemed hostile to the state.

Counter-insurgency has to guard against derivation into oppressive and counter-productive pacifications at the risk of alienating the population. Such actions risk pushing counter insurgents beyond the culminating point of the attack a factor that then pushes the insurgency into stage two of the struggle, albeit with local support. Galula (1964) provides progressive sequences useful for forces outside state borders, rather those inside without the luxury of time. For him, clear, hold and build should be gradual and progressive to wider areas. Indeed, the state as counter insurgent needs to maximize on its resources before it culminates and instead, the same works against its interests by sharpening contradictions as a result of failed process of managing politics. The main political drive of the political line of operations is to maximize on military and economic lines to transform what is essentially a passive support to active political support. Notably, it has to invest in measures that attack existing

structures that underpin parochial and subjective cultures to replace them with the converse.

The success of the foregoing acts as a net signifier of the strength of counter insurgency - the presence of strong political institutions and their accompanying high levels of participation. In other words, just as mobilization and support are fundamental to the transition to other areas, the same is the case for the state. It needs to build this to either roll back or prevent loss of new geographies.   It is thus imperative that the counter insurgents attack vulnerabilities before their transformation into self-sustaining consolidation. This is critical in stage one of insurgency. Failure allows the build-up at stage two that speeds up the disintegration of state forces while catapulting the insurgents into the essential offensive conventional third stage. Stage one calls for the denial of morale and material support - it is synonymous to denial of critical oxygen without which life is sniffed out of it. The problem for the state at stage two level of insurgency, where an asymmetrical war is in operation, is the fact that it is forced to mass against the insurgents forces (guerrilla and conventional) and in the case of Al Shabaab, its terror cells with its strength to drive them out of all their foci, dismantle their structures and replace them with states own allies. This cannot take place without damage to the space and its own population. This in effect is a civil war enabled by external and internal dynamics.

Success here is inherent in the capacity of state operatives to remain focused on the main cause and to endeavour to re-administer the spaces by out-protracting the insurgents. This is conceived here to be a function of mass, sustained commitment in time, treasure, troops and other value provision. It is notable that population control is not synonymous to security provision. Galula (1964) argues for resolute and firm hand-to-command respect and indeed to show local allies the state's seriousness. While fenced camps may be resorted to, the core challenge lies in the resultant contradictions and how they are managed. He also advocates for immediate merciless public punishment for rebels. The core challenge is the drift into excesses that are wont to happen especially in society mediated by age-old ethnic animosities.

Kenya's problem is however more complex and will continue to worsen. Underlying this is the fundamental question of cause, which underpins not only morale but also the price for which war is being waged. This is compounded by lack of clarity as to whether we are engaged in a law and order enforcement or insurgency. Not only does this orient Security personnel, but also the level and

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extent of commitment, which determines seriousness. Core here are resources the government commits to animate the spirit of troops in the field. In effect the question of war as a reality and war as an imagination has to be appreciated, to determine, what should take the center-stage. As General Bruce Clarke (1977:4) notes, three clusters underpin a force's effectiveness; the first includes force strength, type of arms and supplies in addition to transportation. Second are variables of morale, *esprit de corps*, command and control, training, information, motivation, conditioning, and their confidence in a mission assigned. Third, the government forces employment ability. This has to be done wisely and effectively. In terms of ranking, the second and third categories rank up.

The two variable clusters fall under what General Clarke calls the intangibles. He finds leadership; command experience, tactical ingenuity, and skill of troops remain dominant by 200 to 300 per cent. This should be relooked at afresh, guided by chapter 1 Article 1,2, 3 and chapter 14 of the 2010 of Constitution of Kenya and the broadening of threats to national interest as opposed to the current narrow elite subjective and extractive considerations. The clamour for Constitutional change revolved largely around the desire to transform the Security sector to fix issues of corruption, favouritism, ethnic capture, violence and abuse of human rights, command and control, training, professionalization and motivation (welfare). The setting up of National Security Council (NSC) and the decision to provide parliamentary oversight should be seen as the attempts to ensure that national security structures are not subjected to subjective misuse by elite or on its behalf by their agents. In general, the foregoing elements impact on a force's moral fibre and indeed undermine their operational capability and cause, however well enunciated in the mission. Compared to *Al Shabaab*, Kenya's cause in Somalia has overtime become hazy. It continues to be undermined by alleged criminal activities by police internally and elements of the military in Somalia. This has not been helped any better by the apparent validation by both international and local human rightists including the UN reports (See Journalist for Justice 2015; Kelly, Daily Nation 13, November 2017). Juxtaposed to terror attacks, it has become increasingly hard for the government to rationalize effort in blood and expenditure with "Cause" conceived here as mere extraction plus lack of security at internal level.

The Al Shabaab on the other hand has constructed a greater cause rooted in both imaginations and what they conceive as quotidian experience of Muslims in Kenya. It is not only unifying but also allowing many to imagine and aspire for

it. Not only can it be interpreted to rally Somalis but also several other identities under the construction of political Islam. The caliphate targets the greater horn yet at a local level it is able to also rally Somalis around the greater Somalia without erasing the imaginations of those seeking clan and sub-clan liberation. In all these cases, Kenya and its leadership are constructed as corrupt actors aligned with other foreign interest against the interest of Somalis/Moslems. Their mastery of Media and its use allows them to turn it into a veritable force multiplier compared to similar attempts by Kenya Security Forces to utilize the media. For them it is part of war, a line of operations. For Kenya, it is merely an information channel that comes in late after actor action. It is always riddled with contradictions that are self-defeating. For instance, after the death of scores in an Al Shabaab attack in Garissa, the deputy president was at pains to demonstrate effectiveness of Kenya Security Forces only to shoot himself in the foot with media channels airing old pictures of an earlier operation. In any case, little satisfaction was derived from what he claimed to have been a successful retaliation mission that had engendered death for Al Shabaab.

Conclusion

Preventing consolidation and eventual defeat of the nascent Insurge-terrorism in Kenya will revolve around the ability of the state to penetrate and effect control over space through distance decay reduction as a main effort to eliminate the cause. The latter is about growing legitimacy in the population. The net consequence is the reduction of time and a favourable force-to-space ratio. The converse reality for Coin efforts in Kenya currently is the growing distance decay especially at economic, social and political levels. It should be expected that insurgents would strive to sharpen the evolving contradictions.

Notes

1. The initial inspiration underpinning the conceptualization of the framework of favorable spaces and distance decay is drawn from Katzenbach and Hanrahan (1962:134-35) who conceived space in military terms to consist of square mileage plus obstacles plus sanctuaries minus communication and transport, that is, $MS= M1^2 +OB+SAN-CT$. Relative to activities of organized bandit groups, organized crime capital , and the nature of Space, the notion of distance decay , information, technology and transport are brought in by Musambayi and Ngunyi (2014) to demonstrate the political economy of violence in Kenya.

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